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ABSTRACT 
Making Distant Futures: Implementing Geological Disposal of Nuclear 
Waste in the UK and Finland 
This thesis explores the making of distant futures through two nuclear waste 
disposal projects. Geological disposal of nuclear waste (GD) has enjoyed a 
technopolitical consensus for decades as the best available method for the 
long-term management of hazardous radioactive material, yet, to date, no 
geological repository facilities exist anywhere in the world. These ‘disposal 
facilities’ are expected to seclude nuclear waste from the environment for up to 
one million years, raising challenges for technical knowledge production, policy 
implementation and public expectations. Examining the proposed 
implementation of GD in the UK and Finland, this thesis focuses on the ways in 
which the management of nuclear waste is crafted in the present day and 
projected on, million of years into the future, as necessitated by the waste half-
lives and as demanded by regulatory practice. In exploring these two national 
contexts, the thesis traces how knowledge is made about distant futures that 
exist beyond contemporary knowledge making capacity.  
As a contribution to limited ethnographic discussion on nuclear waste matters, 
the making of distant nuclear futures is examined in spaces that have been 
overlooked in sociological literatures on GD e.g. materials science laboratories. 
The thesis draws from actor-network approaches, sociology of time and feminist 
STS literature to develop a ‘comparative-conversationalist’ framework. This 
approach enabled the comparison of wildly different cases by bringing them into 
conversation rather than direct comparison with each other. Based on 
participant-observations in two university research labs; interviews with civil 
servants, university researchers, technical consultants, regulators and industry 
representatives; and documentary analysis, I trace practices through which the 
future is made safe, and, nuclear wastes crafted as manageable.  
The thesis will demonstrate how future making around nuclear waste varies 
over time and space. I propose that, because of the very distant future that GD 
concerns, we should discuss the safety aspects of GD and the ability of 
disposal facilities to contain wastes as ‘real unrealised present possibilities’. 
Towards this, I develop the notion of contain-ability. Contain-ability directs 
attention towards the relational makings of safety in the present, and the 
uncertainty of containment in the very distant future. It underlines safety as an 
emergent feature rather than an inherent property of disposal concepts and 
facilities achieved by engineers.  
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Overall then, the thesis demonstrates that a distant nuclear future is a crafted 
through situated makings that depend on available sociotechnical conditions, 
including: geological environments; the scale and complexity of nuclear 
industries and waste inventories; available financial resources and cultural 
reserves; and imaginations of wastes, nuclear futures and pasts. The 
successes and failures of policies for the implementation of GD cannot be 
construed simply through public acceptance or opposition arguments and more 
attention needs to be directed to the contingencies of scientific knowledge 
production and future making.  
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1 FUTURE UNDERGROUND 
I mean, anyone can let Danger out but the really clever thing is 
finding somewhere for it to go afterwards. 
 - Tove Jansson, Sculptor’s Daughter 
 
In this thesis, I will examine the implementation of geological disposal of nuclear 
waste (GD) in the UK and Finland. At the core of the thesis is a concern with the 
ways in which a multi-millennial future that stretches beyond knowledge is 
rendered predictable; how nuclear wastes are made manageable over the very 
long-term; and how GD is presented as safe through lab work, in policy and 
public documents. 
	
Nuclear waste, like nuclear technologies, is tied to visions of planetary futures, 
even survival. For two consecutive years the Science and Security Board of the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists have moved the minute hand of the Doomsday 
Clock forward by half a minute. The Doomsday Clock was founded by the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that in turn was founded by scientists from the 
University of Chicago who had been involved in the Manhattan Project. The 
Clock represents a fairly grim approach to the future. It draws on the imageries 
of apocalypse (midnight) and nuclear explosion (countdown to zero) to 
communicate threats to humanity and the planet. As things stand, 
contemporary society is two minutes from midnight. Each year a decision is 
made whether the minute hand of the Clock is moved or left in place. The 
decision to move the hand reflects a “broad and international view on existential 
threats to humanity, focusing on long-term threats” such as nuclear weapons 
proliferation and climate change (Bulletin Science and Security Board, 2017: 2). 
In January 2018 the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin published a 
press release alongside its decision to move the Clock forward. The Board 
wrote, “greatest risks last year arose in the nuclear realm […] To call the world 
nuclear situation dire is to understate the danger—and its immediacy” (Bulletin 
Science and Security Board, 2018: 2). The main reason for the nuclear threat, 
the Board argued, was the nuclear muscle flexing by North Korea and the USA 
during 2017. Additionally, the Board claimed that the insufficient response to 
climate change globally, but particularly in the USA, contributed to the decision 
to move the Clock forward.  
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Where in 2018 the Board did not mention nuclear power, in its 2017 press 
release the Board was more optimistic about the role of nuclear in mitigating 
climate change. The Board stated, “the energy potential of nuclear fission—and 
its capacity to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions that cause global 
warming—make nuclear power a tempting part of the solution to the climate 
change problem” (Bulletin Science and Security Board, 2017: 5). This is the 
view advocated by the nuclear industry (WNA, 2015) and the Finnish and UK 
governments (MEE, 2017; DECC, 2014a). However, in the 2017 press release 
the Bulletin’s Board also noted, “nuclear power has safety, cost, waste, and 
proliferation challenges”, and thus growth in the use of nuclear power “require[s] 
concomitant commitments to nuclear safety, security, and waste management 
that are politically, technically, and intergenerationally responsible” (Bulletin 
Science and Security Board, 2017: 5). In this thesis, I am interested in the 
nuclear waste challenge as a long-term threat and its management as form of 
future making. Nuclear waste ensures that the potential threat of nuclear 
technology and radiation do not go away even if societies gave nuclear power 
up today, since nuclear waste remains hazardously radioactive for multiple 
millennia.  
 
The most hazardous types of waste (high level waste and spent nuclear fuel) 
stay radioactive from tens of thousands to a million years. ‘A million years’ is 
easy to write, but more difficult to really grasp. It challenges common sense 
conceptualisations of time as well as the capacity of the scientific knowledge 
production infrastructure to predict and know the future. Nuclear waste (first 
through military and then civilian applications) has been produced for more than 
70 years, and it has already shaped the planet. A group of scientists has 
posited nuclear fallout, a type of waste, as the maker and marker of the 
Anthropocene, a geological epoch in which human society has become a 
geological force moulding Earth (Zalasiewicz et al., 2015). Based on 
chemostratigraphic data collected from Earth’s sediments, these scientists 
propose that the Anthropocene began with the Trinity bomb test in New Mexico 
in July 1945, while subsequent tests left an easily identifiable record to the 
sediments. In other words, nuclear “fallout – a waste – [has] become a 
signifying layer […] that defines our species’ legacy” (Hird, 2017: 188). Nuclear 
waste, Myra Hird writes, “constitutes perhaps the most abundant and enduring 
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trace of the human; a major human-instantiated planetary de- and re-
stratification” (ibid.). This only after seven decades of nuclear waste generation. 
What about the multi-millennial effect of this matter, if not managed in a safe 
manner? 
 
Currently 50 countries are storing spent nuclear fuel in aboveground storage 
facilities. The global nuclear waste inventory holds approximately 270,000 
tonnes of spent nuclear fuel (ANA, 2015; IAEA, 2003). 12,000 tonnes of waste 
is added to the inventory every year (ANA, 2015). Most nuclear waste globally 
is stored in cooling pools that rely on electricity to circulate and cool down water 
in the pools in order to prevent waste from overheating. As the radiation levels 
of nuclear waste naturally decay, the decay process produces significant 
amounts of heat. The loss of electricity and cooling can cause waste to 
overheat, catch fire and release radiation (Union of Concerned Scientists, 
2013). Thus, contemporary storage arrangements are unsustainable, and 
potentially risky, in the long-term. Yet, none of the most hazardous waste has 
been disposed of, and nuclear nations have and continue to struggle with the 
implementation of disposal solutions. 
 
Still, the global nuclear fleet is growing. 60 reactors are under construction in 15 
countries, adding to the 450 operational reactors in 30 countries worldwide 
(NEI, 2017). Both the UK and Finland are currently constructing new reactors 
and foster dreams for more. Both countries are also in the process of 
implementing geological disposal (GD). The UK restarted its search for a 
disposal site in January 2018, while Finland, is the first, and currently the only, 
country in the world that has begun to construct its geological disposal facility 
(GDF), Onkalo, on the island of Olkiluoto in Western Finland.  
 
In this context where nuclear technologies are framed perhaps increasingly as a 
threat; on one hand you have the concerns about non-proliferation and perhaps 
even nuclear altercation, and on the other the hazardous multi-millennial legacy 
of nuclear power generation, it is imperative to understand the role of GD in 
future making. How is GD imagined and what kind of a future is imagined 
through it to justify the construction of more reactors and the production of 
extremely hazardous waste? Especially, when contemporary nuclear societies 
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have not been able to implement long-term solutions to deal with the existing, 
and continuously, growing nuclear waste inventory in the long-term. What kind 
of a vision of the future justifies leaving behind a radioactive legacy that 
continues to pose a threat 3,000 generations from now? Especially when the 
implementation of GD has proven out to be a major sociotechnical challenge. 
 
1.1 Geological disposal of nuclear waste 
The implementation of GD has proven out to be a major sociotechnical 
challenge of an international scale. GD has been conceptualised by the 
technoscientific community as a technical solution to a purely technical 
problem, while the lack of success in implementing GD has been attributed to 
‘social factors’, such as public opposition and a lack of public acceptability 
(IAEA, 2007; OECD, 2000). Yet, finding ‘purely’ technical or ‘purely’ social 
factors in processes such as the implementation of GD is impossible. Rather, 
social scientific work on GD has argued that GD should be treated as a 
sociotechnical challenge. Anne Bergmans et al., describe sociotechnical 
challenges as situations in which “the relationship between the technical and 
social components is still unstable, ambiguous and controversial, and where 
negotiations are taking place in terms of problem definitions and preferred 
solutions” (Bergmans et al., 2012: 3). Since GD teeters on the limits of human 
knowledge and human knowledge production capacity, the futures imagined 
through GD remain contested. The ecological, political and economical stakes 
involved in the implementation of GD are high as GD deals with controversial 
issues; radiation; very distant futures, uncertainty, lack of control. How safety 
and the future are envisioned and made in the present are questions that link to 
the core concerns of this thesis. 
 
GD, as a potential solution for the long-term management of nuclear wastes, is 
almost as old as the civilian nuclear industry. Where the first commercial reactor 
was connected to the grid in the UK in 1956, the US National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) recognised GD as a suitable alternative for the long-term 
management of nuclear wastes already in 1957. A broad technopolitical 
consensus has formed around GD as the best available option for the long-term 
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management of nuclear wastes. The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), for 
instance, has written 
 
The prevailing view of technical experts, as well as of many members 
of the general public […] familiar with the work relating to geological 
disposal, is that geological disposal is a safe and technically 
achievable solution. (NEA, 2008: 14) 
 
Additionally, the 2011 Directive adopted by European Council states 
 
It is broadly accepted at the technical level that, at this time, deep 
geological disposal represents the safest and most sustainable 
option as the end point of the management of high-level waste and 
spent fuel considered as waste. (EC, 2011)  
 
Although GD is presented in technical, institutional circles as a safe, permanent, 
and ‘publically acceptable’ solution to the long-term management of nuclear 
waste, no GDFs for the most hazardous nuclear waste exist. Experience with 
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for military waste, including plutonium, in 
New Mexico (USA) has already given some indications of the intricacies of 
managing nuclear waste and maintaining safety underground.  
WIPP has been operational since 1999. In February 2014, an explosion within 
the underground facility led to plutonium and americium leaking out into the 
atmosphere (Alvarez, 2014). The explosion was caused by a switch from 
inorganic to organic cat litter that was used to absorb liquid waste. The US 
Department of Energy believes that a reaction between the organic cat litter and 
a waste drum caused the explosion, which led to the temporary closure of the 
facility that reopened in January 2017, nearly three years after the incident and 
a potential clean-up cost of $2 billion (Green, 2016). The WIPP case 
demonstrates complicated and situated makings of underground safety. GD 
involves the construction of an engineered facility specifically tailored to the 
waste that will be disposed of in the facility. Instead of a general recipe for 
safety, safety emerges through local sociotechnical encounters and makings. 
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In its simplest formulation, GD is the placement of nuclear waste in a facility that 
has been excavated deep enough into suitable bedrock so that the waste 
cannot travel back to the surface environment. GD, imagined as the ‘final 
disposal of ultimate waste by means of passive safety, as soon as possible’ 
(Schröder, 2017), is an anthropocentric vision of an essentially non-human 
future. Existing social science work in waste and discard studies argues that the 
notion of the ‘finality’ of disposal is not easily defendable (e.g. Hetherington, 
2003; Hird, 2013). Waste, in particular something as long-lived as nuclear 
waste, resists disposal as the end point to its life (van Wyck, 2005). It will not 
just stop and sit quietly in the place designated to it by human society. Thus, the 
notion of the finality of GD is directed more at the human than nuclear waste. 
This idea of finality underscores the discrepancy between the longevity of 
radionuclides and the shortness of human lifespans.  
 
The safety of GD is produced through absences. On one hand, the absence of 
waste from human society and on the other the absence of humans from the 
lifeworld of nuclear waste. As such, GD provides us with a textbook Actor-
Network Theory (ANT) case study of delegation. Bruno Latour (1992) explains 
how we can either try to discipline people to do what we want them to do or 
alternatively we can entrust and delegate that task to nonhumans, such as the 
GDF. The making of safety and safe futures through GD relies on a multi-barrier 
system (see Figure 1), and a notion of passive safety – that is the absence of 
human intervention in the operation of the GDF. Multi-barrier concepts include 
an Engineered Barrier System (EBS) that will work together with the geological 
barrier to prevent the migration of waste to surface environment.  
While the making of a safe future through GD depends on absence, it also 
relies on alliances between organic and inorganic, human and nonhuman 
beings. Thus, delegating safety to the GDF, does not automatically translate 
into safety in practice. Delegation does not mean control, but is contingent on 
the delegator and the delegated playing their agreed roles (Schröder, 2016); the 
GDF to keep waste absent from the aboveground, and humans to remain 
absent from the underground. Therefore, if safety is a contract between humans 
and nonhumans to carry out their roles, it is necessary to be curious about “our 
living-space entanglements” (Tsing, 2016: 6), that is, how safety is made and 
negotiated through situated and relational sociotechnical doings.  
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Figure 1. KBS-3 Multi-barrier concept being implemented in Finland and 
Sweden. Courtesy of Posiva Oy. 
 
The safety and implementability of GD are negotiated in relation and in contrast 
to other nuclear waste management alternatives. The UK’s Radioactive Waste 
Management Limited (RWM), charged with the implementation of GD in the UK 
for instance describes GD as “less vulnerable than surface storage to natural 
processes such as climate change” (RWM, 2018). It also considers GD as 
‘technically achievable’, environmentally safe (unlike disposal in polar ice 
sheets or the seabed) and safe to implement (unlike firing nuclear waste into 
space). The case for the safety of GD is thus made through relational doings, a 
matter I will explore in Chapter 5. 
 
GD in the UK and Finland 
In this thesis, I explore the implementation of GD in the UK and Finland. The UK 
and Finnish GD projects provide us with interesting and contrasting case 
studies. Where the UK GD project has been characterised by ruptures and 
discontinuities, Finland is close to becoming the first country in the world to 
begin the disposal of nuclear waste. How the trajectories of the UK and Finnish 
GD projects have become as different as they are is an overarching concern of 
this thesis. In both countries work towards a long-term solution for the 
management of nuclear wastes begun in the latter half of the 1970s when the 
first reports on nuclear waste management were published in the UK and 
Finland. 
 
Since then GD has transformed into one of the more enduring technoscientific 
controversies in the UK (Bickerstaff, 2012; Gregson, 2012). The history of the 
UK GD project has been discussed in detail elsewhere (e.g. CoRWM, 2006), 
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and I will not delve too deeply into that here. The framework for the latest 
iteration of the UK’s disposal project was laid out in the 2014 Implementing 
Geological Disposal White Paper published by the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC, 2014). The White Paper followed the termination of the 
previous siting process in West Cumbria in January 2013, when the Cumbrian 
County Council decided to withdraw from the process. The White Paper 
reaffirms the Government’s commitment to GD as the UK’s chosen long-term 
waste management method, and to a voluntarist siting process as 
recommended by the Committee of Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) 
in 2006. Following a public consultation on lessons to be learned from the 
Cumbrian experiences, the 2014 White Paper maps the process going forward, 
over a series of time scales. The first two years of the process, following the 
publication of the White Paper, were designated to conducting a National 
Geological Screening (NGS) for compiling existing geological data, developing 
land-use planning processes and preparing to work with local communities. The 
following 15-20 years are to be spent engaging with local communities, 
investigating potential disposal sites and designing the GDF. From then on, 
100+ years have been allocated to the construction, operation and closure of 
the GDF (see Figure 2). Consultations on the siting and community 
engagement processes commenced in January 2018, two years behind the 
original schedule. It is already clear that the White Paper implementation 
process is delayed and the future progress of the UK GD is accruing 
uncertainties. 
 
Figure 2. Timeline of the UK GD project. Adapted from DECC (2014a). 
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In Finland, Posiva, the nuclear waste management organisation, is preparing to 
submit an operational licence application for the GDF. Known as Onkalo, this 
future GDF is in the municipality of Eurajoki that also hosts the Olkiluoto power 
plant. Eurajoki was chosen as the disposal site in 2001 after the parliament 
ratified the Decision-in-Principle (DiP), made by the Finnish State Council, that 
GD aligns with the ‘overall good of society’. The initial construction of Onkalo as 
an underground research lab and rock characterisation facility began on the 
island of Olkiluoto in 2004 and was completed in 2014. In 2015, the Finnish 
parliament granted Posiva a construction licence for the actual GDF – a tunnel 
network extended from Onkalo. As part of the operational licence application, 
Posiva will conduct a full-scale test (FISST) in Onkalo at the depth of 420 
metres during 2018. The aim of FISST is to demonstrate that the barriers of the 
EBS work together to provide passive safety as envisioned. The test is intended 
to support the full operational test planned for 2023 and actual disposal 
activities that are envisioned to commence in the mid-2020s. The closure of the 
GDF is planned for around the 2120s. 
 
1.2 Beyond certainty, beyond the human 
In his book Deep Future, Stephen Baxter (2001) claims that for the first time in 
history human societies are attempting to chart the future of humanity for the 
next million or billion years. Often, these attempts to chart the future take 
humanity into space. In a 2016 interview, Stephen Hawking, for instance, 
argued he did not “think we will survive another 1,000 years without escaping 
our fragile planet” (in Boult, 2016). To secure humanity’s existence, Hawking 
urged us to “look up to the stars and not down at our feet” for our future (ibid.). 
Hawking later revised the timeframe he envisioned humanity has left on Earth. 
Instead of a millennium, he posited we have a century to pack our bags to flee 
our planet. Only 100 years. Hawking’s vision for the future of humanity included 
a “base on the Moon by 2020 and a manned landing on Mars by 2025” 
(Hawking, 2017). These ventures are desperately needed, he argued, in order 
to ensure our continuation as a species. “If humanity is to continue for another 
million years”, Hawking contended, “our future lies in boldly going where no one 
else has gone before” (ibid.). Hawking’s vision entails journeying beyond 
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certainty, beyond current knowledge. It asks humanity to be generous towards 
uncertainty, by positioning the uncertainty of survival in space against the 
certainty of demise on Earth. According to Hawking humanity must embrace 
uncertainty and build a future in spaces beyond knowledge, in spaces of 
uncertainty.  
 
Although located in a completely different space, GD, too, can be read as an 
attempt to chart the future. As with Hawking’s vision of the future, the 
epistemological challenge with GD is that GD expands and exists in a future 
beyond knowledge. Because of the excessively long timescale that GDFs need 
to operate, GD as a technology is uncertain. There will be unanswered 
questions about the workability of the technology to which answers will not be 
forthcoming for multiple millennia (Bergmans, Landström and Schröder, 2014). 
The one million years into the future that GD projects seek to chart provides a 
major challenge for the implementation of GD, perhaps an even greater than 
the challenge posed by radioactivity. 
 
Thus, in this thesis when I talk about GD, I talk about precarious future making 
deep into times that deflect certainty and knowability. Any discussion of GD 
inevitably has to confront timescales that are of the geological kind. Nuclear 
materials - the matter to be held in a GDF - decay so slowly that they have been 
used to calculate the age of Earth. Bertram Boltwood was the first scientist to 
use the decay rate of Uranium to calculate the age of Earth. Nuclear power 
technology relies on that same, slowly decaying Uranium to fuel its reactors. 
Thus, “the very nature of nuclear technology, with the necessity to mine and 
refine naturally radioactive ores and minerals” means that through nuclear 
technologies, societies “engage with a timescale beyond human understanding” 
(Wilson, 2012: 224). The GDF is envisioned, by technical experts and 
governments alike, to contain nuclear waste for long enough to allow the waste 
to decay to a level that has been deemed safe. This means that safety is 
envisioned up to one million years. 
 
As far as this thesis is concerned, when Henry Gee asserts, “it’s about change, 
not stasis; about process, not pattern; about tales, not tableaux; about 
becoming, not being” (Gee, 2000: 134) he might be talking about GD. While he, 
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in fact, describes the evolution of species, this description is equally apt as a 
characterisation of the future of GD. The GDF is a hybrid entity composed of 
engineered and geological barriers. Sustained multi-millennial interactions 
between wastes, microbes, groundwater, bedrock and the EBS ensure that the 
GDF is always becoming, always evolving. Mapping that evolution in the 
present is a challenge. Extrapolating results from short-term laboratory 
experiments into the real-life conditions is difficult, and even more so when we 
are talking about the very distant future (van Poel, 2011). The developments 
and evolution of the GDF take place beyond human senses. The placement of 
waste underground prevents the detection of possible leaks in the future. The 
inability to accurately know the future together with the extremely slow process 
of radioactive decay ensure that the implementing generations cannot know 
whether GD as the chosen option for the long-term management of nuclear 
wastes works in the future as envisioned in the present. Nuclear waste 
transcends time and space. It is what Tim Morton calls a “hyperobject” (Morton, 
2013: 1). Hyperobjects, such as nuclear waste, “involve profoundly different 
temporalities than the human-scale we are used to. […] Hyperobjects occupy a 
high-dimensional phase space that results in their being invisible to humans for 
stretches of time” (ibid.). Waste will move and the GDF evolve over the 
millennia it is expected to operate. While, GD, in its essence, is about slowing 
down or halting movement, it is also an attempt to isolate and contain stuff that 
resists containment (van Wyck, 2005). GD is about trying to control stuff that 
has for decades controlled our imaginations. 
 
Thus, when I talk about making futures through GD, I talk about the need to 
develop sensitivities to futures we will not know. Weighing the Finnish case, 
Abraham van Luik of the US Department of Energy (DoE) notes how the 
Finnish regulations for GD “cover the entire future span, out to the very long 
time period – but they also say that, once the ice has built up again and covered 
Finland, it won’t be Finland. No one will live there. But it doesn’t matter whether 
anyone lives there or not: you still have to provide a system that’s safe for 
whoever’s going to be there when the ice retreats” (in Manaugh and Twilley, 
2012: 237). Thus, when we talk about GD, we talk about the need to develop a 
flat ontology and move away from human exceptionalism. So, I propose that if 
contemporary societies are to make liveable, safe, futures such as envisioned 
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by GD projects, there is a need to step away from the divisions between human 
and nonhuman, underground and aboveground, present and future. Instead of 
privileging one side of these dichotomies, they need to be treated 
symmetrically. To make liveable, safe, futures, it is necessary to understand or 
seek to understand how our futures and situated doings entangle and might 
affect the futures of multiple others, including those with whom we share the 
planet in the short-term, and those who might outlive us. 
 
1.3 Summary of the thesis and individual chapters  
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. In Chapter 2 I review the main 
literature that is pertinent to the thesis arguments. I will highlight the need to 
begin with endings when we talk about the implementation of GD projects; the 
distant future as the end to certainty; GD itself as an end point to the travel of 
nuclear materials, and the Nuclear Age as End Time (Anders, 1962). Drawing 
on existing work, I will discuss wastes as ambiguous matter and GD as a 
‘sociotechnical experiment’, thus questioning the notion of GD as a permanent 
solution to the long-term management of nuclear wastes. Thereafter, I review 
relevant literature on ‘future making’ with particular focus on the uncertainties 
and ethics around future making. 
 
In Chapter 3 I discuss the methods I used in my fieldwork and highlight some of 
the key experiences of doing fieldwork through the notions of absent presence 
and present absence. Taking a cue from Natasha Myers (2008, 2012), I discuss 
participant-observation as body-work, as a tool of ethnographic sense-making, 
giving access to new forms of knowing and new ways of following actors 
(Latour, 1987). Second, I discuss my take on diffraction (e.g. Haraway, 1996) as 
a methodological tool to explore the implementation of GD in a comparative 
setting, and introduce the notion of disposal cultures. Disposal cultures are 
situated compositions and composers of particular forms of knowledge and 
knowing. Disposal cultures have no explanatory power, but have an inbuilt 
diffractionist sensitivity. Diffraction is a relativist take on the world that explores 
the ways in which reality and differences are relational and emerge from 
specific, situated intra-actions between heterogeneous actors. The diffractive 
approach enables a conversation instead of comparison between the UK and 
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Finland and avoids the trap of simplistic like-to-like comparison. Finally, I 
discuss some of the technicalities of the interview, writing and analysis 
processes. 
 
Chapter 4 is concerned with the UK and Finland’s nuclear pasts and futures. I 
begin with a description of the present nuclear infrastructures in the UK and 
Finland as a way of laying ground for the following chapters. In the mid-part of 
the chapter, I explore the making of the waste challenge; how industry and 
policy descriptions of nuclear waste have moved between problematisation and 
deproblematisation of waste matters in the UK and Finland. In the final part of 
the chapter, I change pace and focus on the UK’s relationship with nuclear. 
Here, drawing on Latour’s Frankensteinian technologies (Latour, 2004) and 
Puig de la Bellacasa’s matters of care (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011, 2017), I 
engage in speculative thinking about the nuclear waste challenge as a result of 
‘our’ infatuation with nuclear things. Focusing in particular on the UK’s case, I 
propose that the nuclear waste challenge has emerged from our love, rather 
than fear, of nuclear technologies.  
 
In Chapter 5 I explore the making of the deep future and the making of safety 
through relational doings. I explore how the aboveground and certain geological 
conditions are used to render the deep future of GD scientifically predictable. I 
examine, in particular, how geological faults, fractures and cracks are 
envisioned simultaneously as spaces of risk and as spaces of predictability. 
How these spaces are subsequently utilised in making the technical case for 
safety and predictability of GD are also presented in making a case 
underground safety.  I then turn my attention to the engineering concepts and 
design of the GDF and propose that in its adversity to innovation, the historicity 
of its materials and its aim to slow down time and movement, GD can be 
conceptualised as a technology of stagnation. In the final part of the chapter, I 
explore some of the ways in which the deep future is made on the lab bench; 
what kind of everyday scientific work brings the future into the present?; and 
what kind of work is required to make predictions of the deep future in the 
present? The central argument here is that the making of safe, deep futures 
relies on situated relational makings and simplifications of the complexity of the 
disposal system. 
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Chapter 6 draws on the idea of GD as an on-going sociotechnical experiment 
(Bergmans and Schröder, 2012). Here, I propose that the ways in which the UK 
and Finnish disposal cultures relate to the future, and the idea of finality, affects 
the processes of implementation of GD. In the first instance, I examine how the 
future of GD is imagined through radionuclide half-lives and project timetables. I 
propose that the envisioned distance to the GD future (Michael, 2000), how 
imminent that future is, has shaped the implementation UK and Finnish GD 
projects. Next, I trace the indeterminacy of nuclear wastes. Here, I focus on 
plutonium, reprocessing technologies and the notion of retrivability of nuclear 
wastes. I discuss how the boundaries between wastes and assets, and 
between disposal and storage are not as clear-cut as official descriptions of GD 
let us understand. I also consider how ambiguity in these definitions and 
descriptions might affect the implementation of GD. 
 
In the ultimate chapter of this thesis, I synthesise the main points from the 
earlier chapters and summarise the answers to my research questions. I 
present the concept of contain-ability for exploring GD as a form of future 
making. Contain-ability is, I will argue, ‘a real unrealised present possibility’ (Bell 
and Olick, 1989) of GD. It is a contingent and situated making, taking place, for 
instance, on the lab bench, through policy decisions, public documents and 
other representations of disposals and wastes. How contain-ability is made 
depends on the imaginations of nuclear/GD futures (chapter 4); available 
geological conditions and materials envisioned as containers and barriers 
(chapter 5); and the stuff that needs to be contained (chapter 6). I also argue 
that contain-ability varies over time and space. It is not something inherent or 
present in GD projects or different disposal concepts, but only emerges through  
relational sociotechnical doings.  
 
By highlighting the contingencies of future and safety making through GD, this 
thesis has a policy implication. Where GD projects still tend to be mostly driven 
by technocractic logics, this thesis highlights the negotiability and relational 
aspects of making wastes, safety and the future. Throughout this thesis, I 
underline the entanglement of the social and the technical in the implementation 
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of GD, and the making of the future through GD as sociotechnical, rather than a 
purely technical, challenge. 
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2 BEGINNING WITH ENDINGS 
The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy skips lightly over this tangle of 
academic abstraction, pausing only to note that the term "Future 
Perfect" has been abandoned since it was discovered not to be. 
- Douglas Adams, The Restaurant at the End of the Universe 
 
 
This chapter is all about endings. By exploring endings, I introduce concepts 
and literatures that are important for this thesis. I begin to map out the necessity 
of a flat ontology (Latour, 2005) for understanding the processes through which 
both the future and the safety of GD is made and presented by GD projects. In 
the first section of the chapter (2.1) I explore Günther Anders’ idea of the 
present, the Nuclear Age, as the End Time. The section begins to trace the 
long-term effects of nuclear activities and how these configure our relationship 
with the future and nonhuman beings. In doing so, I draw on the concept of care 
as an integral part of technoscientific practices, and, therefore, of future making. 
In section 2.2 I critique the multiple representations of GD as an ‘end point’ or a 
‘permanent solution’ to nuclear waste management. Drawing on existing social 
scientific work on waste and GD, I develop the existing idea that GD should be 
treated as a long-term sociotechnical experiment. I posit that because of the 
discrepancy between the lifespans of nuclear waste and the existing ability to 
engineer containment in the long term, GD is a temporal rather than a 
permanent category. 
 
The next two sections focus on the ontological challenges imposed by nuclear 
waste and the deep future of GD. Section 2.3 approaches the future as the end 
of certainty. I discuss the discrepancy between our abilities to make and know 
futures and cover key concepts that have emerged from the ‘futures’ literature. 
Finally, in this section I position the ‘deep future’ as a sociological research 
object. The penultimate section of the chapter draws on the work of Tim Morton 
and Donna Haraway to argue for a need to reconfigure common readings and 
divisions of the world in ways that no longer privilege the human or the present 
in order to make safe and fair futures. The final section of the chapter presents 
the research questions that guided the making of this thesis.  
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2.1 End Time as liveable condition 
In Future Matters Barbara Adam and Chris Groves (2007) argue that nuclear 
technology is a textbook example of contemporary society’s ‘Promethean 
power’ to create futures. What they mean is that contemporary capacity to 
construct and create futures through nuclear surpasses existing capability to 
know and take responsibility for the futures made through nuclear technology. 
The effects of civilian nuclear power – that is nuclear waste – are of interest in 
this thesis. Before moving on to waste matters, it is worth noting, however, how 
the promise of nuclear as a vessel for ‘better futures’ has shifted and decayed. 
 
Nuclear power has offered promises of shoring up resource and energy gaps 
with ‘electricity too cheap to meter’, it has promised national prestige (Hecht, 
2009) and progress (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009). The promise of cheap electricity 
of the early Nuclear Age has decayed into experiences and imageries of 
nuclear accidents. Where nuclear has, at least in part, failed to deliver these 
promises, it has produced an international, intergenerational, interspecies 
threat. Nuclear weapons proliferation, and the recently resurfaced concerns 
about weapons are the obvious example of this, and nuclear weapons have 
received some social scientific attention (e.g. Burke, 2016; MacKenzie, 2012). 
Yet, even if we look past nuclear accidents and the past and potential future 
destruction sown by the bomb, nuclear technology has produced, perhaps 
unintended, but definitely long lasting effects deep into the future. The promise 
of nuclear has been replaced with concerns over nuclear wastes and their long-
term management.  
 
Waste, as the product of nuclear technology, challenges our understandings of 
safety and our relationship with the future. Waste remains hazardous for 
multiple millennia, thus undermining the safety of the living world if left 
unattended. Writing at the height of the Cold War in 1962, Günther Anders 
argued that with nuclear technology we have reached the End Time. For 
Anders the End Time is characterised by the nuclear (weapons) threat as a 
world condition. Living under the constant threat of our own (nuclear) power “to 
transform any given place on our planet, and even our planet itself, into a 
Hiroshima” means that the Nuclear Age is “"the Last Age": for there is no 
possibility that its "differentia specifica," the possibility of our self-extinction, can 
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ever end – but by the end itself” (Anders, 1962: 493). The Nuclear Age as the 
Last Age is the End Time. For Anders, the Nuclear Age is the time before the 
end. The End Time is the time preceding nuclear apocalypse, the end of time 
itself. In the End Time, Anders argues, the basic moral question of “How should 
we live?” needs to be radically rephrased as “Will we live?”. Surviving and living 
in the world in the End Time is no longer self-evident. The future is no longer a 
matter of fact. It is something that can be lost. In the End Time, the future 
becomes a matter of care (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017). Surviving and living in 
the End Time require active doing and intervention to prevent the End Time 
from becoming the end of time. “We must”, Anders argues, “do everything in our 
power to make the End Time endless” (Anders, 1962: 494). In other words, the 
End Time is a liveable condition that needs to be cared for and maintained to 
avoid the coming of the end of time. For Anders, public demonstrations and 
marches are a way of intervening in the world to maintain its liveability; and a 
way of demonstrating care for the world to prevent its destruction and the arrival 
of the end of time.  
In a less dramatic way than nuclear weapons, nuclear waste underlines the 
Nuclear Age as the End Time. While the sheer multi-millennial lifespan of 
nuclear waste and radionuclides, as we will see further below, ensures that 
humanity will live and die in the Nuclear Age, taking care of nuclear waste, 
containing its movement now and in the future can be read as an attempt to 
make the End Time endless in the way Anders envisions. 
 
The End Time, then, does not signal the end of the time. Rather, it signifies the 
fragility of the future and the ever-present possibility of its ruination. The End 
Time has the potential of becoming the end of time through nuclear apocalypse, 
a serious nuclear accident or the slow poisoning of the living world by highly 
radioactive waste. Bill Gilbert suggests that we need a new “narrative as a […] 
species”, a narrative that “encompasses the expanse of planetary time, not the 
fleeting moment of pop culture” (Gilbert, 2012: 53). He posits, that we need this 
new narrative if we want “to extend [the Anthropocene] thousands of years into 
the future” (ibid.). Anthropocene is the label given to the current geological 
epoch in which human activities “have become so pervasive and profound that 
they rival the great forces of Nature and are pushing the Earth into planetary 
terra incognita” (Steffen, Crutzen and McNeill, 2007: 614). While the 
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Anthropocene and the Nuclear Age are not synonyms, both natural and social 
scientists have proposed that the beginning of the Nuclear Age marked the 
beginning of the Anthropocene (e.g. Morton, 2013; Zalasiewicz et al., 2015). In 
2015 a group of scientists traced the start date of the Anthropocene to 
 
the world's first nuclear bomb explosion, on July 16th 1945 at 
Alamogordo, New Mexico; additional bombs were detonated at the 
average rate of one every 9.6 days until 1988 with attendant 
worldwide fallout easily identifiable in the chemostratigraphic record. 
(Zalasiewicz et al., 2015: 196) 
 
The Trinity test in New Mexico, the subsequent nuclear weapons tests and the 
resulting nuclear fallout have been posited as the markers and makers of 
Anthropocene. “Waste”, nuclear or otherwise, Myra Hird writes, “has become 
the signifier of the Anthropocene” (Hird, 2015). The consequences of the 
Anthropocene, like those of the Nuclear Age, extend into the very distant future. 
Donna Haraway posits that the Anthropocene “marks severe discontinuities; 
what comes after will not be like what came before” (Haraway, 2016: 100). For 
Haraway, the Anthropocene is a wrinkle in time. It marks discontinuity and 
change. In a sense, her reading of the Anthropocene, then, is similar to Anders’ 
conceptualisation of the End Time. Yet, where for Anders the End Time is 
followed by the end of time, Haraway holds that “our job is to make the 
Anthropocene as short/thin as possible and to cultivate with each other in every 
way imaginable epochs to come” (ibid.). Thus Haraway’s reading of the future is 
more optimistic than that of Anders. Where Haraway wants change and to bring 
about a new epoch, Anders’ focus is on maintaining the status quo; prolonging 
the present, the End Time, for as long as possible, for after that there is nothing. 
Thus, while both Haraway and Anders advocate active doing to maintain a 
liveable world, their visions of the future are at odds with each other. Anders’ 
gloom is balanced by Haraway’s hopefulness of better times yet to come.  
 
Reflecting on Gilbert’s words (see the bottom of page 33), Jane Bennett notes 
that we, as humans, “unconsciously project forward, if not the destructive, short-
sighted version of the Anthropocene, [then] a “cene” that includes, for as long 
as possible, the presence of the anthropos” (Bennett, 2012: 245, my emphasis). 
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Echoing Anders’ call to care for the End Time (so that it does not morph into the 
end of time), Bennett posits that in the Anthropocene, we “seek the 
postponement of the arrival of a radically posthuman future” (ibid.: 246). To 
postpone a posthuman future and to prevent the becoming of the end of time, 
contemporary societies need to unearth “possibilities for humans to evolve 
ways to live in relation to geologic time” (Ellsworth and Kruse, 2012: 14). In 
order to make liveable futures common conceptualisations of time need to be 
expanded. This, I posit, is in a sense what GD projects seek to do. They seek to 
intervene in the world, to prolong the End Time by constructing protective 
structures that have geological, rather than human, lifespans. GD seeks to 
engineer structures that can meet, if not match, the extremely long lifespan of 
nuclear waste. GD is a technology that seeks to isolate nuclear waste 
underground for as long as possible; to protect the anthropos, but also the flora 
and the fauna. In this thesis, I trace some of the ways in which the UK and 
Finnish GD projects seek to intervene in the world to protect it. To intervene in 
the world in order to protect it in the long-term requires that GD projects 
approach the future as a matter of care (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011; 2017). 
 
Matters of care 
Puig de la Bellacasa  (2011, 2017) has taken the notion of matters of concern 
(Latour, 2004) to develop the notion of matters of care. Concern and care as 
affective states, Puig de la Bellacasa posits, are related. They both bring back 
to focus the multiplicity and messiness of (scientific) work that the black boxed 
matters of fact hide. Where concern denotes worry and trouble, care adds a 
sense of commitment. It has stronger affective and ethical connotations. It does 
not replace concern at the core of the politics of things, but brings in something 
else into the mix. Crucially, “the quality of “care” [can] be more easily turned into 
a verb: to care. One can make oneself concerned, but “to care” contains a 
notion of doing that concern lacks” (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017: 42). As such, 
care “involves affective, ethical and hands-on agencies of […] material 
consequences” (ibid.: 3). Care “implicates different relationalities, issues, and 
practices in different settings” (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017: 3); care is always 
situated. Thus, for instance, the EU’s concern for nuclear wastes translates to 
different care and nuclear waste management practices at the level of Member 
States that are responsible for the nuclear wastes they have produced. EU 
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Member States consequently have developed ways to care for their waste 
through a range of disposal concepts and approaches to GD that reflect their 
particular sociotechnical conditions. In this sense we can see care – taking care 
of nuclear waste – as a situated practice emergent of local sociotechnical 
realities (Mol, 2008). GD does not demand or offer a singular solution to the 
long-term management of nuclear waste. Rather, the range of disposal 
concepts and futures envisioned by EU Member States underlines the multiple 
ways in which European nuclear nations are, or are planning to, take care of 
their nuclear waste. 
 
To care “is to affect and be affected by the thing at stake within a controversy or 
debate” (Michael, 2017: 131). Care engages practitioners in their worlds; care is 
an active practice (Martin, Myers and Viseu, 2015). It requires “a willingness to 
respond”  (ibid.: 11, emphasis in the original). Before we care for a thing, we 
“must have the capacity or willingness to respond, to be called into action, to be 
hailed by that object or phenomenon. In short, a person who cares must first be 
willing and available to be moved by this other” (ibid.). Vinciane Despret 
reminds us that care is not superfluous but an attempt to become interested in 
an issue; it is not just the “result of scientific theoretical understanding, it is the 
condition of this understanding” (Despret, 2004: 132, emphasis in the original). 
Care, thus, can be located at the heart of scientific knowledge production, and 
forms of future makings, such as GD. Caring is intimately entangled with 
knowledge production, while “de-passioning” science and research “does not 
give us a more objective world, it just gives a world ‘without us’” (Despret, 2004: 
132). Caring, then, cannot be separated from knowing. Carrie Friese (2013) has 
observed that caring can be taken to signify good lab science, while others 
have conceptualised care as an “inevitable part of scientific research”, even if it 
still “requires constant negotiation and tinkering in order to be accommodated 
by the systems with which it lies in uneasy relationship” (Giraud and Hollin, 
2016: 17).  
 
In this sense, caring can be understood as a ‘disruptive doing’, and as an 
ethical and a political intervention (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017). Puig de la 
Bellacasa draws on the definition of care as “everything that we do to maintain, 
continue and repair “our world” so that we can live in it as well as possible. That 
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world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment, all that we seek to 
interweave in a complex, life sustaining web” (Tronto, 1993: 103). Following this 
definition, GD can be conceptualised through care as an active attempt to 
maintain and continue the world, to extend the End Time. Practices of care, 
treating, managing, and disposing of nuclear waste, are at the heart of safe 
futures envisioned through GD. Protection of both humans and nuclear (that is; 
care for humans and nuclear) lie at the core of GD safety imaginaries, as we will 
see in Chapter 5. Through care, GD projects seek to maintain a livable world. 
 
Yet, GD, as care and a world-sustaining doing is a non-innocent practice. 
Haraway has argued that the point of care “is to make a difference in the world, 
to cast our lot for some ways of life and not others. To do that, one must be in 
action, be finite and dirty, not transcendent and clean” (Haraway, 1997: 36). In 
other words, priorities need to be set and sides chosen. GD, as safety making 
and care-ful doing, thus, relies on prioritising certain spaces and materials and 
ignoring others. In line with Haraway, Aryn Martin, Natasha Myers and Anna 
Viseu write 
 
Care is a selective mode of attention: it circumscribes and cherishes 
some things, lives, or phenomena as its objects. In the process, it 
excludes others. Practices of care are always shot through with 
asymmetrical power relations: who has the power to care? Who has 
the power to define what counts as care and how it should be 
administered? […] Care organizes, classifies, and disciplines bodies. 
(Martin, Myers and Viseu, 2015: 3) 
 
Care is a selective mode of attention and active doing, invites us to ask “For 
whom we care?”; “Who cares?”; “What for?”; “Why do ‘we’ care?”; and “How to 
care?” (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011: 96). By understanding care as selective and 
situated doing that is governed by our willingness to respond, we can begin to 
see how caring for a thing can shift our ontological conceptions of time and 
relationships with others (Schrader, 2015). As a transformative ethos, care has 
ontological significance with cultural, ethical, political, material and social 
impacts. It shapes, reconfigures and reorders the world. Drawing from this what 
I aim to do in this thesis is to illuminate how the nuclear waste problem has 
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been made and remade through degrees of care and negligence of nuclear 
things. I will engage with the notion of care as a selective mode in Chapter 4, as 
a way of speculating about the making and becoming of the waste problem in 
the UK by exploring how the changing attention to nuclear materials has 
affected nuclear waste ontologies. In Chapter 5, I will trace how care for the 
future through GD means that safety is made and argued for by prioritising 
certain spaces and sociomaterial configurations over others. 
 
As we will see in section 2.3, the ways in which we conceptualise time and the 
future shape how we care, how we begin to care, and how we envision 
responsibility. To live on a ‘damaged planet’ (Tsing, 2016) requires that we not 
only extend care and concern temporally to generations ahead, but that we 
commit to living and dying ‘response-ably’ in unexpected company (ibid.). The 
“joint fortune that all forms of life share with human technoscience is no longer 
news” (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011: 85), and future making through GD needs 
not only consider multiple human generations, but also a multitude of 
nonhumans. Caring for the future, ensuring a future in the End Time requires 
intergenerational and more-than-human sensitivities. Haraway argues, “what 
used to be called nature has erupted into ordinary human affairs, and vice 
versa, in such a way and with such permanence as to change fundamentally 
means and prospects for going on” (Haraway, 2016: 40). Hird (2013a) similarly 
has argued that to live in the world and to foster more-than-human sensitivities, 
we must begin to relate to and care about the future in geoscientific terms. 
What this means is the adoption of a long-term approach to future making that 
requires an acknowledgement that in deep time, humans occupy just “one 
moment in the wider life of a thing” (Parsons, 2008: 392).  
 
Living in the End Time 
Understanding the future in geoscientific terms foregrounds times before and 
after humans, and enables a sensitivity to trace how the world is made through 
nonhuman encounters and interactions. “Humans”, Puig de la Bellacasa notes, 
“are in relations of mutual care” (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2010: 164). Humans are 
not alone in caring for Earth and its beings. The making of safe futures through 
GD relies, to a great extent, on nonhuman encounters and interactions (and on 
understanding and predicting these encounters). The GDF is expected to 
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contain the highly radioactive waste and to provide safety from “hundreds of 
thousands to more than a million years”, that is, for “periods of time beyond 
normal human comprehension” (Alexander, Reijonen and McKinley, 2015: 75-
76). The timeframe of GD is vast, and the making of futures through GD 
demands that we engage with times we do not necessarily understand and will 
not know. Nuclear waste and the radioactive threat they pose on the living world 
will outlive humans, as will the GDF – if the models, calculations and predictions 
that have and are being made about the future of the GDF are correct. Because 
of this, the long-term management (or care) of nuclear waste has been 
delegated to nonhuman actors, and the international nuclear waste community 
conceptualises long-term safety through the absence of human actors (see 
section 2.2 below). In Chapter 5, I conceptualise GD as a technology of the End 
Time, as a technology of stagnation. As the long lifespan of nuclear waste 
poses a threat to life aboveground, GD seeks to make safe futures and to 
maintain a liveable world by slowing down time and by separating nuclear 
waste and humans through the disposal of waste underground. Thus, where 
Anders understands the End Time through the human and human concerns for 
survival, I suggest that to make liveable futures we have to let go of 
anthropocentric approaches to what it means to live in the End Time. Taking 
care of nuclear waste, as a means of making liveable futures in the End Time, 
demands interspecies, geoscientific and multigenerational sensitivities to time (I 
return to the need for a flat ontology in understanding future making through GD 
in section 2.4). 
 
2.2 GD as the end point 
The European Commission describes GD as “the end point of the management 
of [nuclear] waste” (EC, 2011). In the UK, the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC), in the 2014 White Paper Implementing Geological 
Disposal, defined GD as a “permanent solution” to the long-term management 
of nuclear waste (DECC, 2014a: 5). Conversely, in Finland the term ‘final 
disposal’ (loppusijoitus) is preferred over that of ‘geological disposal’ (e.g. 
Posiva, 2012). ‘Final disposal’ as a term explicitly suggests finality, an end or an 
ending. In doing so, it seems to simplify GD by invisiblisising uncertainties and 
taming nuclear waste. In the first instance, ‘final disposal’ directs attention away 
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from the geological realm, away from fractures, cracks, scientific uncertainties 
and knowledge gaps. The term ‘final disposal’ guides the reader’s focus 
towards engineering, away from the natural and the geological. It guides 
attention to that which is manageable and controllable. It guides attention away 
from the deep future (see further below), the long timeframe of GD and the 
difficulty of ‘finding somewhere’ for the waste to go. Finally, the notion of ‘final 
disposal’ proposes an end point for nuclear waste. The ‘final’ in final disposal 
can thus be read as an end to movement, threat and risk. Final disposal 
proposes passivity and permanence. 
 
The ‘finality’ of disposal, like the making of safety and disposal futures (Chapter 
5) relies on boundary work (Gieryn, 1983). GD safety making and 
argumentation rest on separations between the human and the nonhuman, the 
aboveground and the underground, storage and disposal. In her seminal work 
Purity and Danger, Mary Douglas (1966) argues that disposal is about creating 
boundaries and order. It is about making waste, a ‘matter out of place’, invisible 
through practices of disposal. Disposal, then, emerges as a way of ordering 
social life; it helps to make sense of society, and helps society to make sense of 
the world (Douglas, 1966). Zsuzsa Gille (2013) in turn has argued that 
theorising waste as matter out of place like Douglas does needs more 
justification. Once disposed of, waste, Gille argues, is no longer seen as a 
matter out of place. Through disposal waste is emplaced in a space society has 
designated and designed for it. It becomes ‘matter in place’. Disposal practices, 
then, in Gille’s reading, make waste determinate. Disposal in part is what 
establishes matter as waste. However, Gille also argues that if waste is defined 
through its spatiality (matter in/out of place), practices (beyond disposal and 
disposal site) that make material waste need to be explored and demonstrated.  
 
Taking cue from Gille, Hird (2013b) notes that disposal ostensibly renders 
waste as matter in place. Yet, this “out-of-sight, out-of-mind rendering 
determines certain stuff to be waste and remain waste, and belies alternate 
renderings, such as waste as lively and flowing” matter (Hird, 2013b: 29, 
emphasis in the original). For Hird, conceptualising disposed-of waste spatially 
as ‘matter in place’ denies the liveliness and vitality of waste matter to move 
and evolve, to become and unbecome something. Waste as ‘matter in place’, 
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Hird argues, is a pacified reading of the matter. Accordingly, Nicky Gregson and 
Mike Crang (2010) note that much social science scholarship on waste, in fact, 
overlooks waste. Instead, existing work tends to focus on the management of 
waste, thus domesticating and circumscribing the liveliness of waste matter. 
Much of this holds true for the existing social scientific work on GD that focuses 
on issues around risk perception, public acceptability and governance of GD 
projects (Kuppler, 2012). National participatory processes have been analysed 
closely (e.g. Durant, 2007; Lehtonen, 2010a; MacKerron and Berkhout, 2009), 
but waste itself, aside from few exceptions (e.g. Gregson, 2012), is largely 
absent in this work. 
 
Elsewhere, discussing landfills, Hird (2013a) has described the vitality of waste; 
how in landfills waste encounters, engages and forms leachates with its 
surroundings. Waste when disposed of it is still lively. It moves within the 
disposal site or landfill with the potential to defy its containment, to leak out, 
configure and reconfigure the world. Disposal, rather than an end point, is 
therefore better conceptualised as a phase in the life of matter – a point to 
which I will return shortly.  
 
Waste is an ambiguous linguistic signifier Hird (2012). Anything and everything 
can become waste. The perceived unusability or worthlessness of matter can 
be seen as the beginning of its transformation into waste (Kennedy, 2007). With 
respect to the indeterminacy of wastes proposed by Hird and others, Gille notes 
“if waste is not by essence waste but it becomes waste, then what is needed is 
to demonstrate by what practices in what […] places the matter […] was made 
into waste to begin with” (Gille, 2013: 3). How and where waste becomes or is 
made waste is important for understanding how containment and disposal are 
envisioned, justified and engineered in GD projects. While containment could 
be seen as just a matter of engineering, this ‘technical realm’ of containment is 
mediated by legislation, risk assessments, envisioned needs, imaginations, and 
discursive performances of containment. The makings and unmakings of waste 
are matters of definition and policy decisions (Chapter 4 and Chapter 6). 
Disposal does not necessarily mean that matter is unwanted or no longer has 
any value. Particularly with regards to nuclear waste, the classification of matter 
as waste or asset, and the readings of its (potential) value defy easy definition. 
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The labelling of nuclear waste is not necessarily connected to the politics of 
value (Gille, 2010). In Chapter 6, I will explore the waste ontologies of the UK 
and Finnish disposal cultures (see Chapter 3). I will propose that the 
emplacement of nuclear waste in a GDF does not necessarily render matter to 
remain waste. GD is not necessarily the end point for nuclear waste, but it can 
be reimagined and the GDF remade as storage. Nuclear waste can unbecome 
through radioactive decay, but it can also be unmade through political decision-
making (Chapter 4). Thus, following Kevin Hetherington (2004) I posit that 
disposal can be seen as the making of (temporary) absence.  
 
Disposal, like waste, thus is a temporary rather than an absolute category. 
“Disposal”, Hetherington writes, “is never final […] but involves issues of 
managing social relations and their representation around themes of 
movement, transformation, incompleteness, and return” (Hetherington, 2004: 
157). He notes that often missing in social scientific literatures on disposal is 
this notion of disposal as continual making and holding things absent. Instead 
the focus has been on getting rid of things or meanings (e.g. Douglas, 1966). 
Yet disposal, Hetherington contends, is more about placing absences than 
about waste; it is spatial as well as temporal doing. In line with Hird, he argues 
that matter out of place that is made absent through disposal is “only ever 
moved along and is never fully gotten rid of”, rather it “has a motility as well as a 
mobility – it moves between a status of presence and absence” (Hetherington, 
2004: 162). Marilyn Strathern, similarly, has proposed that “those involved in 
the activity of waste disposal know that one cannot dispose of waste, only 
convert it into something else within its own life'' (Strathern, 1999: 61). Together 
the notions of the liveliness of waste and the temporality of disposal suggest 
that waste matters cannot fully be managed through disposal practices. 
 
While wastes are made absent through their placement in disposal facilities and 
sites, they cannot be fully disposed of or contained. This is the case particularly 
with nuclear waste, whose multi-millennial lifespan defies and exceeds the 
ability to engineer containment. The lifespan of nuclear waste surpasses that of 
any engineered structure. Even on shorter timescales (hundreds rather than 
millions of years), the problem with containment, Hird writes, is that it is only 
ever temporary. Eventually, even landfills “spill and leak […] as such, landfilling 
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and waste management generally, introduces a resilient tension between 
determinacy and indeterminacy” (Hird, 2013a: 465). Accordingly, Peter van 
Wyck (2005) defines nuclear waste not as matter out of place, but as matter 
without place. Nuclear waste, he postulates, is a “kind of waste that resists its 
own containment. A kind of waste that operates in a radically different 
temporality; it is material whose toxicity requires a different conception of history 
and time” (van Wyck, 2005: 5). So, I would argue that the temporality of nuclear 
waste defies the notion of GD as an end point (I will return to this point further 
below). Moreover, the toxicity and radioactivity challenge the pacified image of 
nuclear waste as manageable or containable material. As matter without place 
nuclear waste defies containment. Just how it does this and what kinds of 
challenges this imposes on making safety claims and safe futures will be 
explored in Chapter 5. 
 
Nonetheless, Nicky Gregson (2012) has observed that in public representations 
of nuclear waste in the UK, nuclear waste has been stripped of its toxicity and 
radioactivity; stripped of its nuclearity (Hecht, 2007). Nuclear waste, Gregson 
argues, has been pacified in public representations, even though it is the 
corrosive and radioactive vitality of the waste that governs its concentration and 
confinement at places such as Sellafield, where the UK stores approximately 
74% of all the UK’s nuclear waste (NDA, 2017a). Gregson writes about her visit 
to Sellafield and own experience of the vitality of nuclear waste by describing 
how “in the HLW store radioactive waste is felt rather than seen. As one stands 
on the storage silos below that hold vitrified waste, one senses both the heat 
and the burden of responsibility that attaches to this stuff” (Gregson, 2012: 
2011). Her description of the waste and how it can be sensed even through 
thick layers of glass and concrete seem to attest to the liveliness and vitality of 
waste. Gregson further claims that while the vitality of radioactive materials in 
relation to the human is appreciated, the colonising materiality of nuclear waste, 
its vitality that “ruptures the integrity of all that comes into contact with it — be 
that organic or inorganic life” is less acknowledged (ibid.: 2016). It is this 
colonising liveliness and vitality, Gregson argues, that is absent from public 
representation of nuclear waste. Instead of the describing the vitality and ability 
of waste to harm and colonise organic and inorganic lifeforms, public 
representations contain and pacify wastes in tabular representations of the 
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volumes, weights, and activity levels of different waste categories. These 
representations, Gregson posits, are often accompanied by images of high-
level waste (HLW) storage facilities at Sellafield in which nuclear wastes are 
only present through their implied containment under “circles coloured yellow 
and black on the floor” (Gregson, 2012: 2012) (see Figure 3).  
 
The visual as well as the tabular representations show nuclear waste as already 
confined and disciplined, translated and translatable into neat figures and 
spaces. These representations and the different ways nuclear waste is 
categorised and sub-categorised into classes by its levels of radioactivity, 
relative volumes and weights, present it as “not only manageable but already 
being managed, thus [the waste problem is] always potentially solved” (Gille, 
2013: 2). In public representations waste is, thus, deproblematised. Kevin 
Hetherington (2004) and Timothy Morton (2013) have objected to the finality 
implied by the representation of waste as controllable matter, since this implies 
that waste can be managed in a permanent way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Nuclear waste storage in the Netherlands. Circles on the floor 
marking the presence of nuclear waste. Creative Commons. 
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Morton argues that nuclear wastes “are not objective lumps limited in time and 
space, but unique beings” (Morton, 2013: 122) that inevitably need to be taken 
into count in designing the GDF, since “we can’t unthink our knowledge of 
them” (Morton, 2011: 86). The GDF design (see Figure 1 in the Introduction) will 
be engineered to contain, not the pacified waste of public representations, but 
the long-lived hazardous waste that currently sits in aboveground storage 
facilities. This, as Morton suggests, means that the GDF “design must account 
for thousand, ten thousand, and hundred thousand year timescales” (ibid.). It 
must account for a long-lived radioactive hazard, not tabular pacifications of 
nuclear waste. Public representations of manageable waste can thus be seen 
to lie in opposition to the engineering and design demands the radioactivity and 
hazardousness of nuclear waste impose on GDF construction. The UK 
Radioactive Waste Management Ltd. (RMW) describes the GDF as a 
 
highly-engineered facility, located deep underground, where the 
waste will be isolated within a multi-barrier system of engineered and 
natural barriers designed to prevent the release of harmful quantities 
of radioactivity and non-radioactive contaminants to the surface 
environment. (RWM, 2016a: 1).  
 
Not only is waste emplaced deep underground, but also within multiple barriers 
to prevent its easy return to the surface. The design of the GDF and the 
materials used in the EBS for isolating waste underground reflect the materiality 
and characteristics of the waste that will be disposed of in the GDF (see 
Chapters 4 and 5). The GDF is  “designed to ensure that the wastes are 
isolated and contained for the long term after disposal by passive means” 
(RWM, 2016b: 40). Together the emplacement of waste deep underground 
behind multiple barriers, the notion that waste needs to contained for the long-
term through passive means are suggestive of the vitality, rather than the 
pacificity and easy manageability, of nuclear waste.  
 
Passive containment of nuclear waste envisioned by GD concepts signifies an 
anticipated absence of lack of human intervention in the operations of the GDF 
after the facility has been sealed and closed. As I will explore in Chapter 5, the 
human is posited as an unreliable guardian of nuclear waste, because of the 
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radically different timescales of the human and the nuclear. Instead the isolation 
of waste and the provision of safety into the very distant future are delegated to 
the underground and the GDF. In contrast and in relation to the human, the 
GDF has been posited as a more reliable and predictable guardian of nuclear 
waste in the long-term by the international nuclear waste community. Where 
human actors are seen as fickle, the GDF is ascribed the ability to provide 
safety in the very long-term. Recently, however, social scientists have begun to 
question the stated reliability of the GDF, as well as the finality of GD as a 
permanent solution to the management of nuclear waste. Because of the multi-
millennial need to contain nuclear waste and the challenge this timescale 
effectively imposes of engineering and knowledge making practices, social 
scientists have proposed that instead of conceptualising GD as an end point, 
GD should be treated as a long-term sociotechnical experiment (e.g. Bergmans, 
Landström and Schröder, 2014; Landström and Bergmans, 2015, Schröder, 
2016). 
  
A long-term sociotechnical experiment 
From Science and Technology Studies (STS) we have learned that ’artifacts 
have politics’ (Winner, 1980). Artefacts embody political visions of society and 
affect the ways in which humans relate to their environment and to each other. 
In Finland for instance, GD has been politically defined to represent the “overall 
good of society” (MTI, 2000). This has been the main justification supporting the 
implementation of GD. As such, the GDF itself can be seen as invested with 
visions of a desirable future – one in which society as a whole is seen to benefit 
from the construction of the GDF.  
 
Instead of thinking of the GDF simply as a technological system or an artefact, I 
will, following existing social science work on GD (e.g. InSOTEC, 2014), 
conceptualise it here as a sociotechnical combination. Rather than a technical 
system surrounded by a social context, the GDF is entangled with visions of 
social good, desirable futures, but also concerns about the future and nuclear 
things. Where, for many technologies, the relationship between ‘social’ and the 
‘technical’ is uncontroversial (see e.g. Bijker and Pinch, 2012), the controversy 
around GD has not settled yet. Possible societal oversight over the GDF 
continues to be debated for instance through discussions about the inclusion of 
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monitoring technologies in the GDF. These technologies could allow society to 
keep an eye on the GDF post-closure. Questions have emerged over what 
would be monitored, what would be the purpose of monitoring, and how would 
societies respond if the monitors generated and sent unusual data from the 
GDF. Bergmans et al. (2012) found differing perspectives on the role of 
monitoring between technical experts and concerned citizens. While technical 
experts viewed monitoring as “a matter of performance confirmation, a tool for 
validating the safety case underlying repository construction”, concerned 
citizens viewed monitoring as a tool for “critical scrutiny of safety, an instrument 
for acknowledging uncertainties and detecting emergent problems in a 
repository” (ibid.: 22). Thus GD deals with highly controversial issues: highly 
radioactive nuclear waste and unknowable (see below) very distant futures, but 
it also continues to be a controversial technology, as its ability to provide (long-
term) safety remains contested. 
  
The GDF is expected to contain nuclear waste for one million years. This 
timeframe of one million years has been, and remains, contested among 
nuclear waste management experts, as I will explore in Chapter 5.  
Nonetheless, one million years is an internationally standardised timeframe for 
GD safety assessment. From a human perspective, one million years proposes 
certain foreverness, a notion supported by the labelling of the GDF as the first 
posthuman structure (Levitt, 2011). The conceptualisation of the GDF as a 
posthuman structure can be taken to signal the discrepancy between human 
and nuclear timescales. In the first instance, it underlines the longevity of 
nuclear waste and the much shorter human existence. Secondly, the notion of a 
posthuman structure implies scientific and engineering ambition. Despite the 
discrepancy between human and nuclear times, the international nuclear waste 
community has established GD as “the ultimate end-point for managing long-
lived radioactive waste in a safe manner which will protect human and the 
environment passively for the required long time scales” (Schröder, 2017, my 
emphasis). This notion of GD as an end point, as I mentioned above, has been 
challenged by some social scientists. 
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Definitions of GD that highlight uncertainty rather than permanence have 
emerged from the work produced by InSOTEC. 1   Where Landström and 
Bergmans (2015), have proposed that GD should be viewed as an ‘on-going 
socio-technical experiment’, others yet have described GD as a “controlled, 
open-ended exploration towards a possible solution” (Kallenbach-Herbert et al., 
2014: ii, my emphasis) or as a ‘hypothesis’ whose functionality is yet to be 
empirically demonstrated (Bergmans and Schröder, 2012). The reading of GD 
as an experiment or a hypothesis stems from the extremely long and slow 
geological, geochemical and geophysical processes as opposed to the short-
term experiments that are conducted to map and predict those processes in the 
present. Moreover, not all geochemical and geophysical processes are 
necessarily replicable in the lab. Thus, there will be knowledge gaps and the 
workability of the GDF cannot be guaranteed in the present. Rather than an 
established solution to the long-term management of nuclear wastes, GD 
should be treated as a ‘technology in the making’ (Bergmans, Landström and 
Schröder, 2014). Because of the discrepancy between the lifespan of nuclear 
waste and lab experiments, tens even hundreds of thousands of years need to 
pass until present-day models and calculations of the safety of GD are proven 
right or wrong. What Bergmans, Landström and Schröder mean by ‘GD as a 
technology in the making’, is that GD should not be posited as a singular end 
point for nuclear waste management. Instead, she claims, GD should be treated 
as a means to attain a safe option for the management of nuclear wastes in the 
long term. Because GD’s ability to deliver what it promises – a safe long-term 
future – cannot be guaranteed today or in the foreseeable future, GD should not 
be the sole policy aim, but a tool for reaching a safe future.  
 
By accepting GD as an open-ended experiment, as a means, but not 
necessarily the end, towards safety, Bergmans, Landström and Schröder posit, 
GD projects can draw from contestation. Instead of striving for consensus, 
controversies can be mobilised as a means of feeding technical democracy 
(Marres, 2005). This could also expand public and stakeholder engagement in 
																																								 																				
1	InSOTEC (International) Socio-Technical Challenges for implementing geological 
disposal) was an EU funded project that ran between 2011 and 2014 and aimed to 
identify the main socio-political challenges for implementing geological disposal and 
their interplay with technical challenges. 
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GD projects beyond the siting process to construction and operation phases, 
closure and post-closure. Similarly, Ibo van de Poel (2011) has argued that a 
focus on nuclear technology more broadly as an experiment could shift debates 
from the acceptance/rejection dichotomy towards a deliberation of the 
conditions and situations in which experiments with nuclear could be 
acceptable. Focusing on the situation of the experiments could be a way of 
sticking with them, instead of outrightly rejecting them. Treating GD as an open-
ended experiment, allowing space for debate and contestation, would work both 
as a means to increase democracy and public engagement in GD projects and 
also to create space for alternative futures and waste management solutions. 
 
Jantine Schröder (2016) has further expanded the idea of GD as a 
sociotechnical experiment, drawing on the work of van de Poel (2011). Van de 
Poel argues that the experimental nature of all nuclear power technologies 
makes it difficult to predict their risks before implementation. With regards to 
reactor technology this is because of the impossibility of testing disaster or 
accident scenarios, such as earthquakes, in realistic circumstances. Thus, 
models and simulations of accidents are based on unverifiable assumptions 
that cannot be fully tested until the reactor is operational, and the reactor’s 
resilience against earthquakes, for example, remains hypothetical.  
In this sense GD, van de Poel posits, is even more experimental than nuclear 
reactor technology. While future risks of GD have been estimated, significant 
uncertainties remain since many scenarios and paths of GDF evolution cannot 
be tested in the lab (e.g. Macfarlane and Ewing, 2006; Shrader-Frechette, 
1993). Uncertainties emerge, for example, from the impossibility to know 
geochemical and geophysical processes in the very long-term, but also from the 
impossibility of predicting how people in the (distant) future might relate to the 
GDF. Will they leave it alone? Will they be intrigued by it? While existing 
literature suggests that the predictability of the GD future is limited in the 
present and field tests cannot represent future real-life situations, empirical 
understanding is needed to gage how such limitations might affect the making 
of safety claims and arguments in a situation in which non-linear long-term 
developments a system are difficult to map, some hazards might be overlooked 
as wholly unimaginable or unthinkable, and GD retains its experimental 
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character. This thesis aims to trace some of the ways in which the UK and 
Finnish disposal cultures seek to make safety out of uncertainty. 
 
Uncertainty about the future, van de Poel argues, renders GD a social 
experiment. Social experiments, he notes, differ from ‘standard’ (scientific) 
experiments in three respects. First, social experiments do not take place in the 
lab. Rather, they are transported into the ‘real world’. Second, since they take 
place in the real world, social experiments might not be recognised as 
experiments; thus monitoring and data collection might be absent. Finally, the 
above reasons render social experiments less controllable than standard 
experiments. This makes it more difficult to contain hazards during the 
experiments, while it might be equally difficult to determinate experiments, 
which might have irreversible consequences. Drawing on van de Poel’s work, 
Schröder differentiates between standard and technological experiments, and 
further between standard and sociotechnical experiments. Technological 
experiments, Schröder posits, are less interested in ‘truth’ than in the 
application of artefacts and methods in ‘real life’ situations. According to her, 
technological experiments such as Posiva’s FISST (mentioned in the 
Introduction) aim to demonstrate the functioning of a technology. Yet, the 
difficulty of extrapolating from the lab to real life conditions inserts a gap 
between the production and application of knowledge, the development and 
implementation of technology. Thus, the implementation of GD precedes the 
verification of its functioning. This makes GD a technical experiment. 
 
What makes GD a sociotechnical experiment, Schröder observes, is the 
entanglement of the social and the technical that is absent from official 
representations of GD safety making. Official discourses on making safety and 
containment rely on delegating safety (Latour, 1992) to the GDF and on the 
absence of humans. Schröder maintains that while safety and the containment 
of nuclear waste is delegated to the GDF, the delegation can only work if 
humans agree to stay away from the GDF. While the GDF is passively doing 
safety, humans must refrain from engaging with the GDF in the future for the 
safety provision to be effective. Safety, in this sense, “is an interactional […] 
process that needs to be sustained, not only by the delegated but also by the 
‘delegator’ and its descendants” (Schröder, 2016: 698). In this reading, humans 
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are involved in the making of long-term GD safety by agreeing to remain away 
from the GDF. By highlighting GD as a ‘final’ and passive technology, the 
international nuclear waste community makes the delegation of safety clear. 
Humans are not expected to be involved in the (long-term) operation of the 
GDF. Safety is based on an imagination of nuclear waste “leaving the social 
world behind” (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 2005: 738), and on broader ‘world-
reduction’ (Jameson, 1975), as I will explore in Chapter 5.  
 
The obscuring of the role of the social in the making safety, Schröder posits, 
potentially jeopardises the delegation of safety, as it overlooks the responsibility 
of the delegator. Instead, approaching GD “as a ‘social experiment’ highlights 
the relevance of the social, human realm in contrast with the largely technical, 
nonhuman description of the technology by the international radwaste 
community” (Schröder, 2016: 669). In addition, conceptualising GD as a 
‘sociotechnical experiment’ sensitises us to the “implausible idea that once 
knowledge ha[s] determined plans and objects, then realisation w[ill] ensue 
without care and caution being necessary any more” (Latour, 2001:11). The 
notion of GD as an end point assumes that safety will readily follow and flow 
from knowledge and disposal plans. The conceptualisation of GD as an end 
point overlooks the complexity and the open-endedness and negotiability of 
safety making. Containment is not just the product of the passive safety 
provided by the EBS, but it is also made by the absence and lack of human 
involvement. In this sense, containment is a contract between present and 
future generations that can be made and unmade. Combined with the liveliness 
of waste, the potential to unmake containment through human intervention 
ensures that the notion of the GDF as the end point to nuclear waste can be 
contested. Appreciating GD as an experiment, rather than as an end point for 
nuclear waste (management), leaves space for alternative futures to emerge 
and for alternative sociotechnical combinations to produce containment and 
safety in the long-term.  
 
Closely connected to this idea of GD as an ‘on-going experiment’ is the notion 
of retrievability, which I will explore in Chapter 6. Retrievability is the ability to 
retrieve waste from the GDF after disposal. Together with reversibility (the 
ability to reverse decisions made during the implementation process), 
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retrievability allows space for alternative futures, should they emerge, and in 
this sense it can also be read as a potential extension of society’s control over 
nuclear waste. Retrievability and reversibility are means of dealing with 
uncertainty and can be mobilised in different ways. Pointing to the examples of 
France and Switzerland, Bergmans, Landström and Schröder (2014) note that 
in France reversibility is a political tool for managing uncertainty and 
maintaining sensitivity to changes in France’s nuclear waste inventory. In 
Switzerland, in contrast, retrievability is perceived as a technical translation of a 
social demand for dealing with uncertainties. The main argument for 
retrievability, however, is its provision of flexibility towards unexpected technical 
developments in the long-term management of nuclear waste. Even after the 
GDF is closed, retrievability fosters the potential for alternative futures to be 
made and enacted upon. Retrievability thus has the potential to blur the 
boundary between disposal and storage. By creating flexibility and potential for 
alternative futures, the notion of retrievability underlines the open-endedness of 
GD. In any case because of the exceptional timescales involved GD, Bergmans 
and Schröder (2012) argue, it is a more open-ended project than statements of 
technopolitical consensus around GD let through. 
 
The open-endedness and experimental nature of GD provide a starting point for 
the examination of GD as a form of future making. The longevity of the 
radioactive threat posed by nuclear waste necessitates its containment for 
multiple millennia, even for one million years. However, the very timescale of 
necessary containment escapes contemporary capacity to know the future and 
the safety claims made of the GDF’s ability to contain nuclear waste will not be 
verifiable in the foreseeable future. The deep future of GD, thus, extends to 
spaces beyond knowledge, and attempts to predict the future will always be 
characterised by uncertainty. Therefore it is imperative to trace how safety 
claims are made in situations characterised by uncertainty, and this is what I will 
do in this thesis.  
 
2.3 Future as the end of certainty 
Al Gore (2013) has described the future as the end of certainty. The deeper into 
the future we look, the greater the uncertainties become (Adam, 2008). 
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Technologies often exert unintended consequences; they synchronise a range 
of elements and occasionally form new systems. This makes futures 
unpredictable (Urry, 2016). Adam and Groves (2007) posit that while the ability 
of contemporary society to create futures is unparalleled, our ability to know 
futures is dismal. Yet, the effects of future making in contemporary societies 
extend further and deeper into the future than ever before. Think nuclear for 
example. Nuclear technology is by definition connected to geological 
timescales, both in terms of its past and future. With the necessity to mine and 
refine naturally radioactive ores and minerals, and to dispose of wastes, 
contemporary society engages with a timescale beyond human understanding 
through nuclear technology. Ordinary practices of future making such as 
forecasting, technology assessment, backcasting and roadmapping (Borup et 
al., 2006; Rappert, 1999) are too limited in scope when it comes to making 
futures through GD. John Urry has noted that future making often “involves the 
assumption of ‘business as usual’ [that] involves seeing some feature of the 
present as the mechanism in how people’s lives will predictably unfold in the 
future” (Urry, 2016: 95). Such an approach to future making is incompatible with 
GD that extends well beyond human times and experience. Moreover, what 
makes GD an interesting case of future making is that “risks are not only the 
possible results but the given point of departure of innovation: the waste is 
there, making its management inevitable and the principle desirability of 
innovation incontestable” (Schröder, 2016: 690-1). GD future making begins 
from the future and (future) risks, which exert their influence in and on the 
present. It is the incompatibility between human and nuclear times – the 
eventual loss of human ‘control’ or ability to manage nuclear waste in the long 
term – that impels action in the present. Morton, for instance, posits “the future 
of plutonium exerts a causal influence on the present, casting its shadow 
backward through time. All kinds of options are no longer thinkable without a 
deliberate concealment of the reality of radioactive objects” (Morton, 2013: 
120). Like Schröder, Morton argues that nuclear waste and waste futures 
demand action in the present. Waste and waste futures demand fairly particular 
action, since ‘business-as-usual’, continuing surface storage, is no longer 
regarded as a reasonable course of action. Inaction, in Morton’s reading, can 
be justified only through deliberately ignoring the risks and hazards of nuclear 
waste matters. Moreover, with risk as the starting point for action, courses of 
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action become limited. Nuclear waste then impels ‘us’ to treat them in particular 
ways to protect the liveable world from the risk of radiation. Nuclear waste 
“forcefully exert[s] […] the imperative” to do something about them (ibid.: 67).  
 
Drawing from Morton, nuclear waste can be conceptualised a hyperobject. The 
notion of hyperobject refers to things (such as climate change or nuclear waste) 
that are distributed in spacetime beyond the human scale. They occupy a “high-
dimensional phase space that results in their being invisible to humans for 
stretches of time” (ibid.: 1). Hyperobjects such as nuclear waste are sticky; they 
will “never leave us alone” (Morton, 2011: 82). They transcend space and time 
and underline the fragility of all entities. They do not respect boundaries 
humans have so carefully constructed between different entities, times and 
spaces. Rather hyperobjects readjust our sense of proximity to each other and 
other entities and “force us into an intimacy with our own death (because they 
are toxic), with others (because everyone is affected by them), and with the 
future (because they are massively distributed in time)” (Morton, 2013: 139). 
Because of “temporal foreshortening”, the radical discrepancy between nuclear 
waste and human lifespans, nuclear waste is “impossible to handle just right. 
This aporia gives rise to a dilemma: we have no time to learn fully about [them]. 
But we have to handle them anyway” (ibid.: 139). Facing this necessity, it is 
important to consider what kinds of futures nuclear waste as a hyperobject 
impels societies to envision and implement. What kinds of relationships and 
ontologies does nuclear waste imply in the present and the future – and for the 
future? What kind of future making is possible with and through nuclear waste 
(or GD), when nuclear waste transcends human existence and extends to the 
humanely unknowable future? These are some of the questions this thesis 
seeks to answer.  
 
Thus far, drawing on literatures on futures, GD and hyperobjects, I have 
proposed that futures are made in the present. Morton has argued that 
hyperobjects such as nuclear waste “exert[s] downward causal pressure on 
shorter-lived entities”	 (Morton, 2013: 139). Humans are left to grapple with 
futures in the present. As such, futures also organise the present. George 
Marcus, for instance, notes how scientists are “constantly trying to understand 
the present by borrowing from a cautiously imagined emergent future” (Marcus, 
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1995a: 4). Scientific imaginations, Joan Fujimura (2003) concurs, are visions of 
future possibilities around which scientific communities and practices organise. 
Future imaginations can mobilise resources from the national policy level to 
research networks, research groups and individual researchers. The future and 
imaginations about the future can inform the course of action in the present by 
facilitating network formation, dissemination of knowledge (Brown and Michael 
2003), and by shaping shared understandings of what kinds of futures are 
possible or desirable (Groves, 2013; Jasanoff and Kim, 2009). In this way, the 
future can be seen as a powerful agent in the present. Through speculations 
such as ‘what the future will bring’ or ‘what the future will be like’ societies 
project agency to the future in the present (Brown, Rappert and Webster, 2000). 
In contrast to the assertion of the non-existence of a perfect future in The 
Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (see the beginning of the chapter), 
contemporary society tends to see the future as a space where things are 
perfected – the future portrayed as a ‘fancier version’ of the present (Marvin, 
1990; Urry, 2016). The future is conceptualised as a space where the problems 
of the past are solved and wrongs a righted (Michael, 2000). GD is a case in 
point. GD explicitly imagines and seeks to produce a future that is safe, 
something that ‘business-as-usual’ storage arrangements cannot provide in the 
long-term. The UK RWM’s (the body responsible for the delivery of UK GDF) 
vision is a “safer future by managing radioactive waste effectively, to protect 
people and the environment” (RWM, 2015: 3, my emphasis). Safe GD futures 
are imagined in the present by contrasting GD with current nuclear waste 
management practices, namely surface storage. Storage and the aboveground, 
as I will illustrate in Chapter 5, are construed riskier as a technology and space 
than the GDF and the underground. In relation to the present situation then, the 
future as imagined through GD is seen as a space where things are improved, 
problems are solved and risks replaced by safety.  
 
Adam and Groves remind us that making futures is simple. Everything we do 
sets futures in motion, yet these ‘futures in motion’ are not predefined or 
determined – rather they are real unrealised present possibilities. Our actions in 
the present inform what futures are possible, and how they might unfold. While 
everything can be seen to set futures in motion, knowing these futures in the 
fullness of their effects is challenging. The effects of nuclear future making for 
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instance are increasingly dispersed in time and space. Knowing and predicting 
the effects of nuclear radiation is difficult, as they can be latent and emerge 
independently of their sites of production. Nuclear things, Adam and Groves 
(2007) note, have the capacity to foreshorten, spoil and eliminate futures. In the 
Nuclear Age, continuity is no longer a given. The Nuclear Age, as we noted in 
section 2.1, has been conceptualised as End Time (Anders, 1962): an era 
where the elimination of future is a potent, present possibility. Here, disruption 
(sometimes deadly) becomes a collective potential. Nuclear future making 
always contains a nuclear risk, always contains the risk of a future taken or 
spoiled. 
 
Adam and Groves differentiate between future taking and future making and 
trace the difference between future taking and making through the relationship 
between ethics, action and knowledge (see Figure 4). Future taking, they hold, 
focuses on the short-term. Here, responsibility is tied to knowledge – meaning 
that we are only responsible for those consequences of our actions that can be 
known or predicted in advance. We (can) “take a chance, hoping to be excused 
from moral blame if it can be demonstrated that the future consequences of our 
actions at the time could not have been ‘reasonably foreseen’” (Owen et al., 
2013: 28). In future taking the unknowability of the future justifies actions in the 
present and forgives the potential negative futures consequences of actions 
taken in the present. The future here is imagined through and as the property of 
the present, as present future. The notion of present future treats the future, 
from the standpoint of the present, as an empty space to be colonised and 
moulded by the present. On the other hand, we have future making. Here, the 
distribution of responsibility changes. Our responsibility flows directly from our 
actions rather than from the known or predictable consequences of these 
actions. 
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Figure 4. Future taking and future making (Adapted from Adam and Groves, 2007) 
 
This is where responsibility is no longer tied to knowledge. Rather, our 
responsibility flows directly from our actions regardless of whether we can 
predict or not their future consequences. Morton has weighed the responsibility 
of the present to the distant future. He argues that our responsibility to extends 
directly to the unimaginably vast multi-millennial futures, because our “smallest 
action now will affect that time in profound ways” (Morton, 2013: 60). He argues 
that ecological awareness, a flat ontology (see section 2.4 below), compels us 
to think about the ‘future future’, the distant times we cannot know. Ecological 
awareness increases our intimacy with greater number of beings than the 
human, and vaster times than the present. While ecological awareness in the 
first instance stands for the denial of human exceptionalism, it is also the 
rejection of the preeminence of the present. While the future imagined through 
GD is distant, nuclear waste has brought it nearer. Nuclear waste has, in a 
sense, created equivalence between the present and the future. Although the 
future is strange, it exists in an intimate relationship with the present. We can 
never fully know or experience the future or account for it, yet the ethics of 
nuclear future making guide our doings towards the very distant, unknowable, 
future (Morton, 2013). In place of a present future of future taking we, thus, 
have a future present.  
 
The notion of future present, Adam and Groves hold, “positions us with 
reference to potential impacts of present actions on future generations who 
have to cope with the consequences of our inventions and interventions” (Adam 
and Groves, 2007: 176). A future present is a space owned by future 
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generations in which we are mere trespassers. Unlike present futures that are 
out there waiting for us to colonise them, the notion of future present highlights 
that the future has its own present. It is already occupied. In a future present 
we, the present generations, “require forgiveness from successors for our future 
making (ibid.: 169). In tune with Morton, Adam and Groves argue that “knowing 
ourselves to be dependent on forgiveness from successors for the unintended 
consequences of our actions becomes important, as it induces an approach to 
the future that is tempered by responsibility to others as yet unborn” (ibid.: 170). 
While Morton argues that hyperobjects such as nuclear waste create 
equivalence between the present and the future, Adam and Groves remind us 
that in order to care for the future and to carry responsibility for future times, we 
need to appreciate that we, nonetheless, are in an asymmetrical, non-reciprocal 
relationship with future generations. Despite the intimate relationship between 
the present and the future, the future nonetheless is a stranger. We will never 
know it firsthand, but this does not mean that we are not responsible for it. The 
standpoint of a future present enables us to trace our actions to their ends and 
to appreciate our responsibility for their latent effects. With the shift from present 
futures to future presents, responsibility is not tied to the known, but to non-
knowledge. The unknowability of the future no longer absolves us from 
responsibility. Rather responsibility needs to flow directly from action. Doing, 
rather than knowing, implies and implicates the responsible. Doing together with 
the hyperobjectivity of nuclear waste, ensures that nuclear future making has 
“become a cosmopolitan endeavour” (Adam and Groves, 2007: 184). When the 
effects of our actions traverse beyond knowledge, responsibility becomes 
grounded in social debate. Instead of knowledge, social debate and ethical 
judgements of right and wrong guide future making.  
 
The epistemic and ontological challenge in making futures through GD is that 
nuclear waste is not forever, but instead offers a very a large finitude (Morton, 
2013), a very distant future. Morton argues that in a sense thinking about 
‘forever’ is easier than thinking about very large finitude. “Forever”, he writes, 
“makes you feel important. One hundred thousand years makes you wonder 
whether you can imagine one hundred thousand anything” (ibid.: 60). Very long 
timescales are abstract and thus difficult understand. Whereas forever has 
certain certainty to it, the deep future, the one million years of containment 
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necessitated by the long timescale of nuclear waste and international standard 
practices, is beyond predictability or ethical and political calculations. Nuclear 
waste is futural. It demands that we carry responsibility not only for the known 
consequences of our actions, but also for our doings in the present regardless 
of our ability to know the futures we make. Nuclear waste swaps the certainty of 
the now to an uncertain future and challenges common sense 
conceptualisations of time.  
 
Deep future 
John McPhee coined the term ‘deep time’ in 1981. The term highlights the 
“apparent insignificance of the span of human existence in the face of 
geological process” (Fearnley et al., 2017). The geological timescale does not 
open up instinctively. It is difficult to grasp and short-term perspectives and 
visions of futures and societal challenges have often been dominated by 
economics and politics. Accordingly, Stephen Jay Gould holds that the 
geological time presents a timescale so vast that humans struggle to 
understand it. He muses that while “an abstract, intellectual understanding of 
deep time comes easily enough - I know how many zeroes to place after the 10 
when I mean billions. Getting it into the gut is quite another matter. Deep time is 
so alien that we can really only comprehend it as metaphor” (Gould, 1987: 3). 
Deep time is at odds with the pace of everyday life and everyday experiences of 
time. Yet, as we saw in section 2.2, short-term perspectives of time will not do 
with GD. In order to make safe futures through GD, we have to try and foster 
geoscientific understandings of time. The ethics of hyperobjects such as 
nuclear waste, Morton writes, “is directed toward the unknown and unknowable 
future” (Morton, 2013: 123). The future of nuclear waste is not one we can 
predict accurately, but a ”future future that is radically unknowable” (ibid.: 61). 
Nuclear waste lives, evolves and decays on a geological timescale. In contrast 
to human existence, it operates in deep time – and thus demands a move away 
from short-termism. 
 
Deep time is beginning to have tangible material meanings outside 
geosciences. A few centuries ago, concern about the planet’s material state in a 
millennium might have seemed misplaced. Now, with nuclear waste to be 
disposed of and with oceans littered with plastic, the fragility of the planet, the 
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effects of human activity are being brought to the fore. “Not only is our species 
increasingly vulnerable to the geologic”, Elizabeth Ellsworth and Jamie Kruse 
write, “we also have become agents of planetary geologic change” (Ellsworth 
and Kruse, 2012: 8). Unsurprisingly, perhaps, a number of artists, designers, 
and philosophers have been inspired by deep time and are now describing it 
and engaging with it through their work. The Long Now Foundation was 
established to “provide a counterpoint to today’s accelerating culture and […] to 
foster responsibility in the framework of the next 10,000 years” (Brand, n.a.). 
Together with the Long Now Foundation art initiatives such as Nuclear Futures 
(2017) that originated in Australia, The Nuclear Culture Source Book 
(Carpenter, 2016), exhibitions such as Perpetual Uncertainty: Art in the Nuclear 
Anthropocene curated by Ele Carpenter and currently touring Europe, and the 
documentary Into Eternity: A film for the future by Michael Madsen (2010) have 
began to visualise and imagine the effects of nuclear activities deep into the 
future, but also to situate geological time as a condition of the present. While 
social scientific literature is increasingly engaging with the geological timescale 
of GD, it has, for long, been surprisingly quite about deep time (Bloomfield and 
Vurdubakis, 2005; Ialenti, 2014a, 2014b). Similarly, futures and posthuman 
studies and the sociology of time have mentioned nuclear radiation or waste 
only in passing (e.g. Adam, 2008; Morton, 2013). Much of the existing literature 
on the future of GD focuses on the challenges of communicating nuclear threat, 
across millennia, cultures, languages and generations (e.g. Benford, 2000; 
Piette, 2016; Sebeok, 1984). 
 
Kristin Shrader-Frechette (1993; 2005) has addressed GD issues from 
intergenerational responsibility to the epistemological ability of modeling 
practices to predict multi-millennial timescales. Paul Bloomfield and Theo 
Vurdubakis (2005), conversely, have presented the Yucca Mountain disposal 
project in the US as a case study for processes of boundary making pushed to 
extremes. Vincent Ialenti (2014a) has examined the relationship between GD 
pasts, presents and futures further. Focusing on the Yucca Mountain project, he 
has proposed GD as a space where “relations between the living societies of 
the present and the unborn societies imagined to inhabit distant future worlds 
are invented and reinvented” (Ialenti, 2014a: 41). His work examines how the 
US nuclear waste regime draws on familiar legal figures and tripartite rule-facts-
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judge adjudicatory relation from the past to demonstrate repository safety in 
regulatory horizons that extend up to a million years into the future. Elsewhere, 
Ialenti (2014b) notes how the nuclear waste safety experts are equally, if not 
more, preoccupied with short-term project deadlines and temporalities of daily 
life than the very long future of the disposal project. The long future, he 
observes, faded into the shadows as shorter term horizons of career stages, 
five-year plans, contingency plans, funding politics, deadlines and so on 
captured his participants’ imaginations more vividly. The conclusion Ialenti 
draws from his ethnographic work is that “the short-term futures of project 
funding politics and the inner-workings of multidisciplinary scientific 
collaborations […] are worthy of much greater social scientific scrutiny” (ibid.). 
He notes further that a sensitivity to the nuances of shorter term challenges, 
such as retirements or career-changes of key personnel, training and 
intergenerational knowledge transfer, helps to illuminate how unexpected 
events in the present can “potentially shake nuclear waste management 
projects’ stabilities” (ibid.). This, by extension, can shake the ability to make 
safe futures through GD. Paying attention to these contemporary events and 
challenges, and how they intertwine with the multi-millennial timescapes of GD 
can begin to sensitise us to some of the ways in which the presents and futures 
of GD are in an intimate relationship (Adam, 1998).  
 
Despite the increasing attention to deep time and the future of GD, existing 
work speaks little of the material encounters and makings of deep time. In his 
discussion of deep time as an anthropological problem, Richard Irvine notes 
how late 18th century geologists ‘forcefully’ advocated fieldwork as the “only way 
to come to terms with the ‘huge solid facts’ of mountain ranges, volcanoes, 
rivers and their drainage basins” (Irvine, 2014: 163). “Physical and sensual 
encounters with the landscape”, Irvine notes, “were coming to be seen as 
essential [for] truly grasp[ing] the scale of the processes at work” (ibid.). 
Situated encounters with geological evidence, then, were considered the main 
avenue for understanding and producing knowledge about deep time. Thus, 
Irvine argues, deep time “is not purely an abstraction to be calculated, but a 
phenomenal experience to be encountered in the field” (ibid.: 170). Not just an 
abstraction or a metaphor, as Gould proposed, deep time is something that can 
be observed, and traced in geological formations. It is something that can be 
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touched, something that affects us visually and tactually. How deep time is 
construed can, then, be conceptualised as an anthropological or sociological 
problem. 
 
In this thesis, I move from deep time to deep future and examine the making of 
the deep future through GD projects. The problem with deep future is that “it is 
long [in] time and short in detail” (Cocks, 2003: xiv). At the heart of this thesis, 
then, is a concern about how the deep future and knowledge about the deep 
future are made in the present. I will propose that deep future is made, 
encountered and experienced in the lab, in the field and in public documents. I 
borrow the term deep future from the science fiction writer Stephen Baxter. I 
prefer the notion of deep future to that deep time as a way of underscoring the 
‘non-factual’ and ‘factual’ conceptualisations of futures and pasts in general 
(Adam and Groves, 2007). Where deep time, as Earth’s past, is situated in the 
realm of the factual, traceable and knowable, and as such is used to inform 
attempts to know the deep future, the deep future itself sits more solidly in the 
field of the speculative and the imaginative. Rather than limiting the deep future 
to time, I work it in all its spatiotemporal depth and propose that the future of GD 
is deep because it is unknowable, but also made unknowable. The future of GD 
is deep because it is out of reach 
 
• Temporally: we simply cannot know such as vast time period, it escapes 
our knowledge making practices, and 
• Spatially: the whole logic of disposal is based on designing an 
unreachable, undisturbed future underground. 
 
GD aims to make an unreachable and undisturbable future. Claims about the 
safety of GD rest on the notion of ‘defence in depth’ (Tweed, Ellis and 
Whittleston, 2015). Depth, in spatial terms, as we will explore in Chapter 5, is 
mobilised as a vital safety factor, as the underground is constructed as a safer 
and more predicable space than the aboveground. On the other hand, in a 
temporal sense, depth decreases certainty. The deeper the future GD projects 
seek to map in the present, the greater the unreliability and inaccuracy of the 
knowledge produced. The deep future of GD escapes beyond the verifiable, the 
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visible, the human. Thus to map the making of the deep future we must adopt a 
flat ontology, which is what I will turn my attention now. 
 
2.4 The end of the world as we know it 
Jamie Kruse (2012) notes that we are slowly beginning to appreciate the forces 
that extend to and from the deep underground, and the relevance of such 
forces beyond human time. Discussing the 2011 Fukushima accident as the 
effect of unimagined and unprepared for geological forces, she notes how the 
design of the Fukushima power plant, together with the earthquake and the 
tsunami coproduced repercussions into the distant future. In a brief instance, 
infrastructure that usually supports society through energy production was 
shaken into nuclear waste. The management of the power plant became a 
matter of managing the multi-millennial effects of nuclear technology 
(Molyneux-Hodgson and Hietala, 2016).  
 
The effects of nuclear technology, be they accidents or waste matter, connect 
nuclear technology to geological timescales. The effects of nuclear technology 
cannot be bound in space and time, but rather they create a global community 
of beings (Adam, 2008). Nuclear radiation treats all entities it encounters 
symmetrically, and contaminates indiscriminately in time and space. As, such it 
is perhaps the closest society has got to the stuff of modernity (Latour, 1992). 
Radiation works invisibly from within, it is knowable only to cells beyond the 
detection capacity of senses. Radiation operates in ‘complex temporalities and 
time-space configurations’ and its timescale “exceeds human capability and 
concern” (Adam, 2008: 193) As such, radiation can be described as a 
hyperobject, as we saw above. It transcends, time, space and human capacity 
to know it. Nuclear radiation, as a hyperobject, does not differentiate between 
things, times and spaces, and so “there will be no “away” towards which we can 
throw” nuclear waste (Morton, 2011: 82). Instead, we need a “flat ontology in 
which there are no ideological twists and bends to carry away our physical and 
philosophical waste into some illusory beyond” (ibid., emphasis in the original).  
 
Nuclear radiation, Morton argues, heralds the end of the world as we know it. 
Radiation treats entities it encounters symmetrically, and humans need to adopt 
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a similarly symmetrical approach to the world. To make and to map the making 
of safe deep futures, humans need to let go of the hierarchies and separations 
we are so familiar with. Our view of the world, Morton argues is ‘landscaped’. It 
relies on the separation of the underground and the aboveground, nature and 
culture. Conceptualising the aboveground or landscape as ‘the world’ ignores 
the fact that landscape “depends on things like underground oil and gas pipes” 
(Morton, 2013: 106). The imagination of landscape-as-world ignores that the 
world is produced; the landscape “is an aesthetic construction” (ibid.) that relies 
on the invisibilisation of sociotechnical systems such as pipes. The imagination 
of landscape-as-world distinguishes between a foreground and a background. It 
presents the world as a container in which our lives take place. In contrast, in a 
flat ontology backgrounds and foregrounds dissolve; no place is special relative 
to another place. By letting go of the notion of landscape-as-world and by 
adopting a flat ontology, Morton argues, we have “the prospect of forging new 
alliances between humans and non-humans alike, now that we have stepped 
out of the cocoon of world” (ibid.). 
 
Such a flat ontology, the collation of the aboveground and the underground, is 
what GD projects seek to avoid (Schröder, 2016). As we shall see later on, GD 
safety is constructed around the separation and contrast between the 
aboveground and underground. Social scientists, as we saw in section 2.2, 
have argued that GD safety is made through sociotechnical combinations 
(Schröder, 2016). GD safety, Schröder for instance has argued, rests on what 
happens both underground and aboveground. Catharina Landström and Anne 
Bergmans posit that in designing the GDF one of the most obvious needs is “to 
develop a 3D spatial understanding to account for underground processes in 
relation to local planning and development” (Landström and Bergmans, 2015: 
387). Hosting a GDF, they observe, changes the spatial organisation of a 
community. Through hosting, the community extends from the surface to the 
underground, while simultaneously the underground comes to exert its 
influence on the surface. The rigid distinction between the aboveground and the 
underground becomes blurred. Landström and Bergmans ground their 
argument on Kiruna, a mining town established in Northern Sweden in 1900. 
Originally Kiruna was built a safe distance from the mine, yet over time mining 
operations have caused cracks to emerge on the surface and streets of the 
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town. Because of these cracks, parts of the town are being relocated. The 
underground has come to assert its influence on the aboveground by extending 
its geological forces and ignoring aboveground attempts at worlding and 
organising society. What the Kiruna example aptly shows is the dissolution of 
the separation of the world into a foreground and background, aboveground 
and underground. It shows how the geological can shape everyday lives 
(Bennett, 2010). It shows the geological as a ‘thing-become-force’; that can act 
and ‘strike back’ in irreversible and far-reaching ways (Kruse, 2012). With the 
cracking of the streets of Kiruna, the notion of living in a world loses its 
meaningfulness. Instead of thinking ourselves as being in the world, Haraway 
(2016) posits, we should think of ourselves as being of the world. Appreciating 
that humans, like everything else, are beings of the world (rather than beings in 
the world) enables us to bring in the missing masses (Latour, 1992); to adopt a 
flat ontology and to treat different entities and beings symmetrically as required 
by responsible future making. If we are to prolong the End Time there is a need 
become-with and compose-with other earthlings and things (Haraway, 2016). 
There is a need to let go of hierarchies, initiate and accept the end of the world-
the-container. To understand the entanglements in the making of GD safety and 
futures, we need to let go of the exceptionalism of the human present. It is past 
time, Haraway argues, that we as humans understand that no single species 
acts alone. Rather, combinations of organic and inorganic beings make worlds 
and futures. 
 
The invisibility of radiation, its effects that are untied to the time and spaces of 
production posit radiation as a phenomenon that escapes traditional Western 
definitions of the ‘real’, ways of knowing, and relating to the material world. In its 
corrosive, invisible vitality, radiation creates new ways of being, living and dying 
with unexpected company on a damaged planet (Haraway, 2016; Tsing, 2016). 
Accepting that company as a companion to whom human responsibility and 
care is extended signals new interspecies and intergenerational ways of relating 
in time and space. At the end of the world, Morton argues, “we are no longer 
able to think history as exclusively human” (Morton, 2013: 5), and Haraway 
concurs that we are living in “times of multispecies” (Haraway, 2016: 35).  
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2.5 Research questions 
I In this chapter I focused on the need to begin with endings (the future as the 
end of certainty, the end of the world as we know it, GD itself as an end) as a 
starting point for tracing the making of futures through GD. I discussed the 
concepts of care, sociotechnical experiments, disposal as a temporal category, 
nuclear waste as a hyperobject, deep futures and future making. What these 
concepts share is a concern with time, the future as well as with matters of 
responsibility. They highlight the uncertainty and situatedness of future making 
and GD as a form of future making, and provide the starting assumptions and 
theoretical framework underpinning this thesis. 
 
Following Morton (2013), I have here discussed nuclear waste as a 
hyperobject. Morton describes hyperobjects as things that are “massively 
distributed in time and space relative to humans” (ibid.: 1). Expanding into times 
and spaces beyond and without the human, nuclear waste has a future 
unknowable to humans. Yet disposal cultures (see Chapter 3) have been 
tasked with mapping and predicting that future. This distribution of nuclear 
waste in time and space beyond human experience and knowledge imposes 
challenges and introduces uncertainties to its management and the making of 
safety into the very distant future. It connects with Adam and Groves’ (2007) 
concern and distinction between future making and future taking. This 
distinction flags the precariousness of the making of futures that often has 
unintended consequences (Urry, 2016).  
 
The concern with GD is that some of these consequences cannot be known in 
the present. This is what the concept of sociotechnical experiments (Landström 
and Bergmans, 2015) explicitly highlights. It helps to challenge the notions of 
‘closure’ and ‘permanence’ mobilised by the international nuclear waste 
community to describe and justify GD. Instead, sociotechnical experiments 
points to the distribution of nuclear waste into the deep future and to the 
impossibility to accurately map and predict that future. The concept, thus, 
directs attention to the inevitable uncertainty of future making through GD – 
and, against the international waste community, encourages GD to be 
approached as an alternative rather than the alternative to producing and 
maintaining a safe future. 
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Finally, future making through GD can also be understood through the notion of 
‘care’, following Tronto’s (1993) definition of care as everything we do to 
maintain a liveable world. Taking care of nuclear waste in official imaginations 
around GD is closely intertwined with visions of making safe futures. However, 
care, as was earlier, is a selective mode of attention and action. Plans to take 
care of nuclear waste through GD focus efforts to the implementation of a 
particular technological solution to the nuclear waste management challenge, 
and exclude other alternatives. In this sense, the notion of care can perhaps be 
seen as opposite to the concept of sociotechnical experiment. Yet, both 
concepts encourage us to ask questions about responsibility and about the 
kinds of futures envisioned to emerge through GD. In the first instance, they 
encourage us to question whether it is possible to take care of a hyperobject 
(nuclear waste) that will inevitably outlive systems and practices of care. What 
does safety mean and how is it argued for, if disposal is just a temporary 
sociomaterial configuration or an experiment rather than a ‘permanent’ 
solution? What kinds of futures are envisioned through GD? What kinds of 
futures and whose futures are at stake in the implementation of GD?  
 
The concepts and literatures I have reviewed here provide a conceptual and 
theoretical framework for this thesis. They illuminate the openendedness and 
uncertainty of making (very distant) futures and underscore the need for a flat 
ontology for tracing the making of the very distant future through GD. Utilising 
these concepts, the overall aim of the thesis is to explore how the UK and 
Finnish disposal cultures make safe futures through GD. This aim will be 
investigated through the following research questions:  
 
• How has nuclear waste been imagined in the Finnish and UK disposal 
cultures? 
• How is safety made, into the deep, uncertain future? 
• How are geological disposal, and the future, imagined within the Finnish 
and UK disposal cultures? 
 
In the following chapter, I outline the research process I followed to answer 
these questions and explain how I addressed the overall aim of the thesis.  
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3 THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 
If anyone wanted ter find out some stuff, all they’d have ter do would 
be ter follow the spiders. That’d lead ‘em right! 
- JK Rowling, Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets 
 
‘Following the actors’ (Latour, 1987) is a canonical methodological trope in 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) and a method of investigation I relied 
on in this study. Following the actors to ‘find out some stuff’ has some 
implications. The imagination of following the actors requires practical choices 
from the ethnographer. Firstly, we need to define the ‘actor’. Who and/or what 
are they? Secondly, we need to decide how, where and how far to follow actors. 
Despite the centrality of the notion, following the actors has remained a fairly 
vague methodological guidepost. Attila Bruni (2005) has noted that over the 
years little methodological guidance has been produced on how the imagination 
of following the actors can be translated into a practical method of investigation 
– particularly so if the actors to be followed are nonhuman. Additionally, 
following actors implies movement and dynamism that can be seen to 
problematise the field in some ways. How do we define our ‘field’ or is it defined 
for us by the movement of the actors? How far can and should we follow them 
within the constraints of the field and our own research? 
 
To answer the first questions about actors, I observe the principle of symmetry 
that is central to actor network approaches (Callon, 1984). In the above 
paragraph, I already mention the notion of nonhuman actors that can be 
anything from spiders to flying cars and laptops. The principle of symmetry does 
not presume difference between humans and nonhumans, but treats these 
differences as relational. An actor can be anything doing something in a 
situation. Tommaso Venturini (2010) holds that the best way to identify an actor 
is to ask whether their absence or presence in a situation would make a 
difference in that situation. If yes, and if the difference is perceived by other 
actors, the entity is an actor in that situation. As a means of following nonhuman 
actors I traced them across documentary and interview data, but I also engaged 
in ‘body-work’ (Myers, 2008, 2012) in the UK lab where I conducted part of my 
fieldwork. I was delegated some basic lab work within the scientific lab that was 
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the focus of fieldwork, which enabled my direct engagement with nonhuman 
actors. Instead of solely relying on the descriptions by scientists and my 
observations of situations as a form of knowing, my body-work enabled different 
ways of knowing the world I was mapping. It put the principle of symmetry to 
use in practice. While the combination of body-work and more conventional 
ways of seeing allowed for different ways of knowing and thinking about the 
field, there were times when the field constrained what it was possible for me to 
know, how and to what extent I could follow the actors in physical settings. I will 
discuss some of the issues stemming from these limitations further below in 
sections 3.3 and 3.8.  
 
In this chapter, then, I will explore some of the practicalities of fieldwork and 
some of my field experiences. I will not detail every aspect of those 
experiences. Nor will I provide a fully comparative account of the experiences in 
the UK and Finland. Rather, I will pick out and illuminate instances of analytical 
and experiental significance. I will, however, begin with a discussion of some 
methodological tools I develop in this thesis and through which I managed the 
comparative aspect of this project. 
 
3.1 A comparative methodology 
This is a comparative study. How the trajectories of the UK and Finnish GD 
projects have become so different is an overarching concern of this thesis. As 
cases for comparison, the Finnish and UK GD projects align with Sheila 
Jasanoff’s criteria of being “different enough to present interesting contrasts, yet 
similar enough for the variations to be disciplined” (Jasanoff, 2005: 29). 
Although it is unclear what will happen after the UK’s departure from the 
European Union, the two GD projects continue to operate within the same 
policy framework laid out by the 2011 EU Directive on the long-term 
management of nuclear waste, for now. The framework is supported by an 
international consensus that predates the Directive by decades and holds GD 
as the best available option for the long-term management of nuclear waste. On 
a country level the Finnish GD project is currently one of the most advanced in 
the world, while the UK’s project has been stumbling for decades. In line with 
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Jasanoff’s criteria, we can surmise that the UK and Finnish GD projects offer 
fertile ground for a comparative study.  
 
Disposal cultures 
Explicitly pointing to the difference between the two projects at this point might 
appear to be at odds with what I am going to discuss below: differences as a 
relational effect of particular and situated sociomaterial doings. During an 
interview one of my participants voiced concerns over the comparative aspect 
of my study. 
 
Each country is different. They cannot be compared to each other or 
any other country. So, please don’t fall into the trap, we read this all 
the time, that ‘oh, Finland has done this and other countries, they 
cannot do it, because this and that’. Every country has it’s own thing, 
story, history. 
 
What emerges from her concern is an interpretation of difference as an 
explanatory category. In that interpretation, historical and cultural differences 
explain the differing progress of national GD projects. From that perspective, a 
comparative study of GD projects can be seen as unproductive and offering 
little new knowledge. Where the participant above saw cultural considerations 
as prohibitive of comparison, other participant scientists and engineers sought 
to explain Finnish ‘success’ and UK stumbles through material differences such 
as the comparative scale and complexity of nuclear waste inventories or 
existing nuclear infrastructures. What I will posit in this thesis is that all of these 
are effects of different sociomaterial doings that are accomplished by disposal 
cultures. Neither material nor cultural differences can categorically explain 
successes or stumbles in the implementation of GD, so an alternate approach 
needed to be developed.  
 
The imagination of disposal cultures draws on Karen Knorr Cetina’s 
conceptualisation of epistemic cultures. She describes epistemic cultures as 
“amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms – bonded through affinity, 
necessity and historical coincidence – which, in a given field, make up how we 
know what we know” (Knorr Cetina, 1999: 1, emphasis in the original). 
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Epistemic cultures have their own sociomaterial realities. How they create 
knowledge emerges from situated arrangements and mechanisms. Similarly, 
disposal cultures are situated compositions and composers of particular forms 
of knowledge and knowing in the nuclear waste realm. As effects of particular 
sociomaterial entanglements, disposal cultures have no explanatory power. As 
such, exploring GD future making through the lens of disposal cultures enables 
the researcher to focus on situated practices of knowledge and future making, 
instead of using national differences as explanatory categories. 
 
Diffraction 
As a relational analytical device, disposal cultures have an inbuilt diffractionist 
sensitivity. Diffraction does not give explanatory power to difference. Instead of 
beginning any analysis from differences, diffraction charts how the effects of 
difference emerge through entanglements and situated doings. In the world of 
physics, diffraction describes a physical phenomenon that is unique to wave 
behaviour. It refers to the way in which waves ‘bend’ when they encounter an 
obstacle, and how waves ‘combine’ when they overlap. A familiar everyday 
example of diffraction is the overlapping of ripples when a stone has been 
dropped into still water. Donna Haraway, in her own words, ‘invented’ diffraction 
as a semantic trope in its sociological use to “record the history of interaction, 
interference, reinforcement and difference” (Haraway, 1997: 14, 273). 
Diffraction “attends to the relational nature of difference; it does not figure 
difference as either matter of essence or inconsequential” (Barad, 2007: 72). 
Diffraction is a departure from the more reflective approach to comparative 
studies. Reflexivity, as an optical metaphor and mostly used in discussions on 
researchers’ ethical and analytical sensitivities, presumes difference. It 
establishes difference between the researcher and the researched, between 
cultures and practices as a starting point to comparison. While reflective 
accounts take differences into account, they do not (necessarily) map the 
emergence of difference. Therefore, rather than using the UK and Finland as 
mirrors to each other to reflect on their similarities and differences, I turn to the 
metaphor of diffraction as a comparative tool. Drawing on Haraway and the 
philosopher-physicist Nils Bohr, Karen Barad (2007) posits that diffraction is 
both an object and a method of exploration: 
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At times diffraction phenomena will be an object of investigation and 
at other times it will serve as an apparatus of investigation, it cannot 
serve both purposes simultaneously since they are mutually 
exclusive. (Barad, 2007: 75) 
 
So, in the first instance I mapped diffractive practices in the lab and beyond in 
both cases. I traced how differences between safe and unsafe, success and 
failure, wastes and assets were made. In the second instance I brought the two 
case studies into conversation with each other to trace the spaces where the 
effects of these makings of difference emerged, and to explore whether those 
points of emergence overlapped or diverged between the two cases. The aim 
here has been to analyse the disposal cultures together-apart (Barad, 2007); to 
set them in a conversation rather than comparison with each other. Thus, rather 
than a mere ‘traditional’ reflective comparative study, the approach I take here 
can be classed as ‘comparative-conversationalist’.  
 
In the following two sections, I describe my core fieldsites in the UK and 
Finland; the ‘benefits’ of undertaking multi-sited ethnography, and my 
experiences of some of the issues around negotiating access to fieldsites. 
 
3.2 Multi-sited ethnography 
In a sense, this study is by definition a multi-sited ethnography (Marcus, 1995b). 
It is a ‘comparative-conversationalist’ study with two university research labs 
forming the core sites of an ethnographic investigation. Overall, I spent a year 
doing fieldwork. I spent the period from February 2015 to July 2015 in the UK, 
and a period from August 2015 to March 2016 in Finland. During the year I 
conducted interviews with central figures in the respective disposal cultures and 
did participant-observation in the research labs. 
 
Labs 
In the UK lab, the research group had around 60 members at any one point 
including staff, PhD students and visiting researchers. The group occupied two 
floors at the top of a 13-storey building, but flowed beyond its designated space. 
The PhD students in the group shared an office space where I was given a 
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desk next to my participants. From the PhD office two doors led to a corridor 
that was aligned with the offices of the academic staff, a printing room and a 
small kitchen space. The lab space was two floors above the offices and was 
divided into eight different sections. This floor also had a number of 
postdoctoral offices. Each of the lab sections was designed and designated to 
particular types of work from sample preparation, to analytical work, to work on 
cement materials and work on radioactive materials. The lab included a national 
facility with state-of-the-art instruments available for visiting researchers working 
with radioactive materials. Access to the lab spaces, however, depended on 
group membership. The lab operated a closed access policy, which meant that 
the lab could only accessed with an authorised staff or student card. This 
imposed some restrictions and demands on me as an ethnographer, which I will 
discuss further in sections 3.5 and 3.7. Aside from the marked office and lab 
spaces, the group had access to departmental labs shared by other research 
groups and that were scattered around the building.  Some of these labs 
housed instruments the group did not have, such as abrasive cutters, glass 
melting furnaces and pycnometers to measure the density of materials. Others 
homed instruments, such as welding equipment and the Hot Isostatic Press 
(HIP), the group could not house in its own labs. Others yet housed 
instruments, such X-Ray Diffractometers (XRD), the group had, but could resort 
to if the group’s own instruments malfunctioned or were fully booked. 
 
In Finland the research group occupied two floors. The actual labs were in the 
basement below the office floors. The biggest lab was a huge space with an 
industrial feel to it. This was where all the big machines for welding and 
otherwise lived. When I initially visited the lab in March 2015, months before my 
fieldwork, the space was under refurbishment and some of the machines stayed 
offline for most of my stay. The basement also housed a number of smaller labs 
with a range of analytical instruments, such as the Scanning Electron 
Microscope (SEM) I recognised from my time in the UK lab. I was whisked 
through these locked spaces accessible with a staff key with a semi-jogging 
pace during my initial visit, but did not re-enter them during the actual fieldwork 
phase for reasons I will discuss in section 3.6. The offices were in the first floor. 
The offices of the academic staff, and a small library that coupled as the office 
of the group’s administrative person, were situated on the right hand side of a 
	 73	
long windowless corridor. From the white walls to the nondescript wall clock the 
place had the feel of a generic Finnish educational institution. At one end of the 
corridor were a small kitchen and a seminar room, where the senior academic 
staff held their weekly Monday meetings. At the opposite end were two offices 
shared by research assistants and PhD students. Together these offices 
housed about 15 people, including me. Altogether the group consisted of 
around 40 people, mostly male members of the research and academic staff. 
Unlike in the UK, PhD students here were a minority.  
 
The cellularity of both of these fieldsites, the multiple spaces that composed 
these labs, raises questions about how we define and bind our sites. In neither 
case, were the sites simple or singular spaces with clearly defined boundaries. 
Work, some materials and scientists flowed between different spaces freely, if 
not thoughtlessly. In the UK lab, restricted access and the presences of 
hazardous materials in the lab required particular rituals before boundaries 
were crossed. Mundane actions of checking that one had their swipe card upon 
entering the lab, donning a lab coat immediately after entering, and washing 
hands prior to leaving the lab performed the boundary between lab and office 
spaces. Even in Finland keys were required to access the office and lab 
spaces. Yet the ‘lab’ becomes an umbrella term encompassing a multitude of 
sites and spaces within the ‘site’. 
 
Moving between sites 
While the sites in a way were multiple in themselves, Christine Hine (2007) 
notes that a simple comparison between two labs does not capture the spirit of 
multi-sited ethnography. She notes that such lab-to-lab comparisons tend to be 
founded on given notions of the sites. They assume that labs are distinct sites 
containing culturally significant wholes. Such a straightforward imagination of 
‘multi-sited’, Hine goes on to argue, fails to acknowledge the ethnographer’s 
role in composing those sites, but also the notion that lives are “lived not in 
discrete locations, but through various forms of connection and circulation” 
(Hine, 2007: 656). Hine’s critique is laid out particularly against early lab 
ethnographies. While these studies developed our understanding of scientific 
knowledge production, they tend to cease their analysis and description at the 
lab door (e.g. Latour and Woolgar, 1979 (1986); Traweek, 1988). Already in 
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1983 Bruno Latour, nonetheless, asserted that if we accept that scientific 
knowledge production is an ordinary social practice, we should move beyond 
the lab walls to trace how science is assigned its epistemological speciality: 
 
sociologists of scientific practice should avoid being shy and sticking 
only to the level of the laboratory (for this level does not exist) and 
being proud of diving inside laboratory walls, because laboratories 
are the places where the inside/outside relations are reversed. In 
other words, since laboratory practices lead us constantly 
inside/outside and upside/down, we should be faithful to our field and 
follow our objects through all their transformations. (Latour, 1983: 
160)  
 
Where Latour made his point through engaging with historical materials rather 
than ethnographic experience, contemporary STS accounts tend to follow 
Latour’s proposition and operate across a broader definition and range of field 
sites. 
 
In line with the call to follow actors discussed at the beginning of this chapter 
and Latour’s call to extend our investigations beyond the physically defined lab, 
George Marcus suggests that ‘following people, things, metaphors, plots, 
biographies and conflicts’ (Marcus, 1995b: 106–110) brings objects to the heart 
of multi-sited ethnography. Research objects, rather than research sites gain 
the centre stage in multi-sited ethnography. Travelling between sites, Knorr 
Cetina (1999: 22) notes, “opens a window on the contradictions, discrepancies, 
variations and differences that divide settings”. In this sense multi-sited 
ethnography enables us to map differences as they emerge within and between 
disposal cultures. Knorr Cetina’s own sites were labs specialised in particle 
physics and molecular biology, yet Anne Beaulieu (2010) encourages more 
creativity in the way we might define our sites. She notes how STS is 
increasingly moving away from physically bounded sites to excavate forms of 
knowledge production where physical spaces are less central. She flags online 
forums as such non-spatially defined spaces of knowledge production. Both 
research labs I engaged with extended from the physical lab and offices to 
digital spaces in the form of mailing lists that were used to communicate 
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relevant events, news and so on. Multiple sites, thus, need not be at different 
physical locations. The strength of multi-sited ethnography stems from a 
rejection of physical boundaries and a willingness to follow actors to a range of 
spaces. 
 
Thinking innovatively about our field sites enables us to compose our own fields 
through the research process (Hine, 2007). My field transcended the lab to 
include websites, documents, email interactions, meetings, lectures, seminars, 
conference venues, and cafés. Following the actors kept the field lively. It led 
me beyond the immediate versions of the field I had come to envision. In that 
sense multi-sited ethnography is risky. It demands openness from the 
researcher. Following the actors led me to a meeting on the development of 
deep borehole disposal as a complimentary method to GD. It took me to an 
international Implementing Geological Disposal Technology Platform (IGD-TP) 
meeting where I presented my work. It took me to Chernobyl alongside the 
scientists I worked with in the lab. It took me to a two-day Introduction to the 
Nuclear Industry course organised by the National Nuclear Laboratory in West 
Cumbria, and to a low-level waste repository in Gyeongju, South Korea. While 
all these travails are not included in this thesis, following the actors led to 
instances of intra-action and engagement with various scientists and sites I 
could not foresee at the start of this study. Nonetheless, when things were not 
‘working out’ during my fieldwork, I hanged myself on the idea that I was doing 
a traditional spatially defined lab ethnography. The most notable consequence 
of this was that the narrow view I had of the field in the first instance did not 
reflect the work I was doing. Additionally, when my fieldwork in the lab was not 
progressing as I had hoped, my sense of the project’s manageability eroded. I 
will discuss on this in section 3.7. 
 
3.3 Negotiating access 
As I mentioned in the section above, I conducted half of my fieldwork in the UK 
(February 2015-August 2016) and half of it in Finland (September 2015-March 
2016). I came away with two very different field experiences that I will describe 
in the following five sections. I have come to view these differences through the 
metaphor of doors and walls. In a 1988 paper Latour as Jim Johnson 
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considered the door, a technical artefact, as an important social actor as 
follows: 
 
Walls are a nice invention, but if there were no holes in them, there 
would be no way to get in or out [...] So architects invented [...] a 
hole-wall, often called a door [...] instead of driving a hole through 
walls with a sledge hammer or a pick you simply gently push the 
door. (Johnson, 1988: 298, emphasis in the original)  
 
For me the difference between walls and doors resonates with negotiating 
access to the field, but also with data collection. The absence of open doors 
and the presence of walls informed where, when and how I could collect data. 
The physical layout of the ‘field’ shaped my experience of doing fieldwork in 
particular ways, and I will discuss this more in depth in sections 3.6 and 3.7.  
 
UK 
In the UK negotiating access was as easy as gently pushing a door open to 
enter a space behind it. The leader of the lab where I hoped to conduct my 
fieldwork was my second supervisor. The lab focused on the design, 
manufacture and performance assessment of a range of materials envisioned 
to contain nuclear waste. Its overarching aim was to develop materials, 
processes and policy to support the clean up of the UK’s nuclear waste legacy. 
Although not certain, I felt fairly safe is assuming that my supervisor would grant 
me access to the lab. By the time I approached him, I had already had 
intermittent contact with the research group for a year. I had attended the 
group’s weekly meetings fairly regularly and presented my work at one such 
meeting. I had attended a three-day postgraduate winter school with the group 
and done two days of observations in the lab as part of my training in the spring 
of 2014. The group was aware of my existence, what sociologists of science do, 
and I was familiar with the group. When I approached my supervisor, he had 
two questions: when did I want to start, and would I like a tour of the refurbished 
labs. The tour, I was given immediately. I started my fieldwork the day after. 
However, the immediacy of the start was facilitated by my successful navigation 
of a series of bureaucratic hurdles (I will explore these in section 3.6) to the 
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existence of which, I had been alerted to by a research fellow working in the 
lab.  
 
Finland 
To the UK’s door, negotiating and maintaining access to the field in Finland at 
times felt as if pushing against the wall. First, securing a field site from distance 
proved more problematic. Familiarity was not on my side, as it had been in the 
UK, even where I thought it might be. While I was prepared for barriers2, I failed 
to see the first one: language. Drafting an email to a professor, I discovered that 
I lacked the relevant vocabulary in my native language to communicate my 
research. After a number of re-drafts and grammatical and spell checks by my 
mother, I managed to draft a decent email. Additionally, having studied on a 
university level only in the UK, I had no experience of or contacts in Finnish 
academia. I had little initial idea who to approach, how to approach them, who 
could be helpful and/or interesting in terms of my research and where the most 
promising field sites might be. Little internet research answered most of these 
questions and I approached a professor running a lab I had identified as the 
most similar, (and thus in my mind, the most promising) to the lab in the UK. I 
received an apologetic ‘no’ from the professor as my planned fieldwork 
coincided precisely with the lab’s planned maintenance and refurbishment. The 
second lab I approached initially welcomed me, but two weeks later rescinded 
their invitation.  
 
Eventually, a mechanical engineering research group agreed to have me. 
Unlike in the UK lab, nuclear waste management and GD were not the group’s 
research focus. Instead, important areas of research included the development 
of materials for a range of demanding applications, welding techniques and 
foundry engineering. It was not what I had envisioned, but my gatekeeper was 
welcoming and seemed cooperative. I had a chance to visit the lab in early 
																																								 																				
2	I knew to expect some challenges. This was partly because of the limited importance 
assigned to sociological nuclear waste research in Finland (SYKE, 2000). I had also 
been warned by an anthropologist2 during an email exchange that gaining access to at 
least some actors might be difficult, and when I was already in the field an interviewee 
noted that the release of a documentary film critical of the GD project had soured some 
people’s attitudes towards ‘outsiders’ (Into Eternity, 2010).  
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spring of 2015 before starting my fieldwork to polish details and to discuss 
mutual expectations with regards to my stay. The plans seemed great including 
talks and seminars. My gatekeeper promised to take me along to a meeting 
abroad to introduce me to some people who might be relevant for my study. I 
left in March, and returned in the autumn, with high hopes that were fast to 
crumble upon my return, as I will describe in section 3.6. 
 
In the following two sections I will first illuminate my approach to participant-
observation and second, how the field imposed certain demands on me, and 
partially assigned roles for me. 
 
3.4 Participant observation or ‘body-work’ 
“If construction is wrapped in bounded locales, the ethnographer needs to 
“penetrate the spaces” and the stream or practices from which fact construction 
arises” (Knorr Cetina, 1995: 151). To penetrate the spaces and stream of 
practices in the lab, I wanted to really participate in those practices. Mere 
observation, I felt, would not be enough to really know the field.  I was lucky 
enough that in the UK lab my supervisor offered me the chance to get my 
hands dirty ‘doing some science’, before I had a chance to ask about actively 
participating in the life of the lab.  
 
Natasha Myers (2008, 2012) notes that life scientists make sense of molecular 
forms and functions through body-work. The body, she holds, has a central role 
in learning, relaying and interpreting the specificities of molecular models. She 
proposes that by twisting their bodies to mimic molecular models, scientists use 
their bodies to generate new forms of knowing and things that are known. If 
performative body-work is a means of sense-making in natural sciences, why 
not in ethnographic investigations?  John Law (2004) has posited that if we 
want to know the messes of ‘reality’, we need to teach ourselves know those 
messes and realities by using unusual methods. We need to create new ways 
and forms of knowing. Body-work for me stands as an idiom for my participation 
in the life of the lab. As I became a ‘trainee scientist’ (as one of my participants 
labelled me), body-work as a tool of ethnographic sense-making added new 
forms of knowing. It generated data I could not have produced by simple  
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Figure 5. Doing body-work: grinding cement with a pestle and mortar in a glove 
box. 
 
observation. How I came to know, and what I came to know, was not separate 
from how I was in the lab. Watching someone being frustrated by a planetary 
mill is entirely different from becoming frustrated by the mill. Listening to 
someone complain how crushing cement is hard work is utterly different from 
feeling the pain in your back or the bruise in your palm for having crushed 
cement for three hours. 
 
Body-work, thus, opened up new ways of knowing and following the actors. I 
came to generate data through bodily engagements and encounters that were 
more complex and nuanced than if I had just relied on hearing and vision. I 
could feel the actors, their cooperation and resistance under my fingertips. Not 
only could I follow the actors in the lab, I became part of the motor behind their 
movement. While body-work expanded what it was possible for me to feel, 
hear, imagine, see and say in and about the field, it also helped to maintain 
curiosity and analytical sensitivity towards the routines of lab life, as I will 
	 80	
elaborate further below. Putting on a lab coat or brushing glass-ceramic powder 
through a sieve with a paintbrush always felt awkward regardless of how many 
times I repeated the acts. In part then by performing my role as a ‘trainee 
scientist’ through sociologically sensitive body-work I never reached the 
“comfortable sense of being ‘at home’” Paul Atkinson and Martin Hammersley 
posit as a danger signal for any ethnographic work (Atkinson and Hammersley, 
2007: 90). ‘Going native’ for them is a cardinal sin in ethnographic work as, in 
their reading, it leads to the blunting of the analytical and critical edge and 
lessens the intellectual distance with which ethnographers enter their fields. 
Nonetheless, I had to take steps towards ‘native-ness’ as a prerequisite for 
body-work and maintaining any kind of presence in the field. My skills as a 
sociologist of science were irrelevant in the lab environment. In order to do 
sociological research in the lab I had to, in a sense, become more like a 
scientist.  
 
3.5 To study one you have to be one? 
As a sociologist of science, my skills in the lab were of little use. As a 
prerequisite for the body-work I described above, I had to acquire sensitivities 
and practices that were more relevant to the lab than my existing set of skills. 
The ease with which the door to the lab in the UK opened was conditional on 
my successful completion of basic training and lab inductions. All newcomers 
had to go through the same process to have access to the lab, and in this 
sense I was no different from the scientists working in the lab.  
 
A research fellow sent me a list of online Health and Safety training modules 
that were the precondition to my entrance and maintained presence in the lab. 
The list included five modules and a final exam3. Each of the modules consisted 
of a video followed by a multiple-choice quiz at the end. The training took about 
two hours to complete. It covered matters such as background radiation, what 
ionising radiations are, the effects of radiation, dose limits, units of 
measurement, legislation, administrative and enforcement procedures and the 
control of the hazards from working with the common radionuclides used in the 
lab. At successful completion, I received a downloadable certificate for each 
																																								 																				
3 The modules included fire training, Introduction to Radiation Protection; Effects, Limits 
and Legislation; and Control of Hazards - Unsealed source work.  
	 81	
module. I had to present these as proof of my eligibility for lab access in the lab. 
The training and the certificates demonstrated that I was equipped with 
sufficient knowledge of how to be and act in a radiation lab. The training did not, 
however, provide me with practical skills or knowledge about the lab I was 
entering. On top of the online training, I went through three separate lab 
inductions that all covered specific workspaces in the lab. These were the 
spaces where my participants mostly conducted their work. The inductions did 
not involve training on lab instruments but were ‘common sense’ introductions 
to the spaces and their particularities. None of this diverged from normal 
practices. Only with with regards to filling and filing Control of Substances 
Hazardous to Health (CoSHH)4 and risk assessment documents my status as a 
sociologist and the reason for my presence in the lab were taken into account. 
These documents were another prerequisite for lab work. Scientists had to fill 
them for all materials and processes (i.e. sample preparation, conducting 
experiments and so on) they envisioned as part of their research. The 
documents were reviewed by the relevant academic and departmental health 
and safety staff. Since I was not expected to conduct my own experiments 
(although this idea had been floated by the group leader), I ‘got away’ by 
studying my participants’ forms, signing them and acquiring the necessary 
signatures for the documents. Before entering the lab I was also given a 
Laboratory Induction Manual to study. It was a 20-page document that outlined 
general laboratory rules and code of conduct from caring for the lab spaces and 
instruments to protocols for data recording and storage onto proper lab attire. 
 
Playing the part 
Apart from relevant knowledge about lab life disseminated through training and 
the manual, the field disciplined me towards a more scientist-like existence in 
the lab by other means. The field governed what I wore, how I opened doors, 
how I moved around, how I stood. The starting assumption in the lab was that 
‘all surfaces are at least slightly contaminated’ (field notes 11 February 2015). 
This assumption translated into routine-like removal of protective gloves before 
opening doors, hand washing before exiting the lab, but it also reverberated in 
																																								 																				
4 COSHH is a UK law requiring employers to control substances that are hazardous to 
health.  
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how the scientists carried themselves in the lab. After I had spent some time in 
the lab observing the scientists at work: their movements, ways of being and 
engaging with the lab space I became aware that I was differently. This 
difference I surmised arose from differences in our awareness of contamination, 
risks and hazards. The way I was in the lab constituted health and safety risks 
in the lab. I had bad office habits – such as resting my chin or cheek on my 
hand, leaning against walls, over desks, in effect slouching – I had to identify 
and unlearn to ensure that I did not unnecessarily come into contact with 
hazardous materials. 
 
What I, and the scientists, wore to the lab was governed by lab rules. Skirts, 
dresses, shorts, and open shoes were definitely forbidden. They exposed skin 
and constituted a health and safety risk in the lab that routinely dealt with 
hazardous and toxic materials. Lab coat, safety glasses and gloves were 
compulsory. While it made me look the part, the lab coat underlined my 
difference in the lab. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Lab coats hanging in the lab. 
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My lab coat is massive. It’s not mine. It’s borrowed, like always, but 
for the first time it makes me really uncomfortable. What if these 
huge clown-sized sleeves are going to get in the way of sample 
prep? (field notes 9 March 2015)  
 
Donning the white coat, looking like a scientist while not being one, became a 
constant reminder of the contingencies of my access to the lab. My presence, 
and the availability of a lab coat, always depended on someone else’s 
(temporary) absence from the lab.  
 
On an experiental level, the lab coat created diffractive moments. Wearing a lab 
coat marked me, in my eyes, as somewhat-same-but-different. The coat, as 
much as the training, was my licence to the lab, but it could be taken away at 
any point. Thus, while the coat created equivalence between the scientists and 
I, it also marked difference. What for the scientists were routine, almost 
unconscious, sociomaterial practices, such as putting on the coat, were much 
more momentous for me. They allowed access, created equivalence and my 
difference from and in the world I studied, even when I became embedded in 
that world. 
 
Shifting roles 
As a participant, I was more an extra pair of hands than a brain in the lab. The 
work I was delegated was something most people could have done. I was 
trained on two instruments (a balance and a planetary mill) necessary for the 
preparation of glass-ceramic samples. The training I received was basic, but 
sufficient for the job I had to do. My main task was to weigh and assemble 
glass-ceramic powders from ‘raw ingredients’ and sieve the assembled mixture 
to ensure an even grain size of the powdery samples. After this the powders 
were placed into small welded cans that underwent a high pressure, high 
temperature treatment in the HIP to ‘melt’ them into a solid glass-ceramic form. 
The now-solid sample would then go through a series of analytical tests to 
determine the characteristics and the suitability of the material for the 
containment of plutonium residues and other ‘orphan’ nuclear waste. 
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During this type of body-work, my relationship with my participants and the field 
was clear. I was a participant in their lab life in the same way as other scientists 
working in the lab were. I followed the same rules, dressed the same, and 
followed the same steps as anyone else preparing a similar sample would have 
done. Nonetheless, sample preparation as body-work was also a tool of 
observation. Through body-work I was able to directly engage with a different 
set of actors. My experiences of the materials and instruments in the lab were 
not mediated by the scientists. Rather, through body-work I was following, 
feeling, experiencing and embodying different relationships in the field. I was 
able to build my own experiences of and relationships with the nonhuman 
entities in the field. The hybridity of my presence, my role as a ‘trainee 
scientists’ / participant-observer blurred the boundary between the participant 
and the observer. These roles were situated and shifting, oftentimes 
simultaneous and overlapping. Similarly the observer-observed relationship with 
my participants was fluid and situated. 
 
Jodie explains to me that she and David do their pH measurements 
in different ways. He has left instructions for her, which she now 
follows. “I do this differently, and I will explain why when we get 
there”, she concludes and works in silence for a while, before asking 
me “would you write down as much as stuff if I was silent?” (field 
notes 19 May 2015) 
 
Here, the roles between the observer and observed were not predetermined. 
They were blurry, situated sociomaterial performances. In the first instance, 
Jodie performed her role as the observed by describing the work she was 
engaging with and explaining what she was doing. The silence following the 
description gave me the space to write down notes (to perform the observer 
role), while the act of writing down notes subsequently prompted her to ask me 
questions about my methods (performing her as the observer and me as the 
observed).  
 
The example above also describes how as ethnographers we cannot always 
choose our roles in the field (Balmer et al., 2015; 2016). Sometimes our roles 
are assumed or assigned to us by our participants. In their collaborations with 
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scientists and engineers in synthetic biology Balmer et al. (2015) identified a 
number of roles assigned to them by their collaborators. Each of these roles 
carried its own assumptions about the type of activities and interests social 
scientists bring to and engage with in their entanglements with synthetic 
biology. Balmer et al. note how “various positions and actions become 
differentially possible across space, types of engagement and over time” (ibid., 
16), highlighting the situatedness of the roles and research we can perform in 
our engagements with the field.  
 
My own role flowed between the extremes and my experiences of being a 
‘nuisance with a notebook’ and a ‘helping hand’. These abstractions were not 
intimately linked with the role I had been assigned or had adopted at any given 
point. When I was more an observer than a participant, I was imagined both as 
a stalker (nuisance) and as a secretary (help). 
 
Alex and I are heading to a lab to drill holes to her iron lids and a 
technician walks up behind us.  
Alex: “It feels like you’re lurking behind us!”  
Technician: “I’m your stalker!”  
Alex: “I don’t need you. I already have one.” [i.e. me] 
Technician: “Ah, so you do!” (field notes 7 April 2015) 
 
Alex asks me if I could lend her a piece of paper, so I tear off a page 
from my notebook and hand it to her. She folds it and uses it to pour 
her sample back into its bag. 
Alex: “Could you take this down for me: 1.0914?”  
“1.0914,” I repeat out loud and write down the number, the weight of 
her sample in grams, in my notebook. (field notes 4 March 2015)  
 
The examples above highlight the contingency of my roles and how my 
participants assumed and performed my roles in particular ways in the field. At 
other instances, negotiations of my role were more explicit, as when Jodie 
asked; “So, what’s your role today? Are you an observer or a helper?” (field 
notes 28 April 2015). At yet other instances, the negotiations were more implicit 
actions such as ‘sliding into the gloves’ of a glovebox or helping to carry things 
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from one lab to another. Or they could be offhanded remarks made by the 
scientists that alerted me to my role in the lab. 
 
The sample prep goes uneventfully until I spill some powder on the 
bench top. “Oh, bloody hell!” I shout inside my respirator in 
annoyance.  
“Oh, it’s fine. Don’t be too harsh on yourself. You can’t be perfect yet. 
You are but a trainee scientist, Marika,” Jodie, who is in the lab, 
remarks.  
“Mm.” 
“But I know the feeling. It’s horrible; messing up someone else’s 
sample.” 
(field notes 7 April 2015) 
 
Doing ‘body-work’ expanded the ways in which it was possible for me to be in 
the field, what kind of entanglements emerged and how I could do my research 
and maintain research relationships with my participants and vice versa. Body-
work, ‘getting my hands dirty’, created a measure of equivalence between my 
participants and I. Although ‘less than’ a scientist, I was ‘more than’ a 
sociologist. Body-work enabled the sharing of common experiences from 
‘messing up samples’ to the difficulty of estimating the volume to mass relation 
of materials, to engaging with instruments for the first time. Doing, rather than 
just watching, established a measure of familiarity with the scientists in the lab. 
In a limited way we could share experiences about lab work, while the shifting 
and situated roles allowed mutual questioning, creating a measure of 
equivalence between the scientists and I. 
 
3.6 Absent presence 
When I entered the field in Finland things had changed drastically from my 
initial visit to the lab nearly six months earlier. I was still welcomed to the lab, 
but was immediately told that my gatekeeper would be absent from the field for 
nearly the whole duration of my fieldwork due to unexpected circumstances. 
The absence of my gatekeeper turned out to impact my fieldwork much more 
than I imagined and in ways I did not anticipate. His absence lunged me into an 
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epistemological crisis mode. It informed the data I could generate; how I saw 
data; how I experienced the manageability of my fieldwork; how I came to 
conceptualise the field; and how I imagined fieldwork successes and failures. I 
will discuss these matters here as well as in section 3.7. 
 
My field experiences in Finland became increasingly defined by what I regard 
as absent presence. The original plan, agreed with my gatekeeper and his PhD 
student Tom, was to follow Tom’s project in a similar way I had followed the two 
projects in the UK. The overarching aim of the project was to explore the 
microstructure and deformation mechanisms of copper canister welds. In its 
detail, the project was much less structured and its objectives more loosely 
articulated than those of the well-defined and bounded projects I followed in the 
UK. This came to be increasingly problematic for my participant as well as for 
my project. When I was beginning my fieldwork in Finland, Tom, about a year 
into his PhD, had not yet begun to work on his PhD project. Instead he was 
finishing up a project he had inherited from another researcher who had already 
left the lab and beginning to write a paper on the project. The exact focus of 
Tom’s own project was meant to be clarified later in the autumn in a meeting 
between him, his supervisor and external collaborators. Tom assured me there 
would be a project to follow after the meeting, implying there would be little for 
me to observe in the mean time. The meeting was a disappointment to him. The 
project had not gained any more clarity. By February, towards the end of my 
fieldwork, the situation had not changed significantly. Tom led a fairly aimless 
existence in the office. He was waiting for a meeting with his supervisor to 
discuss which of the four potential foci his supervisor had identified for the 
project he would focus on. Tom suspected that his preferred choice would not 
align with the preference of his supervisor. While he had much more space to 
negotiate the focus of his project than his colleagues in the UK did, he was 
anticipating some tension and noted “issues might emerge if [my supervisor] 
decides to push for his preferred alternative” (field notes 9 February 2016). By 
this point I too was becoming increasingly fatigued and annoyed by the 
situation. The longer the situation dragged on the less I saw of my increasingly 
frustrated participant. 
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Ended up observing nothing. This … is annoying. (field notes 21 
January 2016) 
 
I began to despair over my project. I was struggling with balancing my 
expectations and what was (not) happening in the field. Similarly I had 
difficulties negotiating my presence in the field. Maintaining my presence in the 
field was a challenge in any case, as I will discuss in section 3.7. Now, I was 
struggling with managing my felt need to do and see something, while 
sympathising with Tom’s plight and respecting his right to withdraw form the 
project, as was outlined in the consent form  (see Appendix I) I had given him 
upon entering the field and that we both had signed. 
 
Already in November I had moaned at my supervisor about having no data. Her 
enthusiastic remarks that no data was data fell on deaf ears. All I saw was a 
thesis devouring black hole in my set of data that would embarrass me and 
everyone else involved with the project. Feelings of helplessness and 
detachment began to creep in. Ironically, I had had a similar conversation about 
the nature of data with Alex in the UK lab. She had similarly struggled with the 
relationship between data and failure. 
 
Alex hasn’t recorded many results of the experiments where her 
cans had failed. She notes how it has taken her some time to 
understand that a failed can is still a result, and that something can 
be drawn from it. (field notes 22 April 2015) 
 
It was much easier to see the sense in the notion that no data was data when it 
was someone else’s project. Instead of contemplating what I was observing by 
‘seeing nothing’, I was preoccupied with absence of the type of data I had 
wanted and expected to generate. What I also missed at the time was the 
similarity between my and Alex’s struggles to conceptualise usable and useful 
data. Neither did I detect the emerging opportunity to reiterate the classic STS 
wisdom of science as a normal social practice where data and things worth 
pursuing were negotiated, where things beyond the lab affected and shaped 
what happened in the lab, what knowledge was or was not produced; where the 
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momentary unraveling of the network of knowledge production led to absent 
presence.  
 
3.7 Present absence 
Challenges I experienced with data generation were not limited to the confined 
observations I was able to make in the lab in Finland. A lack of shared space 
made my interactions with Tom dependent on coordination and explicit 
decision-making rather than flexibility and spontaneity. Where metaphorical 
walls had in ways funneled my entrance to field in Finland, physical walls 
imposed a practical problem once I was in the field. I regard this problem in 
terms of present absence. As I mentioned in section 3.5 I was given a desk 
space in one of the research offices. This, however, was not the one where 
Tom worked. Despite attempts to maintain constant presence in the field, I 
found it increasingly difficult to do this in a meaningful way that was comfortable 
both for me and Tom. I spent a significant amount of time in the office, but failed 
to ‘normalise’ my presence during my six-month stay. As a researcher, I found 
the walls between our offices increasingly problematic as time wore on. They 
played a key part in the relationship that was slowly emerging and taking shape 
between me, Tom and the field as a physical space. They made me feel out of 
control of my project. Confining me in the office next door, they allowed Tom to 
create my absence even when I was present. As he had no clear project plan, I 
partly relied on him to inform me when ‘things started to happen.’ He admitted 
that when things started to happen he forgot about my presence. I grew 
increasingly frustrated. I could not just hover over his desk hoping that 
serendipitously something would happen. I was at a loss on how to shift my 
present absence to present presence. 
 
In both the UK and Finnish lab my participants had notable handle on what they 
allowed me to see, what they showed me, how they performed their research 
for me. Their performances informed what I could say and know about the field. 
Latour and Woolgar (1986 [1979]: 48) have described the desk as the “hub of 
[the] productive unit” in the production of scientific knowledge, yet my 
participants performed this productive unit as unobservable. In the UK lab they 
were happy to narrate and allow me to follow their lab work, yet the actual 
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sense-making process at the desk emerged as an internalised, quiet and 
private work. I could trace the whole sequence of sociomaterial production of 
inscriptions, and the evolution of sample materials into graphs, numbers and 
images, through the various stages and spaces in the lab, as I was part of the 
process. Yet these inscriptions vanished from my field of vision once they 
reached the desks of my participants where they would be translated into 
knowledge claims. In the UK lab, my participants were keen to present me only 
with what they considered ‘interesting’. The boundary between ‘interesting’ and 
‘uninteresting’ roughly followed the boundary between lab and office spaces. 
Although some lab work, mainly some aspects of sample preparation were 
described as ‘so boring’ by the scientists, they were seen as an important and 
interesting enough for me to observe and participate in. I was an audience to 
lab work, but I was not privy to the details of what happened backstage at the 
desk. The privacy of deskwork was the norm. Where the lab was an active 
space, the office was calmer. Discussions were fewer and hushed, and people 
did not frequent each other’s desks. My snooping over someone’s shoulder in 
the office would have constituted a bigger disruption and disturbance than my 
presence in the lab did. The lab was a mobile space where people mingled, 
talked, worked and were trained. The flow within the lab made it a more benign 
setting for ethnographic observation and participation, while the rigidness of the 
office worked as a reminder of my limited capability as an ethnographer to 
control and determine the types of data I gather. 
 
This absence of deskwork from the ‘observable’ was particularly problematic 
and frustrating in Finland. Tom was mostly based at his desk and performed his 
office as a non-observation space. Whatever he worked on at his desk, he 
deemed uninteresting – for me at least. Without fail he stopped working for the 
duration I spent in his office. I failed to establish the kind of friendly rapport with 
him I had managed with my UK participants. The lack of both familiarity and 
proximity topped with our shared stereotypical Finnish inability to engage in 
small talk maintained my excursions into his office on the side of the awkward 
and the artificial – more so than ‘necessary’ interactions in the field. Every time I 
entered Tom’s office I felt that I dragged in a bag of unspoken expectations; his 
expectations of his project, my expectations of his project, my expectations of 
my project and his expectations of my project, all jumbled up in a tense 
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frustrating mess. More than in the UK, my interactions with him were always 
explicitly staged: we had roles to play. I as the observer and he as the 
observed. The less available he was, the plainer it was that I ventured into his 
space with clear motives. I wanted data. We were both aware of this. He knew 
that (aspects of) my data collection depended on his work. He knew I was as 
desperate to fill my notebook as he was to really start his project. As the 
situation stagnated, our roles became more and more entrenched. My presence 
in his space became too explicit, too staged. Both the physical and imagined 
walls grew in significance.  
 
Even in the UK lab my movements and access had been contained by the lab’s 
infrastructure. Because of the presence of radioactive materials in the lab, 
access to the lab was mediated by a swipe card system. Like a hinged door, the 
swipe card system allowed a “selection of what gets in and what gets out so as 
to locally increase order” (Johnson, 1988: 299). The completion of compulsory 
training should have led to the activation of the card I possessed. Although the 
matter was chased with the relevant people, my card was never activated and 
the lab door remained closed to me. Yet, my containment never became a 
barrier for accessing the lab. As a general rule, I only entered the lab with my 
participants who had functioning cards. If I needed to get in to prepare samples 
by myself someone would come and let me in. Moreover, since I shared an 
office space with my participants, transitioning between the office and the lab 
could be spontaneous  
 
Around 1:20pm, Jodie taps my shoulder. She’s going upstairs to 
smash and sieve glass and asks if I’d want to tag along. (field notes 
2 March 2015)  
 
My presence in the PhD office allowed for opportunities for observation, to 
emerge unplanned. Ethnographic investigations could flow from one space to 
another fairly spontaneously. Somewhat counter-intuitively, the fluidity and 
‘surprise’ in the field in the UK made me feel in control of my project. 
Conversely, in Finland the physical layout of the field prevented such 
spontaneity about when, what and whether to observe. Much more than in the 
UK, my research depended on Tom’s definitions of the ‘observable’ and in 
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some ways he was much more in control of what I could see and what not than 
I was.  
 
3.8 Interviews 
Alongside participant-observation in the labs, I conducted 26 semi-structured 
interviews (11 in the UK and 15 in Finland) with academics, PhD students, 
nuclear waste consultants and researchers, civil servants, representatives of 
implementing authorities, the nuclear industry, and regulatory bodies (see 
Appendix II for participant and interview information). My aim with the interviews 
was three-fold. In the first instance, they supplemented the observations I 
conducted in the lab. In Finland, where I used interviews to substitute for the 
relatively poor observational data I was able to produce. Conversely, in the UK I 
used interviews with academics, technicians and PhD students to clarify 
questions that rose during observations and to test my understanding of what 
was going on in the lab. Interviews in both the UK and Finnish labs enabled me 
to develop an image of what kinds of research and research problems individual 
researchers and the labs more broadly focused on – and how this research 
aligned with the priorities and central concerns of the broader disposal culture. 
In this sense, interviews in the lab allowed me to gage how the disposal project, 
the disposal culture and relationships therein were perceived in the labs, and 
how the researchers in the lab situated their work in relation to the broader 
disposal culture. Beyond the lab, I sought to map the UK and Finnish disposal 
cultures through the interviewing process. From initial documentary research I 
had identified a range of institutional actors and approached individuals within 
these institutions for interviews, while also being open to participants beyond 
the group of potential interviewees I had initially identified and sought to include 
additional interviewees from organisations flagged as important to the disposal 
project by my participants during interviews – which is how I ended up 
interviewing the regulator in Finland, but not in the UK, and an industry 
representative in the UK, but not in Finland.  
 
The interviews, apart from one phone interview, were face-to-face encounters in 
places chosen by the interviewees. This meant that most of the interviews took 
place in the interviewees’ offices, although two interviews took place in a café 
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and one at an interviewee’s home. The interviews varied between 18 minutes 
and 2 hour 20 minutes, but were on average approximately 50 minutes in 
length. The shortest one was the phone interview where I found it difficult to 
establish a friendly conversation and manage my participant’s curt answers. 
Conversely, the longest interview stretched, as I did not have the heart or 
knowledge to stop my participant from talking. 
 
The interview schedules (see Appendix III) I used in the process were 
thematically and fairly uniformly structured, although questions were adapted to 
participant’s specific expertise. The schedules consisted of a set of 15 
questions that I went through in the interviews. I did not stick to the structure of 
the schedule where following it could have disrupted the flow of the 
conversation. Where necessary or possible, I included probing and follow-up 
questions. I finished the interviews by asking whether the participants had any 
questions or points of clarification, which usually lead to a discussion of the PhD 
process, how I was going to handle the interview data and what was I going to 
do with it.  
 
I recorded the interviews with my participants’ consent. Before each interview, 
as upon entering the field for observations, I supplied my participants with an 
information sheet describing my project and a consent form. By signing the 
form, my participants indicated their willingness to take part in the interviews (or 
observations). Initially I used a dictophone to record interviews, but eventually 
transitioned to use my phone’s audio recorder. While this put me at ease – the 
phone’s recorder was easier to use, it was more reliable, and the phone’s audio 
files were automatically compatible with the audio software on my laptop – a 
couple of participants voiced their suspicions about the phone. They expressed 
concerns that the interview recordings might end up on online social media 
platforms. Similar concerns were not raised in relation to the dictophone. 
However, going through the consent form, and underlining anonymity and 
confidentiality of the interviews promised in the forms, appeased the 
interviewees (an example interview schedule is in Appendix II). 
 
In the following section, I explore how writing was an important part of the 
research and analytical processes; a way of thinking through my data and 
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crystallising findings. I also discuss the messiness of translation, and mapping 
as a means to prolong the complexity of the field in the face of the orderliness 
created by the act of writing. 
 
3.9 Writing and analysis 
Writing is all over the ethnographic process. From taking and later typing up 
field notes to transcribing interviews and eventually writing a thesis, writing in 
various forms infiltrates every aspect of the research process. Writing is 
entangled with analysis. Even the monotonous and at times utterly slow and 
soul-destroying experience of transcribing is intimately analytical. Already 
during, or immediately after, transcription I highlighted interesting parts, 
annotated and coded transcripts. The same applied to my field notes. Listening 
to interviews, typing up transcripts and notes, and drafting thesis chapters are 
ways of thinking through data. Writing is a way of identifying absences, gaps 
and connections in the data, but also in our own arguments. Writing is a messy 
process with an ambition to create order. That process was rendered more 
complex by choosing to study two markedly different language contexts. 
 
Translation 
Writing is a means of translating our messy and entangled field experiences 
into an orderly form. Draft by draft our thinking should crystallise to a point 
where others can make sense of the world we are describing and be convinced 
by our description. Writing, then, is translation. Only by translating my 
experiences, notes and other forms of data into a single piece of writing, can I 
bring the world I mapped and the actors I followed to reach its intended 
audience. 
 
Translation of data into descriptions, like translation from one language to 
another, assembles a collective through a language whose grammar, genre, 
idioms and tone are shared by the envisioned audience. Translation requires an 
acknowledgement that it is a process of creation, of making similar, but also of 
betrayal (Law, 1997). Translation transforms things into something that travels 
‘better’. In the process messy field experiences become clear written 
descriptions. Mostly incomprehensible spoken Finnish is transformed into a 
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more accessible English account. Operating bilingually was both a challenge 
and a benefit. Bilingual sensitivity to language and linguistic differences opened 
up ways of tracing and mapping discursive makings of long-term safety, and 
how these makings were entangled with imaginations of simplicity and 
complexity, matters of concern and matters of fact. Being able to compare 
written and oral English and Finnish accounts, but also English accounts written 
by Finns 5 , enabled me to map nuances and intricacies in the situated 
performances of GD as a solution to the long-term management of nuclear 
waste. Conversely, trying to translate these nuances and intricacies, often 
emerging through idioms or other culturally situated expressions, was 
challenging. I was concerned about fostering nuances, I fretted over doing 
injustice to my participants’ views and positions, and worried about staying loyal 
to their choices of words and expressions. This concern and sensitivity to 
language partly guided the choices how I present data in this thesis. I only 
translated the data I use in this thesis. As with the originally English data, I 
sought to treat this translated data with respect, appreciating its complexity, but 
also acknowledging that some things would necessarily be lost in translation. 
Translation, nonetheless, was necessary for making this thesis, in its entirety, 
accessible to audiences who have not suffered through years of Finnish 
lessons. Only through translations, was I able to bring Finnish experiences to 
be part of broader sociological conversations. 
 
Translation, then, is boundary work. It performs new audiences and 
commentators. It joins cultures, performs inclusions and exclusions. It redraws 
boundaries for dissemination and discussion. Openly acknowledging the 
process of translation, be it from experience to description or from one 
language to another, and the decision making inherent in the process, works to 
remind the reader as well as the writer that all texts are drawn stories of the 
worlds we have carefully mapped. 
 
 
Mapping  
																																								 																				
5 The vocabulary used in these tends to differ form the language used in accounts 
originally written in English. 
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‘Follow the actors’ is an implicit invitation to map. I began this project by drawing 
a list of actors I had identified as ‘central’ based on preliminary reading. In part 
this was a practical necessity. It was an exercise in identifying potential 
interviewees and actors to follow, and potential and potent questions to pose. 
Additionally, it constituted the first step towards making sense of the disposal 
cultures. 
 
Mapping as a means of making sense of the world can be traced back 
centuries. More recently with the rise of digital methods, mapping has emerged 
in STS as a way of doing “digitally assisted ANT” (Munk and Jensen, 2014: 32). 
Cartography of controversies (Venturini, 2010, 2012), controversy mapping 
(Munk and Jensen, 2014) and issue mapping (Marres, 2015) trace actors in 
virtual spaces and produce visual explorations of the ways in which 
controversies unfold online. Having relied on the slower and more conventional 
of mapping through footwork, I have drawn here on historical mapping practices 
in European ethnology (Munk and Jensen, 2014) and situational mapping 
developed by Adele E. Clarke (2007) for non-virtual ethnographic work. 
Situational mapping that partly draws inspiration from Haraway’s notion of 
‘situated knowledges’ (Haraway, 1991) and the historical-geographical 
cartography of European ethnology are sensitive to the complexities of the 
world they map. Situational mapping, as the name suggests, treats situations as 
its units of analysis. Clarke posits that no explanatory categories exist outside 
the situation: everything needed for analysis and description of a situation can 
be traced within it. 
 
As analytical devices, maps (Figure 7) are relational living things. They evolve 
with the progression of the research and analytical process. A map “starts life 
as a single blank sheet of paper” (Tattersall et al., 2007). Mapping starts with 
simplicity, a list of actors and a blank paper. As the research progresses the 
map becomes messy with detail as the researcher traces and draws new links 
between actors.  As such, maps are a poor aid to writing. They place 
established assumptions and explanatory categories at risk. Composed 
association by association, maps evolve, force to slow down analysis, and 
encourage the thinking through of data in creative ways. As a means for sense-
making, maps  
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Figure 7. Situational map 
 
can capture the messiness of a situation with more complexity than possibly 
more linear textual forms of analysis are able to do. Of course, even at their 
best maps are cleaned-up approximations of the worlds we study. Yet as 
analytical devices through which to think about data, maps are a means to 
linger with the trouble (Haraway, 2016) a while longer before the mess is by 
necessity cleared and cleaned into a PhD thesis. 
 
3.10 Summary 
This thesis is an effect of an effort of making a difference in the world; of an 
attempt to trace the intricacies of the making of very distant futures through GD. 
It is the effect of particular, carefully chosen research methods, of situated 
conversations, observations and specific sociomaterial intra-actions (Barad, 
2007). In this chapter I introduced my take on diffraction as a methodological 
tools to explore the implementation of GD in a comparative setting. Diffraction is 
a relativist take on the world that explores the ways in which reality and 
differences are relational and emerge from specific, situated intra-actions 
between heterogeneous actors. The diffractive approach enables a 
conversation instead of comparison between the UK and Finland and avoids 
the trap of simplistic like-to-like comparison. I discussed the research process 
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as messy, unpredictable, entangled, situated and negotiated, and elaborated on 
the challenges and opportunities I faced in the ‘field’ as a participant-observer. I 
discussed how my field sites, composed of people, instruments and 
infrastructures, performed me as an ethnographer, and my possibilities to know 
the field. They imposed demands on my knowledge and ‘way of being’ for 
access. Infrastructural constraints of the field rendered interactions with my 
Finnish participants in the lab and otherwise dependent on coordination and 
explicit decision-making rather than fluidity. This rigidness and lack of fluidity 
and surprise resulted in feelings of helplessness and uncontrollability of the 
project. Rather, it was the more unpredictable environment of the UK lab that 
made me feel in control of the research process.  
 
To foster anonymity of my participants, I have renamed them after some of the 
voice actors from the Finnish children’s animation ‘Tales from Moominland’ 
(Muumilaakson tarinoita) and actors from the popular British sci-fi series Doctor 
Who. 
 
In the following three chapters I describe the analysis and findings that emerged 
through the approach I have outlined here.  
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4 MAKING WASTE FUTURES 
“On August 6, 1945, the Day of Hiroshima, a New Age began: the age in which 
at any given moment we have the power to transform any given place on our 
planet, and even our planet itself, into a Hiroshima” (Anders, 1962: 493). For 
Anders ‘the Day of Hiroshima’ marks the beginning of the Nuclear Age, a time 
where the future collapses into the present. In the Nuclear Age, the present has 
the capacity to transform itself as well as the future into a wasteland. The 
‘inconceivably long aftermath’ (Piette, 2016) of nuclear activities, military or 
civilian, the past and the present implicate the future. Waste futures, which this 
chapter focuses on, are imagined and implemented as responses to nuclear 
pasts and presents. 
 
In this chapter, I am concerned with these pasts and presents in the UK and 
Finland. I explore these times in order to map some of the ways in which 
nuclear wastes have been made and remade, and how these makings and 
remakings have affected the unfolding nuclear waste management challenge in 
the present and how they affect the anticipated future. In the first two sections 
of the chapter I will provide a brief overview of the nuclear infrastructures and 
waste inventories in the UK and Finland, while in the third section of the chapter 
I look at some of the challenges waste inventory reporting practices impose on 
making sense of the scale of the nuclear waste challenge in a comparative 
framework. In the following two sections I take a step back from the ‘nuclear 
nows’ in the UK and Finland to explore imaginations of nuclear waste 
trajectories in the UK and Finnish nuclear industries. In the final section of this 
chapter, I change pace entirely. Here I will draw on STS work on care, in 
particular on María Puig de la Bellacasa’s (2017) notion of ‘matters of care’, as 
a way of speculatively thinking-with the UK’s case how our infatuation with 
(rather than fear of) nuclear things has contributed to the unfolding of the 
nuclear waste challenge.  
 
4.1 Nuclear places 
Nuclear places in the UK and Finland are hugely different. These places echo 
the geopolitical situations in which the UK and Finnish nuclear industries were 
established, as I will explore below. A key difference emerges around spent 
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nuclear fuel ontologies. The initial military push behind the UK nuclear industry 
necessitated the treatment of spent fuel as an asset providing plutonium for 
nuclear weapons. In the UK, then, the nuclear fuel cycle is open – meaning that 
spent fuel is reprocessed and recycled. In Finland, that never harboured any 
military ambitions, the fuel cycle is closed, and spent fuel is treated as waste. In 
practical terms this means that the Finnish nuclear infrastructure is simpler than 
its UK counterpart. 
  
Geopolitical considerations further informed the designs of the UK and Finnish 
reactor fleets. Following the 1946 US McMahon Act, that forbade US nuclear 
cooperation with other countries, effectively excluded the UK from the 
Manhattan project. From this point on establishing an independent British 
nuclear deterrent was a national priority and the military imperative informed the 
choice of reactor design (Mackerron, 2012). Also in Finland reactor choices 
were driven by Cold War considerations. In a balancing act between the East 
and the West reactors were order from the Soviet Union and Sweden. In what 
follows, I will detail the existing nuclear infrastructure in the UK and Finland. 
 
UK: From national priority to complexity 
The UK has 35 nuclear sites, 30 of these have nuclear waste storages (Cairns, 
2014; WNA, 2017a). Currently, the UK has 15 operational nuclear reactors: 14 
Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor (AGR) and one Pressurised Water Reactor 
(PWR). The first reactor a Magnox prototype, at Calder Hall, was connected to 
the grid in 1956 making the UK the first commercial nuclear power producer and 
dating the beginning of the UK’s civilian industry 21 years ahead of Finland. The 
historical backbone of the UK’s nuclear fleet was formed by 26 Magnox 
reactors. All of these have been shutdown and some of them have been 
decommissioned. The UK fosters the most ambitious hopes for nuclear new 
build in Europe, albeit Brexit and Toshiba’s financial troubles have shed some 
dark clouds over these nuclear hopes. With the entire AGR fleet to be taken off 
grid by 2030, the UK envisions the construction of at least three AP1000 
reactors at Moorside in Cumbria, and two EPRs at Hinkley Point (ONR, 2017a, 
2017b). Also ABWR (ONR, 2017c), Hualong HPR1000 (NAMRC, n.a.) designs, 
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and the SMRs are under consideration.6 The diversity of the proposed reactor 
designs has given rise to some concerns that the UK might be repeating past 
missteps by producing a diverse and a complex nuclear fleet. This could 
present challenges for the management of nuclear wastes from a diverse fleet 
as different reactor types produce different types of wastes (Rhodes, 2016).  
 
As I mentioned above, the UK operates an open nuclear fuel cycle, although 
the government has announced a transition to a closed cycle in 2020. An open 
cycle is premised on the availability of reprocessing technology. THORP, the 
UK’s reprocessing facility, is located at Sellafield, where the UK also stores 74% 
of its nuclear wastes. The implementation and life of THORP have been matters 
of great controversy, as the facility has never operated to its full capacity 
(Rhodes, 2016; Walker, 1999). Moreover, since THORP’s main customers have 
been overseas, the UK now stores notable quantities of ‘foreign wastes’, which 
under contracts should be returned to the countries from which the spent 
nuclear fuel originally arrived for reprocessing. Walker (1999), however, notes 
that waste repatriations are unlikely. This further complicates the waste 
management situation in the UK.  
 
Aside from reactors, storage and reprocessing facilities, the UK’s nuclear 
infrastructure is composed of fuel manufacture facilities at Springfields, a 
uranium enrichment plant and related facilities at Capenhurst, and a low level 
waste repository (LLWR) near Drigg in West Cumbria. From fuel enrichment to 
energy generation, reprocessing and military applications, the UK nuclear 
industry has been self-sufficient, or some might say belligerent (Hill, 2013). The 
origins of the nuclear waste management challenge can be traced to the waste 
management practices of the past, while in part the present waste management 
situation has much to do with the complexity of the UK’s nuclear fleet. William, a 
former member of CoRWM, reflected on the complexity of the UK fleet and 
noted how the “French-style approach” to nuclear engineering where “you could 
get one [reactor design] that would work and then just build a hundred of them 
																																								 																				
	
6	EPR= European Pressurised Water Reactor; ABWR = Advanced Boiling Water 
Reactor. 
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doesn’t fit with the British psyche”. Both the Magnox and AGR fleets lacked 
internal standards (Hill, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
Figure 8. Nuclear places in the UK 
 
The Magnox fleet initially served dual purposes, feeding both the UK military 
and civilian nuclear needs. From the first reactor connected to the grid at Calder 
Hall (1956) to the last one at Wylfa (1971), the power generation capacity of the 
Magnox was gradually increased ten-fold. The steady increase in capacity was 
accompanied by a steady evolution of the reactor design. As each station was a 
slight improvement to the previous one, each Magnox station was a one-off 
project, each slightly different from the others. The AGRs, still in operation, 
similarly are all unique on-site creations, each slightly different to the next. With 
each reactor design modified from the previous, “the British nuclear power 
industry”, William held, “just killed itself with its own complexity”. This complex 
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commercial fleet was further accompanied by a breath-taking list of research, 
prototype and experimental reactors ranging from the Windscale Piles to the 
Dounreay Fast Breeder Reactor and from BEP0 to ZEPHYR.7 Delving into the 
technical specificites and intricacies of each reactor type here is not meaningful 
for the purposes of the thesis. Important to note, however, is the diversity of 
these different reactor types. Matt, a Professor of Nuclear Materials, noted that 
the understanding of the scope and complexity of waste management has 
changed during the 21st century: 
 
What we probably understand now is that we are not going to be 
able to treat our radioactive waste legacy in a way that means that 
we’ve got a relatively small number of packages with a relatively 
small spread of properties. That’s what we thought we were doing. (A 
Professor of Nuclear Materials, interview) 
 
This diversity bears upon the present nuclear waste management effort. The 
diversity of wastes translates to diversity of containers, and Matt continued: 
 
Now it’s pretty clear that the way we are going to have to treat the 
waste is going to produce quite a lot of packages. And these will all 
have unique behaviour, and actually if that behaviour is adequate, fit 
for purpose, that’s not a problem. (Professor of Nuclear Materials, 
interview) 
 
While the Matt only articulates the benefits of ‘adequate’ waste package 
behaviour, implied here is that an inadequate behaviour might be a problem. 
The diversity of waste packages creates an engineering, and by extension a 
safety, problem. The behaviour of the packages needs to be tailored to fit and 
complement, or at least not to undermine the behaviour of other packages, and 
their respective ability of contain waste. Diversity and complexity, thus, can be 
seen to exist in a conflicting relationship with the ability of the GDF to contain 
waste. Diversity of waste packaging fosters uncertainty about the compatibility 
of a broad range of behaviours particular to certain types of packaging and 
wastes. An example of this is the UK’s plan to construct a ‘co-located’ GDF, 
																																								 																				
7 BEP0 = British Experimental Pile 0, ZEPHYR = experimental fast breeder reactor. 
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where high (HLW) and intermediate level wastes (ILW) will be disposed of in a 
single GDF, albeit in different cells within the facility.  Of concern in this case 
are the movement of groundwater, and the durability of the HLW glass in the 
face of “hyper-alkaline” water from the cementitious ILW cell (Corkhill et al., 
2013). Matt elaborated: 
 
There’s a little bit of worry […] that the alkaline plume from the ILW 
cement-based repository migrates down to the HLW repository, and 
then there’s some unfavourable interactions, some impact on 
accelerating glass corrosion and so on. So there are some technical 
worries. (Professor of Nuclear Materials, interview) 
 
Coupled with the potential negative effect the encounter of alkaline plume from 
cementitious waste packages and HLW glass might have for the ability of glass 
to contain HLW, is the impact the co-located GDF might have on the siting 
process. Colin, a member of CoRWM noted that the co-located GDF simplifies 
the implementation process: 
 
I understand why government says one GDF would be 
preferable…it’s one planning process; it’s one of everything. But 
there are a number of reasons why one might not be practical. [Y]ou 
may not have enough geology to put all the waste down there. 
(CoRWM member, interview) 
 
Along the same lines, Matt posited; “finding a contiguous body of rock, which is 
of the right size, is problematic. So how you construct the facility within the rock 
is very much riskier in the sense that you got much less flexibility to change 
this”. So, to return to the main point; uncertainty is dynamic. It emerges from 
complexity. The complexity of the UK’s reactor fleet imposes particular 
challenges for the management of nuclear wastes. The UK’s nuclear waste 
inventory is diverse and broad (section 4.4). Different reactors create different 
kinds of wastes, even if their spent fuel is reprocessed – and not all spent fuel 
will be (Chapter 6). The breadth of the waste inventory and the diversity of 
wastes pose challenges on the engineering of waste packages. The diversity of 
the waste packages in turn imposes uncertainties on their ability to contain 
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nuclear waste for as long and as efficiently as required. Meanwhile, a co-
located GDF, which aims to ease and simplify the implementation process, 
might end up complicating the process. The demands on geology, in terms of 
volume and homogeneity, become more stringent. Complexity, aside from 
increasing uncertainty, decreases flexibility. More geology is needed for a 
broader range of wastes and the availability of ‘suitable’ sites becomes 
narrowed. 
 
Finland: small scale operations 
A year after Finland’s first nuclear reactor, Loviisa 1, was connected to the grid, 
a magazine ran by the Finnish Nuclear Society (Atomiteknillinen Seura, ATS) 
weighed that in terms of nuclear power generation “a small country like Finland 
is in many ways dependent on leading industrialised nations and the services 
they provide, such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel” 
(ATS, 1978: 17). ATS is a scientific association that covers the nuclear field. Its 
central task is to provide opportunities for information exchange for 
professionals employed in the field of nuclear technology. 
 
Indeed, the Finnish nuclear infrastructure pales in comparison to its UK 
equivalent. While Finland harboured hopes of reprocessing (Chapter 6), it never 
envisioned the construction of such technology itself and in the end never 
reprocessed any of its spent fuel. The Finnish nuclear infrastructure is 
composed of four commercial reactors: two Soviet VVER-40 designs8 at Loviisa 
and two BWRs9 at Olkiluoto, delivered by the Swedish ASEA Atom. The choice 
of reactor designs was informed by Cold War considerations (Nikula et al., 
2012), but, unlike in the UK, reactor choices were not motivated by matters of 
prestige, but a deliberate attempt to balance between the East and the West. 
 
Both reactor sites also host shallow geological repositories for LLW and ILW. 
These have been operational since 1998 and 1992, respectively. A US 
designed TRIGA research reactor that was operated by VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland (VTT) in Espoo has been shutdown and is waiting 
for decommissioning. Like the UK, Finland fosters ambitions of expand its 
																																								 																				
8	VVER40	=	Water-Water Energetic Reactor. 
9	BWR = Boiling Water Reactor. 
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nuclear capacity. The delivery of the now infamous Olkiluoto 3 EPR is almost a 
decade late. Initially, commercial operations were meant to start in 2010, but 
have been pushed back several times. The anticipated start of energy 
generation has been 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
      Figure 9. Nuclear places in Finland. 
 
 
stated as December 2018. Fennovoima, a relative newcomer in the Finnish 
nuclear energy scene, is planning to construct another VVER-type reactor in 
Pyhäjoki, Northern Finland. Like Olkiluoto 3, this project is also behind 
schedule. The safety documentation produced by Rosatom, the deliverer of the 
reactor, for the Construction Licence Application (CLA) has not been sufficiently 
detailed to allow the regulatory body, the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority, (STUK), to assess the safety of the planned reactor (YLE, 2016). 
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In what follows, I will explore the waste inventories that have been produced at 
the nuclear sites that I have discussed in this section. In section 4.3 I will 
discuss current practices of reporting nuclear waste volumes and quantities – 
and how this might hinder the researcher for fully grasping comparative scales 
of the nuclear waste challenge. 
 
4.2 Nuclear traces 
Nuclear waste inventories are reflections of particular nuclear pasts, past 
presents, past and present nuclear futures. In the same way as national 
imaginations are embodied and performed in reactor designs (Hecht, 2009), we 
can trace echoes of national technopolitical priorities in nuclear waste 
inventories. The size and complexity of nuclear waste inventories readily reflect 
past and present visions of nuclear futures. They also differentiate between 
national experiences of nuclear waste management and plans for GDF designs. 
 
As the stuff for disposal, nuclear wastes are broadly defined as “radioactive 
material in gaseous, liquid or solid form for which no further use is foreseen” 
(ENSREG, n.a.). This definition leaves a great deal of space for policy makers 
to define what materials are considered as wastes and which are not. National 
nuclear waste inventories, thus, differ in scale and material diversity. These 
differences can be useful indication of scale of the nuclear waste challenge 
countries need to address. Simultaneously, differences between waste 
inventories, as well as nuclear infrastructures, can discourage comparison 
between different countries. The scales of the UK and Finnish nuclear waste 
inventories, for instance, are so vastly different, as we will see, that direct 
comparison between them would provide us with little fruitful material with which 
to work. However, if we treat waste inventories as effects of past and present 
decisions, waste management presents, and visions of nuclear futures, they 
supply material for bringing different disposal projects into a meaningful 
conversation with each other. 
 
Internationally waste classification practices vary based on national policies and 
stances on the ontological status of spent nuclear fuel in particular. The World 
Nuclear Association (WNA) for instance defines spent fuel strictly as an asset, 
and its three tier classification system includes low level wastes (LLW), 
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intermediate level wastes (ILW) and high level wastes (HLW) (WNA, 2018). 
Countries that do not reprocess spent fuel include or replace HLW with spent 
fuel in their classification systems. Table 1 lists the relative volumes and 
radioactivity levels of the three nuclear waste categories to which the WNA 
subscribes. Waste categories primarily rely on levels of radioactivity (WNA, 
2018), yet both Finland and UK use different approaches to categorise their 
wastes. On the international level the classification of wastes follows multiple 
logics, which convolutes the scale of the issue in ways that makes the 
comparison of different cases difficult. Following Geoff Bowker and Susan Star 
Leigh (1999) waste classification on the international level is better viewed as a 
‘nomenclature’ since there is no single, uniform, classificatory principle to 
categorise the stuff. A nomenclature is merely an agreed-upon naming scheme 
that needs not follow particular classificatory principles. Classification practices 
are blurry, spatio-temporal interventions in the world (Bowker and Leigh Star, 
1999). In an ideal case classification practices are consistent and complete, 
covering the world they seek to describe in its wholeness; while classes, ideally, 
are mutually exclusive. No real world classification system, Bowker and Leigh 
Star note, meet these criteria. This becomes even clearer when we try to 
compare two cases classifying the same or similar matter. Nuclear waste 
provides us with a prime example of this, and in section 4.3 we will see some of 
the challenges the varied practices impose on efforts to compare the scale and  
composition of nuclear waste inventories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Relative Nuclear Waste Volumes and Levels of 
Radioactivity 
 
 Volume 
Radioactivity 
Level 
HLW 3% 95% 
ILW 7% 4% 
LLW 90% 1% 
Adapted from World Nuclear Association (WNA, 2018) 
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In Finland nuclear wastes are classified according to their disposal route 
(OECD, 2016). From a practical nuclear waste management perspective this 
effectively means that there are only two nuclear wastes classes: the GDF 
bound SNF and operational wastes that includes both LLW and ILW. The vast 
majority of operational wastes have already been disposed in shallow 
underground facilities at Olkiluoto and Loviisa as a “routine practice” (VTT 
Principal Researcher, interview). LLW consists of what could be considered as 
‘conventional maintenance waste’ (Fortum, 2016), that is, machine parts, pipes, 
work clothing, used protective gear, plastic wrappings, rugs and fabrics. ILW for 
its part, includes ion exchange resins from water purification systems, 
evaporation wastes from drainage water purification, sludges that sediments at 
the bottom of tanks and pumps. Both ILW and LLW are packed into concrete 
containers and emplaced into silos that have been excavated into the bedrock 
at the depth of 60-100 metres (TVO, n.a.). 
 
The UK’s classification system is more intricate than the Finnish binary system 
that merely differentiates between SNF and operational wastes. Nuclear wastes 
are classified according to their heat-generating capacity and activity content 
into LLW, ILW and HLW (NDA, 2014a). LLW has been disposed of in the LLWR 
in West Cumbria since the late 1950s, first in disposal trenches and later in 
engineered vaults. Under the current policy framework all ILW and HLW, and 
some SNF, will be disposed of in a GDF. SNF has traditionally been treated as 
a resource rather than waste and has been reprocessed. However, under the 
current policy framework reprocessing is expected to cease by 2020 (DECC, 
2015). This transition from an open to a closed fuel cycle means that all SNF 
from potential nuclear new build will be disposed of alongside ILW and HLW.  
 
Looking at the national nuclear inventories together-apart, names and labels 
assigned to things are broadly speaking the same: LLW, ILW, HLW, SNF. What 
these labels describe is less clear. What ILW or SNF are, what they are 
composed of is hidden and blurred behind the label. Waste classifications name 
things, but they do not really tell us what things are assembled behind the label, 
what they are. Their usefulness emerges from the production of relationality 
within the top-level category of nuclear waste. Although we do not know exactly 
everything that LLW contains, we know it is different from ILW that is different 
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from HLW that is different from SNF. The significance of these labels emerges 
through their relationship with each other and the implied effects and threats 
they can pose to organic life. The indeterminacy of the UK’s inventory is not 
produced solely by policy decisions about reprocessing and indecisions about 
wastes (chapter 6), but also by improvements in nuclear waste management 
and compaction techniques, anticipated returns of reprocessing wastes to 
overseas customers, and uncertainties related to some of the historical wastes 
stored at Sellafield. 
 
Disposal inventories 
While I have here labelled Finland’s stock of SNF as a ‘waste inventory’ for the 
sake of clarity, the concept of a nuclear waste inventory is absent from Finnish 
nuclear waste imaginations and terminology. The absence of an explicit 
inventory can be a hindrance for the researcher trying to make sense of the 
nuclear waste situation in Finland, a matter I will briefly address further below. 
Nonetheless, I am bent to propose that the absence of an inventory suggests a 
measure of clarity and certainty within the Finnish GD project.  
 
The stock for disposal in Finland is reasonably simple. Past waste management 
practices and regulatory requirements have ensured that the stock is certain, 
and stable. Since Finland has not shifted between open and closed cycles, 
there is little uncertainty as to what the matter going into GDF will be. Moreover, 
the Finnish inventory is small. It is small in contrast to many other nuclear 
countries, but it is also smaller than it could have been. Between 1981 and 
1996 SNF from the Loviisa plant was repatriated first to the Soviet Union and 
then to Russia. The return was part of an agreement signed between the Soviet 
and Finnish governments in 1969 regarding peaceful uses of nuclear power. 
The agreement was in line with the Soviet practice of delivering fuel to and 
receiving SNF from the reactors it had delivered to other countries (Kojo, 2009). 
Because of the clarity over what will be disposed of in Onkalo, the Finnish 
nuclear industry might see no apparent need for an established nuclear waste 
inventory. Both utility companies, TVO and Fortum, store their SNF at the 
reactor sites, while operational wastes are disposed of routinely also at the 
reactor sites. When Posiva applied for the construction licence for Onkalo at 
Olkiluoto in the late 1990s, the existing amounts and anticipated future risings 
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of spent fuel for disposal had already been calculated and established. There is 
little uncertainty as to what is going on, what and how much stuff is going into 
the GDF.  
 
The present situation in the UK stands in contrast to that in Finland. In contrast 
to Finland, the UK has a ‘centralised’ nuclear waste inventory that is updated 
every three years. The latest iteration is from 2016. The inventory has a 
designated website (https://ukinventory.nda.gov.uk) under the government 
domain that offers a ‘snapshot’ of nuclear wastes that have accumulated during 
present and historical nuclear operations. The website offers also estimates of 
future arisings from existing reactors. The website further guides the reader on 
how nuclear wastes and wastestreams are reported, how nuclear wastes are 
classified, what radioactivity is, how the inventory can be used, and how it 
should be interpreted.  
 
Additionally, the inventory also provides a list of materials excluded from the 
inventory, and a rationale for these exclusions (NDA, 2014b). Labelled as 
radioactive materials (in contrast to nuclear wastes), these excluded materials 
include, but are not confined to, depleted uranium, plutonium and (for now) 
SNF. This but underlines the ontological indeterminacy, what is waste and what 
is an asset, of nuclear materials. Take depleted uranium, for instance. It can be 
used in a range of products. It has been used as a counterbalance weight and 
ballast in aeroplanes, such as Boeing-747 and boat keels (WHO, 2001). It is 
however, most commonly associated with military applications. Arthur, an RWM 
Research Manager criticised the current classification of depleted uranium as a 
radioactive material. He weighed that once “you recognise that the best thing to 
do with this depleted uranium is to put it underground rather than to make it into 
depleted uranium weapons and fire it at people, disposal just seems like such 
common sense” (RWM Research Manager, interview). Indeed, despite the 
radioactive material status of depleted uranium, the current government policy 
requires RWM to consider the disposal of this materials, as well as plutonium. 
While this arrangement allows some room for manoeuvre for the government 
with regards to the future treatment of depleted uranium and plutonium, the 
RWM Research Manager questioned whether this open-endedness and 
indeterminacy with regards to depleted uranium is necessary, because the 
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material has such limited uses. The situation with plutonium is not dissimilar to 
that of depleted uranium. The UK government appears to be holding onto its 
atomic optimism that plutonium will deliver on its historical promise as a 
valuable energy source. Theoretically, the UK’s plutonium stock could be 
utilised as a component of Mixed Oxide fuel (MOX), a fuel cocktail of uranium 
and plutonium. Gordon Mackerron (2012) has argued, however, that the costs 
transforming plutonium into fuel and managing MOX SNF as a result is more 
costly than the management of ‘conventional’ SNF. Moreover, MOX is not used 
in UK reactors currently nor will any of the planned new nuclear plants envision 
use this fuel.  
 
Aside from depleted uranium and plutonium, the third major source of 
uncertainty is potential spent fuel from new build reactors – also excluded from 
the UK’s nuclear waste inventory. With new build reactors still sitting on the 
drawing board, their nuclear wastes have not been “confirmed” and have thus 
been excluded from the inventory (DECC, 2015). This adds further uncertainty 
as to the eventual UK nuclear waste inventory. Nonetheless, the government 
holds that new build SNF could be disposed of in the future GDF (BERR, 2008). 
Colin, a member of CoRWM, observed that brining SNF into the GD project 
might prove counterproductive: 
 
The conflation of new build and legacy wastes is quite uniquely 
British, but might also prove unhelpful. It would be a much easier 
task to get people to volunteer for legacy only. (CoRWM member, 
interview) 
 
‘Legacy’ wastes, mentioned by Colin, are nuclear wastes that have arisen or will 
arise from the UK’s existing nuclear capacity; so effectively from the weapons 
programme, the various experimental reactor programmes, nuclear power 
plants and reprocessing activities. Mackerron notes how “the notion of ‘legacy’ 
is […] often invoked to capture the idea that there is a long history of the 
generation of nuclear materials […] and that there is no choice about the need 
to find suitable management solutions” (Mackerron, 2012: 7). In ontological 
terms, legacy is definite. It cannot be undone; it cannot but be waste. This is 
partly due to the irreversible waste treatment and management practices that 
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will be explored further below in Chapter 6. In its 2002 White Paper, Managing 
the Nuclear Legacy, the UK Department of Transportation (DTI) defined the 
UK’s nuclear legacy as those sites and facilities  “developed in the 1940s, 50s 
and 60s to support the Government’s research programmes, and the wastes, 
materials and spent fuel produced by those programmes; and the Magnox fleet 
of nuclear power stations designed and built in the 1960s and 70s” (DTI, 2002: 
8). This begs the question about the visibility and status of wastes produced 
and to be produced by the still operating AGRs and the PWR. Where do these 
fit, categorically? Why are they not seen as part of the nuclear past (the PWR at 
Sizewell as the youngest reactor is 22 years old) or the nuclear future? These 
questions might be moot, as wastes from the AGR and PWR are nonetheless 
being managed and are destined for disposal. The clarity of the boundary work 
demarcating the past from the present and the future nonetheless is intriguing. 
It is characteristic of the UK disposal culture, and I will propose in Chapter 7, 
essential for the performance of contain-ability. Before, we return to the stuff of 
this section, it is also worth noting that UK’s practice of delineating nuclear 
pasts, presents and futures appears in opposition to Finnish imaginations 
around time and nuclear. Rather than boundaries and ruptures, the Finnish 
disposal culture emphasises continuity. 
 
Returning to legacy waste, its ontological certainty and the ethical obligation it 
embodies were at the heart of CoRWM’s recommendation of GD as the best 
available option for the long-term management of nuclear wastes (CoRWM, 
2006). The Committee made it clear that its deliberations only dealt with legacy 
wastes, and it took a clear stance against the conflation of new build and legacy 
wastes. New build wastes, CoRWM argued, are accompanied by different 
ethical, political, social and technical considerations. Moreover, the Committee 
held that at the time when communities are invited to participate in the 
implementation process 
 
the inventory of material destined for disposal must be clearly 
defined. Any substantive increase to this inventory would require an 
additional step in the negotiation process with host communities to 
allow them to take a decision to accept or reject any additional 
waste. (CoRWM, 2006: 113, my emphasis) 
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It can be argued that this, at the moment, is not case. The inventory remains in 
a state of flux with a range of ‘radioactive materials’, including plutonium and 
depleted uranium, existing in an ontological limbo. In its 2014 White Paper 
Implementing Geological Disposal, the now defunct, Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) laid out a so called ‘inventory for disposal’ that 
included everything that might be disposed of in a future GDF, including 
depleted uranium, plutonium and new build SNF. DECC explained that  
 
it is not anticipated that […] the categories of waste and material […] 
will change significantly. They provide the most complete picture of 
the possible inventory for disposal, and are presented as such in 
order to give […] the full picture of the wastes and materials that 
need to be considered.  (DECC 2014a: 14, my emphasis) 
 
While, admittedly DECC’s inventory of disposal lists anything and everything 
that could go into the GDF and thus in a sense checks CoRWM’s condition on 
informing substantive nuclear waste increases, it is reasonable to question how 
clear or informative the inventory for disposal really is. By listing both nuclear 
wastes and radioactive materials, if we follow the ‘official’ classification, DECC’s 
inventory for GD does not provide clarity for the UK GD project, but sits 
awkwardly alongside the UK’s nuclear waste inventory. The messiness of the 
nuclear waste inventory(/ies), the government’s unwillingness to define the 
official inventory clearly and assertion that “waste and spent fuel from new 
nuclear build would not raise such different technical issues compared with 
nuclear waste from legacy programmes as to require a different technical 
solution” (BERR, 2008: 90), might well prove detrimental to the implementation 
of GD. The government’s apparent indecision about or lack of commitment to 
nuclear waste categories adds unnecessary uncertainty to what the nuclear 
waste inventory for disposal might eventually be. This indeterminacy about what 
counts as waste has a negative affect on the GDF’s ability to contain waste. 
The major question with regards contain-ability emerging from this 
indeterminacy is; how can you design to contain matter, when you don’t know 
what it is you are containing? The ability of the GDF to contain nuclear wastes 
is tied to scientists’ ability to tailor materials of containment to suit the needs of 
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wastes. If there is uncertainty about the wastes, there is bound to be uncertainty 
about the materials used for their containment. How can you care for 
something, when you are unsure what it is that you need to care for? 
 
4.3 Reporting wastes 
Finally, it is worth pointing out, albeit very briefly, the different waste inventory 
reporting practices. Making sense of nuclear waste inventories, particularly for 
comparative purposes can be tedious and frustrating. The ways in which waste 
are reported draw partly on the classification practices discussed in section 4.1. 
Comparing waste quantities between and, even within, inventories is a complex 
undertaking. Table 2 lists the best available information for Finnish and UK 
nuclear waste inventories. In doing so, it also demonstrates some of the issues 
with nuclear waste reporting. The quantities of LLW, ILW and HLW are 
customarily reported in volume (m3), while in the UK spent fuel is reported by 
mass (tonnes of heavy metal, tHM). In Finland authorities from Posiva to MEE 
(Ministry of Employment and Economic Affairs) use tU (tonnes of uranium) 
instead of tHM for reporting SNF. Additionally, MEE and the regulator STUK 
report SNF quantities also in numbers of disposable SNF assemblies (MEE, 
2017; STUK, 2014). Posiva on the other hand translates this figure into the 
expected number of waste canisters needed to contain existing and forecasted 
Table 2. Indicative nuclear waste Inventories 
 UK FIN 
HLW 1,150 m3 - 
ILW 290,000 m3 9,978 m3 
 LLW 1,350,000 m
3 
SNF 7,000 tHM 5,500 tU 
Based on data from the UK’s 2016 nuclear waste inventory (NDA, 2017a; NDA, 
2018) and data from Posiva’s website (Posiva, n.a.a) and from a 2016 OECD 
country report on Finland. Thus the FIN data presents the assumed overall SNF 
arising from the operations of the existing four reactors as well as OL3 still under 
construction. The figure for ILW and LLW presents the arising by 2015. All the 
data for the UK presents assumed arisings from closed and currently operating 
reactors. 
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SNF arisings from the three reactors at Olkiluoto and the two at Loviisa (Posiva, 
n.a.a). Numbers of fuel assemblies and waste canisters may be more illustrative 
and communicable than nuclear waste volumes or masses. Still, as a means 
relaying the scale of the matter they are extremely vague units, unless the 
reader is familiar with the dimensions of these objects.  
 
The UK’s favoured references to the Wembley stadium, when talking about the 
quantities of nuclear waste; “the UK has generated a legacy of nuclear waste 
with a volume capable of filling Wembley Stadium” (University of Sheffield, 
2016, see also DECC, 2014a), is as obscure as Finnish references to waste 
canisters. References to Wembley or to the 2,800 waste canisters anticipated 
by Posiva, hardly invokes the imaginary that “the amount of nuclear wastes 
produced is very small” (WNA, 2017b) that nuclear institutions, such as the 
World Nuclear Association (WNA), seek to promote. Where the nuclear industry 
draws on Wembley as something relatable, seeking to invoke an imaginable 
scale for the nuclear issue, Wembley advertises itself as the “largest and most 
prestigious sports stadium” in the UK (Wembley, 2018). The imaginations of 
manageability the nuclear industry seeks to invoke are in direct opposition with 
popular views of Wembley as a large venue. While the Wembley analogue 
might resonate with broader readership than cubic metres in communicating the 
scale of the issue, it might nonetheless guides imaginations in unwanted ways. 
Moreover, one might also argue, that situating nuclear waste in such a 
mundane setting decentres wastes from the representation of the scale of the 
problem by drawing attention to the actual venue or memories of Alan Shearer 
scoring five goals in Wembley in the 1996 UEFA Euros. 
 
If practices of reporting nuclear waste quantities are diverse and unnecessarily 
cumbersome to interpret, the actual terminology and labelling of nuclear wastes 
work the other way around.  Both in the UK and Finland the terminology used to 
describe nuclear wastes tends to do away with much of the messiness 
contained by the terms. When referred to in the singular: “UK Radioactive 
Waste Inventory” (NDA, 2018b), “how the waste and materials are currently 
managed” (DECC, 2014a: 15), “no nuclear waste will be released to living 
nature” (Posiva, n.a.b), much of the diversity within and between nuclear waste 
classes becomes invisibilised. All the while though, the diversity within different 
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classes provides Waste management organisations with engineering and 
nuclear waste management conundrums. Even in the Finnish case where only 
spent fuel is a concern for the GD project, the broad category of spent fuel 
includes three different kinds of spent fuels each of which requires a unique 
waste canister as the fuel assemblies for the BWR, EPR and VVER-440 are of 
different sizes. The UK’s ILW, for instance, emerges in many forms: fuel 
cladding material, sludges, ion exchange resins, plutonium contaminated 
materials and solids from plant operation and maintenance. Based on the 
activity levels of these wastes and the related requirement for their packaging 
and shielding, ILW is internally divided into two categories: ILW and UILW 
(unshielded ILW), the latter category being the one needing more treatment due 
to its higher levels of activity. DECC has described this division as “important for 
the safety of operation and the design of both stores and disposal facilities” 
(DECC, 2015: 36). Similar considerations are relevant for all of the different 
types of nuclear wastes, as none of the categories is internally homogeneous.  
 
While short-hands and the simplification of nuclear wastes might ease 
communication, they do obscure the very tangible relationship between nuclear 
wastes, wasteforms and GDF design. How and what material is classified 
affects how and what disposal cultures do and act in the world. A three or four 
tier classification of nuclear wastes, as an ideal classification practice skims 
over what it classifies. It ignores the liveliness, evolution and changeability of 
stuff, as well as the ability of humans to change their minds about what counts 
as what and why. The more diverse the inventory of nuclear wastes, the more 
there are different kinds of wasteforms and materials present in the GDF 
design, the more challenging the implementation of GD is likely to be. 
Classification invests the classifier with agency. It implies controllability, 
whereas the ‘need’ to classify nuclear things, emerges from a lack of control.  
 
We can undestand nuclear waste classification practices as mechanisms of 
care and protection of the human. It is exactly because of their liveliness and 
invisible power to corrupt that nuclear waste needs to be classified, not for the 
sake of wastes but for the sake of the human. Unable to see, feel or detect their 
liveliness sensorially or in other ways, we need waste classes and labels for our 
own protection. We are immersed in and motivated by the logic and stickiness 
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of nuclear radiation and waste as hyperobjects. Their effects are inescapable in 
their human-scale ‘foreverness’. Thus a way of claiming agency over the unruly 
matter, disposal cultures split it, box it, contain it discursively in neat categories 
that in the end of the day only bear relevance to other categories. The waste 
itself could not care less about the name we give it. Waste will continue to do 
what it does whether we admit its ability to do so or not. 
 
In the following two sections I will explore some of the spaces and practices 
through which nuclear wastes and inventories have been imagined and 
engineered, and how this has fed to imaginations of a ‘nuclear waste problem’. 
 
4.4 From manageability to a threat  
In the early years of the nuclear age the stuff churned out by nuclear power 
stations in the UK had an ambiguous status. It flowed freely between 
imaginations of waste and asset, but the underlining notion was that the stuff 
was manageable. In a 1958 House of Commons debate, Winston Churchill 
asserted, "the radioactivity of waste released from the civil nuclear power 
stations is expected to be negligible” (HoC, 1958, vol. 583, c. 969). While for 
Chruchill radiation was a non-issue, concerns about nuclear waste had been 
voiced earlier. During a 1954 House of Lords debate the Marquess of Salisbury 
posited waste explicitly as a problem:   
   
The widespread use of atomic energy is bringing with it a new 
problem [...] a new industrial waste which is highly dangerous and 
contains radioactivity greater by several orders of magnitude than 
anything that has been known before. (HoL, 1954, vol.187, c. 478, my 
emphasis)   
  
Although Salisbury viewed nuclear waste as a ‘highly dangerous’ problem, he 
observed that the industry had paid special attention to the waste problem, and 
further perceived radiation as controllable: 
 
The atomic energy project has always devoted special attention to 
this new problem. The greatest care has been taken not to allow 
discharges which could give rise to any contamination of air or water 
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exceeding the levels laid down by the Medical Research 
Council. (ibid., my emphasis)   
 
According to Salisbury, then, careful industrial and regulatory practices were 
adequate to contain and keep the new problem of radiation under control. This 
narrative of controllability was reiterated in the 1955 White Paper A Programme 
of Nuclear Power that laid the foundation for the UK’s first civilian nuclear 
programme. In the first instance, the Paper posited that the volumes of waste 
generated by the nuclear industry would be small, while efforts to identify 
storage and disposal solutions had already commenced. Moreover, the Paper 
asserted  
 
The disposal of radioactive waste products should not present a 
major difficulty. The problem is primarily one for the chemical 
processing plants, which will be few in number, and not for the power 
stations. (Ministry of Fuel and Power, 1955: 9, my emphasis).    
 
The perceived small volume of waste together with the presence of 
reprocessing technologies helped to invisibilise and deproblematise waste 
matters. Rather than waste, spent nuclear fuel was conceptualised as an asset 
to be reprocessed and reused. Any waste produced was defined in terms of its 
chemistry rather than its nuclearity (Hecht, 2009). The White Paper further 
envisioned “many valuable uses for [radioactive waste products] which may be 
able to absorb a great part of the output” (ibid: 9). A few years later, Lord Mills 
went as far as to argue; “there is no waste from a nuclear power station. 
[R]adioactive material will be re-processed and most valuable products will be 
obtained from [it]” (HoL, 1957, vol. 202, cc. 1014-1015). Since the early 
motivation behind civilian nuclear power was the generation of raw materials for 
nuclear weapons, the positing of spent nuclear fuel as an asset rather than 
waste is unsurprising. In a debate on the 1955 White Paper, MP Nigel Birch 
made this point explicit. He held that the UK was developing techniques for 
‘waste’ by-products such as Strontium-90 and Caesium-137 to “put them to 
useful work” (HoC, 1955, vol. 537, c. 1675). Strontium-90, he explained, could 
be used to prevent static electrical build-up in industrial processes, while 
Caesium-137 could have medical uses. “The point”, Birch emphasised, was that 
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waste “is a manageable problem” (ibid, my emphasis). Not only was spent fuel 
considered manageable, waste disposal itself was seen as unproblematic. 
Wishing to address public “misunderstanding” of the risks of disposal, MP 
Ronald Bell observed in the same House of Commons debate that “the disposal 
of even the great and increasing volume of atomic waste […] will cause no 
serious trouble at all in the years that lie ahead. [T]he disposal of the processed 
waste can be easily undertaken without any danger to the surrounding 
population” (HoC, 1955, vol. 537, c. 1634). Wastes and disposal were, thus,  
construed as non-issues. 
 
The presence of reprocessing technologies enabled the separation of nuclear 
technology and spent fuel. Rather than waste, spent fuel was primarily viewed 
as an asset, while high level waste was defined through its chemistry rather 
than its nuclearity. Together, these two factors contributed to the narrative of 
controllability of waste. Even where waste was problematised, the underlining 
story was one of manageability. This narrative of the manageability and 
controllability of nuclear waste has not change significantly although wastes 
have since been problematised. 
 
The Flowers Report 
Where the 1955 White Paper posited nuclear spent fuel as a manageable asset 
on one hand, and as chemical waste on the other, the 1976 ‘Flowers Report 
‘presents us with a marked break in the narrative of the controllability of nuclear 
materials. The Report was published as a response to the UK Government’s 
plans to implement a new nuclear programme envisioning a “twenty-fold 
increase by year 2000 and a further quadrupling by year 2030” of the country’s 
nuclear capacity (RCEP, 1976: 3). Facing this vision of the UK’s nuclear future, 
the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP), lead by sir Brian 
Flowers, felt that the environmental implications of such a nuclear expansion 
should be examined in depth. As the first serious consideration of the waste 
issue (among other nuclear matters), the Flowers Report has been referred to 
as the ending of the UK’s nuclear waste management “pre-history” (Cairns, 
2014), and RWM, as the current developer of the UK GDF, traces its origins to 
the Report (Wisbey, 2017). In a marked departure from the nuclear waste 
debates of the 1950s, the Flowers Report describes wastes in terms of their 
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nuclearity and futurity. 
 
“There is the problem of dealing with the highly active radioactive 
wastes which arise in the nuclear fuel cycle and which will have to be 
contained for immense periods of time” (ibid.: 3, my emphasis).  
 
Rather than chemistry, the Report defines the waste and the waste problem 
through their nuclearity. This shift from chemistry to nuclearity challenged the 
narrative of controllability. Waste matter was no longer something that could be 
managed in the present, but that had to be managed into the distant future. The 
Report explicitly criticised the UK’s nuclear establishment for neglecting nuclear 
waste. 
 
The picture that emerges from our review of radioactive waste 
management is in many ways a disquieting one, indicating 
insufficient appreciation of long-term requirements either by 
government departments or by other organisations concerned. 
(RCEP, 1976: 162). 
 
The UK nuclear establishment, the Report observed did not give “any indication 
that they regarded the search for a means of final disposal of highly active 
waste as at all pressing” (RCEP, 1976: 149). It found “this the more surprising in 
view of the large nuclear programmes […] envisage[d] for the coming decades, 
which would give rise to much greater quantities of waste” (ibid.). The stance of 
the UK Department of Energy that “safety and environmental problems related 
to nuclear power could be overcome”, was criticised by the Report that argued 
that such a stance “could lead to recognition of the dangers when it would be 
too late to avoid them. More is needed than bland, unsubstantiated official 
assurance that the environmental impact of nuclear power has been fully taken 
into account” (RCEP, 1976: 198). The Report effectively accused the UK 
nuclear establishment for structural irresponsibility, the “pursuit of progress […] 
creat[ing] ever greater timeprints marked by fundamental uncertainty and 
indeterminacy” (Adam and Groves, 2007: 203). The UK nuclear establishment, 
the Report contended, was appropriating the future in service of the present 
through its negligence of the latent consequences of nuclear operations, which 
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were already emerging as problematic to manage in the very long-term. The 
Report concluded that it would be “irresponsible and morally wrong” to commit 
future generations to nuclear new build if it could not be “demonstrated beyond 
reasonable doubt that at least one method exists for the safe isolation [of 
wastes] for the indefinite future” (RCEP, 1976: 80-1). The demonstration of a 
safe disposal method, the Report posited, should “be an essential prerequisite 
to a big expansion of nuclear power” (ibid.: 152). Rather than something that 
could be kept under review, the Flowers Report posited nuclear waste as a 
matter requiring action. The narrative of manageability shifted towards the need 
to actively manage nuclear waste. 
 
Underlining the responsibility of the present for the future, the Report criticised 
not only the government’s eagerness to commit to nuclear power, but also the 
industry’s nuclear waste management practices. It picked on the “standards of 
general housekeeping” at the BNFL-controlled Sellafield site, which the Report 
considered were not on a sufficiently high level (ibid.: 151). While the storage of 
waste in tanks and accessible facilities at Sellafield was posited as “safe 
enough for the present”, these practices, the Report deemed, were 
“unacceptable as a long term solution” (ibid.: 80). The Report expressed further 
disapproval of the decade-long stagnation in the research and development of 
vitrification, which can be seen as contributing towards a long-term waste 
management solution. Vitrification today is a standard technique for converting 
liquid HLW into a solid and stable glass form. Research into vitrifcation begun in 
the UK in the 1950s, but it had been virtually halted in the 1960s. While this 
research had since recommenced and the vitrification of HLW was expected to 
begin in the mid-1980s, the Report noted that that it was “strange in retrospect 
that a matter so important for the safe development of nuclear power should 
have been delayed for so long […] since vitfirication is intended not only to 
facilitate ultimate disposal of the wastes, but also to make them more secure 
[…] in the interim” period before disposal (ibid.: 145-6). As the UK nuclear 
establishment was driven by the promises of nuclear technology, military and 
energy security considerations, whatever early concerns there were about 
waste were muted by a narrative of controllability, and it was not until the 
Flowers Report that nuclear waste was construed as a ‘matter of care’ (Puig de 
la Bellacasa, 2017), and a serious problem.  
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In a significant break with past nuclear future making, the Flowers Report 
situated the management of nuclear wastes ahead of the development and 
expansion of nuclear power technology. Nuclear waste, the Report held, should 
be addressed before any nuclear new build plans were realised. The Report 
highlighted the intergenerational cost of “cheap power” (Ministry of Fuel and 
Supply, 1955: 8) arguing that nuclear power imposes “dangers to our remote 
descendants long after nuclear fission technology has ceased to be used as a 
source of energy” (ibid.: 192). While the Report did not advocate the curbing of 
existing nuclear energy generation, it nonetheless argued that the hazards of 
nuclear wastes were significant enough to argue against a careless 
commitment to nuclear expansion “in the hope that [such expansion] might be 
avoided altogether” (ibid.: 195). Nuclear waste, the Report argued, is not just 
“another problem arising from nuclear development […] which can certainly be 
solved given suitable control arrangements” (ibid.: 193). While nuclear wastes 
are controllable in the present, their production has set in motion futures with 
repercussions that escape the reach of contemporary industrial and regulatory 
arrangements to manage them in the long-term. Without adequate long-term 
waste management solutions, the Flowers Report argued, there is no moral 
basis to expand nuclear for the benefit and purposes of the present at the 
expense of the future.  
 
This positioning of long-term waste management solutions as a prerequisite for 
nuclear expansion was echoed by the UK Department of Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC) three decades later. In a 2014 press release DECC asserted; 
“building a GDF will help us permanently deal with waste [...] It will also support 
the development of new, low-carbon, nuclear electricity generation in the UK by 
ensuring there is a safe, modern facility for permanently disposing of waste” 
(DECC, 2014a). In this framing, the GDF has been solidified as the signifier of 
the responsibility of the present for the future. It is broadly accepted that the 
generations that have benefitted from nuclear power should take care of 
nuclear waste to “lessen the burden on future generations” (Wilkinson, 2007: 
220, see also CoRWM, 2006). Concurrently, the OECD notes, the international 
nuclear waste community perceives GD as “an ethical undertaking that should 
be pursued now, and not left to future generations” (OECD, 2000: 15). While, it 
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can thus be argued that GD is seen by the nuclear waste community as a 
“material vital doing, and an ethico-political obligation” (Puig de la Bellacasa, 
2011), the extent of its ethical justification for nuclear development and new 
build has been contested in the UK. On the other hand, as we will explore in 
section 4.6, it can be argued that emphasis on nuclear development has stood 
in the way of caring for the waste problem. As we will see in Chapter 6, CoRWM 
(2006) has argued that different ethical criteria applies to the management of 
‘historical’ and potential new build wastes. The acknowledgement and 
acceptance of responsibility, and the provision of a potential long-term solution 
to management of nuclear waste, CoRWM argues, is not a licence to 
exacerbate the waste problem and to subject future beings to potential hazard.  
 
 
4.5 From a problem to a solution 
Where the UK began with a benign view of nuclear wastes as an asset and a 
manageable problem, the Finns approached the waste management issue from 
a different angle. Three years after the first reactor was connected to the grid, 
MP Mauri Pekkarinen argued in a 1980 parliamentary debate; “the fate of 
nuclear fuel waste in particular is a major problem in the very definition of the 
word” (PTK37/1980: 937). In contrast to the prevailing UK narrative of 
controllability and the negligence of waste in practice (section 4.6), from the 
beginning the Finns were more prone to conceptualise waste as a problem that 
required a long-term solution. However, the Finnish approach to waste matter in 
the early years of the nuclear industry, too, was more ambiguous than clear-cut. 
In 1976 (a year before the first reactor was connected to the grid), the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry (MTI) established a working group of national nuclear 
experts from the industry, academia and the civil service to present ideas for 
organising nuclear waste management and to “review matters and research it 
consider[ed] urgent” (ATS, 1978: 16) for the implementation of nuclear waste 
management. In its report the group held that spent fuel constituted the “most 
problematic question in nuclear waste management” (ibid.: 18). The group 
argued that immediate action should be taken to amend the existing Finnish 
Atomic Energy Law to include the until then omitted nuclear waste management 
in nuclear legislation; to obligate nuclear power companies to carry the costs of 
	 125	
nuclear waste management; to establish a nuclear waste research programme 
coordinated and overseen by the MTI; to foster international research links; and 
to prepare for a number of nuclear waste management scenarios. The group’s 
proposal translated into a 1978 Decision-in-Principle (DiP), which held that 
plans for the long-term management of nuclear waste were a prerequisite for 
nuclear power plant operational licences. In other words, nuclear waste 
management was tied to present nuclear operations; consideration of the future 
was situated as a prerequisite for present operations. Ilkka, a retired Posiva 
Advisor, noted that TVO, that unlike IVO had no long-term management plan in 
place in the late 1970s, was forced to address the waste problem with urgency 
in order to secure their operational licence which “would not be renewed if the 
[waste management] programme wasn’t started. [The DiP] was a clear whip 
and a signal that action needed to be taken immediately”. The decision-making 
circles in Finland, then, were sensitive to nuclear waste as a problem that could 
not be left to wait for the future. However, it was waste management, rather 
than waste itself, that was perceived as a challenge. As in the UK, spent 
nuclear fuel was seen as an asset. In its report, the MTI appointed working 
group postulated that the “direct disposal of spent fuel as waste is […] an 
unlikely option, because it would mean wasting resources” (ATS, 1978: 18).  
 
Reprocessing, rather than disposal, was, thus, the early favourite for nuclear 
waste management in Finland. It was seen as economically the most sensible 
alternative, but also as the safer alternative to the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. 
The 1978 Nuclear Waste Report established that “reprocessing wastes are 
seen to be in a safer form than spent fuel. Vitrified high-level waste […] has a 
low solubility and it contains only a fraction of the amount of plutonium in spent 
fuel” (IVO and TVO, 1978: 32). Nonetheless, because of the small scale and 
limited resources of the Finnish nuclear industry, establishing native 
reprocessing capacity was considered unpracticable. Spent fuel would have to 
be reprocessed abroad, where it was hoped the high level wastes resulting from 
reprocessing would also stay after reprocessing. The MTI working group 
argued, “sending [spent fuel] abroad irreversibly should be the first aim for 
Finland” (ATS, 1978: 18). In this way, it was imagined that the management of 
Finnish nuclear wastes could be delegated to other nuclear countries, and TVO 
embarked on negotiations with BNFL in the UK. The state-owned IVO already 
	 126	
had waste management arrangements in place. It had signed a deal with the 
Soviet Atomenergoexport, who delivered IVO’s reactors at Loviisa, in 1969 over 
the repatriation of spent fuel to the Soviet Union. The negotiations between 
TVO and BNFL, however, soured fast and eventually broke down, as the two 
companies fundamentally disagreed over the fate of HLW. Where TVO 
envisioned reprocessing as virtual disposal of its wastes abroad, BNFL 
demanded that HLW should be returned to Finland. A parliamentary debate 
took place against the breakdown of the negotiations between TVO and BNFL. 
The breakdown raised concerns about TVO’s ability to manage its waste in the 
parliament. Invoking the 1978 DiP, MP Mauri Pekkarinen argued that TVO 
“should urgently present its plans for solving the waste problem. Unless such a 
plan can be presented […] their operational licences should be reconsidered” 
(PTK 37/1980: 938). The failure to reach an agreement with BNFL, at least 
theoretically, threatened TVO’s short-term future. In the absence of satisfactory 
waste management plans, TVO’s initial operational licence covered only five 
years, up to 1983. The Finnish nuclear regulatory practices brought the long-
term future to the present to organise the nuclear industry to prevent major 
nuclear waste management problems and radiological threats in the future. The 
nuclear present was governed through the anticipation of future problems. 
“Anticipatory modes”, Adams, Murphy and Clarke argue, “enable the production 
of possible futures that are lived and felt as inevitable in the present, rendering 
hope and fear as important” (Adams, Murphy and Clarke, 2009: 248). An 
anticipated problematic nuclear waste future was invoked to create practices 
and trajectories that would avoid the envisioned problem. The short-term 
nuclear future was presented as conditional on the development of nuclear 
waste management solutions in the long-term. 
 
Where in the late 1970s and early 1980s nuclear waste was a present problem 
for the UK, in Finland the problem, in practical management terms, still lay in 
the future. As a latecomer to the nuclear family, Finland benefitted from 
international experience of dealing (or not) with nuclear waste. Sweden, in 
particular, was an important influence (Äikäs, 2016). In Sweden, nuclear waste 
and its long-term management became politicised during the 1970s, as the anti-
nuclear Centre Party wished to phase out nuclear power. Convinced that 
nuclear wastes presented a problem for the industry, the party hoped to deal a 
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deadly blow to the industry by exposing the waste problem through new 
legislation. The Nuclear Power Stipulation Act, passed in early 1977 posited 
that nuclear power companies had to demonstrate both a method and a site for 
an ‘absolutely safe’ way to dispose of nuclear wastes as a precondition for 
further construction licences (Elam and Sundqvist, 2010). The Stipulation Act 
triggered the development of the KBS-3 concept that is currently being 
implemented in Sweden as well as in Finland. Markku, a Professor of 
Engineering contemplated “when you have Sweden as a neighbour, that’s 
where the ideas come from, that we have to do something as well”.  
 
The 1978 DiP, echoing the Swedish Stipulation Act, established the long-term 
management of nuclear wastes as the “end point of the [nuclear] project that 
has to be taken care of” (MEE civil servant, interview). Yet in the 1980 debate 
following the breakdown of negotiations between TVO and the BNFL, MP Terhi 
Nieminen-Mäkynen argued that “research into nuclear wastes and the problems 
related to their management have been overlooked. We have, apparently, been 
naively imagining that […] the wastes will be shipped abroad and that’s that” 
(PTK 37/1980: 949). More than anything, this accusation is probably suggestive 
of the intensity with which TVO wanted to dispose of its waste abroad. The MTI 
working group had already acknowledged in its Report the “possibility that high-
activity reprocessing waste will be returned to Finland” and further noted how 
the “country must take this possibility into consideration and take the 
appropriate measures in time” (ATS, 1978: 20). TVO’s failed negotiations with 
the BNFL narrowed down the company’s waste management options to a 
choice between storage and disposal. In 1982 TVO presented its renewed plan 
for the long-term management of nuclear waste to the government that 
proceeded to ratify the plan. While disposal abroad continued to be TVO’s 
favoured waste management policy (Nikula et al., 2012), the search for a 
disposal site in Finland began in 1983. The ratification of TVO’s plan together 
with beginning of the siting process, as we will see in chapter 6, have become 
important actors in the making of a narrative of Finnish GD success. 
 
The early 1980s imagination of waste management as a problem began to shift 
as the siting process reached the early 1990s and narrowed its focus from an 
original 101 potential disposal sites to only four sites. The re-articulation of the 
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problem narrative began with a proposal to amend the 1987 Nuclear Energy 
Act. The Proposal observed the limited international progress made in the 
implementation of nuclear waste disposal and argued that “Finland’s […] 
disposal plans are highly likely to attract international interest as the final 
disposal problem continues to grow” everywhere (LA 8/1993: 1). Because of the 
lack of international progress, the Proposal argued, “pressure will be focused on 
countries, where the final disposal problem is considered as technically solved” 
(ibid., my emphasis). In a decade, the Finnish narrative of the long-term 
management of nuclear wastes shifted from a problem to ‘technically solved’ 
despite the lack of a disposal site and the fact that the disposal concept could 
not be finalised until the site was chosen. The relative advancement of the 
Finnish project was framed against the perceived stagnation in other countries 
that was further supported by the problematisation of ‘foreign’ nuclear waste. In 
effect, the proposal to amend the Nuclear Energy Act created two new waste 
categories: ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’, and positioned the latter as a problem. The fear 
was that the comparatively advanced Finnish project would awaken desires in 
other countries to ship their waste to Finland for disposal. What had been the 
original aim of the Finnish nuclear industry, disposal of Finnish waste abroad, 
came to be seen as the ultimate horror scenario, disposal of foreign waste at 
home. So, the policy proposal can be understood in terms of efforts to avoid 
undesirable futures, at this instance, the perceived threat that Finland might be 
made the disposal site of other countries’ wastes. These concerns were 
triggered by Finland’s EU membership negotiations, as it was feared that within 
the EU, under the Euratom Treaty, nuclear materials, including wastes, might 
travel freely. The concern was that this might result in pressure on countries 
with more advanced disposal projects to accept waste from struggling projects 
or countries. By proposing to implement national legislation forbidding the 
importation and exportation of nuclear wastes, the Proposal sought to avert a 
fearful nuclear future. 
 
The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 1994. It posited, “nuclear wastes 
generated in connection with or as a result of use of nuclear energy elsewhere 
than in Finland shall not be handled, stored and permanently disposed of in 
Finland”, while wastes generated in Finland would be disposed of in Finland 
and only in Finland (YeL, 1420/1994: 4). The Act had three significant 
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repercussions for the Finnish GD project. Firstly, it erased IVO’s nuclear waste 
management strategy, as the company was no longer able to send its spent 
fuel to Russia. As a consequence the Finnish disposal inventory, that had only 
contained TVO’s spent fuel until then, was expanded and diversified. Secondly, 
the Act, indirectly, led to the establishment of Posiva. Now that both TVO and 
IVO were liable to implement GD in Finland, they joined forces and established 
Posiva as the GD delivery organisation. Thirdly, the Act effectively smothered 
any residual hopes of reprocessing and disposal abroad. This consequently 
defined the disposal inventory clearly: only spent fuel would be disposed of in 
the future GDF. Until the passing of the Act theoretically, if not necessarily in 
practice, there were four possible routes the Finnish disposal project could have 
followed. These had been identified by the MTI working group as 
 
• Reprocessing and disposal abroad 
• Interim storage of SNF for a sufficiently long period of time 
• Storage and disposal of solidified reprocessing waste 
• Storage and direct disposal of SNF. 
 
The Act effectively completed the narrowing down of nuclear waste 
management options, which had begun with the failed negotiation between 
TVO and BNFL. At this point the future of waste management was framed as an 
either-or choice between interim storage and direct disposal. Ilkka, a retired 
Posiva Advisor, recollected how Posiva underlined in public discussions 
preceding the 2001 siting decisions that long-term waste management in 
Finland was effectively a choice between two alternatives that should be 
weighed against each other: 
 
I was there following the final discussions in the Parliament and it 
was pleasing to hear that what was being discussed were the 
available alternatives. […] This is what we had been trying to 
achieve, so we considered it our success. We were open about 
uncertainties […] and tried to specifically argue that [GD] in any case 
is a better alternative than interim storage.  
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The contrasting of the storage and disposal alternatives, as opposed to more 
complex scientific debates, in the parliamentary debate can be seen as an 
expression of the type of engineering pragmatism that has been seen to 
characterise the Finnish GD project (e.g. van Luik in Manaugh and Twilley, 
2012). Ilkka suggested, “even though it may sound a bit naïve, cold pragmatism 
can be quite important […] for better or worse. It has [led to] bypassing some 
difficult questions too silently […] but the big thing is […] to think what the 
available alternatives here are”. This weighing of the two available alternatives 
against each (disposal against storage) has played a central part in the making 
of safety, as we will see in chapter 5. 
 
In the next section, I will change pace and engage in speculative thinking about 
the nuclear waste challenge as a result of ‘our’ infatuation with nuclear things. 
 
4.6 Nuclear love, actually? 
Beginning with a broader discussion, but then focusing on the UK’s case, I 
propose in this section that the nuclear waste challenge has emerged from our 
love, rather than fear, of nuclear technologies.  
 
If anything, nuclear has always been a technology of the future. Even Disney, in 
Our Friend the Atom (Disney, 1956), engaged with and promoted nuclear as a 
genie, an omnipotent power to move societies forward. In the prologue, Walt 
Disney wrote of nuclear as promising a great future. 
 
The atom is our future. […] The story of the atom is a fascinating tale 
of human quest for knowledge, a story of scientific adventure and 
success. Atomic science began as positive, creative thought. It has 
created modern science with its many benefits for mankind. (Quoted 
in Sorene, 2015) 
 
Disney’s narrative of scientific success, modernity and progress have been very 
much part of more official nuclear imaginations as well. Nuclear has always had 
great promises to offer. While nuclear’s awesome capacity for destruction has 
suggested the always possible coming of doomsday (Anders, 1962; Weart, 
1988), in their peaceful uses nuclear technologies have promised national 
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prestige (e.g. Hecht, 2009; Mackerron, 2012) and electricity too cheap to meter 
(Macfarlane, 2017). The IAEA, the international body regulating, but also 
promoting nuclear technologies, envisions nuclear technologies as a means to 
improve health care, agricultural productivity and food security (IAEA, 1986; 
IAEA, 2017).  Overall, in these imaginations nuclear technology is seen as a 
vessel for better lives and higher living standards.  
 
Recently, the traditionally concrete anti-nuclear stance of the environmental 
movement has splintered as more pro-nuclear voices have been heard from 
prominent members of the movement (e.g. Monbiot, 2011). This shift in stance 
links back to Disney’s narrative of progress and benefits, and adds an ethical 
commitment to the future. Nuclear power is posited as a climate change 
mitigator, a zero to low emissions energy technology providing ‘clean, green 
energy’ for the future (DECC, 2014b; Bickertaff et al., 2008). These claims 
remain controversial and have been contested (Adam and Groves, 2007; 
Caldicott, 2007). Nonetheless, nuclear has been supported by and supports a 
powerful imagination of technopolitical modernisation (Hecht, 2009, 2012; 
Jasanoff and Kim, 2009). Modernity, Latour holds, “is the thrusting-forward 
arrow of time — Progress — characterized by its juvenile enthusiasm, risk 
taking, frontier spirit, optimism, and indifference to the past” (Latour, 2011a: 21). 
These, as I will demonstrate, are the qualities and characteristics the UK 
disposal culture mobilises to justify the UK nuclear establishment’s long 
negligence of nuclear waste.  
 
As a promise of progress and a symbol of modernity, nuclear technology 
invokes advocacy. To advocate is to care (Code, 2015) and to care is an 
attempt to intervene (Haraway, 2016), to make a difference in the world. Adam 
and Groves note how for instance a US based nuclear advocacy group Eagle 
Alliance envisions a future in which science is fully committed to serve humanity 
to foster a more equal and sustainable global society. The Alliance believes that 
“this vision [of an equal and sustainable global society] cannot be realised 
without nuclear” (quoted in Adam and Groves, 2007: 83). The Alliance, echoing 
Disney, argues, “nuclear technologies, used in medical diagnostics and 
treatment, industrial processes, agriculture, food preservation, and energy, 
have proven beyond question to be a major benefit to all humanity” (ibid.). 
	 132	
Nuclear technology in its multiplicity is presented with the capacity to improve, 
even save, lives, and in general, to advance societal wellbeing. Through such a 
narrative of benefits, the Alliance invites readers to care about nuclear, seeking 
to convince them why nuclear matters; why contemporary societies should 
(continue to) embrace and push ahead with nuclear technologies. Potential 
risks are pushed aside as nuclear is imagined as a gift that keeps on giving. 
 
The better future promised by nuclear is, however, mostly contained at reactor 
sites. The different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle are absent from this heroic 
nuclear narrative of progress, including stories of climate change mitigation, 
cheap electricity and improved healthcare. Adam and Groves (2007) have 
criticised nuclear future making as irresponsible. The promise of nuclear 
requires that what counts as nuclear industry is confined to operating power 
plants. They argue that the problem with the narrative of nuclear as a climate 
change mitigator, for instance, is that what is included in calculations of 
nuclear’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions is unclear. This uncertainty about 
nuclear’s actual emissions renders nuclear’s promise of clean energy difficult to 
verify. To understand nuclear power as the solution to climate change 
necessitates, according to Adam and Groves, the negligence of the CO2 
emissions that arise from the construction of power plants and from uranium 
mining, and further how these contribute to global emissions. Adam and Groves 
point to a study describing how the production of one tonne of cement (the 
construction of a power plant demands approximately 14 million tonnes of 
concrete and 1.6 million tonnes of steel) produces one tonne of CO2, which is 
dissipated into the atmosphere. The mining of uranium, on the other hand, 
demands more energy than it produces, while also being a highly polluting 
activity. Gabrielle Hecht (2012, 2017) furthermore has pointed out that in the 
uranium mines the futures of miners and their communities are neglected 
alongside health and safety regulations. Uranium mines, Hecht notes, have 
been at the margins of the nuclear industry. Next to weapons and reactors, 
mining is more readily aligned with other forms of mining endeavours than with 
other nuclear things and activities. As nuclear risks in mines have been 
invisibilised, Hecht argues, occupational hazards are constructed as banal and 
manageable.  
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The promise of nuclear and the narrative of progress thus appear to rely on the 
invisibilisation and externalisation of the human and environmental costs of 
nuclear technology and narrow definitions of what counts as nuclear activities. 
The story of nuclear so far reflects how the advocacy and promise of nuclear 
rely on boundary work, the thinness of definitions and imaginations of nuclear. 
Therefore it is worth asking what kinds of worlds are being maintained at the 
cost of others (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017)? What is the cost of modernity and 
progress, as envisioned through nuclear? What is the cost of nuclear futures? 
 
UK the nuclear pioneer 
The desire for progress and the wish for modernity guide societal concerns, 
what societies do, what they care about. “Our fetishes”, Hecht posits, “keep us 
close to bombs and reactors and far from other places where nuclearity gets 
made and unmade. We have become complacent and complicit in the equation 
between nuclearity and “development”” (Hecht, 2012: 39). The heroic nuclear 
narrative has been told and retold through the exclusion of mines, miners, 
construction work, and waste – the afterthought of the nuclear project. The 
infatuation with nuclear can only really be justified by the exclusion and 
invisibilisation of concerns contesting the promise of nuclear. 
 
Three years after the first commercial nuclear reactor was connected to the 
national grid in the UK, MP Arthur Palmer voiced his concerns, in a 1959 House 
of Commons debate, that the country was plunging into the nuclear field with 
too much enthusiasm. This, he posited, could undermine energy security, 
because, as he saw it, the eager commitment to nuclear might jeopardise the 
standing of conventional energy sources such as coal. He contested that the 
promise of immediate cheap energy from nuclear had already been revised and 
pushed back by Sir Christopher Hinton, the head of Central Energy Generating 
Board. Moreover, Palmer urged care in the development of the UK’s nuclear 
industry. 
 
Other countries are obviously proceeding with caution in this matter. 
They realise, as we must all realise, that nuclear techniques are 
changing all the time and that we are only at the beginning of the 
road. They certainly do not wish to be caught out with a lot of capital 
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tied up in the wrong designs. […] They are not rushing ahead over-
fast with nuclear development. (HoC, 1959, vol. 608, cc. 574-5) 
 
Palmer did not argue against nuclear per se, but held that the UK should take a 
step back, slow down and review all the available reactor choices. His concern 
was that the UK’s rush to push ahead with a particular reactor design at any 
cost (Mackerron, 2012) might result in technological and financial commitments 
that the country might come to regret in the future. In his response to Palmer, 
the State Secretary of Power Sir Ian Horobin dismissed this proposition to 
reconsider all available alternatives as disruptive to the UK’s nuclear future. 
Horobin underlined the care with which the UK’s nuclear programme had been 
considered and conceived. He argued that Palmer’s proposition represented 
the kind of short-termism that would be harmful for the development of the 
civilian nuclear industry and nuclear capacity in the UK. 
 
If we are right in setting to work to build up an industry capable of 
developing these new sources of scientific power, it becomes clear 
that we cannot chop and change on short-term considerations. The 
British nuclear programme is a very carefully considered whole. No 
one will say that the industry will not make mistakes in future, 
although we have been remarkably free from them hitherto owing to 
the skill of those concerned. […] I think it is very important that 
everybody should realise that a nuclear programme on the scale of 
this country's must be a long-term, carefully-balanced programme 
and cannot be interrupted by fits and starts and lurches in response 
to short-term considerations. (HoC, 1959, vol. 608, cc. 579-82, my 
emphasis) 
 
Although Horobin highlighted the need for long-term planning in the making of 
the UK’s nuclear industry and nuclear future, it is notable that this ‘long-termism’ 
does not extend beyond energy generation. The management of nuclear 
materials and waste do not feature in his argumentation for long-term planning, 
neither were they raised as concerns by Palmer in the first instance. Horobin 
also argued that the nuclear industry should be left alone to implement the 
planned and debated AGR fleet. Interference, he held, would destabilise the 
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nuclear industry. “We have to take a big view on this”, Horobin argued, “the 
need for thought and care in investment and design is great […] but I do hope 
[…] Members [of the House of Commons] resist at all costs any injudicious 
interference with the proper development of that programme” (ibid., c 582). The 
industry, rather than Whitehall, was positioned as the capable, and responsible, 
party for the development of the UK’s nuclear future. This effectively meant that 
the nuclear “programme was pursued without being subjected to justification in 
economic terms, and without the scrutiny applied to other public spending” 
(Mackerron, 2012: 9). A vessel for international prestige and leadership, nuclear 
was seen to have value in and of itself.  
 
Moreover Horobin, by inhabiting the cutting edge of nuclear science and 
technology, proclaimed, the UK was not “just a major nuclear Power”, but “the 
major nuclear Power” (HoC, 1959, vol. 608, c 582). To retain its position as the 
major power, the UK, he insisted, should push ahead with the AGR programme. 
The single-minded focus on progress and development of the nuclear industry 
allowed Horobin to invoke the sort of enthusiastic and risk-taking frontier spirit 
characteristic of future making described by Latour (2011a) and Adam and 
Groves (2007). The desire to occupy the cutting edge of nuclear technology 
lead the UK industry to a path of haphazard rector development without 
commitment to a particular design, as we saw earlier in this chapter, more than 
five decades later, a former member of CoRWM reflected that the UK nuclear 
industry was swept away by its initial commercial success. While this approach 
and a narrow focus on reactor development contributed to the subsequent 
nuclear waste management challenge, nuclear technology still continues to be 
envisioned as a source of opportunity rather than as a technology the use of 
which should potentially be re-evaluated, because of its long-term effects. 
 
The early years of the UK nuclear industry have become romanticised by the 
UK’s nuclear establishment, while the pioneering spirit of that time is invoked as 
an explanation for the nuclear waste management challenge. DECC, for 
instance, wrote, “the UK has accumulated a legacy of higher activity wastes and 
material” (DECC, 2014a: 12). The notion of ‘legacy’ plays an important role in 
narratives of the UK’s nuclear pasts and presents. Through the idea of ‘legacy’ 
UK disposal culture frames the UK’s nuclear past in a positive light. Rather than 
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a problem, the notion of legacy transforms the unruly and hazardous nuclear 
wastes and sludges in storage ponds and silos into remnants of a glorious 
nuclear past.  
 
The NDA connects legacy wastes with exhilarating notions invention and 
exploration by describing the UK nuclear industry as having been shaped by the 
“heady atmosphere of scientific discovery” of the early years of the UK nuclear 
industry (NDA, 2016). Nuclear waste in the NDA’s account, thus, is as much a 
creation and a legacy of science and scientific progress. While Sellafield is 
described as “the home of some of the most hazardous nuclear facilities in the 
country” (Sellafield Ltd., 2015a: 37), the NDA underlines the ‘uniqueness’ of 
Sellafield as a site “where many major developments in the 20th century 
nuclear industry were pioneered” (ibid.). Instead of reflection, the UK disposal 
culture has reclaimed the complexity and hazardousness of the nuclear waste 
problem and posited itself as an “an example to the rest of the world” (HMG, 
2013: 6) in nuclear waste management. As in the first half of the 20th century, 
Sellafield is presented as “pioneering the future” once again (Sellafield Ltd., 
2015a: 3) as the UK disposal culture lays claim to the ability to manage the 
uncertainty, complexity and mess. Simultaneously, the historical negligence of 
waste is romanticised. Paul Nichol, Head of the Pile Fuel Storage Pond at 
Sellafield has noted 
 
There’s a real sense of history about the place. We’ve all seen the 
lovely old photos of the pond being built and it really engenders a 
sense of pride. The nuclear pioneers who designed and built the 
pond didn’t have any blueprints to copy and worked to unbelievable 
short timescales. (quoted in Sellafield Ltd., 2015b) 
 
He went onto state how the workforce at Sellafield “has recaptured some of this 
old pioneering spirit, and are coming up with all sorts of innovative solutions for 
the incredibly difficult job we’re faced with cleaning-up Sellafield” (ibid.). The 
emphasis on the pioneering spirit together with contemporary plans for nuclear 
new build normalises and invisibilises waste. Rather than raising waste as 
genuine a matter of concern, and a means to open up debate about nuclear 
power, the UK’s continuing infatuation with nuclear technology naturalises 
waste as an uncritical extension of the industry. Rather than a problem, waste 
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provides business opportunities. The narrative of nuclear as a climate change 
mitigator (e.g. DECC, 2014b) is much stronger than the concerns over waste 
management. In the UK’s nuclear future making, then, nuclear waste continues 
to be trumped by the promise of nuclear power of better futures. 
 
Visibilising waste 
During one of our chats Jodie, a PhD researcher whose project I followed and 
meddled with in the UK lab during my fieldwork mused,  
 
“The UK has been a leader in the field for generating nuclear energy. 
So, why aren’t they leading the field in the disposal of nuclear 
waste?”  
“Yeah, why?”, I wondered too. (Jodie, interview) 
 
Establishing a nuclear industry and maintaining the UK’s position as leading a 
nuclear actor were, for the UK government, priorities, critical practices and 
matters of care (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017). To pursue matters of care is to 
affect and be affected by the matters at stake (Michael, 2017). While care for 
the AGR enabled the construction of a whole fleet of reactors and maintained 
the UK as a leading nuclear country for a while, the narrow attention on reactor 
development led to the unfolding of a long-term nuclear future and emergence 
of nuclear materials that forced the establishment to intervene, to actively 
reclaim responsibility of what had emerged through the negligence of nuclear 
matters. Care for reactor development can here be read as an active selective 
mode of doing by the UK nuclear establishment. Focus on reactor development 
invisibilised other concerns and focused the industry’s energies to a pursuit of a 
narrow, short(er)-term future. Beginning from the late 1950s the UK’s nuclear 
industry focused on the development of reactor designs, while waste materials 
were left in storage ponds at Sellafield without plans for their retrieval and 
disposal in the future. The industry’s attention was on improving nuclear reactor 
and fuel technology, not looking after the by-products of the industry. Although 
the nuclear future was envisioned through ‘a long-term carefully balanced 
nuclear programme’, as we saw earlier, the focus of the UK’s nuclear 
establishment was on the short-term technoscientific future of reactors. Longer-
term consequences weighed little in this future making. What was at stake was 
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national technoscientific and political prestige on an international stage. 
Although 1959 saw the publication of the first review of nuclear waste 
management titled The Control of Radioactive Wastes, nuclear waste, as we 
saw – and as the title of the review seems to imply – was considered 
manageable and controllable. Commenting on the review, Lord Shackleton 
reflected that it was “clear” that nuclear waste disposal “is a subject that will 
have to be kept under continuing review” and noted that the review was an 
“admirable beginning” (HoL, 1959, vol. 219, c. 902) for nuclear waste 
management in the UK. Yet, the ‘admirable beginning’ did not see any follow-
ups until the 1976 Flowers Report, by which point the waste management 
situation had corroded from a state of manageability to alarming. The materials 
had been siting in the ponds long enough to have formed sludges (a kind of 
radioavtive mud), which rendered waste management more complex, 
hazardous and expensive than it would have otherwise been.  
 
Nuclear waste, sludges and murk offer us a classic case of Frankensteinian 
creation (Latour, 2011b). In Love Your Monsters, Latour argues ‘we must care 
for our technologies as we do for our children’. Contemporary societies’ gravest 
sin, he contends, is not that we have created particular technologies, but that 
we have abandoned them to themselves and “have failed to love and care for 
them” (ibid.: 20). Instead of taking responsibility for the becomings of 
technologies, societies ascribe their sins to technologies, to their creations. To 
understand and assume responsibility for the becomings of technology, Latour 
posits, societies must modernise modernisation. We need to overcome the 
boundary between the social and the technical and switch “the modernist notion 
of modernity” for what Latour labels a “compositionist” notion of modernity (ibid.) 
that allows us to see human development as becoming-with (Haraway, 2016) a 
range of nonhumans and to appreciate that interdependency as an essential 
condition to the existence of heterogeneous beings (Puig de la Bellacasa, 
2017). 
 
The initial representation of nuclear waste through its chemistry rather than 
nuclearity (section 4.4) posited waste matter as something manageable, as a 
matter of fact (Latour, 2004). The matter of factness of waste closed down and 
denied its liveliness and vitality. The removal of nuclearity and the belittling of 
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hazardousness of nuclear waste created an imagination of nuclear waste that 
could be ‘kept under review’, but that did not need immediate care or active 
intervention. Rendered passive, nuclear waste did not demand any action. The 
pacification of waste justified its abandonment in storage facilities, but it also 
meant the UK nuclear establishment paid little attention to the effects and 
consequences of its doings. The establishment care for nuclear power 
technology, but not its by-products. 
 
The claimed manageability of nuclear waste allowed the industry to focus on 
developing the industry. By ignoring the vitality of waste matters, the UK nuclear 
establishment could busy itself with caring for the vitality of the industry. 
Meanwhile, a mud-like substance emerged in the depths of Sellafield’s open-air 
storage ponds through encounters between neglected waste matters and their 
environment. The emergent substance, sludge, is an “unplanned by-product” of 
nuclear activities (Sellafield Ltd., 2017, my emphasis). It is a result of 
interactions between algae, decaying spent nuclear fuel or waste, wind-blown 
materials (the ponds are open to air) and forms of debris. Its “radiological 
composition, its texture and weight” differ based on the wastes stored in the 
ponds where sludges have been forming for up to 65 years. Sludge, like nuclear 
waste, is many. Each variation of sludge needs its own bespoke retrieval, 
treatment and storage processes (Sellafield Ltd., 2015a: 44). Most of the 
radiological hazard at Sellafield lies at the bottom of storage ponds that 
continue to house waste and sludge – or a “complete mess” as Christopher, a 
PhD student, working in the UK lab noted. Cleaning up this mess, classifying 
nuclear waste as a problem, decisions on “how to manage this waste in the 
long term” as a way of “planning for our future” (Defra, 2001: 7) are different 
interventions in the waste’s status quo. These practices of classification and 
cleaning up are transformative doings that aim to deliver Sellafield to a safe end 
state and emplace waste underground. Interventions, such as cleaning, in the 
becoming of sludge have transformed waste into a matter of care (Puig de la 
Bellacasa, 2017). 
 
As matters of care, nuclear waste and sludge demand action. Matters of care is 
a Puig de la Bellacasa’s reworking of matters of concern (Latour, 2004). While 
both care and concern connote affective and ethical worry, care has a stronger 
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sense of commitment. Where concern contains thoughtfulness, it lacks a notion 
of doing that care denotes. Caring is the everyday doings of maintenance and 
repair, and a way for ‘us’ to remain responsible for the becomings of things. The 
negligence of nuclear waste next to the prioritised development of reactor 
technologies in the UK underscores the notion of care as a selective mode of 
attention and an active exclusionary material doing. Care for nuclear things 
focused on and cherished energy generation and reactor technology, and in the 
process excluded waste that was left in storage pools and facilities for decades 
to form new and more complex beings, and to lead to a situation where there is 
no choice but to act. Colin, a CoRWM member, noted 
 
There has to be a better way of getting radioactive murk out of 
legacy ponds and silos [at Sellafield] than the way they are 
embarking on doing it. But they don’t have the luxury of sitting there 
for 15 years while somebody comes up with that better way. So 
they’re doing it, because it’s more important to get it done than to 
wait for a better solution in 20 years time. If you had the 20 years to 
wait, you might well be able to do it better later. But you don’t, 
because the bloody buildings are in a mess. (CoRWM member, 
interview) 
	
There is urgency at Sellafield in the present. Past future making has created a 
‘mess’ that needs urgent attention now. Still, this waste has attracted attention 
only after it has, through local encounters, morphed into matter that has 
corrosive messy effects on its immediate surroundings. Sludge, as the 
hazardous effect of these encounters, has raised alarm to intervene, to do 
something. Yet, urgency is not an emergency. Urgency has a different 
temporality (Haraway, 2016). Emergencies, Haraway writes, connote the 
apocalyptic and the mythological, while urgencies are part of our times. 
Urgencies are the present, the times when we must think and do; when we 
must intervene in the ongoing material remakings of the world. Matt, a UK 
Professor of Nuclear Materials, noted that in his dealings with the UK 
government, “the first thing to be chopped when money is tight [is] waste 
management, because […] we can deal with that later”. On the governmental 
level, despite the government’s commitment to GD as the long-term 
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management option for nuclear waste, waste itself does not give rise to the kind 
of urgency that would prompt financial security for the UK’s GD project to cover 
the tasks academics or the industry see necessary. Matt contended that this 
might be costly for the GD project. 
	
One of the barriers to achieving […] geological disposal in the future 
is repeating the mistakes of the past that basically say that’s 
tomorrow’s problem. (Professor of Nuclear Materials, interview) 
 
The government’s postponement of the waste management to the future rather 
than actively engaging with in the present implies a failure to appreciate the 
complexity of the problem, and the time it takes to implement GD (see also 
section 6.2 and 6.3).  
 
Nuclear waste brings “us face to face with a social, emotional, ethical, political 
and environmental situation at the heart of which lies the security of the living 
world” (Massart, 2013: 451). Nuclear waste management is about maintaining a 
‘degree of liveability’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017) in the world. As such nuclear 
waste management is a practice of caring. Caring conceptualised as everything 
we do (Tronto, 1993) is not a moral position but selective attention. Understood 
as doing, care needs a focus. Here, I have proposed that the UK nuclear 
establishment has and continues to focus on nuclear power rather than nuclear 
waste. The urgency experienced at Sellafield has not resulted in a re-evaluation 
of the UK’s nuclear policy. This urgency combined with the continuing faith in 
the promise of nuclear prioritises the present over the future. The urgency at 
Sellafield is about managing and maintaining the site now, while nuclear new 
build is more likely to benefit the present rather than the future. While “those 
who generate the wastes should take responsibility, and provide the resources, 
for the management of [waste] materials” (OECD, n.a.) in a way that will not 
impose burdens on future generations, the decision to commit to nuclear new 
build, despite the waste it will generate, skews that responsibility by imposing 
more nuclear waste on the future. 
 
In Theses for the Atomic Age (1962) Anders extends our ethico-political 
responsibility in time and calls for ‘united generations’. By doing so he argues 
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for the widening of the temporal space of responsibility. The future should be 
afforded the same respect and care as the present. Anders argues that in the 
Nuclear Age “the future has already begun […] the distinction between 
generations of tomorrow and of today has become meaningless” (Anders, 1962: 
495). The future and the present, Anders argues, should be subject to the same 
responsibility. One could ask, then, how can nuclear new build be justified in a 
situation where the UK still lacks a concrete solution to the nuclear waste 
problem (see section 6.3)? If the UK has not been able to care for its waste in 
the past and the present, can it justify generating more waste in the future? 
 
Where Anders imagines care for the future through and with our grandchildren, 
Adam and Groves posit that people imagine futures through all “the things we 
[…] care about, as life-shaping attachments” (Adam and Groves, 2011: 24). 
These attachments inject our lives with meaning. When we care about things, 
we care about their futures. We are invested in their maintenance and their 
becomings. But how far in time and space can our feelings of responsibility 
extend? Following Adam and Groves, one can assert that caring about (at least 
immediate) future generations should come to us fairly easily, yet the question 
remains can we care about nuclear waste? GD has been harnessed as a 
supporting argument for the UK’s nuclear new build programme. The 
relationship between GD and nuclear new build has been contested on ethical 
basis (CoRWM, 2006). While GD has been positioned as an act of taking 
responsibility, it is still used to justify nuclear future making that appears to 
prioritise the present. It appears that the promise of clean and cheap electricity 
through nuclear continues to dominate nuclear future making in the UK – and 
thus contribute to the ongoing nuclear waste management challenge. 
 
4.7 Summary 
In this chapter I first looked at the contemporary nuclear infrastructures and 
waste inventories in the UK and Finland. Here, a specific note was made of the 
difference between the scale and complexity of the UK and Finnish nuclear 
industries. In the following two sections we traced the makings and unmakings 
of the nuclear waste problem. Again, differences emerged between the two 
cases. Where the UK waste definitions shifted from manageability to 
	 143	
problematisation, in Finland waste management was perceived more as a 
problem from the beginning, while later on this problematisation shifted to 
‘foreign’ wastes. In the final section of this chapter, I speculated about the 
emergence of the waste problem in the UK through the notion of care – and in 
particular care as a selective mode of action. Here, I proposed that waste has 
emerged as a problem through negligence, as the UK’s nuclear establishment 
was focused on and cared for the development of reactor technology and the 
maintenance of the UK’s position as the leading nuclear country. 
 
In the following chapter, I will trace the ways in which the safety, containment 
and the deep future are imagined and made in response to the emergent waste 
futures that were explored here.  
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5 MAKING THE DEEP FUTURE 
"That's splendid!" said Moomintroll. "Wonderful news. A cave is much 
better than a box.” 
- Tove Jansson, Comet in Moominland 
 
	
In the previous chapter I looked at some of the past practices and policy 
decisions that set nuclear waste futures in motion in particular, yet 
underterministic, ways in the UK and Finland. The present nuclear waste 
challenges in these countries are partly informed by the complexity of their 
respective nuclear infrastructures and waste inventories, which have been 
informed by policy decisions about the status of nuclear materials; whther they 
wastes or assets (I will pick this discussion up again in chapter 6). The present 
challenges are also informed by the coupling of waste futures and nuclear 
presents that have, at least in part, been influenced by understandings of 
waste’s status not only through the waste/asset binary, but also through shifts in 
the nuclearity of waste. In Finland, nuclear presents and waste futures have 
been tied together more strongly from the beginning of the nuclear industry than 
they have been in the UK. Finnish nuclear operations in the present have been 
tied to long-term waste management plans through nuclear legislation and 
regulations. In the UK, in contrast, the initial pacification of waste materials as 
assets and/or and chemical waste led to a situation where mere oversight of the 
waste situation was deemed as sufficient waste management. 
 
In this chapter I will explore what kind of responses are envisioned and 
engineered as solutions to the waste problem traced in the previous chapter. I 
will examine how safety into the deep future is made through relational and 
situated practices. I will begin by examining how the deep future of GD has 
become standardised through radionuclide half-lives and international standard 
practice. I will then explore, first, how the GDF as a technology of stagnation 
aims at slowing down time and processes underground, and second, how 
claims for safety emerge from the classical juxtaposition of nature and culture; 
available geological, financial and cultural resources; as well as the existing 
nuclear waste inventory. In the final two sections of this chapter, I will explore 
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some of the mundane material practices through which the deep future is 
imagined and enacted in the lab, at the drawing desk and in the field; how time 
is manipulated to make predictions about the future in the present, and how the 
containment of nuclear waste is envisioned in deep invisible spaces in the lab. 
 
5.1 Futures uncertain and standardised 
Stephen Hawking’s vision of the future that we encountered in the introductory 
chapter of this thesis asks for a generous treatment of uncertainty and the 
unknowable. For Hawking, embracing, rather than fearing, uncertainty and 
building a future in spaces beyond knowledge is the only way to ensure human 
survival. While his vision of space inhabiting humans might, at least for some of 
us, appear as utopian, it still draws on and from the past. Hawking 
operationalised the past, such as the Apollo missions, as a form of evidence 
that his future is do-able (Fujimura, 1987). His vision of an extra-terrestrial 
human future, like future making more broadly, is reliant on the folding together 
of pasts, presents and futures (Morton, 2013). The past and present offer 
resources for imagining and crafting futures. In this respect the deep future of 
GD is no different, as we will see. What renders both Hawking’s vision and GD 
separate from much of the more short-term technoscientific future making is 
their vast time horizons.  
 
While Hawking and the international nuclear waste community provide us with 
radically different spatial imaginations of the future, temporally these 
imaginations overlap both in the short and the long-term. Where Hawking 
(2017) envisioned a manned landing on Mars by 2025, the Implementing 
Geological Disposal Technology Platform (IGD-TP), a technoscientific forum 
that directs and coordinates European R&D effort in GD, states as its vision that 
in “2025, the first geological disposal facilities for spent fuel, high-level waste, 
and other long-lived radioactive waste will be operating safely in Europe” (IGD-
TP, 2012: 9). The ‘2025 vision’ in the IGD-TP’s own words represents its 
‘commitment to the future’ (IGD-TP, ibid.: 13). IGD-TP has approximately 120 
members, including the universities where I conducted my fieldwork. The 
Platform’s membership ranges from academic institutions, research institutes 
and centres to nuclear waste management organisations. Each member 
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organisation is committed to the 2025 vision. At the moment Posiva in Finland 
is the most likely candidate to realise this vision. The company aims to begin 
nuclear waste disposal in Onkalo in the 2020s, which means that disposal 
would be completed and Onkalo sealed off and closed in the 2120s (Posiva, 
n.a.c.). The UK, according to present plans will operate its GDF until the late 
22nd century (DECC, 2014a). The UK’s disposal timeline thus exceeds the one-
century mark Hawking (2017) has given humanity to flee Earth in order to 
survive the next million years. 
 
Those next one million years are an epistemic and engineering challenge for 
GD projects. Nuclear waste is an inevitable product of the nuclear fuel cycle, 
and nuclear power generation. The core of a nuclear reactor consists of several 
hundreds of nuclear fuel elements. With time the concentration of fission 
products and heavy elements in the fuel increase to the extent that it becomes 
impractical to continue to use that fuel. Therefore the ‘spent’ fuel is removed 
from the reactor after 18-36 months, depending on reactor design, to maintain 
efficient reactor performance. When removed from the reactor, spent fuel emits 
high levels of radiation and heat. Spent fuel elements are placed in storage 
pools to allow both heat and radiation levels to decrease. The elements stay in 
the pools from several months to several decades, with the pool water acting as 
coolant and protective radiation barrier. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
spent fuel can either be treated as waste or an asset. If it is treated as an asset, 
spent fuel is reprocessed in order to extract the uranium and plutonium it 
contains for reuse. Regardless of whether spent fuel is treated as a waste or an 
asset, it still needs to be stored to allow for radioactive decay – the natural 
decrease of radiation in nuclear materials. Fission products in spent fuel have 
finite lifespans and the term ‘half-life’ is used in nuclear physics to describe how 
quickly an atom undergoes radioactive decay and how quickly the level of 
radioactivity in that material gets halved.  
 
The challenge with GD stems from the slowness of radioactive decay. While 
some radionuclides have minute half-lives, others, as we saw in the 
Introduction, are so long-lived that they have been mobilised to calculate the 
age of Earth. Where the presence of uranium in the Earth’s crust “reveals a 
story millions of years in the telling” (Irvine, 2017), GD writes a new chapter to 
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that story by reintroducing long-lived nuclear waste to the Earth’s crust. These 
wastes are much more radioactive and hazardous than the original uranium 
ore. High level waste resulting from reprocessing retains dangerously high-
levels of radioactivity for approximately 10,000 years, while some fission 
products present in spent fuel are much more long lived. Van Luik of the US 
Department of Energy, explains that some of the actinides in spent fuel “are 
generally very slow to radioactively decay into smaller atoms – which then 
decay more rapidly – and some of the actinides actually do remain hazardous 
for a million years and beyond. The trick is to isolate them for that length of 
time” (in Manaugh and Twilley, 2012: 228). The slowness with which the 
radioactive threat of nuclear waste decays, and the resulting need to isolate 
waste for as long as they pose risks to the lived environment, is the main 
challenge for engineering safe disposal.  
 
The one million years van Luik mentions above has become cemented as an 
internationally accepted and standardised timeframe for GD safety assessment. 
A precursory exploration of the OECD The Safety Case for Deep Geological 
Disposal of Radioactive Waste: 2013 State of the Art document confirms as 
much. The majority of countries in the process of implementing GD seek to 
establish the safety of their GDFs over a million-year assessment period 
(OECD, 2014: 49, 104, 132). In its 2012 Safety Case10, Posiva, the Finnish GD 
implementing organisation, notes how in its Safety Case an assessment “time 
frame of up to one million years into the future is considered”, this “is consistent 
with other assessments of spent nuclear fuel disposal internationally” (Posiva, 
2012: 13). Spent fuel, Posiva continues, must be contained as long as it can 
significantly harm the surface environment, the normal habitats of humans, 
animals and plants. The level of harmlessness is achieved at “one million years 
[when] the activity of the spent nuclear fuel is similar to that of the original 
uranium ore from which the fuel was fabricated” (ibid.: 13-14). The uranium ore 
found in nature is largely considered safe for humans and other living entities to 
be around. Accordingly, the threat posed by spent fuel and high level waste is 
assessed in relation to and against the radioactivity levels of natural uranium 
ore (OECD, 2009). Once the radioactivity of spent fuel and high level waste has 
																																								 																				
10 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines the safety case as a suite of 
“scientific, technical, administrative and managerial arguments and evidence in support 
of the safety of a disposal facility” (IAEA, 2012: 1). 
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decayed to these levels, they are no longer considered dangerous. Thus to be 
classified as ‘safe’, nuclear waste must revert back to ‘historical’ levels of 
radiation (present in the original uranium ore) in the future, but this process, as I 
have noted, is extremely slow. 
	
While the million-year timeframe for safety assessment has become part of 
international standard practice, the establishment of the million-year standard 
has not been uncontroversial. In a 2011 interview, Peter Galison, a historian of 
science and a filmmaker, described the million years as “absurdly distant” (in 
Kruse, 2011), while a retired Posiva Advisor, Ilkka, held that “this kind of million-
year time perspective isn’t part of engineering sciences”. Matti, a researcher at 
the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT), echoed Ilkka closely and 
observed that the timeframe of GD safety assessments forces science and 
engineering out of their comfort zone. Researching the behaviour of the waste 
canister in which spent fuel will be disposed of, he noted  
 
normally, when assessing the lifespan of metals you shouldn’t 
extrapolate by more than a factor of three. Here we are doing it by a 
factor of hundred, so we go beyond technical norms and 
recommendations. So [time] is a technical challenge. (VTT 
Researcher, interview)  
 
This deep future of GD created by radionuclide half-lives and international 
standard practice and enacted through GD safety assessments challenges 
human ability to know the future. The million-year timeframe slides beyond 
knowledge. Rodney Ewing, a Professor in Nuclear Security at Stanford 
University, has argued, much in line with his Finnish colleagues above, that the 
million-year timeframe requires “scientists and engineers to complete an 
analysis that is at its best opaque and at its worst not believable” (Ewing, 2011: 
13). Mapping and making sense of deep future requires what Adams, Murphy 
and Clarke (2009) describe as the substitution of the ‘sciences of the actual’ by 
prediction and speculation. A Posiva Project Manager, Aila, weighed the 
challenge imposed by the deep one million year future of GD on knowledge 
production. 
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It’s one million years. Of course, we can’t predict [it] exactly. We can’t 
predict tomorrow’s weather, so we have to be very humble. […] 
When we talk about one million years, you have to trust. Nobody can 
tell you right or wrong. This is right, that’s wrong and he’s bullshitting 
you. There is no way to know, so you have to trust. Some sort of 
faith-type of thing. Is there a god? Isn’t there a god? Nobody can tell. 
(Posiva Project Manager, interview) 
 
Here, Aila describes the deep future as essentially unknowable. The future 
escapes certainty. It is unpredictable. Rather than a matter of ‘science of the 
actual’, making safety into the deep future is portrayed by Aila almost as a 
religious matter. GD is an uncertain human intervention into an uncertain future. 
Predictions and knowledge claims about deep future and the safety of the GDF 
are empirically unverifiable (Bergmans and Schröder, 2012). Rather than 
accurate knowledge, the making of safety relies on trust in the disposal system 
and available methods of knowledge production. Uncertainties, Arthur, a RWM 
Research Manager noted, “are a huge point for discussion over geological 
disposal”. He went on to divide the level of uncertainties temporally. 
 
If you look at the first 10,000 years, I think uncertainties are quite well 
dealt with in that the engineered barriers are providing a very robust 
process, radioactive decay is happening. […] Geological uncertainty 
obviously, as you get past a million years, it becomes greater. (RWM 
Research Manager, interview) 
 
The million-year timeframe thus forces disposal cultures to look to time of 
increasing uncertainty. The timeframe turns the gaze of disposal cultures to 
times when the presence of the human species is uncertain. Future generations 
might evolve in ways that they no longer resemble humans of today. They might 
not even be the same species. Or it might be that they and other beings cease 
to inhabit the planet during the million years GD safety assessments seek to 
address. With one million years, we “are talking not only about the possibility of 
political, linguistic, material processes, but biological evolutionary processes 
undergoing great changes” (Galison in Kruse, 2011). The deep future and GD 
do not, thus, just challenge knowledge making practices, but also 
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understandings of what it means or might mean to be human; what it means to 
live in the world; and what counts as the ethical object of protection. The very 
distant future of GD thus raises both epistemological and ontological challenges 
and questions in the present. In a spatial sense too GD pushes knowledge 
towards the unknown. The deeper the GD projects extend in space, the less 
data there is about present geological conditions. Uncertainty about geological 
conditions increases at depth (RWM, 2016b). In part this is because “the most 
accurate predictions near [the surface] are facilitated by the proximity to the 
surface, and consequent availability of […] data” (Nordbäck and Engström, 
2016: 96). Conversely, existing alternative or complimentary geological data 
produced by the mining industry, for instance, might not be available or 
appropriate to make judgements about the suitability of geological conditions for 
GD purposes. Since geological data at depth is scarcer, the ability to predict 
disposal conditions decreases not only with time, but also in space. The deeper 
scientists seek to map the future spatiotemporally, the less certainty there is 
about the reliability of the knowledge produced and knowledge production tools. 
	
Despite its futurity, the deep future is the stuff of technopolitical work in the 
present. It poses major challenges for GD projects in the present, but it is also 
viewed as an object of protection and as such has affective power in and over 
the present. The deep future is unknowable, and while GD projects seek to map 
and render that future predictable, GD itself is a project through which that 
unknowable future is being crafted and configured. Where the slowness of 
radioactive decay expands beyond technoscientific practices of knowledge 
production, the envisioned need to protect life from radiation in the very long-
term drives the construction of disposal facilities underground in spaces that are 
expected to be unreachable and unknowable to future generations.  
 
GD, then, asks societies to act upon a future that is and remains inevitably 
uncertain and out of reach. It is little wonder that representatives of STUK, the 
Finnish regulator, and Posiva described GD decision-making through notions of 
‘bravery’ and the ‘need to have guts’. GD, as ethico-political doing, seeks to 
extend the security and safety of the living world to the deep post-human future, 
while simultaneously seeking to postpone the arrival of a future without 
humans. GD asks disposal cultures to predict the unpredictable and to protect 
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times and beings present generations do not, cannot and will not know. GD 
asks geological sciences to evolve from historical sciences into predictive ones, 
to turn their gaze from mapping the unfolding of Earth’s history into the 
unfolding of the distant future. It binds together timeframes that are radically 
different yet equally relevant. Even if it cannot be fully known, the deep future 
needs to be known well enough in the present to plan for its protection. To 
render the deep future predictable and safe enough, it is enacted and made in 
the field, the lab and in public documents through particular sociotechnical 
doings and relatings. In what follows, I explore some of those doings and 
relatings, in the first instance, I trace some of the ways in which geology and 
available geological conditions have been mobilised in making safety into the 
deep future. Here, the focus will be more heavily on the Finnish case. In section 
5.4, I will trace some of the ways in which the deep future was made and 
encountered in the UK lab. 
	
5.2 Making safety underground 
Bedrock has been posited as the guarantor of long-term safety in GD (Nikula et 
al., 2012). It is the final barrier of the multi-barrier concept that is envisioned to 
isolate nuclear waste deep into the future. Even those in the nuclear waste 
community who are more sceptical about GD and its ability to provide safety in 
the very long term agree that geology has an important role to play in the 
containment of nuclear waste. William, a former member or CoRWM, held 
 
The best thing is to put [nuclear waste] back into the Earth’s crust 
where the [uranium] came from in the first place. It’s pretty well 
agreed that some form of geological disposal is the best answer and 
nobody has seriously questioned that. (Former CoRWM member, 
interview) 
 
The role of geology in providing long-term safety is broadly accepted. Geology 
is positioned as the medium that can match and mediate the half-lives of 
radionuclides. The deep future envisioned through GD, William noted, is a mere 
“drop in the ocean compared to the age of the Earth”. Arthur, a RWM Research 
Manager, similarly noted how in the long run the engineered barrier system 
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(EBS) is no match to the longevity of radionuclide half-lives. This leaves the 
geological environment as the main barrier. Arthur noted how 
 
The radiological impact of uranium in a GDF sense doesn’t actually 
increase till you get up to about half a million years, [when] you’re 
beyond the point when engineered barriers provide you with much 
integrity. You’re actually relying on the geological barrier. (RWM 
Research Manager, interview) 
	
No human construction could survive for the timeframe necessary for the 
isolation of nuclear waste, but geology has the ability and capacity to contain 
waste for much longer than any human made system independently could.  
 
Geology, then, is “the ultimate barrier” as a Finnish PhD student Samuli 
phrased it. No single type of geology has been posited as the ‘best’ for GD, yet 
there is “widespread international agreement on the types of rock that may 
provide a suitable […] host [environment] for the GDF for many years” (RWM, 
2016a: 6). In the latest iteration of its Generic Safety Case for the GDF, RWM 
lists three rock types that have been considered suitable for GD internationally, 
and that could thus be considered as host environments for the UK’s GDF. 
These include higher strength rocks (for example, granite), lower strength 
sedimentary rocks (for example, clay), and evaporite rocks (for example, halite). 
Each of these rock types has its strengths and weaknesses. Higher strength 
rocks have low porosity and low permeability, which means that groundwater 
flow in these rocks is low. Similarly, lower strength rocks are characterised by 
low permeability, while evaporate rocks provide a dry disposal environment. On 
the other hand, higher strength rocks have fractures in which groundwater can 
freely flow, while lower strength rocks can have significant quantities of water in 
their pores (RWM, 2016a).  
 
The GDF can thus be constructed in a range of geological environments. In the 
absence of a disposal site, the UK is “fairly unique” as it has developed a 
“totally generic safety case” (Bailey, 2015: 1634). As the UK has a range of 
potential geological settings that could host a GDF, RWM has developed three 
illustrative disposal concepts, one for each of the rock types mentioned above 
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in its Generic Safety Case. These concepts “tell the ‘safety story’, i.e. how 
safety is achieved for each of the illustrative concepts” (ibid.: 1640). However, 
since the UK lacks a disposal site safety remains more solidly in the realm of 
stories and ideas (Adam and Groves, 2007) than it does in countries that have 
already chosen their disposal sites. Yet even where disposal sites exist, safety 
arguments are not set in stone in a straightforward manner. Rather, they are 
made through situated and relational practices. 
 
Relational makings of safety 
Safety is not an inherent attribute of the GDF. Those involved in the GD projects 
like to point to the broad international consensus or  “general agreement […] 
that geological disposal provides the safest long-term management solution for 
higher-activity waste” (RWM, 2016b). The argument presented in this chapter is 
that safety emerges through relational makings. Rather than the safest, GD 
should be conceptualised as the least worst solution available (Corkhill, 2017) 
or a safer than waste management alternative. Relational makings of safety are 
based on binaries separating the human and the nonhuman; the underground 
and the aboveground, disposal and storage, nature and culture. In what follows 
I will explore how these binaries have been mobilised by the Finnish disposal 
culture to make the case for the safety of GD in the very long-term. 
 
GD envisions a future underground. A deep future that is unreachable to and 
undisturbed by future generations. Going underground can be seen as a 
practice of ‘world-reduction’. Fredric Jameson posits that moving from the 
surface to the underground is “systemic exclusion […] in which the sheer 
teeming multiplicity of what exists, of what we call reality, is deliberately thinned 
and weeded out through an operation of radical abstraction and simplification” 
(Jameson, 1975: 223). Jameson’s description falls in line with the logic of 
passive safety, and with the supporting argumentation made for GD. Passive 
safety following the closure of the GDF effectively means the end of human 
intervention and management in the facility. Passive safety, the IAEA holds 
“means that the disposal facility, with its associated radiological hazard, is no 
longer under active control. It is the performance of the natural and engineered 
barriers that provides safety after closure” (IAEA, 2011: 22). In a very clear 
sense, then, safety in the very long-term is delegated to the EBS and the 
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bedrock. Humans, and the surface environment more broadly, are seen as less 
predictable and more changeable than the underground. By extension, human 
ability to manage waste aboveground is considered more uncertain than the 
ability of the GDF to contain waste until it has decayed to safe levels. 
 
Rabbe, a researcher at the Finnish Geological Survey (GTK), positioned recent 
European history against the deep future of nuclear waste, and noted that 
guaranteeing human control over nuclear waste for the necessary timeframe is 
questionable. 
 
If we talk about a few hundred years, what Europe and national 
borders were like, and everything that has happened, it doesn’t 
sound reasonable to me to leave wastes [on the surface]. Who 
knows how long Finland or Posiva will exist? (GTK Researcher, 
interview) 
 
Societal ruptures and discontinuities aboveground are considered as a safety 
risk. They are viewed against the perceived continuity and predictability of the 
underground. RWM posits in a document titled Methods for Management and 
Quantification of Uncertainty how  
 
There is substantially more uncertainty over the future of society than 
there is over whether the geosphere will perform its desired role of 
isolating the waste from such future societies. This is reflected in the 
relative timescales of geological change versus social change. 
(RWM, 2017: 26) 
 
The safety of the GD is articulated through the different temporalities of the 
aboveground and underground, the human and the geological. The slowness of 
geological processes, posited in opposition to the shorter span of social 
change, is at the root of visions of long-term safety deep into the future.  
 
Safety is crafted and seen as the function of the relative passage of time. Matt, 
a Nuclear Materials Professor, held there is “really good scientific evidence that 
in some geological formations the natural construction of the host rock and 
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setting is going to provide the containment we need for the time we need it”. 
Containment then, despite the notion of GD as the ‘end point’ for nuclear waste, 
in this description is not expected to last forever. Nonetheless, the underground, 
unlike the aboveground, is assigned the ability to provide containment deep and 
long enough into the future. Because of the slowness and length of geological 
processes, the underground is constructed as a safe space. Shapiro (1997) 
observed similar kind of relational deep time world-making in the writings of 
Aldo Leopold, an American philosopher and ecologist. Leopold, according to 
Shapiro, “was careful to differentiate between the earth and humans, arguing 
that the earth was considerably less alive in degree, but considerably more 
alive in time and space” (Shapiro, 1997: 106). The making of safety into the 
deep future, as I have begun to trace, relies on corresponding distinctions 
between the liveliness of the aboveground and the underground. These 
distinctions between the degrees of liveliness of different spaces in time are at 
core of arguments positing the underground as safer than the aboveground.  
 
In imaginations of the underground “the defining characteristic of the 
subterranean”, Rosalind Williams writes, “is the exclusion of nature [yet] what is 
most simplified is not nature but humanity” (ibid.: 20-1). While Williams does not 
discuss GD, her observation is relevant here. The GDF will be a highly 
engineered and highly technical space, yet the underground is envisioned by 
the international nuclear waste community as a space undisturbed by humans 
and human time. As we will see further below, the ‘world reducing’ move to the 
underground does not do away with uncertainty or the complexity of the world. 
The underground itself is a contested space. Nonetheless, it is constructed as 
safer and simpler than the aboveground world. The greatest erasure in the 
move underground is the envisioned exclusion of the human. Nikula et al. 
observe that GD “seeks protection for humans and from humans” (Nikula et al., 
2012: 166). The move underground simplifies humanity into that which needs 
protection from hazardous nuclear waste, but also into that which may through 
accidental or deliberate intrusion into the GDF jeopardise the safety provided by 
GD. GD projects do not assign humans with an active role in the maintenance 
of safety (Schröder, 2016). Rather than a space for human meddling the 
underground is a space where humans are not welcome. The international 
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nuclear waste community envisions it as a non-human, and ultimately, post-
human space.  
 
The underground is a reduced world where time and processes slow down. The 
slowness of process promises a stable – and by extension a safe – disposal 
environment. Jukka, a Finnish nuclear consultant held that the “very slow 
groundwater flow [is] probably the biggest [safety] factor”, while RWM write of a 
“considerable confidence that a well-chosen geological site will be relatively 
stable for a very long time into the future and provide effective containment of 
the radioactive material” (RWM, 2017: 26). The pace of geological movements 
and events are juxtaposed with potential events aboveground in support of 
claims about predictability, and the safety of GD in the long-term. 
 
Leaving the [waste] on the surface is unreasonable. When they are 
on the surface, they are a real risk. The idea of the disposal concept 
is that they don’t have to be minded, taken care of, managed. Even if 
[the waste] were just dumped at the end of some tunnel, it’d always 
be a better solution that just leaving them aboveground. (GTK 
Researcher, interview) 
 
Underground nuclear waste poses less of a risk to the aboveground, thus the 
underground is delegated the management of nuclear waste. The notion of 
greater underground safety is not argued only in relation to the perceived 
uncertainties and discontinuities of human societies, but also in relation to 
broader climatic and environmental processes occurring aboveground. “By 
placing the waste underground”, RWM write, waste “will be protected in the 
event of earthquakes, tsunamis and environmental change” (RWM, 2016b: 3). 
Ruptures aboveground are seen as a risk to the safe long-term management of 
nuclear waste. Eero, a Principal Researcher at VTT noted, how “the laws of 
nature govern everywhere”, but aboveground “conditions vary much more. Ice 
ages come and go. They don’t affect the bedrock that much apart from minor 
seismic activity at the edge of the ice sheet. The effects of glaciation are much 
greater aboveground” (see Figure 10). The underground is essentially 
envisioned as the protector of waste from the uncertainties of the aboveground. 
	 157	
It is through contrasting and comparing the underground to the aboveground 
that the safety of GD emerges. In its 2012 Safety Case, Posiva describes how  
 
An appropriately chosen geological formation provides an 
environment that is stable over many millions of years – geological 
timescales – and the nature of changes that can occur is predictable 
from the geological sciences. (Posiva, 2012: 34, my emphasis) 
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Figure 10. Posiva’s vision of the evolution of aboveground and underground 
spaces from the 2020s to the next glaciation. Courtesy of Posiva Oy. 
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The safety of GD is made through relational doings that set the aboveground in 
opposition to the underground. The aboveground is crafted as inherently more 
unpredictable space as recent human history is mobilised to demonstrate the 
fracturing of social order and the significant repercussions this has had on the 
reordering of Europe. On the other hand, the predictability of unpredictable 
environmental disruptions and discontinuities, such as tsunamis or 
earthquakes, and more predictable disruptions, such as glaciations, are 
mobilised to underline the uncertainties or instabilities of safety aboveground. In 
contrast, the underground is envisioned as an undisturbed, predictable and 
stable space – and as such much safer than the aboveground deep into the 
future. The reduced world of the underground isolates the waste from the more 
complex and unpredictable surface world.  
 
The underground offers two-way protection. It protects the aboveground from 
the waste, and the waste from the aboveground. Jukka viewed that a key 
“safety factor probably is that underground the wastes are so unreachable 
compared to […] storage”. Where storage requires active intervention, 
delegating care work to the underground removes the need to discipline 
humans to mind and be mindful of nuclear waste. In a sense, then, safety is 
posited as the luxury of human ignorance to the consequences of the Nuclear 
Age. Matt weighed that 
 
In the end safety means that you can bury this radioactive waste in 
these facilities all the way into the ground, and life carries on on the 
surface. All the living systems that exist in proximity continue to exist 
without being impacted. (Professor of Nuclear Materials, interview). 
  
The ‘unprecedented split future’ (Masco, 2006) introduced by nuclear 
technology, the balancing act between progress and prosperity on one side, 
and destruction and calamity on the other, thus, continues into the deep future 
through nuclear waste management. The split between the human and the 
nonhuman, the aboveground and the underground is envisioned as the most 
likely guarantor of safety and protection into the very distant future. Yet, the 
underground itself – although positioned as safer than – is not an uncontested 
space. Where we often think of rocks and the bedrock as ‘hard stuff’, in GD 
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safety making they emerge as malleable and open to interpretative flexibility 
(Bijker and Pinch, 2012). It is this malleability of the bedrock that I will turn to 
now. 
 
Spaces of risk and predictability 
The siting of a GDF and the making of long-term geological safety are in some 
ways driven by absences. The aim of the siting process is to find the most 
banal, uninteresting and homogeneous geological environment possible. 
Important safety considerations include the presence (or absence) of minerals 
and other resources that may attract future generations and “affect the 
likelihood of future civilisations inadvertently drilling or mining their way into the 
waste” (RWM, 2016b: 14). Thus the argument is that the less resources present 
in the bedrock, the less likely human intrusion into the GDF will be. The main 
safety consideration, however, is the presence and movement of groundwater. 
The low potential for groundwater movement “is one of the main factors used in 
identifying potentially suitable host rocks” (ibid.). Groundwater threatens safety 
by eroding and corroding the EBS, while also offering transportation routes for 
nuclear waste away from the GDF. Containment and safety into the deep future 
are equally about the containment of groundwater flow as it is about containing 
nuclear waste.  
 
In its Providing Information on Geology document, RWM lists the potential for 
the presence and movement of groundwater in the three broad rock types it 
considers as potential host environments for the UK GDF. Evaporites offer a dry 
disposal environment and furthermore they are structurally weak. Any fractures 
that could form and conduct groundwater in the bedrock will self-heal and close 
by themselves. Lower strength rocks, such as clay, similarly are weak and 
cannot sustain fractures that might allow for the movement of groundwater. 
Instead, any potential movement of groundwater or radionuclides happens 
through diffusion – meaning there is no through flow of water in the bedrock and 
the rate of groundwater movement in lower strength rocks is slow. Matt 
explained how “clay is a very impervious barrier; it takes a long time for water to 
get in and it takes a long time for things to fuse out”. Ulla, a researcher at a 
Finnish university, noted that a number of disposal programmes, including those 
in France and Switzerland “have moved from crystalline bedrock towards clay 
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formations”, because of clay’s containment capability. William further posited 
that (partly) because of clay “the French have got a better system” than “the 
Swedish-Finnish hard rock concept”. Both Sweden and Finland are constructing 
their GDFs in the Fennoscandian shield that is tectonically stable and 
composed of granites, that is, higher strength rocks. Unlike clay, granite is 
mechanically strong and “suitable for the excavation of self-supporting tunnels 
and other underground openings, such as deposition holes, technical rooms 
and shafts” (Posiva, 2012: 32). The strength of rock might ease underground 
excavation, but it also implies a presence of fractures in the bedrock. Unlike in 
clay, fractures in granites are unable to seal themselves.  
 
As spaces for groundwater, rock and radionuclide movement, fractures can 
pose risks to safety in the future. They present spaces where alternative futures 
can leak into existence. Fractures, then, can be considered as spaces of risk. 
As spaces of risk they impose boundary conditions for the layout of the GDF. In 
this sense too risk guides the making of safety. While the aboveground is seen 
as a riskier space than the underground, the underground is not a 
homogeneous space. Even here some spaces are riskier than others. In their 
2012 safety case, Posiva term fractures and fault zones in the bedrock as GDF 
‘layout determining features’ (LDFs). The “presence of deformation and 
fractured zones”, Posiva write, is a key constraint for the design of Onkalo and 
an important consideration “in the assessments of long-term performance and 
safety” (Posiva, 2012: 6). The presence of faults and fractures informs the 
location of deposition tunnels and holes. They guide where waste can go 
underground. Fractures are not just conduits of unwanted movement, but can 
also be sources of uncertainty and unpredictability. Van Luik of the US DoE has 
posited that “the older the granites are, the more fractured they are, and [wate 
management organisations] can’t predict a million years into the future where 
the fracture zones are going to be” (in Manaugh and Twilley, 2012: 228). The 
presence of fractures, van Luik claims, throws the long-term integrity and 
stability of the bedrock into question. Future fracturing can be unpredictable, 
and, as spaces of unwanted movement and uncertain evolution of geological 
conditions, fractures can be conceptualised as risky spaces. However, fractures 
are more ambiguous than ‘simple’ spaces of risk. In the first instance, it is worth 
noting that space of risk can be construed in different ways. For van Luik the 
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mere presence of fractures is a risk. Fractures could lead to a loss of 
containment and safety because they introduce uncertainty to the bedrock 
conditions, particularly in the very long-term. If future fracturing is unpredictable, 
there is always the possibility that the GDF is constructed in a body of granite 
that might suffer fracturing in the future. Posiva, in contrast, argues that 
fractures are risky not because they are unpredictable, but exactly because it 
can be anticipated with reasonable certainty that unwanted groundwater and 
radionuclide movement will take place in these fractures. 
 
As such, fractures can and have been mobilised also as, what I term, spaces of 
predictability by the Finnish disposal culture. The Finnish siting process, that 
started in 1983 and culminated in 2001 when Olkiluoto was ratified as the 
disposal site, was guided by fractures and fracture networks. Rabbe, at GTK, 
pointed out how the past two billion years have produced so many cracks, 
fractures and fault lines in the Finnish bedrock that 
 
from a physics perspective there’s no need to create any more, since 
there are all these alternatives through which energy can be 
released. This is the whole basis of the concept. During the siting 
process we identified bedrock blocks with clear boundaries into 
which any rock and groundwater movement would and will be 
channelled. (GTK researcher, interview, my emphasis) 
 
So whereas van Luik poses the age and fractures in granites as risks, Rabbe 
sees them as safety factors. In this way the Finnish disposal culture mobilises 
past and the laws of physics to craft a predictable deep future.  
 
The fractured bedrock is ‘renormalised’ (Barad, 2012) by the Finnish disposal 
culture through the translation of risk into predictability. Following Barad’s notion 
of renormalisation, Hird (2012) writes that waste management in general 
produces facts about disposal sites through the process of bracketing out 
indeterminacy. The presence of fracture networks in the Finnish bedrock is 
used by the Finnish disposal culture to produce determinacy from 
indeterminacy. In their safety case, Posiva note “groundwater flow at Olkiluoto 
takes place mainly through a network of fractures and deformation zones” and 
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how models of these zones and network provide “information about the 
migration paths and flows” (Posiva, 2012: 129, 20). By mapping and avoiding 
spaces of unwanted risky movements the GDF can be constructed in a space 
that supports rather than jeopardises the facility’s ability to isolate nuclear waste 
for the long-term. The presence of well-defined fracture networks in the granite 
bedrock in which Onkalo is excavated is, thus, seen to provide for the 
predictability of geological processes and the performance of Onkalo.	Existing 
fractures, in the first instance as possible spaces of risk, were mapped and 
used during the siting process to “form a cage” around the potential disposal 
site. This cage enables the avoidance of fractures within the GDF and reduces 
the risk of leaks in and out of the GDF in the future, while the GDF itself will be 
contained within a reasonably integral geological block away from major 
factures. Trust in the stability of these bedrock blocks and the stability they 
provide is at heart of predictability and safety making in the Finnish case. Eero, 
a VTT Research Manager, mused “the block structure has survived previous 
glaciations, it is most likely to retain its integrity in the future as well [and] while 
uncertainties naturally remain, conditions inside the bedrock are more 
predictable than aboveground”. Rather than as spaces of risk Eero sees 
fractures and the block structure of the bedrock as sources of predictability – 
and in any case the underground as more predictable than the aboveground. 	
 
The renormalisation of fractures as spaces of predictability relies on the notion 
that deep, geological time is cyclical. It is this cyclicality that is seen as a 
promise of predictability and safety (Adam and Groves, 2007). Claims for the 
predictability of the deep future rest on assumptions that deep time and deep 
process of the past will be repeated in the future. Predictions of geological 
processes, Rabbe explained, are “based on a belief that what happened one 
million years ago, or during the last million years, will happen again”. However 
he went onto note how “that won’t necessarily be the case. There will always be 
uncertainties”. The assumed cyclicality of geological processes is utilised to tell 
stories of the safety and evolution of the GDF in the future. The assumption of 
the cyclicality of geological time and processes, the assumption that what has 
happened before will happen again in the same spaces as before, together with 
the linear time and process of radioactive decay are mobilised to make the case 
for the safety and predictability of the deep future and GD. 
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Finally, available geological conditions play an important role in the ways in 
which underground safety is constructed in Finland. Finland is geologically 
relatively homogeneous and the choice of geological environments suitable for 
GD is limited. Granite, Posiva notes, is the “only realistic choice of host rock” 
(Posiva, 2012: 35). A former Posiva Research Manager, Juhani Vira, has noted 
that Posiva “can’t influence the waste or the site [but] have to take them as they 
are” (Vira and Jalonen, 2014). Available geological conditions inform and shape 
the ways in which safety and safety claims are made through relational 
articulations. Ilkka contrasted the KBS-3 disposal concept being implemented in 
Finland to those of other countries. In Finland the aim of disposal, he argued, is 
to contain radionuclides inside the waste canister in the GDF, but “elsewhere, 
disposal concepts tend to allow the dispersal of radionuclides in clay, and hope 
that radionuclides travel slow enough not to jeopardise long-term safety. These 
concepts might be good, but they wouldn’t suit the Finnish system” due to the 
lack of geological alternatives. Because of the presence of fractures in the 
granite bedrock, dispersal of radionuclides would be riskier than in clay 
environments in which there are no obvious routes for movement. Where Matt 
underlined the slowness of movement in clay and van Luik argued that fractures 
in granite invoke uncertainty in the deep future, Ilkka turned these arguments on 
their heads. To underline the safety of the Finnish system, he posited clay 
formations as spaces of risk if or when waste has been allowed to disperse in 
clay. In clay, he argued, the possible movement of radionuclides is more 
unpredictable than it is in granite. In clay the movement of water and 
radionuclides takes place through diffusion, and movement can occur anywhere 
in the clay environment. Unlike in granites where movement is channelled to 
and by fractures to certain spaces, movement in is clay less predictable than in 
granites.  
 
The different readings of fractures as spaces of risk and predictability highlight 
the negotiability and malleability of the bedrock (Sundqvist, 2002). The 
geological attributes of a site can be mobilised as arguments for or against 
safety and predictability into the deep future, and safety claims are made within 
the constraints of existing geological conditions. Geology, as the ‘ultimate 
barrier’ plays a key role in imaginations and makings of safety into the very 
	 165	
distant future, yet GD, at its core, is an engineered concept. In the following 
section I will focus on how the design of the EBS reflects attempts to make 
safety in the very long-term, and secondly, how time is managed in the lab to 
predict the performance of the EBS over time. 
 
5.3 Technology of stagnation 
“Digging down into the Earth” Williams writes, “is also going back into the past” 
(Williams, 2008: 23). By moving underground, GD seeks to enrol the past to 
create, but also to make and protect the future. The making of safety draws on 
the past both in spatial and engineering sense. Familiar, historical materials, as 
I will explore further below, have been chosen to contain nuclear waste. 
Nonetheless, as we observed earlier, the one million years the GDF is assumed 
to contain nuclear waste surpasses present engineering ability. The timeframe 
of GD, William noted, is “an enormous time in engineering terms”. The one 
certainty about GD is the eventual loss of containment. Matt pointed out that the 
GDF “probably will fail. The thing is not going to be watertight forever. So it has 
to fail safely”. The relationship between safety and failure in GD is more 
nuanced than a simple dichotomy. Failure does not necessarily mean the loss 
of safety. Failure can occur in a safe way. Safe failure is a matter of time. Safety 
is no longer associated with not failing, but rather with failing in a timely way. If 
the GDF fails before enough time has passed since the emplacement of waste 
in the GDF, before enough radioactive decay has taken place, failure is risky. If 
the GDF fails after enough has passed, failure is no longer opposite to safety. In 
any case, safety does not mean the containment of nuclear waste forever. The 
IAEA has posited, “disposal facilities are not expected to provide complete 
containment and isolation of the waste forever; this is neither practicable nor 
demanded by the hazard of the waste, which declines with time” (IAEA, 2012: 
4). The dual process of decay – the natural decrease of radioactivity in nuclear 
waste on one side, and the loss of the EBS’s material integrity on the other – 
means that while the GDF’s ability to contain nuclear waste unavoidably 
decreases with time, so does the need for the isolation and containment of 
waste. However, the incommensurability of EBS and radionuclide lifespans, as 
we have already seen, guarantees that the EBS will fail before radionuclides 
have reached the end of their lifetimes. Thus, the task for waste management 
	 166	
organisations is to engineer containment for long enough, to extend the lifespan 
and material integrity of the EBS enough so that failure can occur safely. Matt 
elaborated that the idea of the safe failure of the GDF draws from nuclear 
reactor technology. 
 
A failsafe reactor is designed so that in the event of some accident, it 
takes itself to a safe state to be intervened with. […] In terms of 
design principles that leads you down a certain way of thinking. So, if 
it’s going to fail safely, you tend to want a very simple design basis. 
(Professor of Nuclear Materials, interview) 
 
Safety is associated with simplicity and the design of the GDF, on paper, is 
fairly simple, a point to which I will return shortly. The GDF as an engineered 
structure, however, is loaded with immense expectations. It has to maintain its 
integrity for longer than any other human made structure yet and operate for 
longer than human civilisation has existed. Also, the GDF design process 
diverges significantly from ordinary engineering practices. It pushes those 
practices beyond their conventions. Matt pointed out how normally engineered 
things are “product[s] of multiple failures”; they are designed, modelled and 
tested on different scales. They go through multiple iterations and closure 
scrutiny.  
 
So before you build the first product, you’ve got a very good idea that 
it’s going to work and you’ve ironed a lot of the deficiencies. 
Sometimes, it doesn’t work out that way. The Millennium Bridge is a 
good example of that. But the geological disposal facility won’t be like 
that. The first one we build will probably be the only one we build. 
(Professor of Nuclear Materials, interview) 
	
The GDF is not afforded, cannot be afforded, the same trial-and-error approach 
to its design as engineered things commonly are. With the GDF there is not a 
chance to smooth out technical hiccups and deficiencies with the next iteration. 
There will only be GDF 1.0. On the other hand, the design of the GDF is not 
what one might think of as an innovative novelty. Its design depends on 
concepts and materials that already exist. The GDF is designed in the image of 
	 167	
nuclear reactors as it relies on the same design and safety principles. The 
safety of the GDF like that of nuclear reactors rests on a multi-barrier system 
(see Figure 1 in the Introduction). The KBS-3 concept Finland is implementing 
is composed of five barriers: 
 
• Ceramic spent fuel elements 
• Copper waste canister with a cast iron insert 
• Bentonite (also used as cat litter) buffer surrounding the canister 
• Bentonite backfill with which the disposal tunnels are filled 
• Granite bedrock. 
 
The basic principle of the multi-barrier system is to provide ‘defence-in-depth’ or 
safety in numbers. The aim of the multi-barrier system is to “confine the 
radionuclides so that the failure of one component does not jeopardize the 
safety of the containment system as a whole” (IAEA, 2003: 18). This way the 
“uncertainties affecting […] one barrier or safety function typically have only a 
small effect on overall performance” (OECD, 2009: 152). Thus, the failure of 
one barrier does not mean the failure of the GDF, and should not affect the 
safety provided by the whole multi-barrier system.  
 
The materials for the engineered barriers of the multi-barrier system are chosen 
and tailored with the waste and the bedrock in mind, thus in Finland for instance 
the materials are selected to suit and complement the dominating geological 
conditions in the Fennoscandian shield and the characteristics of spent fuel. As 
we can see from the list above, the materials chosen to contain nuclear waste 
are rather mundane: ceramics, copper, iron and clay (bentonite). Samuli 
weighed the strengths of these materials. The spent fuel element, he pointed 
out “is practically porcelain”, a similar material to an ordinary coffee cup.  
 
A coffee cup won’t dissolve in water; the fuel element is that kind of a 
material. Then there’s the iron insert offering mechanical protection 
and copper providing corrosion protection. […] Then we have the 
bentonite that is used in landfills to prevent toxins from reaching 
groundwater. We have much experience of it and it provides good 
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insulation. And finally we have the bedrock as a sort of ultimate 
protection. (PhD student, interview) 
 
The mundanity of EBS materials is so striking that some scientists have 
speculated whether more novel materials might be more efficient in invoking 
‘public acceptance’ and confidence in GD. While GD is described as ‘state-of-
the-art’ technology, the conservatism of its material design does not necessarily 
reflect this claim (McKinley, Kawamura and Tsuchi, 2000). Aila, a Posiva 
Project Manager, however noted that it is precisely the mundanity and the 
familiarity of the materials that provides confidence in the disposal concept. 
 
It’s a system that is based on well-known materials. I mean this is the 
fundamental principle that we’re working with clay, copper, iron. 
We’ve known these materials. They’ve been around many, many 
years. So, we can predict them. (Posiva Project Manager, interview, 
my emphasis) 
 
The familiarity of materials enables the prediction of their behaviour over long 
timescales. This is the reason why they have been chosen. Aila further 
elaborated; “we don’t want to use any fancy-schmancy engineered things that 
we don’t understand for those kinds of timeframes”. Novelty means a shallow 
understanding and experience of the long-term behaviour of materials and by 
extension a reduced predictability of the GDF’s long-term functioning. So, 
instead of new innovative materials, Posiva look to familiar materials and 
conduct ‘analogue studies’ on them. One such analogous artefact that has 
attracted the attention of Posiva and the Swedish waste management 
organisation SKB is a bronze cannon that contains vast quantities of copper. 
The cannon lay on the Baltic seabed for centuries. Surrounded by clay and 
abrasive seawater, the cannon provides a good analogue for the copper 
canister that will be surrounded by clay and groundwater in the GDF for multiple 
millennia (Ialenti, 2015). Ialenti describes how Posiva experts study the cannon 
to predict whether and how copper canisters might corrode over the long-term 
in order to forecast the evolution of the GDF into the deep future. By studying 
analogues and relying on familiar materials, the design of the EBS seeks to 
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prolong the ability of the barrier system to meet, even if not match, the longer 
now of the radioactive hazard of nuclear waste. 
 
Thus the Finnish disposal culture mobilises the past in a range of ways to make 
the deep future safe. In the first instance, the cyclicality of geological processes, 
the assumption that the past will repeat itself in particular spaces, is used to 
argue for the predictability and safety of the deep future. Secondly, safety and 
predictability are made through the material historicity of the EBS, the drawing 
on materials and evidence of the past, and the simplicity of the EBS design. 
The reliance on geological and archaeological evidence in making safety 
claims, and GD’s attempt to manipulate time in order to make safety render GD 
a technology of stagnation. As a technology of stagnation, GD abhors novelty. 
The design of the GDF draws on safety principles applied in the design of 
nuclear reactors. Most crucially, however, GD seeks to slow down time. The 
move to the underground and the historicity of the EBS are an effort directed at 
extending the present of the disposal facility. Moved away from the atmosphere, 
the facility is anticipated to be less prone to eroding and corroding forces. 
Constructed underground, the facility is expected to have a longer lifespan than 
it would aboveground. Unlike the aboveground, the underground is seen to offer 
stable and predictable disposal conditions in the deep future. The passage of 
time underground is slower, which is important for the EBS. Underground the 
evolution, and the inevitable degradation of the EBS, slows down. While the life 
of the EBS cannot be prolonged to match the expansive now of nuclear waste, 
stagnating the decay of the EBS is crucial for making safety. Stagnating time 
and by extension the decay of the EBS are a vital doing for engineering safety 
and safe failure in the deep future. 
 
5.4 Crafting deep futures in the lab 
In contrast to Finland, in the UK there is little certainty as to the exact material 
configuration of the EBS. The lack of a disposal site and uncertainty about the 
waste inventory (Chapter 4 and Chapter 6) ensures that the size, design and 
materiality of the GDF all remain unclear. Composing a “meaningful safety 
case” for a GDF under these conditions is very difficult (Bailey, 2015: 1634). 
This amount of uncertainty at the policy level caused some very tangible 
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problems in the lab. David, a PhD researcher working on cement materials 
worried how the present uncertainty about the GDF’s material configuration 
might affect his work in the future. This uncertainty, he explained, 
 
makes it more difficult to justify myself. Basically my justification is 
that I’m working on the generic disposal [concept], which has kind of 
structural concrete, but also cement used in filling the gaps between 
waste packages in one of the vaults So, if they change that or 
change the type of cement used, it would possibly make my work 
irrelevant. (David, interview) 
 
The absence of clear policy raised also some practical problems in the lab with 
regards to experimental designs. Jodie, also a PhD researcher, explained that 
her project’s 
 
main focus is to look at the evolving geochemistry [of the GDF], 
which is a challenge, because no one’s committing to saying what 
materials we are going to use [in the GDF]. So I’m finding it very 
difficult at this stage to build a project or a programme to just study it 
right now, never mind trying to make leachates and pore waters that 
will represent evolved (leachate and porewater) solutions. (Jodie, 
interview) 
 
Telling stories about the deep future without much guidance as to what that 
future might look like was a matter of concern for the PhD students, and it 
intertwined with more immediate short-term concerns about the students’ ability 
to complete their projects, the futures of their work, and their futures as 
scientists. 
 
Yet stories about the deep future were told constantly in the lab and the ability 
to tell these stories emerged through mundane material practices. For example, 
Jodie’s project, that I followed closely in the lab, mapped the early decades of 
the GDF after its closure, in particular looking at the evolution of a cement that 
is envisioned to be used as the tunnel backfill material in the UK’s GDF. 
Realising the anticipated deep future in the lab required careful, but quite 
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straightforward, management of everyday tools, samples and practices from 
Jodie. Her project mapped a particular time, 50 years post-closure, in the 
evolution of the imagined GDF. The conditions in the GDF, at that point, are 
expected to be free both of oxygen and carbon dioxide (CO2), while pH-levels 
and the temperature in the GDF are assumed to drop with time, as the heat 
generated by radioactive decay will slowly decrease. Creating and maintaining 
these conditions in an oxygen and CO2 filled lab that had normal room 
temperature required careful design and management of the experimental 
setup. The easiest, and really the only, way for Jodie to do this was to transfer 
her experiments into a glove box (see Figure 11). The glove box, like the 
bedrock, works as a physical boundary of control in two directions. When 
radioactive materials are involved in an experiment, the glove box protects the 
researcher and the lab from radioactive samples contained inside the box. In 
Jodie’s case the rationale of containment reverted. What the glove box 
contained was the outside world.  
 
The box kept contaminants, oxygen and CO2, on the outside and protected 
samples and the future crafted inside the box from these contaminants. The 
glove box, thus, played a key role in the creation and maintenance of the deep 
future in the present. Jodie managed the atmosphere in the glove box by 
pumping gas into the box to ensure that no oxygen or carbon dioxide would 
linger and venture into the box while she was working on her experiment. For 
the same reason, all Jodie’s tools and sample materials had to travel into the 
glove box via a vacuum chamber attached to one end of the box, to ensure that 
no oxygen or CO2 would make their way into the box with Jodie’s things. The 
lab had an oxygen depleter to help researchers such as Jodie know when 
oxygen had been evacuated from  
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Figure 11. Glove box. 
the vacuum chamber and it would be safe to open the chamber from the inside 
of the box to access whatever tools were needed for a given experiment. The 
depleter, however, did not work and Jodie had to rely on her past experience of 
creating the future in the box in the present. In practice this meant waiting and 
was an exercise in patience: “I have to wait 20 minutes for the chamber to be 
vacked. It doesn’t really take that long, but better to be sure. So we have to 
wait” (field notes 16 April 2015). Equally important to managing the atmosphere 
in the glove box to craft a space for the deep future in the present was the 
management of the temperature in which experiments would be conducted, as 
well as the manipulation of sample size. In the first instance Jodie explained: 
 
My oven is set to 50 degrees because the GDF will be at 50 degrees 
50 years post-closure. So, that’s the justification. Other people use 
heat to speed up the rate of reactions. If you then do the same 
experiment at different temperature points, you can work out how 
things are changing. (field notes 16 April 2015) 
 
Mapping the evolving geochemistry of the cement backfill in the GDF relied on 
simple material doings such as managing the temperature of the crafted oven 
GDF. Ovens, which the lab had in the multiple, were time machines with which 
different parts of the future could be mapped. Not only did they help to make 
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deep futures in the present, they also enabled scientists to stuff very distant or 
very long timespans into their three-year projects. The manipulation of oven 
temperatures sped up material reactions, which enabled scientists to map 
distant and/or long stretches of the future in a short period of time. A further 
aspect of this management of time was the manipulation of sample size. Just 
like high temperatures, small sample size was a tool for speeding up time and 
bringing distant times to the present. Jodie smashed her cement samples, 
which she mixed herself in the lab, into fine powder to further speed up the 
evolution she wished to trace (see Figure 12). The tools and methods she used 
to create the deep future were mundane at best: 
 
Jodie folds a sheet of A4 into two from the middle and places one of 
the cement crayons inside the folded paper. She picks up a rubber 
mallet and begins to hit the cement with it. She breaks half of the 
cement piece into smaller bits, which she pours into a mortar. Some 
of the pieces she snaps into smaller ones with her fingers. She 
grinds the pieces and pours them onto the sieve, which she then 
offers to me. (field notes 16 April 2015) 
 
If the design of the actual GDF relies on simple materials, the deep future in the 
lab, too, was made with simple materials and tools. Paper, pestles, mortars and 
sieves that Jodie used can be found in many homes. Where the making of the 
future in the lab relied on simplicity, simple ways of working were imposed on 
Jodie by the anticipated deep future and the need to map that future in a glove 
box. 
	
A technician walks in; “Are you making a mess again?” he jokes. 
“Yeah, but don’t worry! It’s all contained in [the glove box].” 
He walks closer to see what we are doing. I’m hammering away at 
the cement and the technician jokes that his life is at risk while the 
hammering takes place. “I’d better leave!” he says and waltzes away. 
“If only he knew, it takes out ten minutes just to get the mallet out of 
the box!”, Jodie jokes as we are left alone. 
[…] 
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The technician walks back again. In silence, he watches us work for 
a while. “Isn’t there really an easier way of doing this? Looking at you 
is like going back in time. Don’t you get any mechanical stuff?” 
“Yeah, but not in the glove box. In Geography they have sieving 
stands where you put your whole sample in at once and then come 
back in ten minutes. Job done.” 
“Hmm. It’s like going back in time”, he mutters and turns around to 
leave. (field notes 28 April 2015) 
 
Making the deep future in the present, having to contain work in the glove box 
to avoid the present leaking into the future-in-the-making, set limitations to work, 
and determined what Jodie could do, know and how. The future in the glove 
box was made through banal and slow manual labour. Tools bigger than 
ordinary mallets and sieves did not fit through the vacuum chamber, while 
samples configured to the future could not be taken out of the box without the 
risk of contamination. The need to predict the deep future, thus, structured work 
in the present just as much as the making of the deep future depended on tools, 
data and techniques available in the present. 
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Figure 12. Cement preparation in the glove box. 
 
 
 
Nonetheless, Jodie was constantly aware of the precariousness of the future 
she sought to create and preserve in the glove box. Keeping the present from 
collapsing into the future, preventing oxygen and CO2 from leaking into the 
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glove box and coming into contact with samples was vital for making and 
maintaining the deep future and the project’s capacity to predict and make 
knowledge claims about the evolution of the GDF. Jodie was aware that the 
present might leak into the future despite her efforts to contain it. She explained 
how her sample “pots had been qualified with ultra-purified water. I weighed 
them before and after the water. All pots lost around, or less than, 1% of their 
weight, which is okay, but at the same time [...] if water can get out, CO2 can get 
in [to the pots]” (field notes 16 April 2015). Gaps between sample pots and their 
lids, tears in the gloves of the box, presented spaces of risk to Jodie’s created 
future and, by extension, to her ability to map and make predictions about that 
future. To better control the reliability of her results, Jodie included a blank 
sample for each of her cement samples in the experiment. The blank, that is 
cement-free, samples, she explained, were there to monitor and verify the 
chemistry of the simulated leachate in which her samples sat in their pots, and 
to reveal any potential CO2 leaks into her experiment. The main role of the 
blank samples was to inform Jodie that nothing in the glove box was 
contaminating her samples over the timespan of the experiment. Additionally, if 
her blank samples turned out contaminated or to have something strange in 
them, they could help her identify the contaminant. This might in turn salvage 
the credibility of her experiment despite contamination/contaminated samples. 
 
The manipulation of materials and management of experimental set-ups 
brought the deep future into existence in the present. The deep future is a 
matter of material doings that take place in glove boxes, sealed sample pots 
and ovens that make the deep future in the present, creating conditions for its 
predictability. However, making predictability is a creative and an uncertain 
project, as we saw. The present can leak into the crafted future, and the million-
year timeframe of the safety assessment defies knowing. Jodie noted how she 
“can’t predict what’s going to happen”, but rather, “give a good guestimation” of 
how the deep future might unfold.  
 
In the following section, I will continue to focus on the material makings of the 
deep future in the lab. In what follows, I will explore how the deep future was 
imagined and made through invisible-to-the-eye atomic spaces and material 
interactions. 
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Deep spaces of containment 
If the material manipulation of time through sample size, temperature and 
atmospheric conditions enabled Jodie and others to work with the future in the 
lab, manipulating sample size also opened up deep atomic spaces of 
containment for closer examination. Where the underground, depth and 
distance from the surface, are posited as providing safety in the very long-term, 
in the lab, as well, containment and safety were created and examined in 
subsurface spaces. Rather than the bedrock, the focus was on the deep spaces 
of potential EBS materials. Alex, whose project sought to identify an optimal 
glass-ceramic mix for the containment of plutonium residues11, was interested 
in the hidden, invisible-to-the-eye, properties of her samples. Glass-ceramics, 
Alex explained, are explored as a potential wasteform for the containment of 
plutonium residues due to the dual containment capacity of glass-ceramic 
materials. “You have the glass phase which will incorporate the fission products 
or other stuff”, she explained, “and then you’ve got your ceramic phase that will 
take [plutonium] […] It is a two-phase wasteform where you’ve got actinides in 
one and all the other stuff in another [phase]”. Alex further noted that the dual 
characteristics made it easier to engineer containment. 
 
You’re kind of taking the advantages of glass and ceramics. You take 
the higher loading capacity of ceramics, higher durability of ceramics, 
but you’re also taking the ease of processing from the glass. By 
adding just a small bit of glass to the ceramic […] it’s a lot easier to 
process than just straight ceramic. (Alex, interview)  
 
What Alex was really interested in was the inner world of her glass-ceramic 
samples; what their structures were like, how they came to be what they were, 
and how her glass-ceramics interacted with waste. By exploring the atomic 
spaces of her samples, Alex could map where the “waste is preferentially going. 
Does the cerium go into the glass phase or titanium phase or zirconium? Or 
does it split equally across the board?”. Alex used cerium as an analogue to 
																																								 																				
11 Plutonium residues are classified as high-level waste. They contain more plutonium 
in them than intermediate plutonium-contaminated waste, but not sufficiently to warrant 
the extraction of plutonium and uranium, and their recycling as fuel, economically 
viable. 
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plutonium in her experiments. She explained how “cerium is not the best 
analogue for plutonium. Cerium is used, because it has a very similar ionic 
radius to that of plutonium. Cerium and plutonium are similar in size, but cerium 
reduces more readily than plutonium does”. In a ‘real’ situation, then, plutonium 
might no behave as cerium did in her experiments. Yet, the logic of these 
analogue studies, Alex explained, was to enable “non-active12 research [to] try 
and predict what the waste would do, rather than just looking at producing a 
special glass, but not actually knowing how the waste is going to work”. By 
tracing the movement and distribution of cerium in her samples, Alex hoped to 
be able to predict and identify how plutonium might distribute itself in glass-
ceramics, and additionally, to identify an optimal glass-ceramic wasteform to 
contain plutonium into the very distant future.  
 
Studying the microstructure of her samples could reveal the respective abilities 
of her sample materials for containing waste. Glass-ceramics, Alex explained, 
have “about a hundred per cent density with no porosity, which is why I’m 
interested in it”. Porosity in glass-ceramic, like fractures in the bedrock, can be 
interpreted as spaces of risk. The more porous the wasteform, the more 
uncertain its ability to contain waste materials is. Because of the absence of 
porosity, glass-ceramics are suitable for the containment of radionuclides, and 
plutonium in particular. Mark, a lab technician at UK university, explained that  
 
If you put plutonium as a single atom in a ceramic structure, you’re 
bonding it. It’s actually in the structure. If that ceramic doesn’t 
disintegrate too much, it’s the best way to keep that stuff in one place 
for thousands of years. In a glass, it’s slightly more likely to leach out. 
(UK Technician, interview) 
 
The density of ceramics promises containment and ensures that extracting 
plutonium from a glass-ceramic wasteform is highly difficult and unlikely. Thus, 
the material Alex was studying could carry both security (non-proliferation) and 
safety (containment of radiological hazard) functions. “On a molecular scale”, 
Mark continued, containment is “quite easy”. It is these deep, microscopic 
spaces that researchers map in order to craft and make predictions of safety 
																																								 																				
12	Experiments that do not use radioactive materials.	
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into the deep future. Not only do they trace how waste materials split in 
wasteforms, like Alex did, but they also map the “atomic scale to predict how 
th[e various] interaction[s] could affect the engineering and the environment of a 
GDF over hundreds of thousands of years” (Diamond Light Source, 2015). 
These deep spaces of the EBS, then, entangle with time. They are spaces 
where imaginations of safety, containment and the very distant future are 
crafted and examined. 
 
These deep spaces, however, are often overlooked in public representation of 
GD concepts and safety. Internationally, all disposal concepts rely on the kind 
multi-barrier system that we saw above, which aim to contain radionuclides for 
sufficiently deep into the future both in time and space (NDA, 2010). In 
descriptions and international comparisons of GD concepts, attention is guided 
to the materials and the redundancy of barriers. Visual representations, such as 
the NDA’s depiction of the UK’s envisioned EBSs for low and high heat 
generating wastes (see Figure 13), focus on rather than in the materials. Focus 
on the materials describes the material configuration of engineered safety, the 
different materials chosen for an EBS. It also visualises the isolation of nuclear 
waste inside the EBS and the bedrock. Depicting smooth materials surfaces in 
decontextualized environments, public representations, such as the one above,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Multi-barrier system. Courtesy of NDA. 
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simplify containment. Together with the complexity of the EBS and the bedrock, 
what is invisibilised in such depictions is waste itself. Visual representations of 
the EBS craft dual containment in a sense. By displaying a decontextualized 
EBS they contain the uncertainty and contingency of containment, and by 
extension by invisibilising waste inside the depicted EBS, these representations 
remove the hazard and liveliness of waste, instead presenting them as tamed 
and ordered (Gregson, 2012). The above visualisation by the NDA, for instance, 
depicts how the two types of wastes are neatly contained within waste canisters 
that are held in place by buffer materials and surrounded by the bedrock. What 
is absent are, not just wastes but also, descriptions why the material 
configurations of these two EBSs are so different; why the system for low heat 
waste is composed of cement, stainless steal and another layer of cement, 
while the high heat waste system relies on glass, metal and clay. Such 
visualisations invisibilise where and how containment takes place. They do not 
elaborate on why certain carefully chosen materials have been delegated the 
roles they have within the EBS. The dual absence of descriptions of design and 
of waste blackbox containment that becomes represented as a matter of fact, 
instead of the intricate and precarious doing that it is. 
 
In contrast to these public representations that focus on materials, in the lab the 
focus is very much in the materials. To assess the suitability of her samples for 
the containment of plutonium residues, Alex was interested in the 
microstructure and porosity of her samples, how different ingredients of her 
samples reacted during the sample preparation process and how they 
assembled into a glass-ceramic form. To map these qualities, she had to utilise 
different analytical techniques.  
 
SEM [scanning electron microscopy] shows the microstructure of my 
samples. It can reveal any porosity in them; whether I’ve got 
unreacted material in there, large crystallites, small crystallites. It 
basically zooms in on the micron scale for us to really see the 
structure in our phase assemblage; what it looks like. X-Ray 
Diffraction basically gives us our phase assemblage. Each crystalline 
phase has it
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the standard cards. Each peak is for a certain fingerprint of the phase 
kind of thing. I mainly use it for phase identification. (Alex, interview) 
 
What matters less is the glass-ceramic material. What is of interest for Alex is 
the way in which glass-ceramic material, composed of a range of elements, 
assembles on the microscopic level. She explored the characteristic of six 
different glass-ceramic samples, which varied from each other in their 
composition only slightly, with the aim of identifying the most suitable 
composition for the containment of plutonium residues. As with the GDF, the 
containment within a glass-ceramic material is the effect of multiple elements 
coming together. The ability of glass-ceramic to contain waste emerges from 
the invisible-to-the-eye encounters and relatings of materials that together 
compose the glass-ceramic barrier.  
 
Different techniques for examining the deep microscopic spaces of glass-
ceramics to map its ability to contain plutonium residues governed the ways in 
which Alex prepared samples and managed sample size. Much of her lab work 
was guided by the invisible-to-the-eye atomic spaces and lab instruments’ 
ability to map these spaces. The process from sample preparation to data 
analysis involved constant negotiations with materials, instruments and other 
researchers. From being assembled from powder samples, Alex’s samples 
went through smashing, sieving, grinding and/or polishing depending on her 
analytical needs. These routine material practices served a dual purpose: they 
could be used to manipulate time, as I described above, but also to visibilise 
spaces of importance. To produce accurate data, instruments demanded 
careful sample preparation. The ability of the X-Ray Diffractometer (XRD) to 
produce accurate data for Alex, for instance, depended on the grain size of the 
sample: the finer the grain, the better and clearer the data. Sometimes, poor 
sample preparation opened to touch, although it remained invisible to the eye. 
Setting up an XRD run, Alex began to question her preparation work and 
consulted a fellow PhD student. 
 
Alex: “Do you think these powders are too coarse? They are 106 
microns.  
Other: “How much? 
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Alex: “106 microns. You can rub them between your fingers.”  
Other: “I’m sure it’ll be fine.”  
(Field notes 10 April 2015)  
 
Alex’s haptic encounter with her sample proved out to be accurate. Although 
the feel of the sample justified Alex’s concerns, she initially trusted her sight 
over her touch. The data from the XRD came out “too noisy” and Alex had to re-
run the XRD with double the initial time. The length of the run directly resonated 
with the XRD’s ability to visibilise the deep spaces of containment that Alex 
could not otherwise access. Yet, even when accurate, data produced by the 
XRD was open to interpretation and subjected to simplification. The XRD 
produced diffraction patterns of the materials it analysed. On a pattern, each 
phase present in the sample was represented by a unique ‘fingerprint’. Each 
fingerprint has its particular predetermined place and shape on the pattern, and 
researchers can identify their phases by comparing and matching them to the 
standard phases in a reference database provided by an XRD compatible 
analytical software. The database used by the Alex and others in the lab 
constituted of over 340,000 fingerprints against which researchers made sense 
of their samples. Experienced researchers, such as Matt, could “immdediately 
tell” if a fingerprint on a pattern was an impurity (field notes 11 February 2015), 
while more inexperienced researchers had to rely more heavily on the 
database. This left space for interpretation and negotiation. Differentiating 
between noise and peaks, actual phases and impurities, was not necessarily 
straightforward. Different methods were available for researchers to make up 
their minds. Alex reflected that some researchers relied on statistics and 
percentage offered by the software to help them tidy up their data identifying 
anything “five per cent above noise as a peak”. Instead of relying on statistics, 
Alex made her judgements “by eye” (field notes 20 May 2015). She mused that 
sometimes she had to be more “brutal” with her peaks, which allowed her to 
relegate them into noise easily and swiftly. At other times, cleaning her data 
could involve a great deal of compromising and weighing of options; 
 
The data is messy. Alex determines the fate of peaks on her pattern 
by how they relate to each other: if this one’s a peak, that one must 
be too. Then there is the shouldered peak that doesn’t coincide with 
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the standard. Where Alex’s peak has a shoulder, the software offers 
two peaks She decides it is a match since the correspondence 
between the standard and her sample isn’t “too bad”. (Field notes 20 
May 2015) 
 
This kind of discrepancy between samples and standards were dismissed in the 
data generation process. The parts of the glass-ceramic that did not fit the 
standards were neatly brushed aside by Alex as she made her samples fit 
idealised data offered by the database. The sample became translated into and 
treated as those idealised neat pieces of data and it lost the messiness of the 
powders and patterns with which Alex mostly engaged.  
 
Cleaning and generating data was inherently a process of interpretation and 
creation. In the lab, scientific objects are both produced and transformed. Knorr 
Cetina writes how lab work requires that interpretations and selections are 
made: “any definition of what is or is not the case, any specification of a course 
of action, of a measurement device or a chemical composition is in principle a 
choice among alternative means and courses of action” (Knorr Cetina, 1983: 
157). Data, and by extension safety claims, are made through selections. 
Diffraction patterns have interpretative flexibility (Pinch and Bijker, 2012). How 
Alex interpreted and cleaned her data was guided by the problem to which she 
was seeking an answer. As she was trying to identify the phases in her sample, 
she removed or ignored the peaks that did not fit the idealised phase types, 
while sometimes she dismissed the identifications suggested by the analytical 
programme she used. 
 
Alex explains that she has to decide what’s a peak and what’s not: 
“when you zoom in, this one’s a peak, but when you look at the 
whole picture it’s not. You got to take you time with this, because 
what you say is a peak the machine will then use to analyse the data. 
This, for instance, isn’t a peak but noise, so I’ll take it out”. One of her 
peaks has a ledge and she assumes that there are two peaks, but 
they just haven’t come off for some reason. Nonetheless, she 
decides that her data matches with the computer’s suggestion of two 
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separate peaks. […] “They aren’t the best match, but they fit quite 
well”. (field notes 20 May 2015) 
 
Through a long process of manipulation and tweaking sample materials and 
messy diffraction patterns were translated into trimmed representations of her 
samples on a computer screen that were more informative to Alex than the 
materials she was working with. The deep spaces of materials were simplified 
to accommodate the making of safety into the deep future. The neat 
representations in the shape of diffraction patterns or SEM images could tell 
stories about the deep spaces of containment the sample itself was incapable 
of doing. These representations gained lives of their own and in ways outgrew 
the significance of samples as knowledge making devices (Latour and Woolgar, 
1986 [1979]). Once created, they could exist without the original sample and 
became key in mapping the ability of wasteforms to contain nuclear waste, and 
the evolution of the EBS in the deep future.  
 
5.5 Summary 
The central argument laid out in this chapter was that the deep future and 
safety are made through intricate relational and situated doings. Safety is not an 
inherent quality of GD, but emergent of contingent doings and local 
negotiations. In this chapter I traced some of the ways in which safety, together 
with the deep future, are crafted. I explored how underground safety is made in 
relation to the aboveground that is constructed as an inherently more 
unpredictable space. Geological safety, then, is negotiated and negotiable. I 
explored how safety in the Finnish case has been made through reflecting the 
underground against the aboveground as well as the renormalisation of 
underground spaces of risk as spaces of predictability, and we observed how 
the ontopolitics of fractures in the bedrock depend on available geological 
conditions and choices.  
 
Additionally, I traced how the deep future is made through separations, 
simplifications and the manipulation of time. In the first instance, time is 
manipulated through the move from the above to the underground. 
Underground, processes, events and the passage of time are slower. This 
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slowness, the international nuclear waste community has argued, helps to 
prolong the longevity of containment. Eroding and corroding processes that 
inevitably affect the GDF will take longer, than they would on the surface, to 
damage the GDF’s ability to contain waste. Because of the relatively slow 
passage of time, the underground is posited as a safer than space the 
aboveground. Constructed underground, the lifespan of the GDF, although still 
too short for radionuclide half-lives, but it is better matched with the lifespans of 
radionuclides than it would be aboveground. Digging into the underground can 
be seen as ‘world reduction’ (Jameson, 1975). What is reduced from the 
underground world in the first instance is the pace of time and the human. 
Disposal cultures envision safety through the separation of the human and the 
nonhuman, the aboveground and the underground. Where safety is delegated 
to the underground, the human is conceptualised both as a threat to safety as 
well as an object of protection. The human is seen as unpredictable, and the 
deep future made and imagined as a nonhuman space. As we saw, world 
reduction takes place in the lab as well. In the lab Alex cleaned and simplified 
her glass-ceramic elements to match idealised standards in an existing 
database. The identification of elements required the ignorance and brushing 
aside of inconvenient presences in her sample materials. The making of safety 
and safety claims relied in part on ‘simplifying reality’ and reducing the world to 
manageability. This is reflected also in the design of the GDF, which rests on 
simplicity and familiarity. The design of the multi-barrier system is based on 
mundane materials of which human society has much experience. The 
familiarity of materials and the simplicity of design are seen as fundamental 
safety factors. 
 
In the following chapter I will explore same of the ways in which the deep future 
envisioned through and by GD has been contested within the UK and Finnish 
disposal cultures. 
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6 MAKING A MESS OF FINALITY? 
 
In the previous two chapters I have considered both the making of the nuclear 
waste management problem and the making of safety into the deep future 
through situated doings and relatings. In this chapter the focus will be on the 
notion of the finality of GD, and how different ways of relating with it might affect 
the implementation of GD. As I noted in the first two chapters of this thesis GD 
is envisioned as an “end point” (EC, 2011) to nuclear waste management and a 
“permanent solution” (DECC, 2014a) to the nuclear waste problem. In Finland 
GD is referred to as final disposal (loppusijoitus), which seems to underline 
GD’s promise of an ending. The finality of disposal signals, on one hand, the 
envisioned difference between disposal and storage (DECC, 2014a), but it also 
decentres and invisibilises uncertainty. Final disposal, as a term, seems to 
simplify both the geological and the waste. It invisibilises spaces of geological 
risk and pacifies waste. ‘Final disposal’ proposes an end point in the lifecycle of 
nuclear waste. In doing so, it suggests the controllability of waste.  
 
In this chapter then, I explore how the disposal cultures in the UK and Finland 
relate to notions of finality and the future. I will begin by exploring how in 
Finland Posiva has crafted the final disposal project into a ‘success’ story, and 
how this narrative relies on particular temporal imaginations of the future, which 
have become contested with the beginning of waste disposal in Onkalo drawing 
closer. Secondly, I will look at how the UK’s envisioned nuclear future may 
impose further challenges on implementing GD as a ‘permanent solution’ to the 
waste problem. In the last two sections of this chapter I will focus on the 
ontopolitics of waste and explore it through the technologies and notions of 
reprocessing and retrievability, and how these relate to, underline or undermine 
GD as a permanent solution to the nuclear waste problem. The argument here 
is that Finland’s more flexible approach to finality may at least partially help to 
explain the advances made by the Finnish GD project, while the more rigid 
approach reading of finality in the UK might present an obstacle to the 
implementation of GD. 
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6.1 Making a success story 
Finland is among the handful of countries that have made notable progress 
towards the implementation of GD. At the moment it seems that Finland will be 
the first country to begin the disposal of nuclear waste, around 2025. The 
Finnish disposal culture has crafted a GD ‘success story’ that has been crafted 
by relating Finnish progress to a perceived stagnation of GD projects in other 
countries. The Finnish disposal culture also attributes this ‘success’ to a project 
timetable that is based on TVO’s waste management plan from the early 1980s. 
Ilkka, a retired Posiva Advisory, noted how 
 
In Finland in the early ‘80s, we quite smartly drew a long-term plan 
and strategy how [GD] will be taken care of, and defined checkpoints 
for evaluating whether and how to take the project forward. I do think 
that this was the smart and sensible way to go about it, and actually 
others should have done the same. (Posiva Advisor, interview)	
	
The project timetable is seen not only as a source of success, but also as a 
source of exceptionalism. Above, Ilkka contrasts Finnish progress with the 
perceived inaction in other countries by proposing that the long-term plan drawn 
explains the progress the Finnish disposal project has made, while other 
countries, lacking such a plan, have faltered. Samuli, a PhD student, similarly 
weighed that the progress made by the Finnish GD project as “pretty telling of 
the Finnish mentality”. He viewed the Finnish approach to GD as fairly unique.  
 
We are kind of taking a different approach to the rest of the world. 
We want to dispose of the waste as soon as possible. So, we won’t 
leave the burden of hundred years of nuclear waste stored away 
somewhere for future generations, which is basically what other 
countries are doing. Their concept is to wait for technological 
advancement that enables the reuse of their nuclear waste. (Finnish 
PhD student, interview) 
 
In Samuli’s reading, Finland is exceptional in that the country, unlike others, is 
actively implementing GD. As we saw in Chapter 4, in Finland nuclear waste 
management, including GD, was politically established as a prerequisite for 
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nuclear operations. Although the 1978 Nuclear Waste Report noted how “no 
technically urgent need for final disposal [had] existed [and] the aims of waste 
research [were] far in the future” (Nuclear Waste Report, 1978: 1), in Finland 
the politically forged union between the nuclear present and the waste future 
forced the industry to act with some immediacy. Still, the biggest urgency for the 
industry was not the management of waste in the present, but the provision of a 
credible waste management plan for the future, as a means for securing 
nuclear operations in the present. Ilkka explained: 
 
TVO wouldn’t have voluntarily started with such urgency, but it was 
made clear to them that their operational licence would not be 
renewed, if the disposal project wasn’t set in motion. So, it was a bit 
of a carrot and a stick situation; they were made to act in the present. 
(Posiva Advisor, interview) 
 
The Finnish approach to nuclear waste management could be conceptualised 
as anticipatory. Rather than addressing an urgent waste problem in the present, 
the Finnish disposal project was governed by the anticipation of future waste 
arisings, and having a waste management solution or solutions ready when 
they would be needed in the future.  
 
TVO’s plans and timetable for the implementation of GD drew on geological 
time. Radionuclide half-lives offered, and were used as, parameters for 
planning the Finnish nuclear waste future in the short-term. 
 
The timetable actually has a very pragmatic foundation. […] The 
basis for the timetable in the 1980s was the cooling down period of 
[spent] fuel. According to that the beginning of disposal could be take 
place in 2020. (Posiva Investigates, 2003: 2) 
 
The original timetable for the implementation of GD mobilised radionuclide half-
lives to justify a particular course of action. TVO worked backwards from the 
earliest possible disposal date to craft a structured project plan with clear 
milestones set between the anticipated beginning of disposal in 2020 and the 
beginning of the GD project in the 1980s. Site selection took place according to 
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the initial plan in 2000 and the construction of the GDF similarly began in line 
with the original timetable in the 2010s. The presence of a clear structured 
timetable, which the Finnish GD project has stuck with, has been important in 
crafting a ‘success story’. That timetable has formed the backbone of the 
Finnish project. Rabbe from GTK explained 
 
The timetable was defined in ’83 and it is quite amazing that it has 
held up so well and seems to hold to the end. In the timetable the 
2020s, that at the time felt very distant, were defined as the start of 
disposal and it seems that this will happen. (GTK researcher, 
interview) 
	
The timetable, then, is assigned a central role in crafting continuity and 
successes of the Finnish project. After the 2001 Decision-in-Principle (DiP) 
approving Eurajoki as the GDF host community, the Minister of Trade and 
Industry Sinikka Mönkäre opinioned that the DiP represented a “logical 
continuation of all the work that has been done in line with the target timetable 
for final disposal that was drawn in 1983” (Posiva, 2001: 1). Similarly, in the 
immediate aftermath of the 2001 DiP Posiva CEO Veijo Ryhänen positioned the 
DiP as an “important milestone in the decades long preparation that aims for 
the beginning of practical implementation in 2020” (ibid.: 2). The initial project 
timetable was retrofitted as a definitive early stance on GD to bolster 
imaginations of commitment and continuity. These imaginations have been well 
rehearsed and were drawn upon again in 2015 when decisions on Posiva’s 
Construction Licence Application (CLA) for the actual GDF were imminent. 
Posiva reimagined the initial ‘target timetable’ as a ‘policy’ on nuclear waste 
management. The company posited that the “2001 Decision-in-Principle was a 
logical continuation of the policy that was agreed in 1983”, and further held that 
a positive decision on the CLA would be a logical continuation of the 2001 DiP 
(Posiva, 2015: 4).  
 
In the Finnish narrative the disposal future is seen to flow directly from the past 
and the present. A linear trajectory for the GD project has been crafted with a 
certainty of progress that did not originally exist. In a 2015 parliamentary debate 
on Posiva’s CLA, MP Kristiina Salonen asserted that by ratifying the CLA the 
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parliament “demonstrated great wisdom in deciding to follow a decision from 20 
years ago” (PTK 62/2015: 6). Such re-imaginings of the project in terms of 
linear progress mobilise the past as a justification for decisions made in the 
present. Both in 2001 and 2015 decisions about the future were, in a sense, 
perceived as determined in and by the past, and thus already made. GD had 
become a megaproject with its own temporal logic and high political stakes 
(Lehtonen, Kojo and Litmanen, 2016). The Minister of Employment and 
Economic Affairs Olli Rehn saw the 2015 positive CLA decision flowing from the 
timetable set out in the early 1980s. He held  
 
[The] construction of Finnish nuclear safety has been patient. Current 
nuclear waste policies were drawn more than 30 years ago in the 
early ‘80s. Based on those plans, final disposal has been 
systematically planned for decades. (PTK 62/2015: 3) 
 
The Finnish GD project is imagined in terms of commitment, continuity, and 
commitment to continuity. These notions tied to that of progress through 
decades have enabled the telling of stories of Finnish GD success. In 2000, 
Posiva Communications Manager, Osmo Kurki contemplated how “final 
disposal has been researched and prepared for 20 years and another 20 years 
of research and preparation are still ahead before the final disposal facility is 
operational” (Posiva, 2000a: 2). Drawing from work done in the past Kurki 
extrapolates a narrative of progress into the future all the way to the beginning 
of actual waste disposal. All this before Eurajoki had been ratified as the host 
community and the island of Olkiluoto as the disposal site. The notion of 
progress is tied to that of success, which in itself is portrayed as something that 
could be expected. That the Finnish project has progressed is not considered a 
surprise. In another newsletter from the same year Kurki noted how “in Finland 
different regulations and instructions are taken seriously and action is taken 
accordingly” (Posiva, 2000b: 2). In this reading, the progress of the Finnish GD 
project is not unsurprising, but is in fact also expected.  
 
While progress of the GD project has, thus, been taken almost as a matter of 
fact, Finnish progress is mirrored to advances made elsewhere. Differences in 
levels of progress are mobilised to further bolster a narrative of Finnish success. 
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In a 2003 newsletter, Posiva noted how the company “has become a pioneer. 
Finnish nuclear waste management belongs to the vanguard of its field. It is 
quite satisfying to think one is part of a success story” (Posiva, 2003: 2). 
Additionally, in a 2010 newsletter, Posiva visualises GD as Finland’s home 
domain by depicting the implementation of GD as a sauna (Figure 14). The 
image conflates the exceptional (GD) and the international with the domestic, 
everyday Finnish experience (sauna). Picturing the Finn at ease next to stove, 
literally, adding more steam, while others sit sweating uncomfortably, suggests 
that GD, really, is Finland’s domain – Finland is leading the pack. It is in control 
and knows what it is doing, while others appear to be struggling. The picture is 
indicative also of the relational construction of Finnish success. There is nothing 
exceptional about a Finn in a sauna. Rather, like the progress of the GD project, 
it is what is expected. Exceptionalism and success only emerges in relation to 
the others. It is the relative comfort with which the Finn occupies the space that 
is exceptional, not the fact that he is there. At the same time what is exceptional 
is also normalised. The depiction of the exceptional (GD) through the mundane 
(sauna), aims to convey the manageability of the exceptional. In a sauna, a  
 
Figure 14. ‘Final disposal projects around the world on different levels’. 
Courtesy of Posiva Oy. 
 
Finn is in control, in a sauna a Finn knows how to behave, what to do and, 
ultimately, where the situation will lead and how it will come to its conclusion. 
Part of this narrative of a GD success story is Finland’s perceived 
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transformation from an apprentice to a pioneer. A Councillor at the Finnish 
Ministry of Employment and Economic Affairs (MEE) reflected how in the 1970s 
 
and 1980s Finns attended international nuclear waste management meetings to 
“learn from others. There were the big leading countries […] we wanted to do 
[…] what they were doing. As the years have passed we have progressed and 
little has happened elsewhere” (MEE Councillor, interview). Again, Finnish 
‘success’ emerges in relation to stagnation elsewhere.  
 
Up until the construction of Onkalo, the Finnish disposal culture expected it 
could and would take advantage of existing knowledge and technologies 
instead of being the one to produce them. Posiva’s former CEO Timo Äikäs 
(2016) has joked that the only thing in which the Finnish disposal project has 
failed is that it has moved ahead of those projects from which it was meant to 
learn. Another former CEO of Posiva, Eero Patrakka noted in 2009 that the “aim 
was never to be the first in the world, but many other countries haven’t had the 
courage to make political decisions about final disposal” (Posiva, 2009b: 49). 
Ilkka accounted that an “important lesson is that all those countries that tried to 
rush decision-making have had to return to the start line” while they should 
have, in his view, formulated a long-term plan like Finland did. In a 2015 Posiva 
newsletter article Juhani Vira mused how “one has to acknowledge that there is 
no philosopher’s stone behind Finnish progress. Finland has systematically 
progressed step-by-step for over thirty years now” (Posiva, 2015: 4). The 
Finnish success story is crafted in relation to other countries and attributed to 
project planning and commitment to that planning, and the implementation of 
GD as a long-term project that cannot be rushed. 
	
A long-term plan for a short-term future 
In 2010 a Helsinki-based think tank Demos in its Mission for Finland report 
pointed to Finnish engineering mentality as a root cause for the success of the 
GD project. 
 
[In Finland] problems are rarely political, let alone moral. […] Finland 
is a country where engineering skill provides the answer even to the 
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disposal of nuclear waste. In other countries this would be an ethical 
problem, here it is a practical one. (Demos, 2010: 82) 
	
This engineering mentality and the related pragmatism are considered to be at 
the root of Finnish progress by others as well. A UK nuclear waste consultant 
noted that in comparison to the UK “Finland has a much more pragmatic 
population […] there’s definitely a bit of truth about the pragmatism”. Ilkka, 
similarly noted, 
 
Although it might sound quite naïve, cold pragmatism could be an 
important point here. I’ve read foreign comments and they mention 
that we have been quite pragmatic here. It can be either good or bad. 
I think it includes good things, but there’s also the risk that some 
difficult questions are ignored or aren’t debated properly. (Posiva 
Advisor, interview) 
 
Where pragmatism in the form of timetabling and emphasis on getting things 
done have aided the progress of the GD project, the sensibility of the timetable 
and engineering emphasis of the project have become questioned as the 
beginning of actual disposal operations draws nearer. The timetable, broadly 
perceived as a vessel for progress by the Finnish disposal culture, has been 
contested by some Finnish scientists. There is a concern that the project 
timetable drawn up in the early 1980s has acquired a life of its own and 
transformed from a means to an end to the end itself. Eero from VTT noted that 
there has been a clear shift in the focus of the GD project since Posiva was 
granted the construction licence for the GDF in 2015. This shift in focus, he 
held, is observable in the workload of different VTT research groups that do 
consultancy work for Posiva. He noted that 
 
There has been some wrestling over resources in Posiva. What it 
means is that research into long-term safety, what our group for 
instance does, has been in trouble. In contrast, those in VTT involved 
in construction and planning research are almost drowning under 
their workload. (VTT Principal Researcher, interview) 
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From Eero’s perspective, “Posiva have practically hung themselves in the 
original timetable” and are pushing ahead with perhaps unnecessary urgency. 
He feared that the engineering mentality commented by Demos is taking over 
the Finnish GD project, as construction work rather than safety research 
increasingly, from is perspective, govern the GD project. 
 
What is worrying is that there are funds for construction and taking 
the project forward, but then [safety] research is beginning to suffer. 
[…] The project is flashy. It’s big. It has to be taken care of. And then 
long-term safety, well, it’s not as flashy. Still if long-term safety is 
found to be inadequate, construction will cease there and then. (VTT 
Principal Researcher, interview). 
 
A Finnish Geology Professor, Tapio, mused that the changing role of 
geosciences within Posiva’s project is potentially reflected in academia. 
 
Following funding cuts, the role left for geology [at the university] is a 
sort of support science for civil engineering to make sure that 
engineers, who know nothing about geology, will not completely 
mess things up. At the same time the research focus of the disposal 
project has changed, as the project has progressed to geological 
implementation. It’s more about canister placement and such like. In 
that sense geological research has been sidelined. (Professor of 
Geology, interview) 
 
The concern here is ‘over the future of the future’ (Michael, 2017b). Both Eero 
and Tapio worried about the short-termism of GD future imaginations. The 
imagination of the future of GD through the implementation of a project, rather 
than through the deep future is embodied in funding decisions and prioritisation 
of activities. These decisions prioritising the short-term future are seen as risky. 
On one side, there is the risk of the degradation of appropriate geological 
expertise, as funding is being cut from geological sciences and resources are 
directed elsewhere. On the other, there is the concern that focus of construction 
rather than long-term safety renders the future that GD tries to create more 
uncertain and unpredictable than necessary, as resources are shifted away 
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from scientific research and knowledge production to GDF construction. What 
such short-termism, the imagination of the future through the technoscientific 
timeframe of the project rather than the geoscientifc timeframe of GD, does is to 
overlook relations involving timeframes beyond human lifespan and history 
(Hird, 2009). Technoscientific and geoscientific timeframes are critically 
different. Humans are at the centre of the technoscientific timeframe that is 
“concerned with knowledge-building through relations between humans and 
nonhumans in historical, political, economic, and social context” (Hird, 2013a: 
109). Technoscience, Hird writes, “brings to the fore current practices and 
imagined futures in which humans make up the world through the manipulation 
and management of nonhuman entities” (ibid.). In contrast, geological time 
begins with the ‘liveliness of inorganic and organic processes” rather than the 
human (ibid.). Geosciences recognise the ““radical asymmetry” of relations 
between humans and the vast expanse of nonhuman entities” (ibid.: 110). While 
geosciences traditionally explore the billions of years of Earth history, where the 
inorganic precedes the organic, in the deep future the human will make space 
for the nonhuman, and the organic to the inorganic. In either case, for 
geosciences the starting point is the geological, time and space without the 
human. 
 
Making safety and safe disposal futures demand a geoscientific timeframe in 
which the human is decentred. They demand research that extends beyond the 
immediate human concerns, making space for nonhuman entities and times. 
The concern raised by some scientists in Finland is that the prioritisation of the 
immediate technoscientific future over the more distant future jeopardises the 
attempts to make safety into the deep future. Elina, who researches the effect 
microbes and microbial corrosion might have on long-term safety, noted 
 
We’ve only started research into microbial corrosion and we don’t 
even know yet what the opportunities are. New microbes are 
discovered all the time, and we don’t know what effects they might 
have. […] This research should have begun much earlier […] and 
there are indicators that microbes might be significant. (VTT 
Researcher, interview) 
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Matti, also at VTT, worried that there will not be enough time for research, if 
Posiva sticks with the original project timetable. 
 
Posiva’s timetable is too strict. This corrosion business especially 
needs to be thoroughly investigated. We woke up to it too late. […] If 
it was up to me, I would call a five year time-out. Let’s research this 
properly, and let’s not build any disposal facilities before everything is 
clear. I’m not saying there is a problem [with corrosion], but it hasn’t 
been out ruled yet. (VTT Researcher, interview) 
 
Although GD itself remains uncontested and the future is envisioned through 
GD, the means and paths through which safe futures are made through GD are 
contested. The above examples indicate that the future “is not simply a neutral 
temporal space into which objective expectations can be projected” (Brown and 
Michael, 2003: 4). Rather the future of GD is contested even among those who 
are actively working towards its realisation. In the previous chapter, we similarly 
saw how the fundamental safety provision of GD can be imagined through 
different aspects of the GDF. Where Aila from Posiva underlined the material 
familiarity and predictability of the EBS as the ‘fundamental principle’ ensuring 
the long-term safety of GD, Rabbe from GTK assigned the same fundamental 
role to the block structure of the Finnish bedrock. Both safety and the future of 
the GD project, then, are negotiable. They are made through local doings that 
can be questioned and contested. Where safety is not an inherent property of 
the GDF, as the different interpretations of the GDF’s safety provision 
illuminate, the future of GD does not automatically flow from the timetable, as 
suggested by Posiva and Finnish policymakers. Rather, the future made 
through GD emerges from situated doings and negotiations.  
 
By extension, it is necessary to pay attention to the multiple temporalities at 
play in the implementation of GD in the makings of success. The ‘worries over 
the future of the future’ expressed by some Finnish scientists cannot solely be 
conceptualised through the perceived ‘negligence’ of geological timeframes. 
Concern over the future also focuses on shorter-term technoscientific futures of 
knowledge, skills and capacity maintenance. Eero, for instance, noted that the 
Finnish disposal culture is facing a major challenge and potential restructuring 
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as Posiva’s (external) research needs diminish with the beginning of disposal, 
and the company is expected to commission less research. The maintenance of 
skills, knowledge and jobs is a short-term concern for the Finnish disposal 
culture. Eero noted that Posiva funds and commissions approximately 90 per 
cent of the research done in Finland, thus the advancement of the project will 
have major repercussion for knowledge and skills maintenance. Posiva, Eero 
weighed, is 
 
morphing into a constructing organisation that will still commission 
research, but when the GDF has been built, Posiva will be a disposal 
organisation. With that the volume of research needed will decrease. 
If the research commissioned by Posiva gets halved, for instance, 
jobs in our research groups will disappear. This is something MEE 
should address and establish a working group or something to figure 
out how we’ll deal with this. (VTT Principal Researcher, interview) 
 
Thus while the progress of the GD project and the beginning of disposal is the 
aim of the Finnish disposal culture, that same progress is potentially seen to 
jeopardise the future capacity of the Finnish disposal culture to tackle GD 
related matters, as Posiva’s immediate research needs decrease and as funds 
have been cut from academic geological training and research.  
 
Definitions of ‘success’ depend on the ways in which distance to the future 
(Michael, 2000) is envisioned. Posiva, currently, appears to define the future as 
being close: the future is imagined as the beginning of disposal. Such short-
term view of the future, together with the enrolment of the past decades of 
research and the relative stagnation of GD projects in other countries enable 
the Finnish disposal culture to craft a success story out of the progress the GD 
project has made so far. Eero, while also subscribing to the narrative of 
success, noted, “the beginning of disposal […] is only the beginning of the 
actual work. Everything until now has only been preparation”. His reading of the 
situation locates the future further in time.  
 
The making of a success story, like the making of safety relies on separations. 
Where the making of safety relies on the separation of the human and the 
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nonhuman, the underground and the aboveground, and emphasises the 
nonhuman, imaginations of Finnish GD success underline human 
achievements. While the ‘actual success’ of GD is unverifiable because of the 
immense timescale of GD, the making of success stories relies on shorter-term 
visions of technoscientific futures that are manageable on a human scale. 
However, speaking of successes measurable on the human scale does not 
necessarily translate to the desirable functioning of the GDF in the very long-
term. The rush to complete the already articulated success story, some of the 
scientist in Finland fear, might harm the safe deep future imagined through GD. 
 
6.2 Delaying the disposal future 
Looking back at the UK’s GD past, Arthur, a RWM Research Manager, reflected 
 
I can remember the times when it looked like there was going to be 
an underground rock laboratory up in Cumbria, and it was almost 
assumed that that would all happen and then in 1997 the 
government decided that wasn’t going to go ahead. Since then it has 
almost taken on a stature of nuclear fusion. That it’s always going to 
be 40 years away.13 (RWM Research Manager, interview) 
 
In contrast to Finland where the disposal future seems near and the disposal 
project is described in terms of continuity, the UK’s project has been 
characterised more by stop and starts – and what continuity there is seems to 
be the slipping of GD implementation further into the future. The lack of a 
disposal site puts the UK in a difficult position, as little progress towards 
implementation and GDF design can be made without a site. The 2014 
Implementing Geological Disposal White Paper situated the beginning of GDF 
construction to the 2030s with disposal beginning about a decade later. While 
this timetable is dictated by the assumed length of the siting and community 
																																								 																				
13 The popular joke in nuclear circles is that fusion is always (at least) 30 years away. 
John Holdren, the director of the federal Office of Science and Technology under the 
Obama administration, noted, “it's actually worse than that. I started working on fusion 
in 1966 […] at that time people thought we'd have fusion by 1980. It was only 14 years 
away. By 1980 it was 20 years away. By 2000 it was 35 years away” (in Guterl, 2017). 
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engagement processes, the UK has, drawing on geological time, in the past 
also knowingly pushed GD deeper into the future.  
 
The 1976 Flowers Report was followed by a flurry of siting attempts in the 
1980s, none of which made any progress towards the implementation of GD. 
With each setback, the focus of the GD project shifted. John, a UK nuclear 
waste consultant reflected how the UK has “been chopping and changing” its 
approach to GD. 
 
For me, always, our work on geological disposal in the UK has been 
affected by short timescales. […] We started off with high-level waste 
in 1976. [We] focused on high-level waste for five years, and then 
jumped into intermediate level waste. Jumped from the surface back 
down underground and so on, so it’s been affected by those political 
decisions. (UK nuclear waste consultant, interview) 
	
As these changes in focus between different wastes and spaces did not yield 
the desired end product, the UK Government announced in 1981 that HLW 
would be “stored for at least 50 years until the rate of heat-generation has been 
substantially reduced” (cf. No2NuclearPower, 2012). Geological time, the 
necessity to store HLW in any case, was mobilised to justify a moratorium on 
the search for a disposal site. In a 1993 UK House of Commons debate MP 
Alan W. Williams questioned the Secretary of State for the Environment, Tim 
Yeo on “the earliest date he expects that a waste repository for heat-generating 
nuclear waste will be operational in the United Kingdom; and which sites have 
been considered for such a repository”. In his response to the query, Yeo 
reiterated the earlier government statement: 
 
High-level radioactive waste is treated and stored at the surface for a 
period of at least 50 years, which will allow heat generated by the 
decay of radioactivity to reduce. Decisions about the subsequent 
management of the waste will be taken in due course. (HC Deb, 
1993, vol. 234, cc. 13W, my emphasis) 
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The UK Government effectively postponed nuclear waste decision-making 
deeper into the future as this could be easily justified by reference to the 
characteristics of UK nuclear waste. Thus, the ways in which the UK and 
Finnish disposal cultures have related to the geological timeframe of 
radionuclides to prepare for nuclear waste futures are notably contrasting, as is 
the subsequent progress and focus of the projects. 
 
Where in Finland half-lives were used as the foundation or temporal structure 
for the implementation process, in the UK half-lives were used to justify inaction 
in the present in the long-term management of nuclear waste. Perhaps 
reflecting the distantiated disposal future, the UK GD project with its many siting 
attempts has suffered from short-termism. John, a nuclear waste consultant, 
argued that the lack of long-term commitment to GD is reflected in the thinking 
about disposal futures in the UK. 
 
When the 2008 White Paper came out, everyone said ‘okay, yeah, 
we’ll be finding sites in a year or two’. It’s like what kind of knowledge 
has anyone got of the previous successful and partially successful 
programmes? I mean Sweden had a terrible start to finding its site, 
but they had a long-term approach and they kept to that long-term 
approach. […] We fundamentally don’t gather this-this long-term 
aspect, I think.	(UK nuclear waste consultant, interview) 
	
The UK’s commitment to GD has been characterised by a desire for quick 
solutions. As we saw above with each setback the UK’s approach to disposal 
has changed until the decision was made to momentarily abandon attempts to 
implement politically toxic and controversial disposal solutions. Ilkka similarly, 
weighing Finnish ‘success’ in a comparative context noted how “in the UK, 
Germany, even Sweden and the USA, all those countries that tried to take 
shortcuts to implementation have [struggled a little]”. Attempts to rush the 
implementation of GD have, thus, marked disposal projects elsewhere too. In 
the UK the discrepancy between political, geological or just GD project 
timescales has been difficult to reconcile. Since waste imposes “no short term 
threat to safety” (DTI, 2002: 10), the UK’s GD project has been dominated by 
electoral cycles. The postponement of decisions on GD and the subjection of 
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the project to electoral logics and parliamentary politics have meant that the 
political and policy context for the implementation of GD has altered significantly 
over the years. Since the inception of the UK’s GD project, the country’s nuclear 
policy has shifted from an ambitious nuclear new build programme to no 
nuclear and back to new build ambitions, while the focus of the GD project itself 
has oscillated between waste classes, the aboveground and the underground. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, the nuclear ambitions of the 1970s motivated the 
Flowers Report. More recently when CoRWM was appointed in 2003 to review 
and recommend options for the long-term management of the “nuclear waste 
problem” (CoRWM, 2006: 14) nuclear power was considered an “unattractive 
option” because of its economics and “important issues of nuclear waste 
[waiting] to be resolved” (DTI, 2003: 12). Yet by the time CoRWM had reached 
its recommendations in 2006 after extensive public, stakeholder and expert 
engagement, the Government was backing nuclear again, believing nuclear 
“has a role to play in the UK not only in reducing emissions but also to maintain 
the diversity of our electricity generation mix” (DTI, 2006: 8). The GD project 
then has existed in instability with regards to the surrounding politics and also 
the scale and complexity of the waste inventory, as waste from nuclear new 
build will expand the inventory. By extension uncertainty exists about the 
timespan over which the future GDF might stay operational and open – this is 
governed by the amount of waste that might need to be disposed of in the 
facility. Moreover, Colin from CoRWM noted that the most ambitious new build 
scenarios are at odds with the UK’s current waste management policy. 
 
Nuclear is back in government in a big way. And if you look at some 
of what they talk about; one scenario, you’ll never actually get there if 
you try it, because it’s so ambitious, but it’s 75GW of nuclear 
electricity by 2050, which almost certainly means a return to a closed 
fuel cycle. (CoRWM member, interview). 
	
Although Colin considers this scenario as utopian, a return to a closed fuel 
cycle would mean a return to reprocessing that under the current nuclear policy 
ceases in 2018. Nuclear new build would also, as was briefly mentioned above, 
contribute to the creation of a more complex waste inventory. As the number 
and design of potential new build reactors remains uncertain, waste from new 
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build has not (yet) been included in the UK’s nuclear waste inventory. As long 
as the new build situation remains uncertain, the waste inventory and by 
extension the future of the UK’s GD project remains uncertain. Moreover, 
CoRWM has argued, “communities are unlikely to express a willingness to 
participate in a siting process unless they have a clear understanding of the 
waste inventory they may be asked to accept” (CoRWM, 2006: 145). In 
CoRWM’s view, then, as long as the waste inventory remains open, the 
progress of the UK’s GD project will be precarious. Colin, furthermore, noted 
that potential volunteer communities might define waste differently from the 
official stance. During the previous siting process in Cumbria local communities, 
he noted, “were very clear that they would not see spent fuel as a waste”. He 
mused: 
 
[the UK] may well get a community that says ‘no spent fuel’. […] You 
may well find a community that volunteers for the legacy or large 
chunks of the legacy, but not new build. And then what do you do 
with the new build? You have to look for a second GDF. (CoRWM 
member, interview). 
	
Nuclear new build complicates GD future making in the UK. Communities that 
have become used to benefitting from reprocessing activities through jobs may 
well contest the re-classification of spent fuel as waste (rather than an asset) or 
object to the disposal of spent fuel due to nuclear weapons proliferation 
concerns. While communities might contest waste classifications or refuse to 
host an ‘open inventory’, new build and the inclusion of new build waste in the 
inventory stretch the period over which the GDF will have to remain operational. 
Colin explained, 
 
If you just confine yourself to the legacy, you know what it is. The 
inventory is defined, and the timescale what the waste will arrive in 
the GDF is defined, and then at the end of that, which admittedly is a 
hundred years or something, you lock the door and you walk away, 
and the GDF just sits there. New build spent fuel, if you manage that 
as a waste, it’s much more open-ended. (CoRWM member, 
interview). 
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John similarly noted that the UK has “dumped everything together into one 
project, rather than splitting it up into separate projects, which may be an issue 
in that [it is] less likely to achieve one single GDF”. The conflation of new build 
and already ‘existing and unavoidable wastes’ (CoRWM, 2006) injects 
uncertainty to the UK’s disposal project. New build waste might extend the 
period over which the GDF needs to operate, and it would definitely extend the 
UK’s nuclear waste inventory increasing the amount, complexity and 
characteristics of the waste packages that need disposal. 
 
The relationship between nuclear new build and GD is contested. Matt reflected 
that GD is a necessary justification for nuclear new build. He held that a credible 
nuclear waste management and disposal solutions as part of the UK’s “nuclear 
fuel cycle [are] really important, because otherwise you won’t have a mandate 
for nuclear energy production. [...] It’s important that we maintain a credible 
strategy, if we go for new nuclear build”. In line with his reading of the situation, 
and in contrast to the concerns about the conflation of new build and already 
existing wastes voiced by CoRWM and other actors, the UK Government in a 
2007 consultation document The Future of Nuclear Power the UK Government 
posited that it “is technically possible and would be desirable to dispose of both 
new and legacy waste in the same repository facilities” (DTI, 2007: 122). In a 
2009 document on the arrangements for the management and disposal of 
waste from nuclear new build, the Government further held that it was “satisfied 
that effective arrangements will exist to manage and dispose of the waste that 
will be produced by new nuclear power stations in the UK” (DECC, 2009: 2). Yet 
another national policy draft that offered the same conclusion of the future 
GDF’s ability and capacity to house both legacy and new build waste, sparked 
four CoRWM members to address a public letter to Ed Miliband, the Secretary 
of State for Energy and Climate Change at the time. In the letter the CoRWM 
members contended, “it is unknowable whether or not effective arrangements 
will exist” (Blowers et al., 2009: 1). Where the Government expressed 
confidence that the GDF will be operational when needed, the CoRWM 
members viewed the future availability of disposal solutions as uncertain, since 
no site or a willing host community had been chosen at the time. They also 
reiterated that CoRWM’s position on and recommendations of GD as the best 
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available long-term waste management method applied only to ‘legacy’ waste, 
not waste from new build. The authors of the letter quoted the 2008 Nuclear 
Energy White Paper that stated ”before development consents for new nuclear 
power stations are granted, the government will need to be satisfied that 
effective arrangements exist or will exist to manage and dispose of the waste 
they will produce” and argued that the existence of effective disposal 
arrangements “is a matter of judgement not of ineluctable fact” (ibid.). In the 
letter Blowers et al. argued that CoRWM had not identified an existing solution 
for the long-term management of nuclear waste, but a process through which 
such a solution could be reached. They further underlined that since the siting 
process depended on the willingness of a community to host a GDF, “neither 
the scientific nor the social requirements have yet been met and consequently, 
in our judgement, it is not possible to conclude that effective arrangements 
‘exist or will exist’” in the foreseeable future (ibid.). The UK Government has 
nonetheless stuck to its position and in 2014 DECC had relegated GD from a 
‘prerequisite’ for new build, as argued by the Flowers Report, into a technology 
that “will […] support the development of new, low-carbon, nuclear electricity 
generation” (DECC, 2014b). This prioritisation of shorter-term nuclear policies 
with more immediate potential benefits and the Government’s headstrong 
commitment to nuclear new build might jeopardise the longer-term nuclear 
future envisioned through GD. 
 
As was mentioned, Blowers and colleagues in their letter to Miliband noted that 
the policy recommendations made by CoRWM applied to existing and 
unavoidable wastes only. When CoRWM began its deliberations in 2003 its 
remit included “the materials that currently exist as waste or could arise over the 
next century or so as a result of decommissioning of existing nuclear facilities, 
both in terms of volume and radioactivity” (CoRWM, 2006: 19). By the time the 
Committee finished its deliberative process the Government’s nuclear ambitions 
had rekindled and in its 2006 Recommendations Report CoRWM wrote 
	
The main concern in the present context is that the proposals might 
be seized upon as providing a green light for new build. That is far 
from the case. New build wastes would extend the timescales for 
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implementation, possibly for very long, but essentially unknowable, 
future periods. (ibid.: 13).  
 
CoRWM thus saw that new build waste would introduce unwelcome uncertainty 
to the GD project. Moreover, the Committee was firm in its stance that its 
recommendations should not be read as justification for new build. This was 
partly because of the uncertain futures introduced by new build waste, but also 
because “the political and ethical issues raised by the creation of more wastes 
are quite different from those relating to committed – and, therefore, 
unavoidable – wastes” (ibid.). CoRWM argued that if a new build programme 
would be introduced, it would require a “separate process to test and validate 
proposals for the management of the wastes arising” (ibid.). Yet, in its shorter-
term nuclear new build ambitions the UK Government has appropriated 
CoRWM’s recommendations to support the new build project and overlooked 
CoRWM’s objections. 
 
From the beginning, the UK’s nuclear future making has suffered from short-
termism. Reactors have and continue to enjoy precedence over waste 
management in UK nuclear imaginations and policy making (Chapter 4). In 
simple terms this has left the UK’s GD project open to contention. In the first 
instance, the rushed siting attempts of the 1980s were met with public 
opposition, the experiences and memories of which have made later GD 
implementation attempts more difficult. On one side, local communities draw on 
those past attempts and experiences of the nuclear industry (Wynne, 1996; 
Bickerstaff, 2012) to make sense of contemporary encounters with the GD 
project and the implementing bodies. On the other side, where Finland, for 
instance, has been able to harness the GD past as a positive resource in 
crafting and projecting a narrative of success into the future, in the UK this 
discursive tactic is unavailable. Rather, the GD past is considered a place best 
not to be revisited.  
 
In a public meeting at the British Academy between RWM and the International 
Review Panel, compiled by the British Geological Society to assess RWM’s 
geological criteria for its National Geological Screening, a member of the 
audience asked how the new siting process would differ from the previous that 
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halted in 2013. He saw that the past process suffered from lack of transparency 
and opennes in terms of the management and public access to relevant 
geological data. The Chief Scientific Advisor of RWM responded; “I think it’s 
probably not worth going back into the detail of the past history, but […] I just 
want to reinforce […] that the whole emphasis of this new process is to be open 
and transparent”. While the Chief Scientific Advisor sought to guide attention 
away from the past of the project in order to focus on a ‘better’ future, beliefs 
about the past as a space of controversy may shape visions of the GD future. 
The audience member who asked the question, for instance, elaborated at 
length how the handling of data during the previous siting process eroded local 
trust in the fairness and openness of the implementation process and the 
implementing body.  
 
Wendell Bell and James Mau note, “beliefs about […] history limit the range of 
alternative images of the future and make it more probable that a particular one, 
rather than others, will be dominant” (Bell and Mau, 1971: 20). This is not to say 
that the future is determined by the past. Rather, just like actions in the past set 
futures in motion (Adam, 2008b), past experiences inform visions and 
expectations of the future. Where “the future [can be] mobilised in real time to 
marshal resources, coordinate activities and manage uncertainties” (Brown and 
Michael, 2003: 2), the UK’s current nuclear future making with its new build 
ambitions seems to introduce, rather than manage, uncertainties pertaining to 
GD. This introduction of uncertainty might delay the arrival of the disposal future 
that is “created in the present through contested claims and counterclaims over 
its potential” (Brown, Rappert and Webster, 2000: 5) as a long-term solution to 
the management of nuclear wastes. The uncertainty introduced by current 
nuclear policies, the imagination of the GD future as empty and untainted by the 
past and present (Adam and Groves, 2007) together with the prioritisation of the 
present over the past and the future; nuclear new build over disposal; and the 
present siting process over previous experiencess, may undermine the future 
the GD project seeks to realise. 
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6.3 Atomic optimism narrowing down futures  
A sort of optimism about nuclear things and materials (e.g. that a disposal 
solution will be found for new build waste) has and continues to characterise the 
UK’s approach to the management of nuclear waste and materials. Plutonium is 
a good example of this. It is the embodiment of the dual promise of nuclear. It 
“was once thought to be the most valuable substance in the world. 10 kg would 
make a nuclear bomb, or generate 100 million kilowatt hours of electricity” 
(Brown, 2013). Plutonium is a highly toxic human made metal, a “by-product” 
(POST, 2016) of irradiating uranium fuel in a nuclear reactor. Due to its toxicity, 
plutonium is a safety risk. While outside the body it is fairly harmless, inhaled it 
increases cancer risk. It can, under certain conditions, self-sustain a chain 
reaction. This needs to be accounted for in its storage arrangements, and it 
makes plutonium unsuitable for routine waste treatment methods such as 
vitrification used for high-level waste. It also means that plutonium needs to be 
stored in small quantities in air-conditioned facilities to prevent it form reaching 
criticality and creating an explosive release of energy akin to a nuclear weapon.  
 
The UK stores the world’s largest civilian plutonium stock at Sellafield, where 
plutonium is looked after by an armed guard, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary. A 
number of organisations, including the NDA, the Office for Nuclear Regulation 
(ONR) and the Environment Agency (EA), are responsible for the regulation 
and safety of plutonium storage. The UK Government’s policy for plutonium “is 
to provide a solution that puts the vast majority of UK held plutonium beyond 
reach” (BEIS & NDA, 2017: 19). ‘Beyond reach’ is an ambiguous policy 
statement, and a range of technologies have been proposed, individually or as 
a combination, as possible methods for managing the UK’s plutonium stockpile. 
All proposals put forward thus far are based on tried-and-abandoned or 
untested-and-non-existent technologies. The UK Government’s current 
preference for managing plutonium is to reuse it as mixed oxide fuel (MOX), but 
alternative, complimentary rather than exclusionary, solutions to the long-term 
management of plutonium have also been suggested. These include 
transmutation (POST, 2005), the reuse of plutonium as fuel in fast reactors 
(IMechE, 2013) and disposal. Whichever combination or individual technology 
the future management of plutonium relies on imaginations of brave new 
technologies and/or revisiting failed technologies of the UK’s nuclear past.  
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Optimising the atom 
Plutonium is divisive and divided. It is often imagined as two: reactor-grade or 
weapons-grade plutonium. While these plutoniums differ in their isotope 
composition, both present potential proliferation risks and need to be managed 
with that risk in mind. This duality is what makes plutonium such a difficult 
matter to define for the purposes of nuclear waste management or otherwise. 
Currently reactor-grade plutonium is defined as nuclear material, a zero value 
asset, as opposed to waste (NDA, 2010). Until the 2010s, the UK’s official 
position was to store plutonium “indefinitely […] until 2120” (NDA, 2010: 9). 
Since then increasing pressure both nationally and internationally has been 
pushing for a more clearly defined long-term management strategy for the UK’s 
plutonium stockpile and a decision on whether plutonium should be disposed of 
or reused. Optimism about the ability to optimise plutonium as an energy source 
together with concerns over proliferation, imaginations of nuclear apocalypses 
and utopias, have emerged as arguments against the disposal of plutonium. 
The desire to optimise the atom is not confined to plutonium solely, but 
characterises the UK’s relationship with a range of nuclear materials. Colin, for 
instance, weighed the UK’s nuclear future in relation to spent fuel. 
 
Coming back to the earlier comment about ‘what is the future?’, it 
may actually be that by 2050 spent fuel may actually not be a waste 
at all. It might just be waste in our time. And in the UK position that 
actually doesn’t matter, because the first thing we’re going to do is to 
store this stuff for a hundred years. […] The reality is that the UK will 
not be disposing of spent fuel until way after there is much more 
clarity about the nuclear future. (CoRWM member, interview) 
 
Colin went onto note how the classification of spent fuel either as an asset or 
waste “makes no practical difference to the way any of it is managed at the 
moment”. While the half-life and heat generation of spent fuel can be seen as 
fostering flexibility in the present (as decisions about the future of SNF need not 
be made imminently), they also foster indecision or enable the postponement of 
decisions about the future of the waste management, as we saw in section 6.2. 
With regards to plutonium, its potential as an energy source has prevented the 
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UK Government from articulating a clear long-term management strategy for the 
material, as suggested first by the policy of ‘indefinite’ storage, and second by 
the ambiguous aim of placing plutonium ‘beyond reach’. A 2007 report 
commissioned by the NDA on the management of plutonium, while making no 
recommendation on management alternatives, considered disposal as the 
lowest risk alternative, but also posited that reusing plutonium could “release 
significant value from the material” (NDA, 2007: 15). Frank von Hippel and 
Gordon Mackerron have argued that the claim about the significant value of 
plutonium is not credible, but has been made without any “reviewable basis” 
(von Hippel and Mackerron, 2015: 18).  
 
Yet the notion of plutonium’s potentially ‘significant value’ echoes the early 
atomic optimism in the UK about the future utility of difficult nuclear materials. 
Following this ‘historical’ optimism, the UK Government laid out in 2011 its 
preference to manage and use the UK’s civilian plutonium stock as MOX fuel 
(DECC, 2011). In a 2011 House of Commons debate Colin Hendry, Secretary 
of State for Energy and Climate Change, articulated this preference through the 
comparison of MOX and disposal technologies. The MOX option, Hendry 
posited was “the more technically mature [alternative], given that MOX fuel 
[has] been successfully fabricated and used in reactors in Europe, and given 
that by comparison no equally mature immobilisation technology [is] readily 
employable” (HoC, 2011, vol. 533, c.313). Unlike with GD, the UK has 
reasonable experience of MOX production. Sellafield produced MOX for over 
three decades to support the UK’s FBR programme. The production of MOX 
continued even after the curbing of the FBR programme in 1994. In this sense 
the commitment to MOX over disposal as the long-term management method 
for plutonium can be seen as future making through business-as-usual (Urry, 
2016). The House of Commons debate where Hendry defended the MOX 
option, however, took place against the closure of the Sellafield MOX Plant 
(SMP). The Plant was completed in 1997, but due to deficient design and a 
poor performance record, the NDA decided to close the plant in 2011. The SMP 
was designed to produce 120 tonnes of fuel out of the UK’s plutonium stockpile 
per annum, but managed only five tonnes in its first five years of operations. 
While Hendry recognised the risks of the “reuse-as-MOX option, particularly 
given the poor performance of the Sellafield MOX plant” (ibid.), he associated 
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the risks with the particular design of the SMP rather than MOX technologies 
more broadly. As he ascribed and confined the MOX fabrication failure to a 
particular facility rather than to the MOX production technology, the MOX option 
retained its validity (Brown and Michael, 2003).  
 
The UK is not the only country that has struggled with MOX. Japan, France and 
the US, similarly, have faced challenges with MOX production. Based on 
experiences in the UK and more broadly, von Hippel and colleagues argued in 
a 2012 comment piece in Nature that  
 
[the UK strategy of reusing plutonium as MOX] is likely to run into 
technical and political difficulties, as well as escalating costs. [...] 
Britain should seriously evaluate the less costly and less risky 
method of direct plutonium disposal, and take the opportunity to lead 
the world towards a better solution for reducing stockpiles. (von 
Hippel et al., 2012: 167) 
 
Unlike the UK Government, the authors of the piece see little benefits in the 
reuse of plutonium. Rather they advocate disposal as the better solution. 
Similarly, von Hippel and MacKerron (2015) have argued against MOX fuel 
holding that MOX is an unnecessarily costly solution for the management of 
plutonium. They posit that since plutonium-as-MOX lacks a solid economic 
rationale, MOX should be “regarded as a waste-disposal program” (von Hippel 
and MacKerron, 2015: 3). If MOX is thus just a more complex and costly route 
towards the eventual disposal of plutonium, von Hippel and MacKerron argue, 
then “there is every reason to ask whether alternative approaches could 
achieve as good a result at less cost” (ibid.). Joining these critiques, Neil Hyatt 
(2017) has argued against the sole focus on MOX for the long-term 
management of plutonium as risky. The UK industry, he claims, has thus far 
demonstrated little interest in a future MOX fuelled nuclear industry. He holds 
that “the commercial appetite for MOX […] is expected to remain weak” (Hyatt, 
2017: 307). Both of the UK’s PWRs, the presently operational Sizewell B and 
Hinkley Point C yet to be constructed, have the technical readiness to use MOX 
fuel. However neither reactor is likely to begin accepting MOX. Sizewell B is not 
licensed for MOX use, while the Generic Design Assessment for Hinkley Point 
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C explicitly excludes MOX use from consideration (ONR, 2011). The UK 
Government’s vision of MOX as the future for the management of plutonium is 
thus contested by the nuclear industry. Moreover, since the Government is not 
in a position to impose its MOX vision on the industry in practice, the 
Government’s favoured strategy for the long-term management of plutonium 
through MOX can be argued to rest on utopian future visions.  
 
Atomic optimism 
The preference for MOX seems to spring from the same kind of atomic 
optimism that characterised early discussions of the management and utility of 
nuclear wastes and materials in the UK. The belief that profitable technological 
solutions can be found for the (by-)products of nuclear activities appears deeply 
rooted in the UK’s nuclear imaginations. The notion of the malleability and 
transformability of nuclear products is at the heart of plutonium management 
plans. In part, the UK Government’s desire to find uses for the UK’s civilian 
plutonium stock can be seen to stem from the UK’s desire to be a serious 
competitor in the nuclear market (Walker, 1999). William Walker (1999) has 
noted that when the military interest in plutonium production diminished, the UK 
Government put its faith in the development of the fast breeder reactor that 
would require large quantities of plutonium. As the UK failed to establish itself in 
the reactor market, its commitment to reprocessing strengthened. It was with 
reprocessing and the fuel cycle, rather than reactor technology, where the UK’s 
market opportunities were seen to lay. MOX, thus, is the latest reincarnation of 
a decades’ long desire to put plutonium to good use. In Nuclear Entrapment, 
Walker traces how in the 1990s the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant 
(THORP) was given an operational licence at a time when the facility was 
already redundant. THORP was designed to reprocess spent oxide fuels and 
most of its customers were foreign nuclear operators. THORP was depicted as 
providing easy profit with foreign customers shouldering most of the operational 
costs, while the predictions of the UK’s civilian plutonium requirements were 
exaggerated and intertwined with the fast breeder programme. Moreover, 
Walker notes, the licencing of THROP relied on the alleged superiority of 
reprocessing over the storage of spent fuel. Running through the story of 
THORP, he argues, is a failure to maintain diversity of technological alternatives 
to nuclear waste management. Reprocessing has been the UK’s go-to waste 
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management policy, and it was not until the 1990s that the Government and 
industry came to regard storage and disposal of spent fuel as an alternative to 
reprocessing, but even so disposal remained marginalised. Accordingly, Hyatt 
has argued for more diversity in the management of plutonium. He advocates a 
“dual track strategy” in which plutonium is either converted to MOX or prepared 
for disposal (Hyatt, 2017: 303). A commitment to such a strategy, he argues, 
would ensure that the UK would be better positioned to include plutonium in the 
nuclear waste inventory, and by extension to be better prepared for disposal, 
should the reuse of plutonium as MOX prove an unviable long-term 
management strategy.  
 
Although the dual track strategy is not the UK’s official plutonium management 
policy, Arthur noted that RWM are obliged to demonstrate preparedness that it 
can engineer a suitable plutonium wasteform, in case the disposal of plutonium 
is added to the disposal agenda. While Hyatt has argued that disposal is the 
only alternative capable of addressing the entire civilian plutonium stock, von 
Hippel and Mackerron view that the absence of commercial immobilisation 
technologies for plutonium might make the serious consideration of the disposal 
of plutonium unlikely. Hyatt however points out that not all plutoniums are 
suitable for MOX conversion. Similarly, the Institute of Mechanical Engineers 
(IMechE) has observed that that the management of the UK plutonium stockpile 
is “more complex than was originally anticipated” (IMechE, 2013). As with the 
UK nuclear waste inventory, materials that need management under the 
plutonium banner are multiple, varied, and complex. Aside from the 
military/civilian designation, there are different grades of plutonium that might 
require different kinds of treatment and, alternatively, have different potentials 
for future usage. IMechE’s for instance has proposed a three-track 
management plan for plutoniumu based on three different grades (high, low and 
poor) of civilian plutonium. Each grade would, in IMechE’s proposal, have its 
own management pathway. In the proposed management plan, high grade 
plutonium would be converted into MOX, while lower grade plutonium would be 
used in the PRISM14 and poor quality plutonium would be disposed of in a GDF. 
																																								 																				
14 PRISM = Power Reactor Innovative Small Modular technology is a sodium-cooled 
fast reactor currently under development in the USA with a planned ability to burn 
spent fuel from conventional reactors.  
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IMechE notes that to realise this vision of plutonium management, the NDA 
would have to alter and invest in its plutonium classification system. Plutonium 
would have to be re-classified (Bowker and Star, 1999) according to grades and 
quantities of different types of plutonium. This would further require the NDA to 
demonstrate the potential range of grades applicable to the different 
management alternatives in order to identify appropriate management methods 
that best suit the plutoniums needing to be taken care of. Thus, the IMechE’s 
more diverse, like the UK Government’s more singular, vision of the 
management of plutonium requires significant technological development or the 
reintroduction of older technologies in order to be realised in the future. 
 
The belief in the Midas-like ability of the industry to optimise the atom might 
impose further challenges on GD. Managing plutonium as MOX does not erase 
the need to implement GD or the need to dispose of plutonium in one form or 
another. The spent MOX fuel still needs to be disposed of. The management of 
plutonium through MOX might impose challenges for the construction and 
design of the GDF. MOX disposal has two notable disadvantages in 
comparison to plutonium disposal (Hyatt, 2017). Firstly, the heat output from 
MOX wasteforms is expected to surpass the heat generated by ‘simple’ 
plutonium or spent fuel wasteforms. This would expand the footprint of the GDF 
since MOX canisters would need to be placed further apart from each other 
than ‘ordinary’ spent fuel canisters to ensure that their combined decay heat will 
not fry and disable the multi-barrier system. The increased size of the GDF 
would hike up implementation costs and, more crucially, possibly render the 
siting process more challenging, as a greater volume of intact bedrock would be 
needed for GDF construction. Secondly, MOX disposal demands a geological 
environment with conditions that prevent the oxidation of uranium. Oxidation 
would make the uranium more mobile, more difficult to contain. While this is not 
seen by engineers to present an insurmountable challenge to GD, it is an 
important consideration in assessing the safety of GD (ibid.). Finally, MOX fuel 
is significantly more expensive than conventional nuclear fuels and, as we saw 
above, the UK nuclear industry is not invested or interested in using MOX in its 
reactors in the foreseeable future. Thus, while MOX fails to eradicate the need 
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for eventual plutonium disposal, it generates further concerns for GDF safety 
considerations.  
 
Limited waste management alternatives 
Through plutonium, and reprocessing, we can trace some of the more 
prominent challenges of the UK GD project. Reprocessing has, in the first 
instance, fostered a narrow approach to nuclear waste management (Walker, 
1999). Additionally, it has ensured that nuclear waste management depends on 
highly rigid material practices. The materiality of nuclear wastes from 
reprocessing introduces a level of inflexibility to the UK’s GD project. 
Reprocessing generates a range of nuclear wastes and materials that, if not 
reused, need to be treated and immobilised before disposal. Immobilisation of 
this waste in an engineered wasteform is necessary because of its material 
form. High level wastes, for instance, mainly exist in a liquid form, while 
plutonium is stored as powder. The UK’s range of waste is incorporated, 
immobilised, in carefully chosen materials. Cement for ILW, glass for HLW, 
glass-ceramics for plutonium residues and plutonium contaminated materials, 
and ceramics for plutonium – if plutonium was to be disposed of. The merging 
of nuclear waste and materials of containment creates new material entities: 
wasteforms.  These wasteforms mesh nuclear wastes and mundane durable 
materials on the atomic level in irreversible ways. When HLW is vitrified, mixed 
with borosilicate glass, it becomes so entangled with the glass that teasing it out 
from the glassy wasteform is comparable to removing the pigment of a dyed 
glass. The glass and HLW assemble in an inseparable way. The same will 
apply to ceramic plutonium wasteforms, if the decision is made to immobilise 
plutonium and emplace it in the GDF. The very concrete entanglement of 
nuclear waste with materials of containment on the atomic level (Chapter 5) 
removes any potential there may be for reverting wastes back into useful 
materials. Once plutonium is put in, there is no taking it out of the GDF. The 
irreversibility of these material entanglements reduces the flexibility of the GD 
project and the GDF design in ways that maintain uncertainty in the final 
disposal inventory. The irreversibility of immobilisation can be seen as a 
affecting the UK Government’s willingness to commit materials to disposal, 
where these materials might have potential future uses.	While waste classes 
themselves are flexible and mutable, once a material has been declared and 
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treated as waste, once it has been immobilised, there is not an easy way to 
reverse the decision. This may go some way in explaining the UK’s 
unwillingness to commit nuclear materials to disposal. The rigidity of 
wasteforms, the need to engineer new assemblages for the containment of 
waste maintains open-endedness that in purely GD terms is potentially 
unhelpful. 
 
Classifying a material as nuclear waste requires certainty about the material, 
namely a judgement of its future usefulness or uselessness. Because of the 
material forms of UK’s nuclear wastes and materials, decisions about the 
futures of these stuffs need to be taken well before disposal. The composition of 
wasteforms additionally renders the engineering of retrievability, the ability to 
retrieve nuclear waste packages from the GDF, redundant. In the UK, the policy 
position on the irreversibility of GD is clear. In the 2014 White Paper, DECC 
made it clear that the GDF will provide a permanent solution to the long-term 
management of nuclear waste in the UK and that the “purpose of a GDF is to 
dispose of waste, not to store it” (DECC, 2014a: 5, 24). The imagination of GD 
as a permanent solution to the long-term management of nuclear waste 
requires that clear, irreversible decisions about what counts as waste and what 
does not need to be made before disposal commences. This rigidity and 
irreversibility of waste categorisation imposed by the UK’s waste treatment 
practices and the commitment to disposal as a permanent waste management 
strategy might hinder the implementation of GD. Reprocessing, the production 
of wasteforms, and the imagination of GD as the ‘end point’ for nuclear wastes 
leave the UK’s GD project intolerant of flexibility and unable to accommodate 
technopolitical uncertainties and indeterminacy. 
 
In the following section I will return to the Finnish case, and explore how the 
notion of retrievability, excluded from the UK’s disposal plans, has shaped the 
implementation of GD in Finland, and how it has informed the understanding of 
GD as a permanent solution to the nuclear waste problem. 
	
6.4 Fiddling with the finality of disposal 
In The Bedrock of Opinion, Göran Sundqvist proposes that "those who argue 
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for reprocessing […] consider spent fuel to be a resource, while those who 
argue for a final storage of all spent fuel view it as nothing but waste" 
(Sundqvist, 2002: 8). Such a clear-cut definition of waste, however, is 
potentially problematic. Spent fuel in particular escapes easy definition. While 
Sundqvist’s assertion seems applicable to the UK’s case, where waste 
classifications and definitions need to be finalised and cemented before 
disposal, the inclusion of retrievability in a disposal concept challenges such 
neat binaries as waste and asset. Retrievability, that is, the ability to bring 
wastes back to the surface after they have been disposed of in the GDF, was 
included in the Finnish GDF design in response to public and parliamentary 
debates on retrievability during the siting process (Lehtonen, 2010).15 Markku 
Lehtonen notes that the demand from retrievability emerged from local 
concerns in Loviisa that was in contention to become a disposal site, while a 
survey conducted by a regional newspaper revealed that the majority of Finnish 
parliamentarians were in favour of retrievability (ibid.). The inclusion of 
retrievability in the Finnish disposal concept has been underlined as a rare 
outcome from public participation in the siting process (Hokkanen and Kojo, 
2003). Opponents of the GD project have argued that Posiva used retrievability 
to legitimise the GD project without addressing or changing the design or basic 
principles of the disposal concept (Rosenberg, 1999). By including retrievability 
in the disposal concept, Posiva could demonstrate that it had listened and acted 
upon the criticism laid against GD by opposing groups. Thus, the inclusion of 
retrievability has ensured and insured Posiva’s original concept as the one that 
will be implemented.  
 
From a democratic and governance perspectives, the inclusion of retrievability 
closed down controversy and spaces of debate. Where Posiva can be seen to 
have appropriated public concerns to support an already existing waste 
management solution, the inclusion of retrievability in the concept can also be 
read as introducing flexibility to waste definitions. This ensures that GD does 
not rely on such rigid waste classifications as it does in the UK. 
 
The Finnish disposal culture understands retrievability as a techno-economic 
																																								 																				
15 Retrievability is part of the French and Swiss disposal concepts, but not the current 
UK one. 
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issue, and through the ability of spent fuel to flow between waste and resource 
classifications. Retrievability is mainly conceptualised through the acquisition of 
potential revenue from spent fuel in the future. STUK describes retrievability as 
a mechanism that offers future generations the chance to manage nuclear 
wastes in a more “rational and economic manner” (STUK, 2001) in case 
advancements in waste management technologies were to allow this. This 
statement is underscored by the notion that ‘waste’ is a temporal class. The 
unavailability of reprocessing technologies in Finland forced the classification of 
spent fuel as waste in the early 1980s. By the same token, were new 
alternatives for the management and/or use of spent fuel to emerge the waste 
designation could be reversed and spent fuel reclassified as a resource. The 
Finnish branch of Greenpeace (2008) has criticised this techno-economic 
foundation of retrievability for the failure to acknowledge that the retrieval of 
waste might be needed as a safety measure to prevent radioactive leaks or to 
retrieve damaged waste canisters.  
 
Once disposed of, spent fuel in official imaginations, it seems, is conceptualised 
only through its ability to unbecome waste and to become a resource. Its 
liveliness, mobility and ability to pose a threat to safety through leakages are 
ignored. Indeed, in 2001 MTI asserted that the “need for retrieval because of 
safety reasons seems extremely unlikely” (MTI, 2001: 6). Highlighting 
technological development rather than safety as the potential primary cause for 
retrieval reflects a belief in engineering to offer solutions to ‘wicked problems’ 
such as nuclear waste management (Demos, 2010). Technological failure does 
not feature in imaginations of retrievability. Additionally, the notion of 
retrievability contributes to representations of nuclear waste as controllable 
through GD. Imaginations of the passivity and tameness of spent fuel are at the 
core techno-economic notions of retrievability. The Finnish vision of retrievability 
describes spent fuel through passivity and pacificity. Rather than a lively and a 
corrosive material, spent fuel is depicted through stillness, its slow decay 
towards harmlessness, or alternatively its readiness for retrieval and potential 
reuse.  
 
The inclusion of retrievability renders the GDF ontologically ambiguous. Where 
STUK’s Nuclear Safety Board posits that retrievability “must not jeopardise 
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long-term safety or increase the likelihood of intentional or unintentional human 
intrusion in to the GDF” (STUK, 2000: 6), Vira from Posiva has noted; “based on 
the Decision-in-Principle on final disposal, we, in fact, are not allowed to try to 
prevent people from intruding into the GDF” (Posiva, 2010a: 3). Similarly, 
Markku, an engineering professor, noted that the multi-barrier system “cannot 
be too big of a barrier for future generations who might want to reuse nuclear 
waste”. While MTI denied the necessity for waste retrieval due to safety 
reasons, it held that retrievability “may in the future be considered necessary, 
for instance, if transmutation technology leaps forward significantly” (MTI, 2000: 
9). Echoing this Olli Rehn, Minister of Economic Affairs, in a parliamentary 
debate over Posiva’s CLA noted that if “during the upcoming decades a better 
solution is found [for the management of spent fuel], the doors have not been 
closed to it” (PTK 62/2015: 10). The temporality of GD as the best available 
solution is recognised by Rehn and MTI alike. Yet the potential emergence of a 
better nuclear waste management solution in the future is not seen to justify the 
leaving of waste aboveground in the present. In a 2010 newsletter Posiva 
asserted that while “technology will undoubtedly develop from here, waiting for 
the future is not a solution” (Posiva, 2010a: 3). As we saw in Chapter 5, the 
aboveground is constructed as a riskier space than the underground (Williams, 
2008).  
 
Where the 1987 Nuclear Energy Act posits that “nuclear wastes […] must be 
disposed of in a permanent manner” in Finland (Nuclear Energy Act 990/1987), 
retrievability muddles that permanence and leaves an opening for alternative 
waste management futures, even if these futures are not readily embraced. 
Posiva, in its 2015 CLA, notes that possible future developments in nuclear 
waste management technologies might make the retrieval of spent fuel an 
attractive option in the future, yet the GDF design does not include aspects that 
enhance the retrievability of nuclear waste (Posiva, 2012). This, Posiva posits, 
is due to safety reasons and STUK, similarly, maintains that the “retrieval of 
waste canisters, if needed” should be possible “with the technology available at 
the time of disposal and with reasonable resources” without compromising 
safety (STUK, 2000: 6). Although explicit arrangements for retrievability are not 
included in the GDF design, the prevailing view within the Finnish disposal 
culture is that, at least in principle, “retrieval is always possible […] but that it 
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could incur significant costs” (Lehtonen, 2010b: 146). Nonetheless, by 2015 
retrievability had become a “central criterion of the disposal concept” in 
technopolitical imaginaries (PTK 62/2015: 10). 
 
In the Finnish ‘final’ disposal project, the very idea of finality has been blurred to 
make way for the implementability of GD. Retrievability blurs the waste/asset 
and the disposal/storage binaries. Samuli reflected that where the Egyptians 
buried pharaohs, the GD project “buries energy sources underground”. 
Similarly, Markku held that future generations must be given the chance to 
“reuse nuclear wastes and exploit their energy of which only a fraction has been 
used. I believe they will be used many times over, they aren’t waste but a 
resource”. Ulla, similarly weighed that “spent fuel is very valuable. It would be 
most sensible to extract reusable elements from it […] but it’s expensive and 
insensible in Finland in the present situation, a probably during the next few 
millennia as well”. “If we really think about it”, she noted, “we are disposing of 
vast amounts of reusable material”.  
 
In this sense the Finnish disposal culture imagines spent fuel as both-and. Even 
after disposal spent fuel’s waste status is ambiguous. This diverges greatly from 
the UK’s either-or conceptualisation of spent fuel. In the UK, aboveground spent 
fuel can be either an asset or waste, underground it is just waste. The 
acknowledgement of the temporality and indeterminacy of matter, the 
discursive, if not necessarily engineering, openness to retrievability and 
uncertainty of matter might well be what enables GD to move forward. Timo 
Seppälä, Posiva’s communications officer, has noted that retrievability “has not 
been insignificant for the progress [of the project]” (Seppälä, 2001: 6). 
Retrievability, he observes, is a question that emerged time and again in 
parliamentary debates.  
 
People avoid making “final” decisions. Thus retrievability offers an 
official route for cancelling final disposal. Moreover, it offers future 
generations the opportunity to evaluate the sensibility of the solution 
we are planning now. (ibid.).  
 
From this perspective, fiddling with the notion of finality, avoiding rigid 
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boundaries between storage and disposal, asset and waste, have influenced 
the implementation of final disposal. Although from an engineering perspective, 
Posiva might merely be paying lip service to retrievability, as no particular 
provisions for the retrieval of waste are being implemented, the Finnish disposal 
culture appears relatively willing to embrace uncertainty, if, as in the case of 
retrievability, this is seen to facilitate the advancement of the GD project. The 
Finnish disposal culture acknowledges the potential temporality of disposal 
(Hetherington, 2003) and the indeterminacy of waste (Hird, 2012). These are 
not seen as challenges to the implementation of GD, which, even with 
retrievability is considered “a better way to protect humans and the environment 
from nuclear waste than aboveground storage demanding constant oversight” 
(Vira, 2010: 3). By acknowledging the potential becomings and unbecomings of 
waste and disposal, the Finnish disposal culture seems willing to embrace 
uncertainty at least to a certain extent as a way of taking the GD project 
forward. 
 
6.5 Summary 
In this chapter I traced some of the ways in which the policy ‘finality’ of GD and 
its implementation have been challenged in both the UK and Finnish disposal 
cultures. In the first two sections of the chapter I observed how imaginations of 
disposal futures remain dominated by short-termism, although in both cases 
geological time has been mobilised to envision and plan disposal futures. In 
Finland, the beginning of disposal has been imagined as an end point towards 
which the implementation process is progressing. While this short-term vision of 
the GD future has enabled the crafting of a success story, concerns have risen 
that the emphasis on engineering and constructing the GDF might jeopardise 
long-term safety, as less resources are committed to safety research. In the UK, 
on the other hand, the rush to implement GD in the first instance, and the 
subsequent pushing of disposal future deeper into the future, may have harmed 
subsequent attempts to implement GD. Where in Finland the disposal project 
has been structured based on the half-lives and heat generation of spent fuel to 
identify the earliest possible disposal date, in the UK half-lives have been 
mobilised to justify inaction and postponement of decisions on the disposal 
front.  
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In the second half of the chapter, I explored waste imaginations through 
reprocessing, MOX and the notion of retrievability. What emerged here were 
significant differences in the ways in which uncertainty and the indeterminacy of 
waste are accommodated by the UK and Finnish disposal cultures. In the UK 
the notion of the permanence of GD, and by extension the definition and 
classification of waste, is much more rigid and than in the Finnish case. The 
Finnish disposal culture seems more prepared to accommodate the 
indeterminacy and temporality of both wastes and disposal. Letting go of a 
narrow definition of finality and permanence, and accepting the changeability of 
wastes, policy, and disposal, seem to have been vital in the progress of the 
Finnish GD project. In contrast, the UK’s indecision as around the disposal 
inventory, and the need to decide and stick to waste definitions as final, seems 
to discourage the making of decisions about waste, preparing immobilisation 
solutions to ambiguous materials such as plutonium, and further uncertainty 
about the disposal inventory might discourage communities from volunteering to 
host the GDF.  
 
Miller has argued, “without the opening up of our imaginations to the deep 
future, we will lack the capacity to grasp our deep responsibility” (Miller, 2016: 
437). Short-termism in the makings of disposal futures diminishes the sense of 
responsibility for the deep future, which can then be postponed or be treated in 
an unequal relationship with the present. The UK and Finland relate to notions 
of the future and finality in different ways. The UK has been more prone to rush 
to implement GD, which has resulted in the GD project receding deeper into the 
future. Finland, on the other hand, took a slower approach to the 
implementation process, and is closer to beginning to realise the disposal 
future. Finland also appears more willing to embrace the uncertainty and 
ambiguity of disposal and waste categories than the UK does. The UK’s either 
or approach, either waste or asset, either disposal or storage, emerges in 
contrast to the Finnish both-and approach to GD. In Finnish imaginations, 
disposal can be(come) storage, and waste can be(come) an asset. This both-
and approach to GD, the blurring of binaries and the notion of finality may be 
important factors in the ‘successful’ implementation of GD. The UK’s more rigid 
approach to categories, on the other hand, may risk the continued presence of 
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hazardous nuclear materials in interim aboveground storage facilities. In both 
countries disposal futures have been contested and questioned through and 
because of their short-termism.  
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7 MAKING CONTAIN-ABILITY 
 
We're forever teetering on the brink of the unknowable, and trying to 
understand what can't be understood. 
- Isaac Asimov, The Caves of Steel 
 
 
A central concern of this thesis has been to trace ways in which the UK and 
Finnish disposal cultures make and envision safe futures through the geological 
disposal of nuclear waste (GD). These countries were chosen for this study 
since they are both different and similar enough to enable interesting, yet 
disciplined, contrasts and variations to emerge from the research (Jasanoff, 
2005). In doing so, the UK and Finland have enabled me to highlight some of 
the issues, ‘successes’, struggles and concerns that relate to the making of very 
distant futures through GD.  
 
In the first part of this thesis, I outlined my research problem, built a theoretical 
and conceptual framework for the thesis, and described how I proceeded to 
answer my research questions: 
 
• How has nuclear waste been imagined in the Finnish and UK disposal 
cultures? 
• How is safety made, into the deep, uncertain future? 
• How are geological disposal, and the future, imagined within the Finnish 
and UK disposal cultures? 
 
In building the theoretical and conceptual framework for this thesis in Chapter 2, 
I mobilised the past, the already known, in an effort to create something new. 
Like practices of future making, this thesis does not emerge out of nowhere, but 
is rooted in existing work. In Chapter 3, I reconceptualised participant-
observation as body-work (Myers, 2008), as a way of relating with a range of 
human and nonhuman actors during and through data collection. Immersed 
elbow deep in the field with a respirator glued to my face at times, I was better 
able to follow the whole range of actors and processes I was interested in – but 
also better able to appreciate the role of nonhuman actors and the ways in 
which scientists relate to their at times toxic materials in the lab. I also 
introduced disposal cultures as a ‘comparative-conversationalist’ method for 
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treating the UK and Finnish cases together-apart (Barad, 2007). The aim was to 
bring the two cases into a conversation rather than a direct comparison with 
each other. 
 
In the second part of this thesis I mapped the trajectories of the UK and Finnish 
nuclear establishments and disposal cultures towards the implementation of GD 
(Chapter 4). I traced how nuclear waste has been problematised, re- and 
deproblematised by the UK and Finnish nuclear establishments and disposal 
cultures. I also traced some of the ways in which the deep future and safety are 
negotiated and made through relational doings in the present, both in field and 
in the lab as well as in public documents and statements on GD (Chapter 5). 
Finally, in the penultimate chapter of this thesis, I explored some of the ways in 
which the UK and Finnish disposal cultures relate to the future and the notion of 
finality, and how these relatings influence the making of safety into the distant 
future.  
 
In this concluding chapter, I will synthesise the main arguments I have made in 
the thesis and offer my contributions to the wider field of STS. I will focus the 
final chapter around the issue with time. Time has been the thread running 
through the thesis. Time is accompanied by uncertainty and change. The longer 
the timeframe, the more space there is for uncertainty and change to emerge. 
In order to make safe futures GD projects need to manage and control time and 
its effects. Therefore, in section 7.1 I return to the challenge the very long 
lifespan of nuclear waste imposes on the making of safety and safe futures in 
the present. Here, I propose that the greatest differences between the UK and 
Finland emerge from the ways in which they construct and relate to the future 
and the notion of finality. I further propose that these relatings are affected by 
the materiality of nuclear waste inventories and imaginations of the possible 
future value of nuclear materials. In section 7.2 I discuss safety as emergent of 
situated makings. I posit that rather than a property of GD, safety and safe 
futures are made in contrast and in relation to something other than the 
proposed disposal concept. In section 7.3 I introduce the notion of contain-
ability as a means to better discuss and conceptualise the temporality and 
contingency of the making of very distant futures through GD. I propose that 
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sensitivity to the temporality, as opposed to the claimed finality, of disposal 
might be vital for the implementation of GD.  
	
7.1 Discrepant times as the problem 
“Since objects don’t float in an infinite void”, Tim Morton writes, “every entity has 
its own time, both in a physical and in a deep ontological sense” (Morton, 2013: 
66). GD brings together a range of such times that are radically different. The 
short span of human existence is in a drastic contrast with the exceedingly long 
half-lives of nuclear waste. The multi-millennial radioactive risk extends beyond 
our ability to engineer and know things. While the future of nuclear waste 
stretches to times we cannot know, it is this same distant nuclear waste future 
that stretches backwards to the present, impelling societies to act in uncertainty 
in the name of the safety of future generations. The risk imposed by nuclear 
waste in and on the future is considered to be too great not to be addressed in 
the present. Yet, because of the discrepancy between human and nuclear 
times, Morton (2013) notes, it might be impossible to manage nuclear waste 
‘just right’. This discrepancy between human and nuclear times gives rise to the 
major challenge in the implementation of GD. While humans run out of time to 
fully know and learn about nuclear waste, the waste has to be somehow 
handled and managed anyway. The making of safe futures through GD thus 
rests on best available knowledge and knowhow in the present without much 
certainty about the accuracy of that knowledge deep into the future. This notion 
of the unknowability of the very distant future and the related concept of GD as 
a ‘sociotechnical experiment’ (Bergmans, Landström and Schröder, 2014; 
Schröder, 2016) provided the stating point for this thesis and the aim of this 
thesis has been to explore how the UK and Finnish disposal cultures make safe 
futures through GD in this context of uncertainty.  
 
The nuclear waste problem is a problem of time, even more so than a problem 
of radioactivity. Nuclear waste is so massively distributed in time that it is 
impossible know fully. Nuclear time belittles human time, as the fleeting human 
existence is in stark contrast with the slow, long now and the very distant future 
of nuclear waste. It is time that set limits to knowledge production and attempts 
to predict the future of GD. As we saw earlier present-day modelling tools 
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cannot deal well with very long timescales of GD, which means that 
uncertainties about the functioning of the GDF remain at the time of 
implementation and for millennia afterwards. In the lab, time is sped up through 
mundane material means to bring the deep future closer and to render it more 
predictable. Yet, while in the lab speeding up time is vital for providing the basis 
for safety claims and predictions about the future, GD itself seeks to slow down 
time to provide and maintain safety into the deep future. 
 
GD as technology of stagnation 
We can think of GD as a technology of stagnation. GD seeks to prolong 
society’s capacity to control nuclear waste and uncertainties by slowing time 
down, resisting novelty and drawing from the past. 
 
The first move in the long-term management of nuclear waste is the relocation 
of waste. Moving waste from the aboveground to underground is an explicit 
effort to slow down time and prolong control over nuclear waste. The 
underground and nuclear waste are more equivalent than nuclear waste and 
the aboveground are. The slowness of geological processes underground is 
juxtaposed with the faster pace of environmental, climatic and societal events 
and processes aboveground. Through this juxtaposition, the underground is 
constructed as a (more) predictable space than the aboveground. The former is 
characterised by stability and continuity, whereas the latter is depicted as an 
(more) unpredictable and disruptive space due to the faster passage of time, 
the relative rapidity of change, aboveground.  In this sense, safety is crafted as 
the function of the relative passage of time. The slowness of life underground is 
seen as a greater provider of safety than the changeable and faster pace of life 
aboveground. 
 
Secondly, the making of safe futures through GD relies on the past. The past, 
archaeological and geological evidence, is mobilised to predict and make safety 
claims about the future. Familiarity rather than novelty and innovation are 
positioned at the core of safety. Historical knowledge, gained for instance 
through archaeological evidence, of the behaviour of materials is projected into 
the future in order to predict how materials might evolve in distant times. The 
familiarity of the materials used to engineer the EBS is positioned as a 
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fundamental safety principle. The familiarity of these materials (ceramics, 
copper, clay, iron, granite in the Finnish case) and the long joint history they 
have with humans is seen to render the materials predictable. There is more 
data and experience of familiar, historical, materials such as copper than of 
more recent and innovative materials. 
 
Additionally, the idea of safety barriers itself is old. Different configurations of 
“barriers have been used to protect humans and property from enemies and 
natural hazards since the origin of human beings” (Sklet, 2006: 494). The idea 
of safety barriers has evolved from “barriers used to defend a medieval castle 
[that] mostly were of a physical nature [to] the modern principle of defence-in-
depth [that] combines different types of barriers—from protection against the 
release of radioactive materials to event reporting and safety policies” 
(Hollnagel, 2016: 71). The multi-barrier system of the GDF seeks to moderate, 
even if not match, the longer now of nuclear waste, and in doing so provide 
protection against the release of nuclear waste and radiation. Thus the 
envisioned function of the EBS is two-fold. In the first instance, it aims to 
provide defence-in-depth through the redundancy of barriers. The failure of one 
barrier should not affect the safety provision of the entire system. In the second, 
the aim of the system is slow down time and movement both in and out of the 
GDF, be it groundwater or human intrusion or escaping radionuclides.  
 
As we saw in Chapter 5, both the international nuclear waste community and 
social scientists appreciate containment as a temporal category despite the 
representation of GD as a ‘permanent solution’ to nuclear waste management. 
Instead of offering foreverness, GD seeks to stagnate and slow time down. GD 
is not envisioned to provide technical containment forever, but for long enough. 
One of the GDF design objectives is to ensure the safe failure of the facility. 
Where safety is ‘‘nearly always defined as a condition where nothing goes 
wrong and a safe situation as ‘‘marked by the absence of accidents and 
incidents” (Hollnagel, 2014: 12), in GD safety and failure are not easy 
opposites. Safe failure is a function of time. It is about slowing down the 
unavoidable decay of the EBS. Safe failure stands for the failure of the EBS 
after the levels of radioactivity in the disposed of nuclear waste have decreased 
to harmless levels. Safety is, thus, tied to the GDF’s ability to stand against time 
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and its corroding and eroding affects. GD therefore seeks to make and maintain 
safety by managing time and uncertainty. In order to do this, the material 
configuration of the GDF draws from the past to project possible courses of 
material evolution and behaviours into the future. By drawing on familiar 
materials, the past, the geological evidence and the age-old multi-barrier safety 
concept, GD projects seek to render the future predictable. Whereas novelty is 
seen as a potential source of uncertainty, familiarity and the past are mobilised 
in the making of safe distant futures. 
 
Distance to the future 
The very long lifespan of nuclear waste enables various imaginations of the 
future. As we saw in Chapter 6, the UK and Finnish disposal cultures relate to 
time and the lifespan of nuclear waste in different ways. This has influenced the 
ways in which they have related to the disposal future and how they have 
structured their GD projects in the past. 
 
In the UK, the lifespan of nuclear waste projected into the future was mobilised 
to justify the postponement of action for half a century, whereas in Finland the 
very same lifespan was used as a foundation for the implementation of GD. The 
lifespan of nuclear waste has thus been utilised in different ways by the two 
disposal cultures. In the UK it was used to push the implementation of GD 
deeper into the future, while in Finland the lifespan of nuclear waste was 
mobilised to bring the disposal future closer to the present. Where long distance 
to the future, such as created by the UK disposal culture, can diffuse urgency 
and discourage action, a shorter distance to the future may imply more 
immediate effort (Michael, 2000). Different distances to the future, Michael 
(2000) writes, suggest different levels of ‘do-ability’. It is easier to achieve 
something within a decade than a century. The nearer the future, the more do-
able and more in need of action it may seem.  
 
The logic of earliest possible disposal and the imagined immediacy of the 
disposal future have driven the GD project forward in Finland. While the project 
has remained reasonably well within its original timetable the imagined short 
distance to the disposal future has produced its own problems. Some Finnish 
scientists have expressed concerns that the objective of the GD project has 
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become blurred over time. Their concern is that the construction of the GDF has 
taken priority over the underlying science and safety research. The fear is that 
the implementation process has become more about completing an engineering 
project than providing safety into the deep future. Thus the different visions of 
the distance to the future by the UK and Finnish disposal culture have had 
differing effects from procrastination to, perhaps, a rush to meet the future. Both 
disposal cultures, despite their different approaches to the future, demonstrate 
some difficulties of relating to the very distant future. 
 
Blurring finality 
The international nuclear waste community envisions GD as the end point to 
nuclear waste management. Yet the UK and Finnish disposal cultures relate to 
this notion of finality in different ways. The UK’s more rigid reading of the idea of 
finality emerges in contrast with the more flexible approach displayed by the 
Finnish disposal culture. The differing approaches to ‘finality’ tie in with the 
classification of nuclear materials as waste or an asset. Here again, the UK’s 
approach emerges as more rigid, as nuclear materials are categorised either as 
waste or asset, whereas in Finland nuclear waste is imagined as both-and; it 
can still have future uses and value even after disposal. Thus, decisions about 
waste do not necessarily follow the politics of value in unproblematic or 
straightforward ways (Gille, 2010). The difference between the UK’s either-or 
and Finland’s both-and readings of nuclear waste can be traced, at least in part, 
from the materialities of their waste inventories. 
 
In the UK reprocessing has created a range of nuclear wastes and materials 
that, if not reused, need to be treated before disposal. What this means is that 
nuclear wastes are meshed together with mundane durable materials (cement, 
glass, ceramics) to create disposable wasteforms. In wasteforms waste and 
materials of containment entangle on the atomic level in a technically 
irreversible way. This deep meshing of materials removes any possibilities of 
reverting waste back to asset. In this way, the materiality of the UK waste 
inventory and the need to treat nuclear waste before disposal reduces the 
flexibility of the UK’s GD project and limits the space for alternative futures. 
While waste classes themselves are flexible and mutable, once a material has 
been declared waste and prepared for disposal, there is no easy way to reverse 
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the decision. Because of the materiality nuclear wastes and materials, decisions 
about the futures of these matters need to be made before disposal. The 
irreversibility of waste decision and the atomic optimism of the UK government 
to find uses for materials with some potential future utility can be seen to 
undermine the UK Government’s readiness to commit materials to disposal and 
clearly define the inventory for disposal. This in turn maintains uncertainty about 
the inventory, and can potentially delay, if not the beginning of disposal, then 
the closure of the GDF. 
 
In Finland the potential for post-disposal alternative futures for nuclear waste is 
much greater. Spent fuel, which constitutes the whole disposal inventory, is in a 
readily disposable form and needs no special treatment prior to disposal. This 
facilitates the potential for its retrieval and reuse in the future. The retrieval of 
waste from the GDF post-closure offers a route for reusing waste, but also for 
cancelling GD. Retrievability is seen to offer future generations an opportunity 
to re-evaluate GD as a long-term policy without imposing the burden of active 
(aboveground) nuclear waste management on them. Thus space is left for the 
utilisation of possible technological advancements in the treatment of nuclear 
waste without actually waiting for those advancements to emerge. The Finnish 
case suggests that the implementation of GD might well rely on the blurring of 
the notion of ‘finality’ and allowing the ‘final’ to become temporary.  
 
Through retrievability disposal always has the potential to revert to storage, and 
waste to asset. Retrievability underlines the temporality and indeterminacy of 
disposal, as well as waste classifications. Rather than definite categories, 
disposal and waste are viewed as temporary classes with the potential to 
become something else. In contrast to the UK disposal culture, the Finnish one 
seems more willing to accept and implement a disposal solution that might in 
time become a means for ensuring that waste is at the disposal of future 
generations than that is disposed of permanently. In this sense, the Finnish 
disposal culture emerges perhaps more inclined to embrace uncertainty as a 
way forward than the UK disposal culture does. 
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7.2 Safety as relational makings 
GD has been proposed and promoted as the best available (e.g. EC, 2011; 
NEA, 2008) or the least worst option (Corkhill, 2017) for the long-term 
management of nuclear waste. We can read GD as an attempt to create more 
equivalence between the discrepant human and nuclear through delegation 
(Latour, 1992). GD is an attempt to exert and extend control over waste beyond 
human ability by delegating safety to the GDF and the underground. It is an 
attempt to make society durable (Latour, 1990) in space and time; and to 
ensure the safety and security of the living world (Massart, 2013). The 
international nuclear waste community imagines safety and GD almost as 
synonyms. While Posiva’s slogan reads ‘only safe disposal is possible’, the 
RWM (2016c) visions a safer future through GD. Thus in the imaginations of 
nuclear waste management organisations GD, safety and the future appear in 
close association. GD is safe; GD is (in) the future. 
 
Safety, however, is not a property of GD. It is argued, negotiated and made 
through relational doings. Future making through GD contrasts and compares 
the times of different spaces and entities in order to make a case for long-term 
safety. Geological processes and the underground are contrasted with societal, 
environmental and climatic events of the aboveground. In contrast to life 
aboveground, life underground is described as slower, more stable and more 
predictable – particularly in the very long-term. The extended, yet calmer, 
liveliness of the underground in time and space, in contrast to the faster-burning 
and more changeable life aboveground, the international nuclear waste 
community argues, makes the underground better able to meet and mediate the 
very long future of nuclear waste. The making of safety relies on ‘world-
reduction’ (Jameson, 1975); it relies on separations between nature and culture, 
the underground and the aboveground. These separations enable the 
contrasting and comparing of different spaces – and the making of safety. 
Aboveground societal and climatic changes are faster – even when we talk 
about glacial cycles. Where glaciation disrupts life aboveground, it is not 
expected to significantly affect the underground. In contrast to the scarring of 
the aboveground, the underground is expected to survive glaciations without 
major changes to underground conditions. Through the comparison and 
contrast of aboveground and underground spaces, events and processes the 
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underground is established and presented as safer than the aboveground. 
Although the underground is presented as safer than, it is not an uncontested or 
an unambiguous space.  
	
The underground itself emerges in this thesis as a malleable and negotiable 
space. In Chapter 5, I traced how the envisioned safety of granite and clay 
environments have been contested and contrasted. UK and US researchers 
(neither country envisions disposal in granite) have described granite as a risky 
space in the long-term. Particularly fractures, characteristic of old granites, have 
been considered as what I have termed spaces of risk. In granites all movement 
is governed by fracture networks. As conduits for movement, fractures can pose 
risks to containment and safety. They can offer groundwater ways into the GDF. 
When groundwater encounters the EBS, it imposes its erosive and corrosive 
influence on the EBS, slowly decaying and disabling the ability of the EBS to 
contain nuclear waste. Where fractures offer ways into the GDF, they also offer 
ways out – escape routes for the waste when the EBS has failed. Thus, 
fractures enable movements both in and out of the GDF, thus placing the GDF’s 
ability to contain nuclear waste at risk.	
	
In contrast to this reading of fractures as spaces of risk, the Finnish disposal 
culture has renormalised (Barad, 2007) these spaces as spaces of 
predictability. The very fractures and age of the granite that others have 
described in terms of risk and uncertainty have been translated as sources of 
predictability and stability. Because all movement in granites is channelled to 
fractures, movement is contained in particular spaces. Safety can be 
engineered by avoiding and working around these spaces. The perceived 
predictability of risky movement in specific spaces is mobilised as a safety 
argument.  
 
Spaces of predictability and the safety provided by these spaces, relies on the 
notion of the cyclicality of geological time. The predictability of underground 
future (as opposed to future aboveground) rests on assumptions that past 
geological processes will be repeated in the future. The assumed cyclicality of 
geological processes is utilised to tell stories about the safety of GD in the 
future. The cyclicality of geological time and processes, the assumption that 
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what has happened before will happen again in the same spaces as before, 
together with the linear time and steady process of radioactive decay are 
mobilised to make the case for the safety and predictability of the deep future 
and GD. 
	
7.3 Temporality of containment 
Official representations of GD, as we saw in the Introduction, describe GD in 
terms of permanence. We can read in GD the need to demonstrate containment 
(Kinsella, 2001) and control (Mackerron and Berkhout, 2009) that has 
dominated nuclear operations internationally. Containing nuclear waste in the 
GDF is a promise of continuing safety and security. Containment of nuclear 
waste is desired, anticipated, expected, even projected, but never certain, never 
verifiable. Containment can be located in the ‘non-factual future and the realm 
of ideas’ (Adam and Groves, 2007). While containment might become proven 
as a fact in due multi-millennial course, we will never have certainty about 
containment. Rather, it remains an idea, or perhaps more accurately, an ideal.  
 
As we saw earlier (in Chapter 5), the most certain thing about GD is that 
containment will fail. The temporality of disposal, the ability of waste to escape 
containment is well established in social science literature (see e.g. 
Hetherington, 2004; Hird, 2013a). Waste has the ability to flow (Gille, 2013) 
even when contained, and to form new entities within the disposal environment 
(Hird, 2013a). The longevity of nuclear waste ensures that waste cannot be 
kept in place ‘forever’, and van Wyck (2005) has described nuclear waste as 
‘matter without a place’. Its containment can only ever be temporal. This ‘reality’ 
of the waste’s long lifespan, as we have already seen, sets parameters for the 
making of safe futures through GD.  
 
The multi-millennial half-lives of nuclear waste, together with international 
standard practice for GD safety assessment, have created, what I have called 
in this thesis, the deep future of GD. The deep future, the timeframe for GD 
safety assessment, has been cemented to one million years. This timeframe 
challenges existing engineering and knowledge making practices and 
capabilities, and even sections of the international nuclear waste community 
have questioned the meaningfulness of this timeframe. There is much 
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uncertainty about the reliability of predictions, calculations and models that are 
being made about the very distant future in the present. The deeper into the 
future GD cultures seek to map their projects and the evolution of the GDF, the 
less verifiable the models and calculations become and the more unpredictable 
the future. Samuli, a Finnish PhD student, weighed how “modelling tools run out 
capacity fast. If we put in as detailed data as we observe in the bedrock, we 
would never get any results. A computer fails much faster than we are able to 
input that level of detail into the model”. Thus by necessity and in order to make 
any predictions about very distant times disposal cultures engage in world 
reduction (Jameson, 1975), and individual experiments and experimenters 
focus on a limited number of factors influencing and contributing towards safety. 
Predictions about the future are made through simplification and fragmentation 
of the systems on which safety claims rely. At the same time, these tools are 
pushed well beyond their routine operations to map and predict times and 
processes they have not been designed to deal with. The radical difference 
between nuclear time and present ability to map that time drives knowledge 
production practice to plains of uncertainty, even unknowability. 
 
This unknowability of the deep future, tied to the long lifespan of nuclear waste, 
has led some social scientists to propose the conceptualisation of GD as a 
‘long-term sociotechnical experiment’ (Bergmans, Landström and Schröder, 
2014; Schröder, 2016), and thus to directly contest the international nuclear 
waste community’s representation of GD as the ‘end point’ for nuclear waste or 
as the ‘permanent solution’ to the long-term management of nuclear waste. The 
experimental nature of GD, these authors write, stems on one hand from the 
very longevity of the future that needs to be mapped and modelled. Knowledge 
about the actual workings of the GDF, whether it provides safety and 
containment, as designed and imagined today, will not be available for tens or 
hundreds of thousands of years (Bergmans, Landström and Schröder, 2014). 
While containment relies on the long-term functioning of the GDF, it also rests 
on the hope and anticipation that future generations will not meddle with the 
GDF; that they stay away from the GDF, as the present generation wants them 
to do in order to maintain containment (Schröder, 2016). Little certainty about 
the GDF’s ability to contain nuclear waste into very distant times is forthcoming 
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in the present, and containment remains hypothetical for the necessary 
timeframe.  
 
Contain-ability 
Given this uncertainty, what I propose here is that instead of containment we 
should talk about contain-ability. Where containment implies immobility, stasis, 
and order, contain-ability is more open and sensitive to the contingencies and 
uncertainties of containment. The ability in contain-ability in the everyday use of 
the word translates to ‘possession of the means or skill to do something’. Ability, 
thus, signals something that can be made, gained, but also lost. It has temporal 
quality. Our means to do things can be squandered, wasted, while unused skills 
can rust to the point of uselessness, so that even if we wanted to do something 
we simply might be incapable to do so. 
 
Contain-ability does not deny to possibility of containment, but underlines its 
temporality, unpredictability and unverifiability.  As we know now, containment 
is not an inherent attribute of GD. Rather it is made through situated relatings 
and doings of the underground and waste, as well as understandings of finality. 
As we have seen further above, designing containment depends on the waste 
that requires containment, and the geological environment in which the GDF will 
be constructed. The ability of the GDF to provide containment is based on 
knowledge about the characteristics and quantities of waste, and the knowledge 
about the characteristics of the geological environment. Waste and geology set 
the parameters for making containment.  
 
While the term contain-ability underlines the temporal and experimental nature 
of GD, it also underscores this situatedness of making containment and safety 
into the very distant future. Where containment can be described in the abstract 
as a product of the GD multi-barrier system, contain-ability points to local 
configurations of the making of containment. It highlights the local contingencies 
and dependencies of safety and future making. Contain-ability highlights the 
negotiability of containment. Rather than a given property of the GDF or the 
EBS, containment is the possible product of a range of different sociotechnical 
configurations – as underscored by the observations that each disposal culture 
and GD project envisions safety and the future through (slightly) different 
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means and configurations. While Matt noted that “the European nations and the 
USA are taking quite different approaches” to designing their GDFs, William 
argued that European nuclear nations are trying to “pretend that they share 
enough to make it worthwhile to collaborate, while in fact the […] disposal 
concepts are so different basically that there will be very little they have in 
common”. The ability of the GDF to contain waste is thus the product of local 
doings that depend on available resources, geological options, the scale and 
characteristics of the disposal inventory and the ability of the disposal culture to 
make decisions. 
 
Disposal projects speak of containment in certain terms. Containment is 
represented as something that will happen. In the 2014 Implementing 
Geological Disposal White Paper that laid out the most recent framework for the 
UK’s GD project, containment is described as “achieved through the use of 
multiple barriers that work together to provide protection over hundreds of 
thousands of years. […] The multiple barriers […] provide safety” (DECC, 
2014a: 19). Containment is treated as a matter of fact. What I propose, 
however, is that containment is what Wendell Bell and Jeffrey Olick (1989) 
would call ‘an unrealised real present potential’. Bell and Olick note that much 
of science studies this kind of real present potentials or dispositionals. These 
real present possibilities can usually be detected by the suffixes descriptive of 
possibilities, such as ‘-able’, ‘-ible’ and ‘uble’. Contain-able. As an example of a 
dispositional Bell and Olick provide us a glass: 
 
For example, a fragile glass may never be broken, but there is a real 
(present) possibility that it could be broken: it really is breakable. 
Studying such possibilities results in an empirical basis for warranted 
assertions about possible futures. (Bell and Olick, 1989: 122) 
 
For the glass its breakability is real regardless of whether it breaks or not. Its 
breakability is a real unrealised present possibility for its future. With regards to 
GD, containment is such an unrealised present possibility. It is unrealised 
because no GDFs for civilian waste exist and thus the promise of containment 
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has not been realised even in the short-term.16 Because of the million-year 
timeframe, containment remains a possibility rather than a certainty. Because of 
the unverifiability of containment into the very distant, there can be no certainty 
that GDF actually will work the way it has been designed to do. In their 
discussion of futures, Bell and Olick distinguish between real present 
possibilities and planned possible futures. They note that real present 
possibilities are uncertain. They might or they might not occur in the future. In 
contrast, planned possible futures can be empirically tested. Containment on 
the GD timeframe is never assured. It cannot be planned based on empirically 
evidence and testing. There cannot be evidence-based certainty that the GDF 
will contain nuclear waste for as long as necessary. 
 
More than anything else, containment is an unrealised real present possibility of 
GD future making in the present. The making of containment is reliant on the 
kind of situated practices and doings I have traced in this thesis. Containment is 
not a property of GD, but a locally crafted and configured ability of an 
engineered structure to contain nuclear waste for long enough. When we 
discuss GD as a form of future making, we should talk about contain-ability, 
about contingency and temporality, rather than about containment that signals 
certainty and ‘foreverness’, stasis and finality. Making futures through GD is as 
much about containing and managing time as it is about managing and 
containing matter. Safety is about prolonging the present of the GDF’s ability to 
contain waste to mediate the much longer now of nuclear waste. The challenge 
for crafting containment is less the radioactivity of nuclear waste than the 
slowness of radioactive decay. The incommensurability between nuclear waste 
and humans and human-made things introduces epistemological challenges to 
GD. It is the incommensurability of nuclear and human times that impels me to 
reconsider GD future making as the making of contain-ability. 
	
The notion of contain-ability, thus, directs attention towards the uncertainty and 
situatedness of future making, the temporality of disposal and the challenge of 
managing nuclear waste, a hyperobject that is distributed in time beyond human 
experience and knowledge. As an ‘unrealised real present possibility’, contain-
ability poses difficult questions around future making and responsibility. 
																																								 																				
16 One could also interpret the accident in the WIPP as demonstrating unrealised 
(perhaps even unrealisability) of containment. 
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Disposal cultures have been delegated the responsibility for making safe distant 
futures, yet there is inevitable uncertainty about the outcomes and functioning 
of the GDF (in the long-term). This uncertainty does not absolve disposal 
culture and the implementing generations of responsibility. Accepting that 
responsibility for the future flows directly from actions in the present rather than 
knowledge of potential outcomes in the future (Adam and Groves, 2007), 
contain-ability underlines the necessity to carefully consider what kinds of 
futures societies are willing to set in motion in the present. Are today’s nuclear 
nations willing to subject other beings, peoples, spaces and time to the 
potentially risky consequences of decision made in the present? What kinds of 
future risks or hazards are nuclear nations willing to shoulder? Contain-ability, in 
this sense, helps to raise questions about alternative futures. 
 
Akin to the concept of sociotechnical experiments, the notion of contain-ability 
highligts the openness and uncertainty of future making through GD. By 
challenging the binaries between disposal and storage, waste and asset, 
contain-ability questions official imaginations of GD as an end point to nuclear 
waste management. In doing so, it highlights a space for the emergence of 
alternative unplanned futures. Thus, what I propose here that the most effective 
way to make safe futures through GD might be generosity towards openness 
and uncertainty, as discussed in Chapter 2, rather than an emphasis on closure 
and finality proliferated in official imaginations of GD. 
	
7.4 For the future 
In this thesis I have explored how the UK and Finnish disposal cultures seek to 
make safe distant futures through GD. Disposal cultures (Chapter 3) is a 
method I developed to bring the two GD projects into a conversation with each 
other and to avoid direct, unfruitful, comparison between them. On the other 
hand, disposal cultures are also an object of study. They emerge from and are 
shaped by the existing nuclear industries and waste inventories together with 
research, policy, industry and regulatory actors and practices. It is the emergent 
differences between disposal cultures that help to illuminate some of the 
challenges and concerns in the implementation of GD. Indeed, the ‘smallness’ 
or cohesion of the Finnish disposal culture appears to have fostered continuity 
and a more smoothly progressing GD project in contrast to the UK case. The 
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UK disposal culture has been shaped by a more eclectic collection of policies 
and actors over the years (Chapter 4), and the UK GD project has come to be 
characterised more by discontinuities and uncertainties. 
 
In part these differences stem from historical care practices, that is, from the 
ways in which nuclear waste has been managed over time. In Finland, nuclear 
waste has been more solidly tied to direct disposal from the beginning of 
Finnish nuclear activities, whereas in the UK the management of nuclear waste 
has been dominated by shorter-term technopolitical considerations (e.g. 
weapons, fast breeder reactors), which have generated a more complex 
nuclear waste inventory. Yet, what both cases show is the close and precarious 
relationship between care practices and future making. The UK case amply 
evinces the consequences of past future imaginations and how future making 
can slip into future taking (Adam and Groves, 2007) when policies change, 
technologies fail and past decisions and visions come to dominate the courses 
of action in the present. Thus, the ways in which the UK, as well as Finland, 
plan to take care of its nuclear waste inventory emerges from their local 
sociotechnical realities (Mol, 2008), but they also demonstrate how care 
practices are not innocent, but involve prioritisation and choosing of sides (e.g. 
Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011, 2017; Haraway, 2016). 
 
What the Finnish and UK cases highlight is the difficult dynamic between time 
and care. The UK’s GD project continues to be captive to shorter-term 
considerations (plutonium, new build), while within the Finnish disposal culture 
some concerns have been voiced that care for the GD project itself has become 
prioritised over taking care of nuclear waste through GD, as the completion of 
Onkalo threatens to take precedence over long-term safety (Chapter 6). GD 
projects thus highlight the importance of the questions about care (‘Who cares?’ 
‘What for?’ ‘Why do ‘we’ care?’, ‘How to care?’) put forward by Puig de la 
Bellacasa (2011). Considering the long-term futures at stake in nuclear waste 
management, and GD in particular, thinking through and with these questions is 
vital. As a hyperobject (Morton, 2013), nuclear waste expands into times and 
spaces beyond knowledge, and official imaginations of the permanence GD (as 
care) are problematic. While, in a sense, the UK and Finnish disposal cultures, 
themselves, struggle with the long timespan of GD, they still tout the 
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permanence of GD. Yet, the very longevity of nuclear waste may require that 
conceptualisations and practices of care are open to change, rather than set in 
time. The recognition that nuclear waste will outlive the GDF is more in line with 
the notion of GD as a ‘sociotechnical experiment’ (Landström and Bergmans, 
2015; Schröder, 2016) than it is with the official imaginations of permanence. 
The notion of ‘sociotechnical experiment’ is sensitive to the observation that 
future generations “have to cope with the consequences of our [present 
actions]” (Adam and Groves, 2007: 176) and to the uncertainty of future making 
in the present (Chapter 5). It highlights that care should be understood as a 
temporal and reversible practice in order to make safe distant futures through 
GD.  
 
Yet the prioritisation of GD over other nuclear waste management alternatives 
and futures not only by the UK and Finnish disposal cultures, but also by the 
broader international nuclear waste community, has closed down public debate 
around the long-term management of nuclear waste and GD in particular. GD 
projects tend to be driven by technocratic logics that seek local acceptance to a 
disposal concept deemed safe by the international nuclear waste community. 
By highlighting the relational and negotiable aspects of safety and future 
making, this thesis has policy implications. In the first instance, it challenges the 
traditional ‘social’ explanations to the fortunes of GD projects as insufficient and 
simplistic, and further posits that these explanations need to be opened up to 
better conceptualise how the ‘social’ and the ‘technical’ are entangled in GD 
projects. Thus, by questioning the singularity of safety, the idea of the GDF as a 
‘readily implementatiable’ and traditional explanations, this thesis makes the 
case for a more co-productionist approach (Jasanoff, 2004) to the GDF design 
and siting process. It does not argue that ‘just everything goes’, but rather that 
there is room to include potential host communities and other publics earlier 
and more broadly in the implementation process than has been done up to now.  
 
Second, by underlining safety as the result of situated makings rather than a 
property of GD, this thesis makes the case for opening up debates on the long-
term management of nuclear waste. It underscores how the making of safety 
and safe futures takes place through contrasting and relating GD to available 
alternatives, and through the mobilisation of available resources from the 
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bedrock to waste to cultural imageries. In doing so this thesis invites and 
contributes to debates on GD, alternative waste management solutions and 
possible futures. While this thesis does not question the potential of GD to 
produce and deliver safe futures, it proposes that GD’s ability to provide safe 
futures lies within the realm of the possible rather than in the realm of the 
probable, and since the workability of the GDF cannot be tested and verified in 
the present, it should be opened up for debate. Thus this thesis is in a position 
to broaden and inform discussions between waste management organisations, 
policy-makers and local communities in countries that are in the middle or are 
entering challenging phases of their GD projects – such as the UK that is just 
restarting the siting process or Sweden, where the regulator showed a green 
light to the construction of the GDF in January 2018 (WNN, 2018).  
 
To conceptualise GD’s possible ability to provide safe futures, I have introduced 
the notion of contain-ability. The notion of contain-ability challenges the 
divisions between disposal and storage, waste and asset on which 
technoscientific imaginations for the safety of GD rest. It also underlines the 
temporality, contingency and precariousness of containment, as such contain-
ability has applicability in waste and discard studies and STS more broadly 
beyond the fairly narrow focus on GD. Emphasising containment, and closure, 
as something with a temporal aspect, something that can be gained but also 
lost, the notion of contain-ability can be utilised for instance in the study of 
controversies. It underlines the ability and potential to matters to resurface; how 
material and/or discursive containment can unbecome, and the precariousness 
of closure. 
  
 
7.5 Summary 
In this final chapter, I synthesised the main arguments I have made in this 
thesis and offered my contributions to the field of STS. I proposed that time – 
the discrepancy between human and nuclear times – is the biggest challenge 
disposal cultures face in the making of futures through GD. The incompatibility 
between nuclear and human times makes it impossible for GD cultures to know 
the futures they seek to protect and create, as nuclear time expands beyond the 
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capacity of contemporary knowledge making practices to accurately predict and 
map the future.  
 
I then contended that a significant difference between the UK and Finnish 
disposal cultures that emerges from this study is the way in which these 
cultures relate to nuclear waste. On one hand, the two disposal cultures have 
mobilised the extensively long lifespan of nuclear waste in diverging ways. 
Where the Finnish disposal culture calculated the earliest possible disposal 
date based on the lifespan of nuclear waste, thus using this lifespan as the 
foundation for a structured GD project, in the UK the same lifespan has been 
used to justify inaction and procrastination as no immediate need to address the 
issue was perceived. On the other hand, the materiality of nuclear waste 
inventories in the UK and Finland has informed the way the disposal cultures 
conceive the idea of GD as the ‘end point’ of nuclear waste management. In the 
UK, where nuclear waste is a form undisposable as such, waste needs 
treatment prior to disposal. What this means in practical terms is that waste 
categorisations are irreversible. Once waste has been treated, it cannot be 
separated from its wasteform. This results in a rigid reading of the ‘finality’ of 
disposal and might also contribute to delays in the implementation of GD, as the 
UK Government is unwilling to classify nuclear materials with potential future 
uses as waste. In contrast in Finland waste needs no treatment before disposal. 
This, together with the inclusion of retrievability in the disposal concept, allows 
the potential unmaking of waste at a later date. Retrievability in the Finnish 
reading ensures that waste has the potential to revert to an asset, and disposal 
to storage. Thus, the Finnish disposal culture emerges as more willing to 
embrace waste and disposal as temporal rather than final categories, although 
at the moment GD remains the sole policy aim for the long-term management of 
nuclear waste. 
 
Thirdly, I argued that safety is made through relational sociotechnical doings. It 
is not a property of GD. I traced how safety is made through contrasting and 
relating the aboveground and the underground. The underground is constructed 
as safe in relation to the aboveground. Where the aboveground is considered 
as unpredictable, fickle and vulnerable to societal, environmental and climatic 
changes, the underground is posited as stable, predictable and less prone to 
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disruptions. The assumed cyclicality or underground time is contrasted against 
the perceived linearity of aboveground time, as a measure of predictability. I 
further posited that not all underground spaces are considered equal. Rather, 
underground safety is constructed through available geological resources; with 
the strengths of the available geology highlighted against the perceived 
weakness of other potential geological environments. 
 
Finally, I introduced the notion of contain-ability as a means to better discuss 
and conceptualise the temporality and contingency of GD future making. 
Contain-ability challenges the divisions between disposal and storage, waste 
and asset on which technoscientific imaginations for the safety of GD rest. It 
thus helps to further underline the situatedness of the making of safe futures 
through GD.	
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Appendix I – Participant Consent Form and Information Sheet 
Participant consent form 
 	Title	of	Research	Project:	Disposal	Cultures:	Nuclear	Waste	Management	Practice	and	Policy	
in	Finland	and	the	UK		Name	of	Lead	Researcher:	Marika	Hietala			Participant	Identification	Number	for	this	project:	 																																											Please	initial	box	
	
1. I	confirm	that	I	have	read	and	understand	the	information	sheet	and	I	have		had	the	opportunity	to	ask	questions	about	the	project.		2. I	understand	that	my	participation	is	voluntary	and	that	I	am	free	to	withdraw	at	any	time	without	giving	any	reason	and	without	there	being	any	negative	consequences.	In	addition,	should	I	not	wish	to	answer	any	particular	question	or	questions,	I	am	free	to	decline.			3. I	understand	that	my	responses	will	be	kept	confidential.	I	give	permission	for	other	members	of	the	research	team	to	have	access	to	my	anonymised	responses.	I	understand	that	my	name	will	not	be	linked	with	the	research	materials,	and	I	will	not	be	identified	or	identifiable	in	the	report	or	reports	that	result	from	the	research	unless	I	give	my	consent.				4.					I	agree	for	the	data	collected	from	me	to	be	used	in	future	research				5. I	agree	to	take	part	in	the	above	research	project.			________________________	 ________________									____________________	Name	of	Participant	 Date	 Signature				_________________________	 ________________									____________________	Name	of	person	taking	consent	 Date	 Signature	(if	different	from	lead	researcher)	
		_________________________	 ________________									____________________		Lead	Researcher	 Date	 Signature		Copies:		
Once	this	has	been	signed	by	relevant	parties	the	participant	will	receive	a	copy,	to	keep	with	
the	information	sheet	and	any	other	written	information	provided.	A	copy	of	the	signed	and	
dated	consent	form	will	be	placed	in	the	project’s	secure	storage.		
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INFORMATION SHEET for RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
PROJECT TITLE  
 
Disposal Cultures: Nuclear Waste Management Practice and Policy in 
Finland and the UK 
 
INVITATION  
You have been contacted because you are a member of a nuclear 
engineering group or are working in a related area (another scientific field, 
policy arena, industry etc.). 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project that is studying the 
innovation and implementation processes related to geological disposal in 
the UK and Finland. In particular, this study focuses on geological disposal 
as a socio-technical system.  
 
Before you decide whether to take part in the research, it is important for 
you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. 
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it 
with others if you wish. Ask me (Marika Hietala) if there is anything that is 
not clear or if you would like more information.  
 
Thank you for reading this. 
 
PURPOSE of the RESEARCH 
To investigate and understand the scientific work that goes on in the 
design and implementation of geological disposal.  
 
COMMITMENT  
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to 
take part you will be given this information sheet to keep has it contains 
my contact details. You will be able to withdraw from taking part in the 
research at any time by contacting me. If you decide not take part or wish 
to withdraw please, please ensure I have been informed.  
 
WHAT TO EXPECT 
I may visit your place of work and record (often written notes) some of the 
activities that take place there. I may also ask you to take part in recorded 
conversations or individual / group discussions about your research. My 
visits are intended to be informal occasions and I may ask to simply follow 
you around for a while as you do your everyday work. There will hopefully 
be little disturbance to you and your on-going activities. Although I will 
spend time with you as an individual, the research is not studying you as a 
person, rather just the kinds of things that go on in your work and what you 
feel about those and your area of work more generally.  
 
BENEFITS 
While there are no immediate benefits to people taking part in the project, 
it is hoped that this work will contribute an understanding of the technical 
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and social complexity of implementing geological disposal, and may raise 
awareness among scientists and engineers about some of the factors 
impacting the way contemporary science is conducted and developed.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Any information that I collect will not be attributed to individuals without 
explicit consent.  I will not identify any people, laboratories or institutions 
by name, but will allocate IDs or pseudonyms to identify these in any 
reports or papers I will write. On any rare occasions where it might be 
important to my analysis, I will seek express discussion and permission to 
name individuals in the writing that comes out of the field study. 
 
INFORMATION 
Any digital recordings (audio/photographic) made during this research will 
be used during analysis and may be used for illustration in conference 
presentations or lectures. No other use will be made of them without your 
written permission, and no one outside of myself or my supervisor will be 
allowed access to the original recordings. If being interviewed using digital 
audio, you will be asked to give explicit verbal consent to the interview. 
 
RESULTS 
My primary aim is to write up the analysis of the data as a doctoral thesis. 
Some of the anonymised data will likely be used for presentations and 
academic publications.  
 
ETHICAL APPROVAL 
The project has received ethical approval from the University of Sheffield, 
Department of Sociological Studies Ethics Committee and will follow 
professional guidelines laid down by the British Sociological Association. 
 
CONTACT  
If you have any questions about the work or about the conduct of the 
researchers, then please contact me, Marika Hietala: 
 
Email : mthietala1@sheffield.ac.uk  
 
Or my supervisor, Dr Molyneux-Hodgson : s.hodgson@sheffield.ac.uk  
 
 
If you decide to take part in the research, please sign the Consent Form 
attached. 
 
MANY THANKS 
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Appendix II – List of Participants and Interviews 
 
Participants 
 
Participant Code Participant Role 
UK 
Alex  PhD student – materials science 
Arthur  RWM – research manager 
Christopher  PhD student – materials science 
Colin  CoRWM member 
David  PhD student – materials science 
Jodie  PhD student – materials science 
John  Consultant – safety case 
Kevin  Lab technician – materials science 
Mark  Lab technician – materials science 
Matt University professor – nuclear materials 
Nicholas Industry representative 
William Former CoRWM member 
 
Finland 
Aila  Posiva – research manager  
Eero  VTT research manager 
Elina  VTT researcher – corrosion 
Ilkka  Posiva – retired advisor 
Jukka  Consultant – biosphere  
Johan University professor – engineering  
Lilli Nuclear regulator 
Marja Civil servant – nuclear section 
Markku  University professor – engineering  
Matti VTT researcher – copper  
Rabbe GTK Researcher  
Samuli PhD student – rock mechanics 
Tapio  University professor – geology  
Tom PhD student – engineering  
Ulla University researcher – chemistry 
 
 
Interviews 
 
Participant Code Interview Date  Mode of Interaction 
UK 
Alex  17th July 2015 In person 
Arthur  17th March 2015 In person 
Christopher  3rd December 2014 In person 
Colin  9th April 2015 In person 
David  3rd December 2014 In person 
Jodie  17th July 2015 In person 
John  16th March 2015 In person 
Kevin 18th May 2015 In person 
Mark  21st May 2015 In person 
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Matt 25th June 2015 In person 
Nicholas 28th May 2015 Telephone 
William  30th January 2015 In person 
 
Finland 
Aila  14th January 2016 In person 
Eero  17th November 2015 In person 
Elina  7th March 2016 In person 
Ilkka  8th February 2016 In person 
Johan 2nd February 2016 In person 
Jukka  28th September 2015 In person 
Lilli 8th March 2016 In person 
Marja 21st October 2015 In person 
Markku  10th September 2015 In person 
Matti 7th March 2015 In person 
Rabbe 22nd October 2015 In person 
Samuli 9th December 2015 In person 
Tapio  2nd March 2016 In person 
Tom 21st September 2015 In person 
Ulla 18th February 2016 In person 
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Appendix III – Example interview schedule 
16 March 2015 Interview 
 
So I have four broad themes I’d like to discuss today; your career, the UK’s 
nuclear waste disposal eco-system, research in the UK and policy 
implementation, does that sound OK? 
 
Career  
You have made an extensive career in the field of nuclear waste disposal, could 
you give me a brief potted biography of your time in the field?  
• So are those all the roles you’ve undertaken? 
• Just to clarify, has your whole career been in consultancy? 
• Going a bit further back on your personal time line, what did you study in 
university? Where did you study? 
• How did you end up working on nuclear waste disposal? 
 
Do you remember back to earlier days when perhaps people thought a GDF 
would be a reality by now?  
• If not, can you speculate why the implementation of waste disposal 
seemed unproblematic at that time? 
• What happened/went wrong? 
 
 
NWM eco-system 
Going back to your role as a consultant, what is it exactly that you do? 
• Can you give concrete examples? 
 
Who are the major players in the UK’s nuclear waste disposal eco-system? 
• What are the relationships between these players? How do they relate to 
each other? 
 
Where do consulting bodies or companies fit into this eco-system? 
 
You’ve worked across the board with bodies like the EA, CoRWM, RWM etc., 
does the work that you do and have done for these different bodies differ in 
some ways? 
• Do they ask different types of questions? Or emphasise different things?  
 
RWM is a central but also a fairly new actor in the implementation of geological 
disposal what kind of a role are they playing? 
• What should they be doing? What is expected of them? Why? 
• Are times under RWM different from earlier regimes, like Nirex? 
 
 
Safety case 
What is a safety case? 
• What is it purpose? Can you explain that in layman terms? 
 
What are the most significant remaining scientific knowledge gaps in relation to 
geological disposal?  
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• Is there a priority order? Should there be? 
 
How far does everything have to be ‘known’ about a particular process or 
problem?  
• What levels of uncertainty are allowed? 
• Who decides the acceptable margin of error? Is it the RWM or the 
different research groups? 
 
In terms of research activities, is waste disposal eco-system coordinated in 
some way? 
• Is more coordination needed? Why? Why not? 
 
 
Policy implementation  
You have significant experience of nuclear waste disposal nationally and 
internationally, are there some aspects or factors of the UK’s approach to 
nuclear waste disposal that are particular to the UK? 
 
The UK is planning a co-located GDF, what are the main benefits of this 
arrangement? 
• Does the co-location of wastes pose particular research problems and if 
so what kind? 
 
Are there countries the UK has particular close relations with in terms of 
research and of GDF visions/missions? 
• What can the UK or RWM learn from foreign experiences? 
 
What are your hopes for the implementation of geological disposal in the UK 
under the new White Paper?  
• What do you see as the biggest barriers to its implementation? 
 
As a geologist, what is your view of the National Geological Screening? 
 
What are the biggest remaining challenges overall in relation to GDFs around 
the world?  
 
 
Finishing 
Do you have any question you would like to ask me?  
 
What questions did you expect to be asked? 
• Was the interview what you were expecting? 
 
Can you think of people it might be worth me chatting to?  
 
 
 
Thank you! 
 
 
	 251	
REFERENCES 
Adam, B., 1990. Timescapes of modernity: The environment and invisible 
hazards. London, England: Routledge.  
Adam, B., 2008. Future matters: futures known, created and minded, Twenty-
First Century Society, 3(2), 111-116.  
Adam, B., 2010. History of the future: Paradoxes and challenges. Rethinking 
History, 14(3), 361-378  
Adam, B., and Groves, C., 2007. Future Matters: Action, knowledge, ethics. 
Leiden, Netherlands: Brill.  
Adam, B., and Groves, C., 2011. Futures Tended: Care and Future-Oriented 
Responsibility. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 31(1), 17–27. 
Adams, D., 1980. Restaurant at the End of the Universe. London: Macmillan. 
Adams, V., Murphy, M., and Clarke, A.E., 2009. Anticipation: Technoscience, 
Life, Affect, Temporality. Subjectivity, 28, 246-265.  
Äikäs, T., 2016. From piggybacking to the pole position: Finnish nuclear waste 
management sets the example [Peesailusta piikkipaikalle: Suomalainen 
ydinjätehuolto näyttää mallia]. [pdf] Available at: http://www.ats-
fns.fi/images/files/2016/syp2016/presentations/SG1_TAikas_NuclearWas
teManagement.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Alexander, W. R., Reijonen, H., and McKinley, I., 2015. Natural analogues: 
studies of geological processes relevant to radioactive waste disposal in 
deep geological repositories. Swiss Journal of Geoscience, 108, 75-100. 
Alvarez, R., 2014. The WIPP problem, and what it means for defense nuclear 
waste disposal. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. [online] Available at: 
https://thebulletin.org/wipp-problem-and-what-it-means-defense-nuclear-
waste-disposal7002#skip-link. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
ANA (Australian Nuclear Association), 2015. Current Status of Spent Nuclear 
Fuel: ANA Information Sheet. [pdf] Available at: 
http://www.nuclearaustralia.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/ANA-
Information-Sheet-20150331-Spent-Nuclear-Fuel1.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
Anders, G., 1962. Theses for the Atomic Age. The Massachusetts Review, 3(3), 
493-505.  
Asimov, I., 1954. Caves of Steel. New York: Doubleday. 
Atkinson, P., and Hammersley, M., 2007. Ethnography: Principles in Practice, 
3rd ed. London: Routledge. 
ATS, 1978. Guidelines of nuclear waste management in Finland. 
[Ydinjätehuollon suuntaviivat Suomessa]. ATS Ydintekniikka. [pdf] 
Available at: https://www.ats-
fns.fi/images/files/ydintekniikka/atsyt_1978_1.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
Bailey, L.E.F., 2015. Development of a Generic Safety Narrative for the UK 
Geological Disposal Facility. Mineralogical Magazine, 79, 1633–1640.  
	 252	
Balmer, A.S, Calvert, J., Marris, C., Molyneux-Hodgson, S., Frow, E., Kearness, 
M., Bulpin, K., Schyfter, P., Mackenzie, A., and Martin, P., 2015. Taking 
Roles in Interdisciplinary Collaborations: Re ections on Working in Post-
ELSI Spaces in the UK Synthetic Biology Community. Science & 
Technology Studies, 28(3), 3-25.  
Balmer, A.S, Calvert, J., Marris, C., Molyneux-Hodgson, S., Frow, E., Kearness, 
M., Bulpin, K., Schyfter, P., Mackenzie, A., and Martin, P., 2016. Five 
rules of thumb for post-ELSI interdisciplinary collaborations. Journal of 
Responsible Research, 3(1), 73-80. 
Barad, K., 2007. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the 
Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. London: Duke University Press. 
Barad, K., 2012. On touching: The inhuman that therefore I am. differences, 
23(3), 1-21. 
Baxter, S., 2001. Deep Future. London: Orion Books Ltd. 
Bell, W., and Mau, J.A., 1971. The Sociology of the Future. New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 324-338. 
Bell, W., and Olick, J.K., 1989. An epistemology for the futures field: Problems 
and possibilities of prediction. Futures, 21(2), 115-135. 
Beaulieu, A., 2010. From co-location to co-presence: Shifts in the use of 
ethnography for the study of knowledge. Social Studies of Science, 
40(3), 453-70. 
Benford, G., 2000. Deep Time: How Humanity Communicates Across Millennia. 
New York: Harper Perennial.  
Bennett, J., 2010. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press. 
Bennett, J., 2012. Earthling, Now and Forever?. In: E. Ellsworth and J. Kruse, 
eds., Making the Geologic Now: Responses to Material Conditions of 
Contemporary Life. Brooklyn, NY: Punctum Books, 244-246. 
Bergmans, A., Elam, M., Simmons, P., and Sundqvist, G., 2012. Perspectives 
on Radioactive Waste Repository Monitoring: Confirmation, Compliance, 
Confidence Building, and Societal Vigilance. Technikfolgenabschätzung 
– Theorie und Praxis, 21(3), 22-28.  
Bergmans, A., Landström, C., and Schröder, J., 2014. Reversibility & 
Retrievability: A Vehicle for Organising Long-Term Repository 
Governance? IGD-TP Geodisposal 2014. Manchester, UK, 24-26 June 
2014. 
Bergmans, A., and Schröder, J., 2012. Review of initiatives addressing socio-
technical challenges of RWM & geological disposal in international 
programmes. [pdf] Available at: 
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=aW5zb3RlYy5ldXx
pbnNvdGVjfGd4OjViMjk0NmM2ODVhMTZk. [Last visited 9 February 
2018]   
 
	 253	
BERR (Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform), 2008. 
Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Nuclear Power. [pdf] 
Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/228944/7296.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018] 
Bickerstaff, K., 2012. “Because we’ve got history here”: nuclear waste, 
cooperative siting, and the relational geography of a complex issue. 
Environment and Planning A, 44, 2611-2628.  
Bijker, W.E., and Pinch, T., 2012. The Social Construction of Facts and 
Artefacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and Sociology of Technology 
Might Benefit Each Other. In: W.E. Bijker, T.P. Hughes, and T. Pinch, 
eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems, Anniversary 
Edition: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology. 
Cambrige, MA: MIT Press, 11-44. 
Bloomfield, P., and Vurdubakis, T., 2005. The Secret of Yucca Mountain: 
Reflections on an Object In Extremis. Environment & Planning: Society & 
Space, 23(5): 735-56.  
Blowers, A., Mackerron, G., Allan, M., and Wilkinson, P., 2009. New Nuclear 
Build and the Management of Radioactive Wastes. [pdf] Available at: 
http://www.nuclearwasteadvisory.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/CoRWM1_Letter_201109.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
Borup, M., Brown, N., Konrad, K., van Lente, H., 2006. The sociology of 
expectations in science and technology. Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management, 18(3-4), 285-298.  
Boult, A., 2016. Stephen Hawking: Humans will die out within 1,000 years 
unless we leave Earth. The Telegraph. [online] Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/17/stephen-hawking-humans-
will-die-out-within-1000-years-unless-we/. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Brand, S., n.a. About Long Now. [online] Available at: http://longnow.org/about/. 
[Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Brown, P., 2013. U.K. Stockpiles Plutonium in Hopes of Future Energy. 
Scientific American, 6 May 2013. [online] Available at: 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/uk-stockpiles-plutonium-in-
hopes-of-future-energy/. [Last visited 9 February 2018]    
Brown, N., and Michael, M., 2003. A Sociology of Expectations: Retrospecting 
Prospects and Prospecting Retrospects. Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management, 15(1), 3-18.  
Brown, N., Rappert, B., and Webster, B., 2000. Contested Futures: A sociology 
of prospective techno-science. London: Routledge. 
Bruni, A., 2005. Shadowing Software and Clinical Records: On the Ethnography 
of Non-Humans and Heterogeneous Contexts. Organization, 12(3), 357-
78. 
	 254	
Burke, A., 2016. Nuclear time: temporal metaphors of the nuclear present. 
Critical Studies on Security, 4(1), 73-90.  
Cairns, B., 2014. Implementing Geological Disposal: Geological disposal policy 
and new white paper. Radioactive Waste Management Ltd: National 
Geological Screening Technical Event. The Geological Society, London, 
30 September 2014. 
Caldicott, H., 2007. Nuclear Power Is Not the Answer. California Literary 
Review. [online] Available at: http://calitreview.com/19/nuclear-power-is-
not-the-answer/. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Callon, M., 1984. Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of 
the scallops and the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay. The Sociological 
Review, 32(S1), 196-233. 
Carpenter, E., 2016. The Nuclear Culture Source Book. London: Black Dog 
Publishing. 
Clark, N., and Hird, M., 2013. Deep Shit. O-Zone: A Journal of Object-Oriented 
Studies, 1, 44-52.  
Clarke, A.E., 2009. From Grounded Theory to Situational Analysis: What’s 
New? Why? How? In: J.M. Morese, P. Noerager Stern, J. Corbin, B. 
Bowers, K. Charmaz, and A.E. Clarke, eds., Developing Grounded 
Theory: The Second Generation, 194-233. 
Cocks, D., 2003. Deep Futures: Our prospects for survival. Kensington: 
University of South Wales Press. 
Code, L., 2015. Care, Concern, and Advocacy: Is There a Place for Epistemic 
Responsibility?, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 1(1). [online] Available 
at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=fpq. 
[Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Corkhill, C.L., Cassingham, N.J., Heath, P.G., and Hyatt, N.C., 2013. 
Dissolution of UK high-level waste glass under simulated hyperalkaline 
conditions of a colocated geological disposal facility. International 
Journal of Applied Glass Science, 4(4). 341-356  
Corkhill, C., 2017. Making Data for the Safety Case. ESRC Nuclear Futures 
Seminar, Exeter, UK, 22-23 November 2017. 
CoRWM (Committee on Radioactive Management), 2006. Managing our 
Radioactive Waste Safely: CoRWM’s Recommendations to the 
Government. [pdf] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/294118/700_-
_CoRWM_July_2006_Recommendations_to_Government_pdf.pdf. [Last 
visited 9 February 2018]   
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change), 2009. The arrangements 
for the management and disposal of waste from new nuclear power 
stations: a summary of evidence. [pdf] Available at: 
http://www.umweltbundesamt.at/fileadmin/site/umweltthemen/umweltpolit
ische/SUP/SUP_UK_NPS/Waste/wasteassessment.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
	 255	
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change), 2011. Management of the 
UK’s plutonium stocks: A consultation response on the long- term 
management of UK-owned separated civil plutonium. [pdf] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/42773/3694-govt-resp-mgmt-of-uk-plutonium-stocks.pdf. [Last 
visited 9 February 2018]    
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change), 2014a. Implementing 
Geological Disposal. [pdf] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/332890/GDF_White_Paper_FINAL.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 
2018]   
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change), 2014b. Publication of 
Implementing Geological Disposal White Paper 2014. [online] Available 
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/publication-of-
implementing-geological-disposal-white-paper-2014. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change), 2015. Lead Document 
setting out the United Kingdom’s National Programme for the 
Responsible and Safe Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive 
Waste. [pdf] Available at:  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/457904/Lead_Document_on_the_United_Kingdom_National_Progr
amme_under_Council_Directive_2011-70-Euratom_-_FINAL.pdf. [Last 
visited 9 February 2018]   
Defra, 2001. Managing Radioactive Waste Safely: Proposals for developing a 
policy for managing solid radioactive waste in the UK. [pdf] Availablet at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20031221042814/http:/www.d
efra.gov.uk/environment/consult/radwaste/pdf/radwaste.pdf. [Last visited 
9 February 2018]    
Demos, 2010. Mission for Finland: How Finland will solve the world’s most 
wicked problems. Country brand report 25.11.2010. [pdf] Available at: 
http://www.demoshelsinki.fi/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/TS_Report_EN.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 
2018]    
Despret, V., 2004. The Body We Care For: Figures of Anthropo-zoo-genesis. 
Body & Society, 10(2–3): 111–134 . 
Diamond Light Source, 2015. News from the UK synchrotron: Winter 2015. 
InsideDiamond. [pdf] Available at: 
http://extranet2.diamond.ac.uk/ISV/Flipping/InsideDiamond/Winter2015/fi
les/assets/basic-html/page-1.html#. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Disney, W., 1956. Our Friend the Atom. [video online] Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QDcjW1XSXN0. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
Douglas, M., 1966. Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution 
and Taboo. 
	 256	
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry), 2002. Managing the Nuclear Legacy: 
A strategy for action. [pdf] Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dti.gov.uk/nuclear
cleanup/ach/whitepaper.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018]     
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry), 2003. Our energy future - creating a 
low carbon economy: Energy White Paper. [pdf] Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.berr.gov.uk/files/fil
e10719.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry), 2006. The Energy Challenge: Energy 
Review Report 2006. [pdf] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/272376/6887.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry), 2007. Future of nuclear power - the 
role of nuclear power in a low carbon UK economy: consultation 
document. [pdf] Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081105160613/http://www.b
err.gov.uk/whatwedo/energy/whitepaper/consultations/nuclearpower2007
/page39554.html. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Durant, D., 2007. Burying globally, acting locally: Control and co-option in 
nuclear waste management. Science and Public Policy, 34(7), 515-28. 
EC (European Commission), 2011. Council Directive 2011/70/EURATOM of 
19th July 2011 Establishing a Community Framework for the 
Responsible and Safe Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive 
Waste. Brussels: European Commission. 
Elam, M., and Sundqvist, G., 2011. Meddling in Swedish success in nuclear 
waste management. Environmental Politics, 20(2), 246-63. 
Ellswoth, E., and Kruse, J., 2012. Making the Geologic Now: Motivations, 
Provocations. In: E. Ellsworth and J. Kruse, eds., Making the Geologic 
Now: Responses to Material Conditions of Contemporary Life. Brooklyn, 
NY: Punctum Books, 13-23. 
ENSREG (European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group), n.a. Categorisation of 
radioactive waste. [online] Available at: http://www.ensreg.eu/safe-
management-spent-fuel-and-radioactive-waste/categorisation-
radioactive-waste. [Last visited 9 February 2018] 
Ewing, R. (2011) Standards & Regulations in the United States: What Went 
Wrong?. MRS Proceedings, 147. 
Fearnley, C.J., López-Merino, L., Downing, N., and Irvine, R., 2017. A glass of 
whisky could help you get your head around the concept of 'deep time'. 
Independent, 21 December 2017. [online] Available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/glass-of-whisky-deep-time-
geology-peat-a8104081.html. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Friese, C., 2013. Realizing Potential in Translational Medicine The Uncanny 
Emergence of Care as Science. Current Anthropology, 54(S7), S129-
S138.  
	 257	
Fujimura, J.H., 1987. Constructing ‘Do-Able’ Problems in Cancer Research: 
Articulating Alignment. Social Studies of Science, 17(2), 257-293. 
Fujimura, J.H., 2003. Future Imaginaries: Genome Scientists as Sociocultural 
Entrepreneurs. In: A.H. Goodman, D. Heath, and M.S. Lindee, eds., 
Genetic Nature/Culture: Anthropology and Science beyond the Two-
Culture Divide. Berkley: University of California Press, Ch., 9. 
Gee, H., 2000. Deep Time: Cladistics, The Revolution in Evolution. London: 
Fourth Estate. 
Gieryn, T.F., 1983. Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-
science: Strains and interests in professional ideologies of scientists. 
American Sociological Review, 48, 781-795. 
Gilbert, B., 2012. Modeling Collaborative Practices in the Anthropocene. . In: E. 
Ellsworth and J. Kruse, eds., Making the Geologic Now: Responses to 
Material Conditions of Contemporary Life. Brooklyn, NY: Punctum 
Books, 56-61. 
Gille, Z., 2010. Actor networks, modes of production, and waste regimes: 
reassembling the macro-social. Environment and Planning, 42, 1049-
1064.  
Gille, Z., 2013. Is there an emancipatory ontology of matter? A response to 
Myra Hird. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2(4), 1-6.  
Giraud, E., and Hollin, G., 2016. Care, Laboratory Beagles and Affective Utopia. 
Theory, Culture & Society, 33(4), 27-49. 
Gore, A., 2013. Future. New York: Random House. 
Gould, J.S. (1987) Time’s arrow, time’s cycle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Green, J., 2016. WIPP nuclear waste accident will cost US taxpayers $2 billion. 
Ecologist. [online] Available at: https://theecologist.org/2016/sep/20/wipp-
nuclear-waste-accident-will-cost-us-taxpayers-2-billion. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
Greenpeace, 2008. EIA-programme for the extension of the planned nuclear 
grave in Olkiluoto [YVA-ohjelma Olkiluotoon suunnitellun ydinjätehaudan 
laajetamiselle]. [pdf] Available at: 
http://www.greenpeace.org/finland/Global/finland/p2/other/report/2008/gr
eenpeacen-lausunto-olkiluodo.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Gregson, N., 2012. Projected futures: the political matter of UK higher activity 
radioactive waste. Environment and Planning A, 44, 2006 – 2022.  
Gregson, N. and Crang, M., 2010. Guest editorial materiality and waste: 
Inorganic vitality in a networked world. Environment and Planning A, 42, 
1026–32.  
Groves, C., 2013. Horizons of Care: from future imaginaries to responsible 
innovation. Society for the Study of Nanoscience and Emerging 
Technologies (SNET) 4th Annual Conference, University of Twente, 
Netherlands, 23 October 2012. 
	 258	
Gusterson, H., 2008. Nuclear futures: anticipatory knowledge, expert judgment, 
and the lack that cannot be filled, Science and Public Policy, 35(8), 551–
560.  
Guterl, F., 2017. Is Fusion Energy in our Future? Scientific American. [online] 
Available at: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/is-fusion-energy-
in-our-future/. [Last visited 9 February 2018]    
Hanberger, A., 2012. Dialogue as nuclear waste management policy: can a 
Swedish transparency programme legitimise a final decision on spent 
nuclear fuel? Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences, 9(3), 181-
96. 
Haraway, D.J., 1991. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of 
Nature. London: Free Association Books. 
Haraway, D.J., 1992. The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for 
Inappropriate/d Others. In: L. Grossberg, C. Nelson, and P. Treichler, 
eds., Cultural Studies. London: Routledge, 295-337. 
Haraway, D.J., 1997. 
Modest_Wittness@Second_Millenium.FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMuse
™: Feminism and Technoscience. New York: Routledge. 
Haraway, D.J., 2016. Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene. 
London: Duke University Press. 
Hawking, S., 2017. Stephen Hawking speaks on ‘the future of humanity’ at 
Starmus Festival. [video online] Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lpG5P6ugeeI&t=2434s. [Last visited 
9 February 2018]   
Hecht, G., 2006. A cosmogram for nuclear things. Isis, 98, 100–108 
Hecht, G., 2009. The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity 
After World War II. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Hecht, G., 2012. Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Hetherington, K., 2004. Secondhandedness: consumption, disposal, and absent 
presence. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 22, 157-
173.  
Hill, C.N., 2013. An Atomic Empire: A Technical History of the Rise and Fall of 
the British Atomic energy Programme. London: Imperial College Press. 
Hine, C., 2007. Multi-sited Ethnography as a Middle Range Method for 
Contemporary STS. Science, Technology & Human Values, 32(6), 652-
71.  
Hird, M.J., 2009. The Origins of Sociable Life: Evolution After Science Studies. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Press. 
Hird, M.J., 2012. Knowing Waste: Towards an Inhuman Epistemology. Social 
Epistemology, 26(3-4), 453-469.  
Hird, M.J., 2013a. Waste, Landfills, and an Environmental Ethic of Vulnerability. 
Ethics & the Environment, 18(1), 105-124  
Hird, M.J., 2013b. Is Waste Indeterminacy Useful? A response to Zsuzsa Gille. 
Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2(6): 28-33. 
	 259	
Hird, M.J., 2015. Waste flows. Discard Studies: Social studies of waste, 
pollution & externalities. [online] Available at: 
https://discardstudies.com/discard-studies-
%20compendium/#Wasteflows. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Hokkanen, P., and Kojo, M., 2003. The Effect of Environmental Impact 
Assessment on Decision-making [Ympäristövaikutusten 
arviointimenettelyn vaikutus päätöksentekoon]. [pdf] Available at: 
https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/40473/SY_612.pdf?sequ
ence=1. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Hollnagel, E., 2014. Is safety a subject for science. Safety Science, 67, 21–24.  
Hollnagel, E., 2016. Barriers and Accident Prevention. London: Routledge. 
HoC (House of Commons), 1955. Atomic Energy (Peaceful Purposes). 25 
February 1955, Vol. 537, cc. 1625-77. [online] Available at: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1955/feb/25/atomic-
energy-peaceful-purposes#S5CV0537P0_19550225_HOC_109. [Last 
visited 9 February 2018]   
HoC (House of Commons), 1958. Radioactive Waste (Disposal). 4 March 1958, 
vol. 583, cc 969. [online] Available at: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1958/mar/04/radioactive-
waste-disposal#S5CV0583P0_19580304_HOC_225. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
HoC (House of Commons), 1959. Nuclear Power Programme, 1 July 1959, vol. 
608, cc. 569-82. [online] Available at: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1959/jul/01/nuclear-
power-programme. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
HoC (House of Commons), 1993. Radioactive waste. 6 December 1993, vol. 
234 cc.12-3W. [online] Available at: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1993/dec/06/radioa
ctive-waste#S6CV0234P0_19931206_CWA_80v. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
HoC (House of Commons), 2011. Nuclear Power Production (Sellafield). 11 
October 2011, vol. 533, cc. 307-314. [online] Available at: 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-10-
11/debates/1110129000002/NuclearPowerProduction%28Sellafield%29. 
[Last visited 9 February 2018]   
HoL (House of Lords), 1954. Atomic Energy Authority Bill. 11 May 1954, vol. 
187, cc. 469-519. [online] Available at: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1954/may/11/atomic-energy-
authority-bill. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
HoL (House of Lords), 1957. The Fuel and Power Industries. 2 April 1957, Vol. 
202, cc. 977-1017. [online] Available at: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1957/apr/02/the-fuel-and-
power-industries-1#S5LV0202P0_19570402_HOL_94. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
 
 
	 260	
HoL (House of Lords), 1959.  Radioactive Substances Bill. 24 November 1959, 
vol. 219, cc. 209-216. [online] Available at: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1959/nov/24/radioactive-
substances-bill-hl-1#S5LV0219P0_19591124_HOL_100. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
HMG (Her Majesty’s Government), 2013. Industrial Strategy: the UK’s Nuclear 
Future. [pdf] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/168048/bis-13-627-nuclear-industrial-strategy-the-uks-nuclear-
future.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Hyatt, N.C., 2017. Plutonium management policy in the United Kingdom: The 
need for a dual track strategy. Energy Policy, 101, 303–309. 
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), 1986. Promoting nuclear medicine 
in developing countries: An overview of the field and IAEA’s role. [pdf] 
Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/28205880410.pdf. 
[Last visited 9 February 2018] 
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), 2003. Scientific and Technical 
Basis for the Geological Disposal of Radioactive Wastes. [pdf] Available 
at: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/TRS413_web.pdf. 
[Last visited 9 February 2018]   
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), 2007. Factors Affecting Public and 
Political Acceptance for the Implementation of Geological Disposal. [pdf] 
Available at: http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1566_web.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]    
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), 2011. IAEA Safety Standards for 
protecting people and the environment: Disposal of Radioactive Waste. 
[pdf] Available at: http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1449_web.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), 2012. The Safety Case and Safety 
Assessment for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste: Specific Safety 
Guide. [pdf] Available at: http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1553_web.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), 2017. Joint FAO/IAEA Division of 
Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture. [online] Available at: 
https://www.iaea.org/about/organizational-structure/department-of-
nuclear-sciences-and-applications/joint-fao/iaea-division-of-nuclear-
techniques-in-food-and-agriculture. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Ialenti, V.F., 2014a. Adjudicating Deep Time: Revisiting the United States’ High-
Level Nuclear Waste Repository Project at Yucca Mountain. Science & 
Technology Studies, 27(2), 27-48.  
Ialenti, V., 2014b. When Deep Time Becomes Shallow: Knowing Nuclear Waste 
Risk Ethnographically. Discard Studies. [online] Available at: 
https://discardstudies.com/2017/03/09/when-deep-time-becomes-
shallow-knowing-nuclear-waste-risk-ethnographically/. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]    
	 261	
Ialenti, V., 2015. Looking Into the Far Future of Earth’s First Long-Term 
Nuclear-Waste Vault. Nautilus. [online] Available at: 
http://nautil.us/blog/looking-into-the-far-future-of-earths-first-long_term-
nuclear_waste-vault. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
IGD-TP (Implementing Geological Disposal Technology Platform), 2012. 
Implementing Geological Disposal Technology Platform: Vision 
Document. [pdf] Available at: https://igdtp.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/VisionDoc_Final_Oct24-1.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
IMechE (Institute of Mechanical Engineers), 2013. UK Plutonium: The Way 
Forward. [pdf] Available at: https://www.imeche.org/policy-and-
press/reports/detail/uk-plutonium-the-way-forward. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
InSOTEC, 2014. InSOTEC | International Socio-Technical Challenges for 
implementing. geological disposal. [online] Available at: 
http://www.insotec.eu. [Last visited 9 February 2018] 
Into Eternity: A Film for the Future, 2010. [Documentary Film] Directed by 
Michael Madsen. UK: Dogwoof. 
IVO (Imatran Voima) and TVO (Teollisuuden Voima), 1978. Nuclear Waste 
Report, June 1978 [Ydinjäteselvitys, kesäkuu 1978]. Helsinki: IVO and 
TVO. 
Irvine, R.D.G., 2014. Deep time: an anthropological problem. Social 
Anthropology/ Anthropologie Sociale, 22(2), pp. 157-72. 
Irvine, R.D.G., 2017. Deep Time Materials: Uranium. [online] Available at: 
http://www.oceanoftime.uk/deep-time-materials-uranium/. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]  
Jameson, F., 1975. World-Reduction in Le Guin: The Emergence of Utopian 
Narrative. Science Fiction Studies, 2(3), pp. 221-230. 
Jansson, T., 1968. The Sculptor’s Daughter: A Childhood Memoir. London: Sort 
of Books. 
Jansson, T., 1946. Comet in Moominland. London: Puffin Books. 
Jasanoff, S., 2004. States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and the 
Social Order. New York: Routledge. 
Jasanoff, S., 2005. Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and 
the United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Jasanoff, S., and Kim, S.-H., 2009. Containing the Atom: Sociotechnical 
Imaginaries and Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea. 
Minerva, 47, 119–146.  
Johnson, J., 1988. Mixing Humans and Nonhumans Together: The Sociology of 
a Door-Closer. Social Problems, 35(3), 298-310. 
Kallenbach-Herbert, B., Brohmann, B., Simmons, P., Bergmans, A., Barthe, Y., 
and Martell, M., 2014. Addressing the Long-Term Management of High-
level and Long-lived Nuclear Wastes as a Socio-Technical Problem: 
Insights from InSOTEC. [pdf] Available at: 
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=aW5zb3RlYy5ldXx
	 262	
pbnNvdGVjfGd4OjI3NGUwNGU2YTk4MjdjMw. [Last visited 9 February 
2018]    
Kennedy, G. 2007. An ontology of trash: The disposable and its problematic 
nature. New York: Suny Press.  
King, F., Ahonen, L., Taxén, C., Vuorinen, U., and Werme, l., 2002. Copper 
corrosion under expected conditions in a deep geologic repository. [pdf] 
Available at: http://posiva.fi/files/2620/POSIVA-2002-01_web.pdf. [Last 
visited 9 February 2018]   
Kinsella, W., 2001. Nuclear Boundaries: Material and Discursive Containment at 
the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. Science as Culture, 10(2), 163-194.  
KK 555/1992. Written question 555. Aittoniemi on nuclear waste storage plans. 
[Kirjallinen kysymys 555. Aittoniemi: Ydinjätteen 
varastointisuunnitelmista] [pdf] Available at: 
https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Kysymys/Documents/kk_555+1992.pdf
#search=KK%20555%2F1992. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Knorr Cetina, K., 1983. New developments in science studies: the ethnographic 
challenge. Canadian Journal of Sociology, 8(2), 153-177. 
Knorr Cetina, K., 1995. Laboratory Studies: The Cultural Approach to the Study 
of Science. In: S. Jasanoff, G.E. Markle, J.C. Peterson, and T. Pinch, 
eds., Handbook of Science and Technology Studies. London: Sage, 140-
166.  
Knorr Cetina, K., 1999. Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make 
Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Kojo, M., 2009. The Strategy of Site Selection for the Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Repository in Finland. In: M. Kojo and T. Litmanen, eds., Renewal of 
Nuclear Power in Finland. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 161-191. 
Kruse, J., 2011. Waste-Wilderness: A Conversation with Peter Galison. [online] 
Available at: https://discardstudies.com/2014/03/26/waste-wilderness-a-
conversation-between-peter-galison-and-smudge-studio/. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
Kuppler, S., 2012. From government to governance? (Non-) Effects of 
deliberation on decision-making structures for nuclear waste 
management in Germany and Switzerland. Journal of Integrative 
Environmental Sciences, 9(2), 103-122.  
LA 8/1993. Bill 8: Hautala et al.: Proposal for changing the Nuclear Energy Act. 
[Lakialoite 8: Hautala ym.: Ehdotus laiksi ydinenergialain muuttamisesta 
Eduskunnalle].  [pdf] Available at: 
https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Lakialoite/Documents/la_8+1993.pdf#s
earch=LA%208%2F1993. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Landström C., and Bergmans, A., 2015. Long-term repository governance: a 
socio-technical challenge, Journal of Risk Research. [online] Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2014.913658. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]  
Latour, B., 1983. Give me a laboratory and I will raise the world. In: K. Knorr 
Cetina and M. Mulkay, eds., Science observed: Perspective on the 
Social Study of Science. London: Sage. 
	 263	
Latour, B., 1987. Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers 
Through Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Latour, B., 1992. Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few 
Mundane Artifacts In: W.Bijker and J. Law (eds.), Shaping 
Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change. 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 225-259. 
Latour, B., 2000. When things strike back: a possible contribution of ‘science 
studies’ to the social sciences. British Journal of Sociology, 51(1), 107–
123. 
Latour, B., 2011a. From Multiculturalism to Multinaturalism: What Rules of 
Method for the New Socio-Scientific Experiments? Nature and Culture, 
6(1), 1-17.  
Latour, B., 2011b. Love Your Monsters: Why We Must Care for our 
Technologies as We Do our Children. Breakthrough Journal, 2,19-26.  
Latour, B., and Woolgar, S., 1986 [1979]. Laboratory Life: The Construction of 
Scientific Facts. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Law, J., 2004. After Method: Mess in social science research. London: 
Routledge. 
Law, J., 2008. Actor Network Theory and Material Semiotics. In: B.S. Turner, 
ed., The New Blackwell Companion to Social Theory. Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Lehtonen, M., 2010a. Deliberative decision-making in Finland, France and the 
UK: Influence of mixed form of deliberation in the macro discursive 
context. Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences, 7(3), 175-96. 
Lehtonen, M., 2010b. Opening Up or Closing Down Radioactive Waste 
Management Policy? Debates on Reversibility and Retrievability in 
Finland, France, and the United Kingdom. Risk, Hazards & Crisis in 
Public Policy. 1(4), 139-79. 
Lehtonen, M., Kojo, M., and Litmanen, T., 2016. The Finnish success story in 
the governance of a megaproject: the (minimal) role of socioeconomic 
evaluation in the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. In: M. Lehtonen, P.-
B. Joly, and L. Aparicio, eds., Socioeconomic Evaluation of 
Megaprojects: Dealing with uncertainties. Abingdon: Routledge, Ch. 5. 
Levitt, T., 2011. Should future generations be forced to deal with our nuclear 
legacy? The Ecologist. [online] Available at: http://tinyurl.com/3un4424. 
[Last visited 9 February 2018] 
MacFarlane, A., 2003. Underlying Yucca Mountain: The Interplay of Geology 
and Policy in Nuclear Waste Disposal. Social Studies of Science, 33(5), 
783-807. 
Macfarlane, A., 2017. The Walking Dead: “Truth” and the “Success” of 
Advanced Reactor Technology. Society for Social Studies of Science: 
Conference theme: STS (In)Sensibilities. Boston, Massachusetts, August 
30 - September 2, 2017 
Macfarlane, A.M., and Ewing, R.C., 2006. Uncertainty Underground: Yucca 
Mountain and the Nation's High-Level Nuclear Waste. Cambrige, MA: 
MIT Press. 
	 264	
Mackerron, G., 2012. Evaluation of nuclear decommissioning and waste 
management:  A report commissioned by the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change. [pdf] Available at: http://www.efn-uk.org/l-street/politics-
lib/nuclear-reports/index_files/DECC-MacKerron-nucwaste.pdf. [Last 
visited 9 February 2018]  
MacKerron, G., and Berkhout, F., 2009. Learning to listen: institutional change 
and legitimation in UK radioactive waste policy. Journal of Risk 
Research, 12(7-8), 989-1008. 
Manaugh, G., and Twilley, N., 2012. One Million Years of Isolation: an Interview 
with Abrham van Luik. In: E. Ellsworth and J. Kruse, eds., Making the 
Geologic Now: Responses to Material Conditions of Contemporary Life. 
Brooklyn, NY: Punctum Books, 226-237. 
Marcus, G.E., 1995a. Introduction. In G.E. Marcus, ed., Techno-scientific 
Imaginaries, Conversations, Profiles and Memoirs. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1-10. 
Marcus, G.E., 1995b. Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of 
Multi-Sited Ethnography. Annual Review of Anthropology, 24, 95-117 
Marres, N., 2005. Issues spark a public into being: A key but often forgotten 
point of the Lippmann-Dewey debate. In: B. Latour and P. Weibel, 
eds., Making Things Public. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 208-217. 
Marres, N., 2015. Why Map issues? On Controversy Analysis as a Digital 
Method. Science, Technology & Human Values, 40(5), 655-686. 
Martin, A., Myers, N., and Viseu, A., 2015. The politics of care in technoscience. 
Social Studies of Science, 45(5), 625–641. 
Marvin, C., 1990. When Old Technologies were New. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.   
Masco, J., 2006- The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-Cold 
War New Mexico. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Massart, C., 2013. The marker: A precious link between generations and a part 
of the long-term safety story. In: OECD/NEA, ed., The Safety Case for 
Deep Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste: 2013 State of the Art. 
Vienna: OECD/NEA, p. 415-21.  
McKinley, I.G., Kawamura, H., Tsuchi, H., 2000. Moving HLW-EBS Concepts 
into the 21st century. MRS Online Proceedings Library Archive, vol 663. 
MEE (Ministry of Employment and Economic Affairs), 2017. Nuclear Energy is 
the basis of Finnish electricity generation [Ydinenergia on Suomen 
sähköntuotannon perusta]. [online] Available at: http://tem.fi/ydinenergia. 
[Last visited 9 February 2018]   
MEE (Ministry of Employment and Economic Affairs), n.a. Spent nuclear fuel 
will be disposed of in Finland [Käytetty ydinpolttoaine sijoitetaan 
Suomeen]. [online] Available at: http://tem.fi/kaytetty-ydinpolttoaine. [Last 
visited 9 February 2018]   
Michael, M., 2000. Futures of the Present: From Performativity to Prehension. 
In: N., Brown, B. Rappert and A. Webster, eds., Contested Futures: A 
sociology of prospective techno-science. London: Routledge, Ch. 2. 
	 265	
Michael, M., 2017a. Actor-Network Theory: Trials, Trails and Translation. 
London: Sage. 
Michael, M., 2017b. Enacting Big Futures, Little Futures: Toward an ecology of 
futures. The Sociological Review, 65(3), 509-524. 
Miller, R.W., 2016. Deep Responsibility for the Deep Future. Theological 
Studies, 77(2), 436-65. 
Ministry of Fuel and Power, 1955. A Programme of Nuclear Power. [pdf] 
Available at: http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-129-
73-c-55-31-31.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018]    
Mol, A., 2008. I eat an apple: on theorizing subjectivities. Subjectivity, 22(1), 
28–37.   
Molyneux-Hodgson, S., and Hietala, M., 2016. Socio-technical imaginaries of 
nuclear waste disposal. In: R. Hindmarsh and R. Priestley, eds., The 
Fukushima Effect: A New Geopolitical Terrain. London: Routledge, Ch. 8. 
Monbiot, G., 2011. The double standards of green anti-nuclear opponents. The 
Guardian, 31 March 2011. [online] Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/georgemonbiot/2011/mar/31/d
ouble-standards-nuclear. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Morton, T., 2011. Zero Landscapes in the Time of Hyperobjects. Graz 
Architectrual Magazine, 7, 78-87. 
Morton, T., 2013. Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the 
World. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
MTI (Ministry of Trade and Industry), 2000. State Council Decision-in-Principle 
on 21st December 2000 on Posiva Oy’s application for the construction a 
final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel produced in Finland 
[Valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös 21 päivänä joulukuuta 2000 Posiva 
Oy:n hakemuksen Suomessa tuotetun käytetyn ydinpolttoaineen 
loppusijoituslaitoksen rakentamisesta]. [pdf] Available at: 
http://tem.fi/documents/1410877/2413079/PAP+2000.pdf/b8ed32a8-
b56b-49d9-85d2-fdae444e0458. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Munk, A., and Jensen T.E., 2014. Revisiting the Histories of Mapping: Is there a 
Future for a Cartographic Ethnology? Ethnologia Europaea, 44(2), 31-47.  
Myers, N., 2008. Molecular Embodiments and the Body-work of Modeling in 
Protein Crystallography. Social Studies of Science, 38(2), 163-199. 
Myers, N., 2012. Dance Your PhD: Embodied Animations, Body Experiments, 
and the Affective Entanglements of Life Science Research. Body & 
Society, 18, 151-89. 
NAMRC (Nuclear Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre), n.a. UK new 
build plans. [online] Available at: http://www.namrc.co.uk/intelligence/uk-
new-build-plans/. [Last visited 9 February 2018] 
NAS (National Academy of Sciences), 1957. The Disposal of Radioactive 
Waste on Land. Publication 519, Washington DC: National Academy 
Press. 
 
 
	 266	
NDA (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority), 2010. Plutonium: Credible Options 
Analysis (Gate A). [pdf] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/457827/Plutonium_-
_credible_options_analysis_2010__redacted_.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
NDA (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority), 2014b. 2013 UK Radioactive Waste 
Inventory:  Radioactive Wastes and Materials Not Reported in the 2013 
UKRWI. [pdf] Available at: https://ukinventory.nda.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/18/2014/02/14D043_NDASTSTY140013_-
_Radioactive_Wastes__Materials_Not_Reported_in_the_2013_UK_Radi
oactive_Waste_Inventory.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018] 
NDA (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority), 2017a. Radioactive Wastes in the 
UK: A Summary of the 2016 Inventory. [pdf] Available at: 
http://ukinventory.nda.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/2017/03/High-
Level-Summary-UK-Radwaste-Inventory-2016.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
NDA (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority), 2018a. 2016 UK data. [online] 
Available at: http://ukinventory.nda.gov.uk/the-2016-inventory/2016-uk-
data/. [Last visited 9 February 2018]     
NDA (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority), 2018b. UK Radioactive Waste 
Inventory. [online] Available at: http://ukinventory.nda.gov.uk. [Last 
visited 9 February 2018]   
NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency), 2008. Moving Forward with Geological Disposal 
of Radioactive Waste: A Collective Statement by the NEA Radioactive 
Waste Management Committee (RWMC). [pdf] Available at: 
https://www.oecd-nea.org/rwm/reports/2008/nea6433-statement.pdf . 
[Last visited 9 February 2018]  
NEI (Nuclear Energy Institute), 2017. World Statistics: Nuclear Around the 
World. [online] Available at: https://www.nei.org/Knowledge-
Center/Nuclear-Statistics/World-Statistics. [Last visited 9 February 2018] 
Nikula, A., Raumolin, H., Ryhänen, V., Seppälä, T., Vira, J., and Äikäs, T., 
2012. Kohti turvallista loppusijoitusta – Ydinjätehuollon neljä 
vuosikymmentä. [Towards safe final disposal – Four decades of nuclear 
waste management]. Eurajoki: Posiva. 
No2NuclearPower, 2012. History of nuclear waste disposal proposals in Britain. 
[online] Available at: 
http://www.no2nuclearpower.org.uk/radwaste/history-of-nuclear-waste-
disposal-proposals-in-britain/. [Last visited 9 February 2018] 
Nordbäck, N., and Engström, J., 2016. Geological Mapping and 
Prediction/Outcome Studies of Onkalo. Posiva 2016-14. Olkiluoto: 
Posiva. 
Nuclear Futures, 2018. Nuclear Futures: Exposing the legacy of the atomic age 
through creative arts. [online] Available at: http://nuclearfutures.org. [Last 
visited 9 February 2018] 
 
	 267	
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development), n.a. 
Ethical and Environmental Considerations in the Long-term Management 
of Radioactive Wastes: Ethical and Environmental Background to the 
Management of Waste. [online] Available at: https://www.oecd-
nea.org/rwm/reports/1995/geodisp/ethical-environmental-
considerations.html.  [Last visited 9 February 2018] 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development), 2000. 
Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste: Review of Developments in 
the Last Decade. [pdf] Available at: https://www.oecd-
nea.org/rwm/pubs/1999/2048-geological-disposal.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development), 2009. 
Considering Timescales in the Post-closure Safety of Geological 
Disposal of Radioactive Waste. [pdf] Available at: https://www.oecd-
nea.org/rwm/pubs/2009/6424-considering-timescales.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]       
OECD(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development), 2014. The 
Safety Case for Deep Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste: 2013 
State of the Art. [pdf] Available at: https://www.oecd-
nea.org/rwm/docs/2013/rwm-r2013-9.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018]    
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development), 2016. 
Radioactive Waste Management Programmes in OECD/NEA Member 
Countries: Finland. [pdf] Available at: https://www.oecd-
nea.org/rwm/profiles/Finland.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018]    
ONR (Office for Nuclear Regulation), 2011. Generic Design Assessment – New 
Civil Reactor Build Step 4 Fuel and Core Design Assessment of the EDF 
and AREVA UK EPRTM Reactor. [pdf] Available at: 
http://www.onr.org.uk/new-reactors/reports/step-four/technical-
assessment/ukepr-fcd-onr-gda-ar-11-021-r-rev-0.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
ONR (Office for Nuclear Regulation), 2017a. Moorside [online] Available at: 
http://www.onr.org.uk/civil-nuclear-reactors/moorside.htm. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
ONR (Office for Nuclear Regulation), 2017b. Hinkley Point C progress. [online] 
Available at: http://www.onr.org.uk/hinkley-point-c/index.htm. [Last visited 
9 February 2018]   
ONR (Office for Nuclear Regulation), 2017c. UK Advanced Boiling Water 
Reactor (UK ABWR). [online] Available at: http://www.onr.org.uk/new-
reactors/uk-abwr/index.htm. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Owen, R., Stilgoe, J., Macnaghten, P., Gorman, M., Fisher, E., and Guston, D.,  
2013. A Framework for Responsible Innovation. In: R. Owen, J. Bessant, 
and M. Heintz, eds., Responsbile Innovation: Managing the REsponsbile 
Emergence of Science and Innovation in Society. Chichester: Wiley. 
Parsons, L. 2008. Thompson’s Rubbish Theory: Exploring the Practices of 
Value Creation. European Advances in Consumer Research, 8, 390–93.  
 
	 268	
Piette, A., 2016. Deep Geological Disposal and Radioactive Time: Beckett, 
Bowen, Nirex and Onkalo. In: J. Beck and R. Bishop (eds.), Cold War 
Legacies: Systems, Theory, Aesthetics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press. 
Posiva, n.a.a. What is nuclear waste? [Mitä ydinjäte on?]. [online] Available at: 
http://posiva.fi/loppusijoitus/ydinjatehuolto/mita_ydinjate_on#.WmhmAyO
ca9Y. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Posiva, n.a.b. Basics of final disposal. [online] Available at: 
http://posiva.fi/en/final_disposal/basics_of_the_final_disposal#.WmhfRiO
cZAY. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Posiva, n.a.c. General Time Schedule for Final Disposal. [online] Available at: 
http://posiva.fi/en/final_disposal/general_time_schedule_for_final_dispos
al#.WmhmciOca9Y. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Posiva, 2000a. The most significant environmental protection project of our 
time? [Meidän aikamme merkittävin ympäristön-suojeluhanke?] Posiva 
Investigates 2/2000. [pdf] Available at: 
http://posiva.fi/files/579/003_Posiva_tutkii.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 
2018]   
Posiva, 2000b. Finland is a model student in the implementation of nuclear 
waste management [Suomi on ydinjätehuollon toteuttamisessa 
mallioppilas] Posiva Investigates 3/2000. [pdf] Available at: 
http://posiva.fi/files/579/003_Posiva_tutkii.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 
2018]   
Posiva, 2001. Onwards following the latest knowledge [Eteenpäin uusinta tietoa 
seuraten]. Posiva Investigates 1/2001. [pdf] Available at: 
http://posiva.fi/files/585/011_Posiva_tutkii.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 
2018]   
Posiva, 2003. Fragments: The pioneer does not have it easy. [Siruja: 
Edelläkävijällä ei ole helppoa.] Posiva Investigates 2/2003. [pdf] 
Available at: http://posiva.fi/files/589/032_Posiva_tutkii.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
Posiva, 2009. “In Finland we dared to make decisions” [“Suomessa uskallettiin 
tehdä päätöksiä”]. Posiva Investigates 4/2009. [pdf] Available at: 
http://posiva.fi/files/1000/POSIVA_4_09_netti.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
Posiva, 2010. Knowhow to be demonstrated in practice [Osaaminen osoitettava 
käytännössä]. Posiva Investigates 1/2010. [pdf] Available at: 
http://posiva.fi/files/1103/Posiva_1_2010_netti.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
Posiva, 2012. Safety Case for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel at Olkiluoto – 
Synthesis 2012. [pdf] Available at: 
http://www.posiva.fi/files/2987/Posiva_2012-12web.pdf. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]  
Posiva, 2015. “How did YOU do it?” [Miten TE sen teitte?”]. Posiva Investigates 
1/2015. [pdf] Available at: 
http://posiva.fi/files/3956/151_Posiva_Tutkii.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 
2018]   
	 269	
POST (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology), 2005. Managing the 
UK Plutonium Stockpile. Postnote 237. [pdf] Available at: 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/POST-
PN-237. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
POST (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology), 2016. Managing the 
UK Plutonium Stockpile. Postnote 531. [pdf] Available at: 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/POST-
PN-0531#fullreport. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
PTK 37/1980. Parliamentary debate 37 on Friday 18th of April 1980 [27. 
Perjantaina 18 päivänä huhtikuuta 1980]. [pdf] Avalailable at: 
https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/ptk_37+1980.pdf
#search=PTK%2037%2F1980. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
PTK 74/1982. Parliamentary debate 74 on Tuesday 22 of June 1982 [74. 
Tiistaina 22 päivänä kesäkuuta 1982]. [pdf] Available at: 
https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/ptk_74+1982.pdf
#search=PTK%2074%2F1982. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Parsons, L. 2008. Thompson’s Rubbish Theory: Exploring the Practices of 
Value Creation. European Advances in Consumer Research, 8: 390–93.  
Puig de la Bellacasa, M. 2010. Ethical doings in naturecultures. Ethics, Place, 
and Environment 13(2): 151–69. 
Puig de la Bellacasa, M., 2011. Matters of care in technoscience: Assembling 
neglected things. Social Studies of Science 41(1): 85–106.  
Puig de le Bellacasa, M., 2017. Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics in More 
than Human Worlds. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Rappert, B., 1999. Rationalising the future? Foresight in science and 
technology policy co-ordination. Futures, 31, 527–545. 
RCEP (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution), 1976. Sixth Report: 
Nuclear Power and the Environment. [pdf] Available at: 
http://davidsmythe.org/nuclear/flowers%20commission%201976.pdf. 
[Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Rhodes, D., 2016. Historical Background to the Industry. An Introduction to the 
Nuclear Industry: National Nuclear Laboratory and National Skills 
Academy. National Nuclear Laboratory, unpublished. 
Rosenberg, T., 1999. Frustrating theatre: Final disposal EIA from the 
perspective of the Loviisa movement. [Turhauttavaa teatteria. 
Loppusijoitus-YVA Loviisa-liikkeen näkökulmasta]. In: T. Litmanen, P. 
Hokkanen, and M. Kojo, eds., Nuclear waste in our hands: Finland’s 
nuclear waste management and Finnish society [Ydinjäte käsissämme. 
Suomen ydinjätehuolto ja suomalainen yhteiskunta]. Jyväskylä: SoPhi, 
266- 284.  
Rowling, J.K., 1998. Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets. London: 
Bloomsbury. 
 
 
 
	 270	
RWM (Radioactive Waste Management Ltd.), 2015. Corporate Strategy 2015-
2018: A safer future by managing radioactive waste effectively, to protect 
people and the environment. [PDF] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/451924/Radioactive-Waste-Management-Corporate-Strategy-2015-
to-2018.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018] 
RWM (Radioactive Waste Management Ltd.), 2016a. Geological Disposal: 
Generic Disposal Facility Design. [pdf] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/635113/NDA_Report_no_DSSC-412-01_-_Geological_Disposal_-
_Generic_Disposal_Facility_Designs.pdf.	[Last visited 9 February 2018]   
RWM (Radioactive Waste Management Ltd.), 2016b. Geological Disposal: 
Overview of the generic Disposal System Safety Case. [pdf] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/634857/NDA_Report_no_DSSC-101-01_-_Geological_Disposal_-
_Overview_of_the_generic_Disposal_System_Safety_Case.pdf. [Last 
visited 9 February 2018]   
RWM (Radioactive Waste Management Ltd.), 2016c. National Geological 
Screening Guidance: Implementing Geological Disposal, Providing 
Information of Geology. [pdf] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/517677/ngs-guidance.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
RWM (Radioactive Waste Management Ltd.), 2017. Methods for Management 
and Quantification of Uncertainty. [pdf] Available at: 
https://rwm.nda.gov.uk/publication/methods-for-management-and-
quantification-of-uncertainty/. [Last visited 9 February 2018]     
Schrader, A., 2015. Abyssal intimacies and temporalities of care: How (not) to 
care about deformed leaf bugs in the aftermath of Chernobyl. Social 
Studies of Science, 45(5), 665–690.  
Schröder, J., 2016. Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste: A Long-Term 
Socio-Technical Experiment. Science and Engineering Ethics, 22, 687-
705.  
Schröder, J., 2017. Envisioning the fate of radioactive waste: Comparing 
geological disposal and Advanced nuclear waste technologies. ESRC 
Nuclear Futures Seminar, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, 27-28 
March 2017. 
Science and Security Board Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2017. It is two and 
half minutes to midnight: 2017 Doomsday Clock Statement. [pdf] 
Available at: 
https://thebulletin.org/sites/default/files/Final%202017%20Clock%20Stat
ement.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Science and Security Board Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2018. It is 2 
minutes to midnight: 2018 Doomsday Clock Statement. [pdf] Available at: 
https://thebulletin.org/sites/default/files/2018%20Doomsday%20Clock%2
0Statement.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
 
 
	 271	
Sebeok, T., 1984. Communication Measures to Bridge Ten Millennia. Technical 
Report prepared for Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation. [pdf] Available at: 
http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/16/010/16
010244.pdf?r=1. [Last visited 9 February 2018] 
Sellafield Ltd., 2015. Sellafield: Performance Plan. [pdf] Available at: 
https://www.cumbria.gov.uk/elibrary/Content/Internet/538/755/1929/4258
7103227.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Sellafield Ltd., 2017. Radioactive sludge makes momentous move to modern 
storage. [online] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/radioactive-sludge-makes-
momentous-move-to-modern-storage. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Seppälä, T., 2001. Finland chose a final disposal site – but how was the 
decision-in-principle made? [Suomi valitsi loppusijoituspaikan – mutta 
miten periaatepäätös syntyi?]. ATS Ydintekniikka, 30(2), 5-6.   
Shapiro, S., 1997. Caught in a web: The implications of ecology for radical 
symmetry in STS. Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture 
and Policy, 11(1), 97-110. 
Shrader-Frechette, K., 1993. Burying Uncertainty: Risk & The Case Against 
Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste. Berkeley: University of California 
Press.  
Shrader-Frechette, K., 2005. Mortgaging the Future: Dumping Ethics with 
Nuclear Waste. Science and Engineering Ethics, 11, 518-520. 
Sklet, S., 2006. Safety barriers: definition, classification, and performance. 
Journal Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 19(5), 494–506.  
Sorene, P., 2015. Our Friend The Atom: The 1956 Disney Book That Made You 
Love The Bomb. Flashbak. [online] Available at: https://flashbak.com/our-
friend-the-atom-the-1956-disney-book-that-made-you-love-the-bomb-
38741/. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Steffen, W., Crutzen, P.J., and McNeill, J.R., 2007. The Anthropocene: Are 
Humans Now Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature? Ambio, 36(8), 
614-621. 
Strathern, M., 1999. The aesthetics of substance. In: M. Strathern, ed., 
Property, Substance and Effect. London: Athlone, 45-64.  
Strauss, H., 2010. Involving the Finnish public in nuclear facility licensing: 
participatory democracy and industrial bias. Journal of Integrative 
Environmental Sciences, 7(3), 211-28. 
STUK (Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority), 2000. Statutory Statements: 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority [Lakisääteiset lausunnot: 
Säteilyturvakeskus]. In: MTI, ed., State Council Decision-in-Principle on 
21st December 2000 on Posiva Oy’s application for the construction a 
final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel produced in Finland 
[Valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös 21 päivänä joulukuuta 2000 Posiva 
Oy:n hakemuksen Suomessa tuotetun käytetyn ydinpolttoaineen 
loppusijoituslaitoksen rakentamisesta], 6. [pdf] Available at: 
http://tem.fi/documents/1410877/2413079/PAP+2000.pdf/b8ed32a8-
b56b-49d9-85d2-fdae444e0458. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
	 272	
STUK (Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority), 2001. Long-term Safety of 
Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, May 23, 2001. YVL 8.4. [online] 
Available at: 
http://www.edilex.fi/stuklex/en/lainsaadanto/saannosto/YVL8-4?toc=1. 
[Last visited 9 February 2018]   
STUK (Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority), 2014. Safety oversight of 
nuclear power use. [Ydinenergian käytön turvallisuusvalvonta: 
Vuosiraportti 2013]. [pdf] Available at: 
http://www.julkari.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/126874/stuk-
b172.pdf?sequence=1. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Sundqvist, G., 2002. The Bedrock of Opinion: Science, Technology and Society 
in the Siting of High-Level Nuclear Waste. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Sundqvist, G., and Elam, M., 2011. Meddling in Swedish success in nuclear 
waste management. Environmental Politics, 20(2), 246-263. 
SYKE (Finnish Environment Institute), 2000. Statutory Statements: Finnish 
Environment Institute. [Lakisääteiset lausunnot: Suomen 
Ympäristökeskus]. In: MTI, ed., State Council Decision-in-Principle on 
21st December 2000 on Posiva Oy’s application for the construction a 
final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel produced in Finland 
[Valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös 21 päivänä joulukuuta 2000 Posiva 
Oy:n hakemuksen Suomessa tuotetun käytetyn ydinpolttoaineen 
loppusijoituslaitoksen rakentamisesta], 16. [pdf] Available at: 
https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Documents/m_7+2000.pdf. [Last 
visited 9 February 2018]   
Tattersall, C., Watts, A., and Vernon, S., 2007. Mind mapping as a tool in 
qualitative research. Nursing Times. [online] Available at: 
https://www.nursingtimes.net/mind-mapping-as-a-tool-in-qualitative-
research/199503.article. [Last visited 9 February 2018] 
Traweek, S., 1988. Beamtimes and Lifetimes: The World of High Energy 
Physicists. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Tronto, J., 1993. Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care. 
New York: Routledge.  
Tsing, A.L., 2015. The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of 
Life in Capitalist Ruins. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
TVO, n.a. Power plant waste [Voimalaitosjäte]. [online] Available at: 
http://tvo.fi/voimalaitosjate. [Last visited 9 February 2018].  
Tweed, C.,Ellis, A., Whittleston, R., 2015. Delivering safe geological disposal of 
nuclear waste. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, 168 
(EN4), 206-217.  
Union of Concerned Scientists, 2013. Infographic: Safer Storage for Nuclear 
Waste. [online] Available at: 
https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_power/making-nuclear-power-
safer/handling-nuclear-waste/infographic-dry-cask-cooling-pool-nuclear-
waste.html#.WnLzkiOcbBI. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
 
 
	 273	
University of Sheffield, 2016. Research into the safe disposal of nuclear waste 
receives £1.5 million boost. Availabe at: 
https://www.shef.ac.uk/materials/news/nucleargrant-1.562109. [Last 
visited 9 February 2018]  
Urry, J., 2016. What is the Future? Cambridge: Polity Press. 
van de Poel, I., 2011. Nuclear energy as a social experiment. Ethics, Policy & 
Environment, 14(3), 285–290.  
van Wyck, P.C., 2005. Signs of Danger: Waste, Trauma and Nuclear Threat. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Vira, J. and Jalonen, T., 2014. Requirements-led implementation in Finland. 
IGD-TP Geodisposal 2014. Manchester, UK, 24-26 June 2014. 
Venturini, T., 2010. Diving in Magma: How to Explore Controversies with Actor-
Network Theory. Public Understanding of Science 19(3), 258–273.  
Venturini, T., 2012. Building on Faults: How to Represent Controversies with 
Digital Methods. Public Understanding of Science 21(7), 796–812.  
Von Hippel, F., and Mackerron, G., 2015. Alternatives to MOX:  Direct-disposal 
options for stockpiles of separated uranium. [pdf] Available at: 
http://fissilematerials.org/library/rr13.pdf. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
von Hippel, F., Ewing, R., Garwin, R., and Macfarlane, A., 2012. Nuclear 
proliferation: Time to bury plutonium. Nature. [online] Available at: 
https://www.nature.com/articles/485167a. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Walker, W., 1999. Nuclear Entrapment: THORP and the Politics of 
Commitment. London: Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Weart, S.R., 1988. Nuclear Fear: A History of Images. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Wembley, 2018. Wembley Tours. [online] Available at: 
http://www.wembleystadium.com/Wembley-Tours.aspx. [Last visited 9 
February 2018] 
WHO (World Health Organisation), 2001. Depleted uranium Sources, Exposure 
and Health Effects. [pdf] Available at: 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/66930/1/WHO_SDE_PHE_01.1.p
df. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Wilkinson, P., 2007. The future for nuclear: radioactive waste management. 
Environmental Law & Management, 19, 218-220. 
Williams, R., 2008. Notes on the Underground, New Edition: An Essay on 
Technology, Society and the Imagination. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
Wilson, B.M., 2012. The Nuclear Present. In: E. Ellsworth and J. Kruse, eds., 
Making the Geologic Now: Responses to Material Conditions of 
Contemporary Life. Brooklyn, NY: Punctum Books, 222-225. 
Winner, L., 1980. Do Artifacts Have Politics? Daedalus, 109(1), 121-136. 
Wisbey, S., 2017. Radioactive Management in the UK. ESRC Nuclear Futures 
Seminar, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, 27-28 March 2017. 
WNA (World Nuclear Association), 2015. Nuclear industry stands ready to help 
tackle climate change. [online] Available at: http://www.world-
	 274	
nuclear.org/press/press-statements/nuclear-industry-stands-ready-to-
help-tackle-clima.aspx. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
WNA (World Nuclear Association), 2017a. Nuclear Power in the United 
Kingdom. [online] Available at: http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-
library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/united-kingdom.aspx. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
WNA (World Nuclear Association), 2017b. Radioactive Waste Management. 
[online] Available at: http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-
library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-wastes/radioactive-waste-
management.aspx. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
WNA (World Nuclear Association), 2018. What are nuclear wastes and how are 
they managed? [online] Available at: http://www.world-
nuclear.org/nuclear-basics/what-are-nuclear-wastes.aspx. [Last visited 9 
February 2018]   
WNN (World Nuclear News), 2018. Swedish repository gets positive regulatory 
response. World Nuclear News. [online] Available at: http://www.world-
nuclear-news.org/WR-Swedish-repository-gets-positive-regulatory-
response-2301184.html. [Last visited 9 February 2018]   
Wynne, B., 1996. May the sheep safely graze? A reflexive view of the expert–
lay divide. In: S. Lash, B. Szerszynski, and B. Wynne, eds., Risk, 
Environment and Modernity. London: Sage, 104–137.  
YLE (Finnish Broadcasting Company), 2016. STUK still waiting on documents 
from Russian-owned nuclear plant. [online] Available at: 
https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/stuk_still_waiting_on_documents_from_
russian-owned_nuclear_plant/9149333. [Last visited 9 February 2018]  
Zalasiewicz, J., et al., 2015. When did the Anthropocene begin? A mid-
twentieth century boundary level is stratigraphically optimal. Quaternary 
International, 383, 196-203. 
  
 
